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Abstract 
This thesis explores the everyday experiences and aspirations of young people living 
in Los Angeles and London, focusing on their cultural and political dispositions, 
emotions, thoughts and practices, and how these converge with, and diverge from, the 
dominant neoliberal discourses they are surrounded by. The contemporary literature 
on youth and youth politics tends to view young people as active and cognizant agents 
in the reproduction of socio-cultural and political-economic institutions, discourses, 
and practices. Applying a socio-cognitive approach to the analysis of interview data, 
ethnographic observations, and media-cultural texts, this thesis contends that these 
bodies of literature neglect the unconscious dimensions of young people’s practices, 
and in particular, that insufficient emphasis is placed on how these contribute to the 
reproduction of neoliberalism. It argues that, if the literature on youth is to adequately 
conceptualize and represent young people and their roles in social reproduction, then 
research explorations must attend to these unconscious dimensions. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, doing so facilitates and enriches analyses of the ways in which different 
institutional settings influence, constrain, and enable young people, and of some of 
the ways that young people contest, internalize, and negotiate between the dominant 
societal discourses presented to them. The thesis also explores some of the lessons 
that a socio-cognitive approach to youth culture and politics can contribute to the 
work of critical educators concerned with progressive social change. It argues that 
critical and progressive educators must incorporate socio-cognitive insights into their 
practices in order to tackle the potential dispositional barriers which may hinder the 
realisation of the political objectives of critical and progressive pedagogy.  
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Preface 
“While the world economic crisis of 2008–2009 might have killed off 
neoliberalism as a global ideological project—patently, in the noun form—it is 
highly likely to leave the capillaries of the beast, less Leviathan than Great White 
Shark, largely intact”  (Comaroff, 2011, p. 142). 
 
“I’m an ardent believer in free-markets”. – Barack Obama 20101 
 
 Following the 2008 global financial crisis, there were a number of scholars, 
activists, and journalists who, somewhat overly optimistically, were quick to 
pronounce the end of hegemonic forms of neoliberalism (Braedley & Luxton, 
2010; Cahill, 2009; Grantham & Miller, 2010; Stiglitz, 2008). What started as a 
wave of housing foreclosures in late 2006 in the US quickly ballooned into a 
national and international credit crisis that bankrupted or severely weakened 
longstanding financial institutions and entire national economies (e.g., Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Sterns, Iceland, Ireland, Greece), which had been exposed to toxic 
and mispriced financial derivative schemes, like mortgage back securities and 
interest rate swaps (Mason, 2010; Taibbi, 2011). The aftermath that followed gave 
rise to a temporary rupture in the belief that anti-inflation policies, multi-national 
corporations, and unregulated market forces would bring about global peace and 
prosperity. Indeed, and quite remarkably, even French President Nicholas Sarkozy 
and then US presidential candidate Barack Obama joined in the choir by 
bemoaning the failures and excesses of neoliberal capitalism, while the phrase ‘the 
demise of capitalism as we know it’ appeared three times in 2009 in the opinion 
pages of The Guardian (Comaroff, 2011). However, neoliberalism - which can be 
roughly understood as a political-economic paradigm, based on an ideology that 
calls for the state implementation, facilitation, and enforcement of a market 
economic system and logic across national and global settings, and essentially 
across all forms of human organization and decision making - has remained 
largely intact, and continues to guide the policies of Western and Non-Western 
governing elites (Braedley & Luxton, 2010; Hall, 2011). For example, the 
neoliberal economic and financial deregulation policies which, among other things, 
relaxed if not effectively eliminated capital controls such as position limits on 
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financial speculation, leveraging practices, and capital gains taxes, and which are 
held to be the main cause of the 2008 global financial crisis (Mason, 2010), have 
gone largely unchanged in the UK and the EU (Prieg et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2012), 
and only cosmetically altered in the US (Taibbi, 2011). To be certain, the fact 
remains that while governments across the globe have responded in different ways 
to the crisis, the majority of them are unwavering in their belief that neoliberal-
derived pro-market strategies will solve the looming and now global problems of 
unemployment, income inequality, credit crunches, sovereign debt, and global 
warming to list a few, as evidenced by the following official statement from the 
Group of Twenty (G20) (national governments which represent sixty-five percent 
of the global population): 
 
Our work will be guided by a shared belief that market principles, open 
trade and investment regimes, and effectively regulated financial 
markets foster the dynamisms, innovation, and entrepreneurship that 
are essential for economic growth, employment and poverty reduction 
[….]. These principles […] have lifted millions out of poverty and 
have significantly raised the standard of living (Group of Twenty 
2008).  
  
 However, the G20’s commitment to neoliberal market principles and 
prescriptions seems to overlook the empirical reality that the 2008 financial crisis 
and its wide reaching social, political, and economic effects, is only the latest of a 
series of similar crises that have followed the last thirty years of the 
neoliberalization of the global economy, and that have at different intervals, 
impacted most of the developed and developing world (Ellwood, 2002; Harvey, 
2005; Mason, 2012). For example, the widespread riots, volatile financial markets, 
and political instability now unfolding in Greece, Spain, and Italy, and the massive 
and drastic cuts in public spending being implemented by current Canadian, UK, 
and US government administrations closely echo events characteristic of the 
1980s and 90s neoliberalization of the developing world. During this period, from 
Mexico to Russia, to Argentina and Thailand, entire national economies crashed 
one after another under the weight of unsustainable financial speculation and 
lapsed capital controls (e.g., the 1994 Tequila Crisis, or the 1997 Asian Financial 
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Crisis), which were encouraged and facilitated by, among other powerful and 
Western controlled neoliberal institutions, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the US Treasury Department and Federal Reserve. These and 
other neoliberal institutions effectively forced financial liberalization onto the 
developing world, which was consequently accompanied by drastic austerity 
measures and increases in the privatization of public resources, poverty, and 
unemployment along the way (Ellwood, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2008). While 
multi-national corporations, institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds, insurance 
companies, and investment advisors), and local elites have throughout the 
neoliberal era profited from the various windfalls, the vast majority of people have 
suffered and continue to suffer the consequences of a global economic system that 
is now, in effect, a global speculative casino (Baker, 2009; Chomsky, 1999; 
Ellwood, 2002; Schiller, 2000); one which is significantly contributing to the 
proliferation, at a seemingly exponential rate, of the growth of slums and 
shantytowns in metropolises all over the world (Davis, 2006; Patel, 2010). As 
Harvey (2005, p. 185) argues: 
 
For those left or cast outside the market system a vast reservoir of 
apparently disposable people bereft of social protections and 
supportive social structures there is little to be expected from 
neoliberalization except poverty, hunger, disease, and despair. Their 
only hope is somehow to scramble aboard the market system either as 
petty commodity producers, as informal vendors (of things or labour 
power), as petty predators to beg, steal, or violently secure some 
crumbs from the rich man’s table, or as participants in the vast illegal 
trade or trafficking in drugs, guns, women, or anything else illegal for 
which there is a demand.  
  
 But as the neoliberal chickens come home to roost, the reactions from the 
ground have taken different forms across the developing and developed world. 
Tunisia and Egypt saw the rise of revolutionary movements led primarily by 
disenfranchised, marginalized, and unemployed young people which toppled 
Western backed neoliberal dictatorships, while in Greece, Italy, and Spain, 
popular movements inspired by anarchist principles of participatory democracy 
10 
 
have risen to mount a sustained challenge to the neoliberal policies being imposed 
on them by unelected European Central bankers (Baird, 2011; Kitidi, 2012; Mason, 
2012). While it is still too early to tell how successful these movements will be, 
their resistance is visible, youth led, relatively widespread in its respective national 
settings, and can, to some extent, be partially credited for the recent 2012 elections 
of socialist French president Hollande, and the quadrupling of Greek 
parliamentary seats captured by the Coalition of the Radical Left. Arguably, 
however, the most significant achievement of all of these popular movements has 
been the fact that they have not relied on political parties and centralized power 
structures to bring about social change. Rather, utilizing a variety of strategies, 
they have reinvigorated the notions of direct democracy and mutual aid, and have, 
along with an informed critique of neoliberal policies (which they view as the 
main cause of existing socio-economic problems and disparities), reintroduced 
them into the public discourse. Los indignados movement in Spain, for example, 
has since May 15, 2011 carried out continuous and daily political resistance, 
consisting of public space occupations, nationwide boycotts, walkouts, and strikes, 
and has attracted between 6 and 8 million Spaniards, and 80% of national public 
support.
2
 Additionally, this movement has launched a successful campaign to 
prosecute the former head of the IMF Rodrigo Rato for his role in the failure of 
the Spanish bank Bankia that significantly weakened the Spanish economy. In 
Greece, bottom up and decentralized initiatives concerned with important issues 
like food distribution have enacted systems that bypass wholesale distributors who 
import cheap produce from foreign markets, and instead support local farmers. 
Such initiatives, while still in their infancy, are gaining momentum. As Kited 
(2012, p. 1) observes, “it is obvious that the alternative distribution network set up 
by the municipalities cannot affect the totality of this process. But it remains a 
very positive sign of self-organization, as well as an expression of solidarity in 
action between the poor producers and the impoverished consumers”. However, 
all of these cases of political alternatives and actions are in stark contrast to the 
limited extent of resistance in the UK and the US: the two leading pioneers, 
paragons, and promoters of neoliberalism (Rutherford & Davison, 2012). There, 
the neoliberal model of representative democracy where key decision making 
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power is controlled by an elected elite and unaccountable market-oriented 
technocrats has gone largely unchallenged, with three seemingly indistinguishable 
major parties running and controlling the central government in the UK, and two 
doing so in the US. This is despite the fact that the last thirty years of neoliberal 
policies have seen income inequality skyrocket, and have contributed to the post-
2008 crisis dramatic spikes in child poverty rates, rises in the costs of living, and 
cuts to public spending in both countries, consequently diminishing the quality of 
life for significant numbers of working and middle-class people, whilst at the same 
time soaring incomes and record profits continue to be enjoyed by a tiny minority 
of wealthy and powerful elites (Eaton, 2011; Grantham & Miller, 2010; Ramesh, 
2011). For example, in the UK, Ramesh (2011, p. 1), reports that income 
inequality is growing faster than in any other OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) country as: 
 
The share of the top 1% of income earners increased from 7.1% in 1970 
to 14.3% in 2005. Just prior to the global recession, the OECD says the 
very top of British society – the 0.1% of highest earners – accounted for 
a remarkable 5% of total pre-tax income, a level of wealth hoarding not 
seen since the second world war. 
 
While in the US, Grantham & Miller (2010, p. 175) report that:  
 
In the three decades from 1979, the highest paid 1% of the population 
doubled its share of national pretax income, to 18%. Incomes of the top 
1% increased 194%; the top 20%, 70%; and the bottom 20%, just 6.4%. 
The Gini index saw inequality attain the same level as during the Great 
Depression. Corporate profits are at their highest level in five decades, 
while wages and salaries have the lowest share of the national pie on 
record. 
 
 Furthermore, governing and other power elites in both countries are now, and 
usually under the discourse of ‘we are all in this together’, openly declaring that 
UK and US residents need to get used to many years of growing and lasting 
unemployment and cuts to public spending (Curtis, 2012; Taibbi, 2012). Despite all 
this, and considering that 65% of the UK and 50% of the US population view 
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income inequality as problematic (Ramesh, 2011), the majority of non-elite people 
that compose the majority of UK and US society do not seem to have developed a 
heightened sense of political consciousness (Rustin, 2012), or at least not one that 
is comparable to that evident in other parts of the world as described above, leading 
to Jameson’s (1994: xii) rather sardonic claim that, “it is now easier to envision the 
end of the world, than the end of capitalism”. The recent surge of anti-corporate, 
anti-government corruption, and anti-cuts to public spending protest movements 
springing up all across the UK and the US, while meaningful, is still arguably quite 
marginal, and mostly consists of single day events that do not go beyond people 
walking in state-permit approved streets (known as free-speech zones in the US) 
and waving signs. Moreover, because of their limited temporal and tactical nature, 
these types of political practices do not significantly challenge existing power 
structures and this is why UK and US power elites tend to disregard them as simply 
people letting off steam. As Villa (2008, p. 6) notes, “where political action 
actually transcends the opening of a chequebook, where it is relatively popular, 
spontaneous, and civic-minded in character, it is treated by our leaders as little 
more than white noise, irrelevant to the political process”. Furthermore, whilst on a 
walk in central Cairo, Tunis, Athens or Barcelona, one is likely to run into some 
form of sustained political action or be handed a pamphlet outlining political 
grievances and anti-neoliberal solutions, on a walk down any high street in the 
centre of any major city across the UK and US, one will observe that public 
political practices of any kind are very rare. Even the popularity and energy of the 
2011 US Occupy Wall Street movement has noticeably died down. This begs the 
questions: how and/or why is it that the majority of the UK and US population who 
do not benefit from, and are in some instances significantly disadvantaged by, the 
current neoliberal arrangement, seemingly continue to support and reproduce it; 
and crucially, are they even aware that they are doing so? Moreover, why is it that 
the resistance or challenge to neoliberalism in the UK and the US is not as 
widespread and sustained as it is in other parts of the developed and developing 
world? That is, as Hall (2011) asks, how does one account for this current 
conjuncture, where unlike in other parts of the world, there is as it stands in the UK 
and US no visible and viable alternative to neoliberalism?  
          These are questions that this thesis has been designed to help address. 
Focusing on UK and US neoliberal societies, it will make the case that 
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neoliberalism must be understood as a unique social phenomenon whose reach and 
influence stretches far beyond the realms of political-economy and into the spheres 
of culture and socio-cognition. That is, the hegemony of neoliberalism is often 
theorized as being enabled by a combination of macro political-economic systemic 
imperatives and civil society consensus structural factors, and micro-subjective 
processes whereby neoliberal discourses permeate through the majority of the 
population’s ‘common sense’ understandings of how society should function 
(Chomsky, 1999; Gill, 2003; Hall, 20011). For example, according to Harvey 
(2005), the UK and US’s long march to neoliberalism was largely facilitated by the 
circulation of neoliberal discourses via civil society institutions (e.g., universities, 
churches, mass media), which embedded themselves into the majority population’s 
‘common sense’, where neoliberal ideas are seen as the sole guarantor of freedom, 
prosperity, and democracy. However, while I agree with the macro component of 
this dominant thesis, I will suggest that these taken for granted ‘common sense’ 
understandings constitute only one dimension of the micro-subjective side of the 
social reproduction equation. This ‘common sense’ angle, no matter how 
sensitively it has been applied in contemporary theories of hegemony, is still mired 
in, or at least very much reflects, the Marxist concept of false consciousness, which 
Jost (1995, p. 397) defines as, ”the holding of false beliefs that are contrary to one's 
social interest and which thereby contribute to the disadvantaged position of the 
self or the group”. While there are plenty of convincing sociological and social-
psychological accounts that lend empirical support for the prevalence of false 
consciousness in contributing to an individual’s active support and reproduction of 
beliefs and practices that disadvantage them and their social group (Fox, 1999; Jost, 
1995), false consciousness theorizations, nonetheless, imply that individuals hold a 
relatively cognizant, albeit misguided, awareness of their consent, contribution, and 
submission to the existing social order. To be certain, it assumes a sort of 
phenomenological ontology, where people, regardless of their oppressed or 
marginalized position, are perpetually reflecting on their direct experiences and 
practices. However, as Bourdieu (1990) notes, people’s conscious consent to 
established and oppressive social practices, and capitalist systems in particular, 
whether deliberate and/or misdirected, does not sufficiently account for the 
durability of capitalism and its uncanny ability to evolve and adapt to changing 
times despite the ongoing crises and rampant social inequalities that it creates. Nor 
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I might add, does it account for the significant discrepancy in resistance to it as 
discussed above. If it did, then the century old Marxist project of consciousness-
raising should have worked by now, or at the very least proved a more effective 
means of developing counter-hegemonic forces than is currently the case in the UK 
and the US. Thus, for Bourdieu, it is not the falseness that is incorrect in ‘false 
consciousness’ theorizations, but the consciousness (Burawoy, 2008). Instead he 
proposes that an investigation of social reproduction requires that we pay attention 
to the role that people’s deep-seated socio-cognitive dispositions (that is, their 
unconsciously and habitually manifested beliefs, attitudes, inclinations, preferences, 
and practices) contribute to the reproduction of capitalist societies (Bourdieu, 1990).  
 Nonetheless, contemporary theorizations concerned to explain the durability, 
persistence, or contestation of neoliberalism continue to tend to take for granted 
and/or ignore these super-ordinal cognitive processes, even though numerous 
empirical studies from the cognitive sciences demonstrate that they exert an 
unconscious yet powerful influence on the ways that individuals perceive, 
interpret, and act in the social world (Ariely, 2008; Epley & Gilovich, 1999; 
Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Fishbach & Shah, 2006; Zemack-Rugar et al., 2007). 
Indeed, this research has consistently demonstrated that much of our everyday 
behaviour is largely automated and beyond the realm of our conscious awareness, 
triggered by any number of subliminal socio-environmental stimuli (e.g., 
advertisements, facial expressions, voice intonations, smells, etc.). This research, 
has also emphasized the conscious dimensions that human cognition enables, and 
that are dependent on, and form a reciprocal relationship with, underlying 
unconscious cognitive and affective dimensions (Damasio, 1999). However, while 
multi-national corporations have for some time now used these cognitive insights 
to help sell their products, that is, to bypass consumers’ conscious awareness and 
rationality in order to elicit unconscious dispositions that lead to increased 
consumption (Ariely, 2008; Crisp, 2004; Patel, 2010; Olson, 2009), they have not 
been used by critical social researchers concerned to understand the social 
reproduction of neoliberalism. This thesis is an attempt to help fill this gap. By 
incorporating insights from theories of social cognition, in particular the concept 
of socio-cognitive schemata (or frameworks) which shape how we act upon and 
interpret the social world, it seeks to enrich our understandings of how socio-
cultural and political-economic structures, institutions, and discourses influence 
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the conscious and unconscious attitudes, emotions, beliefs, and behaviours of 
individuals, and, consequently, help us to better understand processes of social 
continuity and social change (Cerulo, 2010; Kesebir et al., 2010; Lieberman et al., 
2003; Ridgeway, 2006; Sheperd, 2011; Torney-Purta, 1992). As Van Dijk (1996, 
p. 5) argues: 
 
A continued plea must be made for a more integrated and more explicit 
study of the relations between discourse, cognition, and society. Our 
theoretical and critical understanding of the relations between 
discourse and society, […], will be necessarily incomplete without 
such a cognitive ‘interface’. 
 
Aims, Objectives, and Methods 
 In contrast to the tendency of much of the Western political-economic and 
sociological literature on systems order to emphasize either deterministic 
structural and power elite explanations (Gill, 2003), or bottom up culturalist 
explanations (McGuigan, 2010), the following chapters offer an analysis that 
looks at both the top-down and bottom up dialectical mechanisms and processes 
that I will suggest help to sustain the current neoliberal conjuncture. After 
documenting some of the ways that neoliberalism, as conceived and implemented 
by an elite group of politicians, businesspeople, and intellectuals, has inflected the 
dominant societal structures, institutions, and political, economic, educational and 
cultural discourses of UK and US society, this thesis will empirically explore how 
this neoliberal nexus influences the culture and politics of non-elite UK and US 
inhabitants, and in particular those of the contemporary post-1980s generation of 
young people commonly referred to as the Millennial generation (Twenge et al., 
2012). The specific objectives of this thesis are to investigate: 
 
 How far and in what ways the socio-cultural and political-economic 
dispositions, emotions, thoughts and practices of contemporary urban 
young people in London and LA are infused or inflected by neoliberal 
discourses and practices. 
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 What critical educators dedicated to progressive social change can learn 
from a socio-cognitive approach to the analysis of youth culture and 
politics. 
 The methods used to address these objectives, which will be laid out in more 
detail in Chapter 4, consist of an improvised mixture of critical-ethnographic 
strategies, made up of in-depth semi-structured interviews with twenty-nine young 
people (ages 16-19) and three adult youth workers from Los Angeles, and fourteen 
young people (ages 16-19) and two adult youth workers from London, coupled 
with a series of ethnographic observations conducted in youth centres and music 
concerts. The interviews were primarily designed to elicit responses from young 
people on the following themes: leisure time, news and media exposure and use, 
economic and political behaviours and beliefs, understanding of political-
economic issues (e.g. employment practices, environmental politics, political-
economic systems, and poverty), and opinions on solutions to political-economic 
problems, education, and personal and family aspirations. Their responses, which 
will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, have been analyzed for both their 
conscious/reflective and more unconscious/dispositional elements. However, I 
want to emphasize that while the analysis of the data provided in these chapters is 
informed by established inductive and analytical social science methods, and 
grounded in empirical evidence, this research is exploratory in nature, designed to 
investigate some of the substantive content and central tendencies of 
contemporary youth culture and politics, and what this investigation may 
contribute to socio-cognitive inspired pedagogic strategies aimed at progressive 
and democratic social change. It is, therefore, primarily meant to lay a foundation 
for future research, whilst at the same time also offering some important 
substantive insights that can contribute to contemporary understandings of the 
barriers and possibilities for progressive social change.  
 I selected Los Angeles (LA) and London as the major urban centres from 
which to recruit participants because I have lived in both cities for extended 
periods of time, and have got to know individuals who provided me with 
invaluable access and entry to schools and youth centres. Furthermore, LA and 
London are considered alpha world cities, as well as templates and testing grounds 
for neoliberal policies in other urban settings (Brenner, 2006; Davis, 2006).  
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Why Youth? 
 While a similar study on an adult population would have been fruitful and 
worthwhile, this thesis focuses on young people. There are a number of reasons 
for this: first, contemporary generations of young people (which in this thesis 
encompasses a 16-19 year old cross-sectional demographic) have been directly 
bombarded and/or surrounded by neoliberal discourses more than any other 
previous UK and US generation, and also represent the most immediate generation 
of emerging adults who will be eligible to participate in the electoral process. 
Therefore, they offer a unique sample from which to observe the relationship 
between neoliberal discourses, cultural experiences, and political and cultural 
beliefs and practices. Second, young people are and will have to face the most 
severe consequences of enacted neoliberal policies (e.g., higher university tuition 
fees, disappearing social safety nets, and decreases in employment security, 
benefits, wages, pensions, and increasing privatization and militarization of public 
spaces). Third, neoliberalism, has since its inception, been consistently challenged 
by individual and organized groups of young people who have fuelled, established, 
and participated in global movements against neoliberalism, currently manifesting 
itself in the US, and to a limited extent in the UK and elsewhere, as the ‘Occupy 
Movement’. At the same time, it is also young people, through their consumption 
practices (which are the most sought after by corporations) that significantly help 
to maintain and reproduce the global system of neoliberal political-economy and 
fuel the consequent processes of economic and cultural ‘globalization’. Fourth, 
according to several studies from the developmental psychology literature, 
political-economic and socio-cultural attitudes and beliefs begin to develop and 
crystallize during adolescence (Eckstein et al., 2011; Krosnick & Alwin, 1991; 
Loughlin & Barling, 2001; Sears & Levy, 2003). And fifth, young people possess 
the creative capacity to manipulate culture in indefinite and unpredictable ways 
that have the potential to generate new modes of creative, expressive, and practical 
thought and action that can impact the established social arrangements of society. 
That is, young people tend to inhabit a variety of cultural forms, some of which 
are unique to young people, and more often that the rest of population, strongly 
identify themselves in relation to specific cultural forms (ranging from mainstream, 
sub-cultural, and counter-cultural). Coupled with the fact that, “their political 
views are rarely carbon copies of their parents” (Flanagan, 2008, p. 1), young 
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people occupy a privileged position from which to observe wider processes of 
social continuity and social change (Furlong & Cartmel 2007; MacDonald & 
Shildrick 2009). Therefore,, research on contemporary UK and US urban young 
people’s socio-cultural and political-economic cognitive frameworks and 
corresponding practices can help to illuminate the barriers to, and the possibilities 
of, successfully contesting the current neoliberal conjuncture. As Shilrick et al., 
(2009, p. 457) argue, “if new cultural trends emerge or significant social 
developments happen, it is feasible that they will be seen here first or most 
obviously, among the coming new generation of young adults”. Moreover, as 
Twenge et al., (2012, p. 16) point out, “there is considerable intellectual, cultural, 
and economic interest in discovering and predicting generational trends”. Lastly, 
the growing international literature concerning youth politics has shown that while 
young people are mostly alienated from conventional political participation like 
voting, new media forums, (specifically social networking Internet sites), have 
given young people new ways to be political and civically-minded (Coleman, 
2006; Harris, 2008).  
 
General theoretical approach and thesis structure 
 What follows in this thesis should not be interpreted as an exercise or a return 
to ‘Vulgar Marxism’ or structural or cognitive determinism. The theories and 
empirical methods that guide this thesis were carefully selected for their insistence 
on a multi, inter, and/or trans-disciplinary analysis and exploration of the 
individual-society dialectic and cognition-culture interface. The thesis is 
underpinned by an ontological presupposition which understands both society and 
individual human agents to be products of multiple, or more precisely, 
confounding determinations, which far from being fixed or total, are in constant 
flux and reconfiguration. There is limited value, I would suggest, in trying to 
understand something as convoluted as neoliberalism and its multifaceted effects 
on individuals, using an over simplistic application of the classic Marxist and 
Weberian arguments which respectively valorise the material and ideological as 
primary societal determinants from which all else follows. Nor is there much value 
in working with first instance deterministic and reductive dichotomies which take 
the form of economic versus cultural, sociological versus psychological, rational 
versus emotive, or structural versus agentic. In this thesis, explorations favour a 
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more holistic and comprehensive approach that views key socio-structural, 
discursive, and cognitive determinants as overlapping and mutually reinforcing in 
the reproduction of society.  
 The rationale for this is that, whilst it may well be the case that the economic 
determines the cultural, or that the psychological determines the sociological, 
there is no contemporary mode of empirical methodology that I am aware of that 
can even approximate a proof of first instance determination. Therefore, rather 
than get bogged down in such unfalsifiable and tautological distractions, it seems 
more fruitful instead to search out and document as many of the most prevalent 
dimensions, factors, and mechanisms as can be feasibly accounted for, map 
existing relationships and points of mutual reinforcement or contestation between 
them, and from that, infer theorizations grounded in empirical data that help to 
describe and explain the complex role of human institutions and human agents in 
the reproduction of society. I believe that it is only through such a comprehensive 
mapping of multiple-determinants, and their various points of intersection and 
mutual reinforcement that we can begin to get a more complete picture of the 
complex socio-cultural and political-economic processes and structures which 
enable, constrain, and mediate individual thought and action. Moreover, as well as 
exploring the ways these processes and structures promote oppressive ideas and 
aspirations, it is also necessary to highlight possible points of interjection, and 
instances of opposition and/or reaction to dominant social discourses and practices. 
This kind of analysis, I would suggest, is more likely to be generative of new ideas 
and strategies that may in some way contribute to the challenging of established 
and burgeoning oppressive social modes, and the creation of a more just and 
equitable society. The overall structure of this thesis is as follows:  
 To begin with, in Chapter 1, I discuss the genealogy and ontological claims 
of neoliberal theory and some of the ways that neoliberal ideology and policies 
have shaped the major contemporary societal structural and institutional forces 
and discourses of the UK and the US, creating what Plehwe et al., (2007) refer to 
as a set of hegemonic constellations that seek to legitimate and promote 
neoliberalism domestically and globally. I focus specifically on the neoliberal 
structural and discursive inflection of political, economic, education, welfare, non-
profit, and media-culture institutions, and suggest some of the ways this nexus 
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may influence the socio-cultural and political-economic schemata of 
contemporary urban UK and US young people. 
 In Chapter 2, I review the leading theories on capitalist social reproduction 
and media driven consumer culture. This includes the works of the classic and 
contemporary Frankfurt schools, the classic Birmingham School of cultural 
studies, and some of the key concepts and arguments from the works of Louis 
Althusser, and Pierre Bourdieu. In this review, I will pay close attention to the 
empirical validity and criticisms of these approaches to argue that a synthesis of 
their strengths, coupled with often neglected insights from cognitive and social-
psychology is needed to comprehensively theorize and research neoliberal 
hegemony and its multi-faceted and wide reaching material and discursive effects. 
I end this chapter by setting out the theoretical guidelines and presuppositions that 
will inform the methodology and data analysis for the empirical component of this 
thesis. 
 In Chapter 3, I connect the discussions of Chapters 1 and 2 to the wide 
literature on young people and youth culture. Specifically, I utilize the lessons and 
considerations from the theoretical guidelines laid out in Chapter 2 to analyze four 
of the most prevalent themes found in contemporary literature on young people 
and youth culture. These include young people’s agentic use of media-culture, 
young people’s agentic identity construction, the effects of media-culture on 
young people’s socio-cognitive/subjectivity development, and youth political and 
civic engagement. From this review, I identify gaps within this literature that this 
thesis will help to address. 
 In Chapter, 4, I discuss the methodology used for the empirical component of 
this thesis. By taking all of the lessons and insights that came out of the literature 
reviewed in the first three chapters, I discuss the ontological orientations of my 
study, and lay out the research design and methodology. This consists of a broad 
array of qualitative inductive, critical-ethnographic, interview, and triangulation 
methods that were employed to collect data from a cross-sectional sample of Los 
Angeles and London millenials. I also describe the research sites where I carried 
out the study, the processes by which I gained access to them and the participants, 
the interviews with participants, and the ethical considerations that needed to be 
addressed. I end the chapter by explaining how I conducted the data analysis using 
a combination of grounded theory, critical discourse analytic, and socio-cognitive 
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inspired strategies culminating in the construction of a three-fold ‘actual’ typology 
of  Los Angeles and London young people. 
 Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are dedicated to discussing and unpacking the major 
characteristics of the three classifications in my typology that I have classified as 
Critical/Political, Artsy/Indie, and Mainstream. I describe the more prevalent 
socio-cultural and political-economic experiences of each group, and attempt to 
connect these to the substantive content, i.e., the central tendencies, and cognitive, 
normative, and affective dimensions of these young people’s socio-cultural and 
political-economic schemata. Specifically, by unpacking the conceptual, semantic, 
and lexical associations corresponding to these young people’s interview 
responses, I draw out some of the ways that their dispositions, emotions, thoughts, 
and practices contest or reflect dominant neoliberal discourses.   
 In Chapter 8, I provide a brief review of the literature on critical and 
progressive pedagogy and discuss how the major findings from my study may 
contribute to the educational and political objectives of these pedagogies. 
Additionally, I lay out a theoretical framework and corresponding sample series of 
classroom activities that reflect what I will refer to as a socio-cognitive approach 
to critical and progressive pedagogy.  
 In Chapter 9, I summarize the key insights from each chapter. I also discuss 
some the limitations of this thesis and propose methods to address these 
limitations in future research.  
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Chapter One 
 Homo Economicus in  
Post-Schumpeterian Society 
“One of the greatest mistakes is to judge a policy on its intentions rather than its 
results”. – Milton Friedman3 
 
This thesis begins from the premise that in order to develop an in depth 
understanding of the societies that contemporary UK and US young people inhabit, 
it is crucial to first document and analyze the dominant political-economic 
ideological paradigm that plays such a key role in shaping those societies, i.e., 
neoliberalism. My concern in this chapter is, therefore, to describe neoliberalism 
and trace its consequences. To that end, this chapter will draw out some of the 
main theoretical and discursive frameworks that characterize neoliberal political 
economy, governance, and culture. To facilitate this endeavour, I will first review 
the intellectual history, ontological presuppositions, evaluative dimensions, and 
policy implications and rationale of neoliberal ideology as conceived of, and 
actively promoted by, a group of elite Western intellectuals collectively known as 
the Mont Pelerin Society and their global ideological apparatus (Plehwe et al., 
2007). Secondly, I will describe how neoliberal ideas have helped to form some of 
the major social policies enacted by UK and US governments since the 1980s. 
This includes an examination of a sample of economic, welfare, and education 
policies introduced by UK and US neoliberal governments during the last thirty 
years and their resulting aftermath. While this examination is necessarily brief, it 
is meant to elucidate how the implementation of neoliberal policies and practices 
have inflected and shaped the dominant structural, institutional, and discursive 
components of contemporary UK and US states, economies, and civil societies.
4
  
It is not my intention to suggest that the views and practices of UK and US 
populations are determined by these components. Nor am I implying that the 
hegemony of neoliberalism is total or uncontested. However, contemporary UK 
and US young people are directly or indirectly effected and surrounded by the 
                                                 
3
 Retrieved from: 
http://bfi.uchicago.edu/about/tribute/mfquotes.shtml 
4
 Such components include think tanks, state educational and welfare institutions, supra-
governmental institutions, multi-national corporations, non-governmental organizations, and the 
mass media. Together they converge to a significant extent to help form what Plehwe et al., (2007) 
refer to as a set of hegemonic constellations that disseminate, promote, and legitimate neoliberal 
discourses, policies, and practices. 
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neoliberal policies and discourses which are disseminated and promoted by 
dominant forces in their respective societies (Boyles, 2008; McGuigan, 2010), and 
arguably, as noted above, more so than any other generation or population of 
young people. It is, therefore, necessary to document and specify what these 
neoliberal policies and discourses entail, how they are directly and indirectly 
disseminated to young people, and what their implications are for contemporary 
youth culture and politics.
5
 
 
1.1 What’s So New About Liberalism?  
 In the influential 1992 book The End of History and Last Man, political 
scientist Francis Fukuyama famously declared that the neoliberal model for 
political economic organization, what he referred to as the liberal-democratic 
model,
6
 represents the last stage of political-economic national and global 
organization. Borrowing from Marx’s historical materialist and teleological view 
of history, Fukuyama’s (1992) central thesis positions neoliberalism as a natural 
and historical inevitability, akin to the ecological mechanical processes of 
Darwinian evolution. However, such a deterministic view of history fails to 
consider at least two important points. First, what is abstractly, and sometimes 
crudely, referred to as neoliberalism is simply the latest Western incarnation of a 
series of human ideas that were implement by human volition via human 
institutions. That is, neoliberalism is a social construct, no more natural, legitimate, 
or inevitable than chattel slavery or anarcho-syndicalism. The extensive cultural 
anthropological and political historical literature has noted how at any time and in 
any part of the world that humans inhabit, any number of political-economic and 
accompanying socio-cultural forms can take root. These are shaped in large part 
by the available material resources, ideas, and customs that human groups are 
exposed to (Diamond, 2005; Habermas, 1991; Graeber, 2004; Polanyi, 2001; 
                                                 
5
 Although I will briefly discuss some of the internal complexities and geo-historical specificities 
of UK and US forms of neoliberalism, I do not have the space in this thesis to go into these aspects 
in too much depth. What follows, therefore, should be considered a first approximation that mostly 
describes the most salient and shared features of UK and US neoliberal societies, and which pays 
particular attention to how neoliberalism has impacted the urban and cultural landscapes of 
contemporary UK and US young people.  
6
 The term ‘liberal-democracy’ can also refer to pre-neoliberal forms of political-economic 
organization that marked early 20
th
 century UK and US societies. However, from the context of 
Fukuyama’s (1992) arguments (as they were written as a response to the fall of the Soviet Union), 
it can be inferred that he is specifically referring to the neoliberal model of open global markets 
and representative/parliamentarian modes of democratic governance that underpinned the 1980s 
UK and US neoliberal revolutions (Hall, 2011; Gill, 2003).  
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Toqueville, 2004). However, Fukuyama’s (1992) central thesis seriously 
underestimates the role of human agency, and ignores the fact that the 
implementation of neoliberalism has been an ongoing political project, spanning 
the last seventy years of UK and US history, which has been conceived and 
formulated by a group of elite Western intellectuals, businesspersons, and 
politicians (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). Second, Fukuyama’s view of history also 
ignores the numerous counter-forces, some progressive and some reactionary, that 
continue to contest the neoliberal model. Given that current UK and US societies 
are still underpinned by a neoliberal framework (Braedley & Luxton, 2010; 
Cameroff, 2011; Hall, 2011), I will use this section and chapter to describe and 
elaborate on the first point, but the second point should be considered a given, and 
will be addressed in the following chapters.  
 What exactly is neoliberalism? Like post-modernism or evolution, it is a 
concept that is often loosely exclaimed but vaguely explained, and one which can 
take any number of forms and definitions rendering any attempt at an exact 
definition somewhat problematic. However, a cohesive framework for 
understanding neoliberalism, consisting of its key features, can be sketched by 
reviewing the genealogy of ideas of a group of self-conscious neoliberal 
intellectuals who in 1947 formed the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) (Mirowski & 
Plehwe 2009). Notable members of the original MPS among others, included 
prominent economists Friedrich Von Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, 
and Michael Polanyi (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). This highly exclusive group of 
like-minded intellectuals sought, in their own words:  
 
 The redefinition of the state so as to distinguish more clearly between the 
totalitarian and the liberal order.  
 The possibility of establishing minimum standards by means not inimical 
to initiative and the functioning of the market.  
 Methods of re-establishing the rule of law and of assuring its development 
in such manner that individuals and groups are not in a position to 
encroach upon the freedom of others and private rights are not allowed to 
become a basis of predatory power. 
 Methods of combating the misuse of history for the furtherance of creeds 
hostile to liberty. 
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 The problem of the creation of an international order conducive to the 
safeguarding of peace and liberty and permitting the establishment of 
harmonious international economic relations (Hartwell, 1995. pp. 41-42). 
 
 To briefly put the above mission statements into historical context, after 
experiencing the failures of laissez-faire economics that led to the 1929 Great 
Depression, and the Second World War that followed, Western governments had 
implemented a post-war economic system of heavy market regulation. Largely 
influenced by the fiscal policy arguments of economists John Maynard Keynes 
and Harry Dexter White, advocates of this Western post-war economic consensus 
had argued that left to their own devices, markets would create large-scale 
unemployment, social inequalities, and volatile and unpredictable business cycles 
(Ellwood, 2002). Therefore, in order to avoid a repeat of the mass unemployment 
and discontent that contributed to WW2, governments had stepped in to regulate 
the market. This included the implementation of health, safety, and wage 
standards that businesses had to abide by, and a global system of capital controls 
anchored by fixed currency exchange rates (Chomsky, 1999; McNally, 2009). In 
addition to these regulations, Western governments had also granted concessions 
to organized labour, such as the rights to organize and to collectively bargain, and 
established a system of antipoverty welfare institutions that would guard the less 
fortunate against extreme poverty and destitution (Roy & Steger, 2010). However, 
while observing the implementation of Keynesian fiscal policies throughout the 
West, the members of the MPS worried about the threat of what they viewed as an 
interventionist nanny state that was too involved in the economy, fearing that such 
interventions would inevitably lead to an authoritarian Socialist state similar to the 
Soviet Union. Hayek (1994) and Friedman (2002) argued that any form of 
extensive government central planning, whether Keynesian-Capitalist or Marxist-
Leninist, (however benevolent and well intentioned), creates high inflation, 
stagnating economies, unproductive workforces, and results in the loss of 
individual freedom and entrepreneurial incentives. As Polanyi (2001, p. 260), 
writing in direct response to the central arguments of the MPS, noted: 
  
Planning and control are being attacked as a denial of freedom. 
Freedom and enterprise and private ownership are declared to be 
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essential to freedom. No society built on other foundations is said to 
deserve to be called free. The freedom that regulation creates is 
denounced as unfreedom; the justice, liberty and welfare are decried as 
a camouflage of slavery.  
 
 Dismissing Keynesian notions of positive liberty as utopian, or as inherently 
authoritarian, the MPS was instead inspired by the notions of instrumental 
rationality and negative liberty of 18
th
 century classical liberalism (Curtis et al., 
2007). Members of the MPS argued that society is best served by striving for 
economic efficiency and unfettered growth, which are best achieved when 
governments allow and encourage individuals to freely pursue their self-interests 
and assumed entrepreneurial drives. The rationale was that, according to the MPS, 
human beings are essentially hyper-rational (self-interested) and competitive 
agents that embody John Stuart Mill’s conception of Homo Economicus (Patel, 
2010). As the lauded paragon of classical liberalism Adam Smith (1776/1901, p. 
31) wrote:  
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interests. 
We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and 
never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. 
 
Therefore, rather than try to create a political-economic structure that tries to 
hinder or sublimate these basic and dominant human properties, the MPS argued 
that political-economic structures should instead let these dominant behavioural 
properties run free, premised on the belief that natural competitive market 
mechanisms, undistorted by excessive government intervention, will ensure 
rational outcomes that are beneficial to all of society. This may seem like a rather 
paradoxical view, but according to this logic, if people are free to pursue their own 
interests and desires, (e.g., prestige and/or capital accumulation), and if these 
desires are channeled through unrestricted competitive forces, (i.e., via the market 
mechanisms of supply and demand), positive societal outcomes will naturally 
manifest themselves. Fuel-efficient cars, effective medicines, fashionable clothing, 
and cheap food are all prominent examples of products that are readily available 
because of self-interested and competitive behaviours. The businesses that provide 
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these goods do so because of self-interested desires to accumulate wealth, and 
given that they are in competition with other businesses that are pursuing their 
own self-interests, we, as individual consumers, benefit from having a variety of 
choices at varying prices and quality, which we are free to choose from based on 
our calculated needs. Similarly, it is argued that individual workers will also 
benefit from this form of economic organization as unregulated competitive forces 
will ensure that labourers end up in the best working environments for the highest 
wages (Adler, 2009; Ellwood, 2002). As Ariely (2008, p. 239) notes: 
 
The result is that we are presumed to be making logical and sensible 
decisions. And even if we make a wrong decision from time to time, 
the standard economics [neoclassical/neoliberal] perspective suggests 
that we will quickly learn from our mistakes either on our own or with 
the help of ‘market forces’. 
 
 Guided by their homo economicus ontological assumptions and unwavering 
faith in the role of the metaphysical ‘invisible hand’ of the free-market in 
correcting economic inefficiencies and market externalities, members of the MPS 
zoomed, narrowed, and morphed classical liberalism into a Social Darwinian 
version of liberalism, i.e., into neoliberalism. To wit, while classical liberals like 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo believed in the efficiency of unregulated market 
forces, they also argued that, for example, workers should be allowed to move 
freely between and across nation-states in search of higher paid work. Moreover, 
they argued that capital should be anchored in communities where the owners 
themselves reside, so that owners can experience the effects of their policies first 
hand and correct any negative externalities that may be detrimental to their society 
(Chomsky, 1999; Ellwood, 2002; Smith, 1776/1901). To be certain, Smith and 
Ricardo’s liberalism was not just based on the innate selfishness of humanity. 
Their liberalism was much more nuanced in that it coincided with the 
Enlightenment Age thinking that valued reason, creativity, and human freedom 
over dogma and all forms of oppressive authority which were deemed to be an 
affront to human dignity, and in that context, their liberalism can also be 
considered as largely reflecting humanist values. Smith even went as far as to 
argue against corporate privileges, greed, and the concentration of private wealth, 
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and for public education and government policies that favoured the working 
classes. As he stated, “when the regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, 
it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the 
masters” (1776/1901. p. 235). Furthermore, much of what Smith, Ricardo, and 
many of the other classical liberals argued for was in many ways a utopian society 
that could only function if it met the following key conditions.
7
 First, truly free-
market societies have to be composed of various small enterprises no larger than a 
pin factory (Smith, 1776/1901) that are ideally located in the communities where 
the owners reside. Second, these enterprises are in turn supposed to operate under 
what in economic terms is referred to as ‘perfect competition’- a hypothetical 
economic condition where no single group or person can control and distort 
market forces by, for instance, enjoying state sanctioned privileges that can lead to 
monopoly control of markets (e.g., corporate charters). Third, market equilibrium 
under this hypothetical competitive condition can only be reached by the self-
interested behaviour of highly educated, rational, and free individuals that poses 
relatively ‘perfect information’ (a condition where all buyers, sellers, and workers 
know, or poses immediate access to undistorted knowledge about all products, 
services, and working conditions and wages all the time). And fourth, trade 
between countries must be balanced so that one country does not become 
dependent or indebted to another (Ellwood, 2002). The MPS, however, seemingly 
ignored all of these aspects, or simply did not read Smith or the cannon of 
classical liberalism in its entirety. Either way, they argued for, and gave primacy 
to, the unrestricted and transnational movement of capital and capitalists, but said 
little, and when presented, posed contradictory ideas about the unregulated 
transnational mobility of workers and their rights (Chomsky, 1999). They also 
mostly dismissed notions of human empathy, compassion, altruism, and basic 
ethics as expounded by Smith (1759/2006), to be merely quixotic ideals (Curtis et 
al., 2007; Patel, 2010). Indeed, as Mirowski & Plehwe (2009, p. 26) note, “notably 
absent [from the MPS manifestos] are the range of human and political rights 
traditionally embraced by liberals (including the right to form coalitions and 
freedom of the press)”. Humans, the MPS argues, given their homo economicus 
                                                 
7
 The historical context of the classical liberal arguments must also be taken into consideration in 
that many of the presuppositions of prominent classical liberals are informed by their observations 
of a post-Feudal yet pre-capitalist Western European political-economic structure, which is another 
key difference between classical liberalism and neoliberalism.  
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ontological and existential make up, will only behave ethically or altruistically if it 
benefits them (Curtis et al., 2007; Patel, 2010), and therefore society as a whole 
should be transformed into a competitive market arena that channels these 
dominant self-interested drives and desires into a stable societal equilibrium. In 
practice, this implies that individuals should reject collectivist and humanist values 
(e.g., a socially conscious concern for the environment, labour rights, and human 
rights) in favour of market-centred norms and values such as competitiveness, 
entrepreneurialism, and a preoccupation with the enhancement of one’s human 
and economic capital (Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Patel, 2010). As Braedley 
& Luxton (2010, p. 8) argue: 
 
Human rights and equality under neoliberalism are the rights and 
equality to compete, but not the rights to start from the same starting 
line, with the same equipment, or at the sound of the same gun. It 
certainly does not include rights to certain outcomes, such as a certain 
degree of health or education. Competition, because it is portrayed as 
an “impersonal choice” rather than structured by people’s decisions, is 
somehow perceived fairer than direct government action in the 
distribution of social goods and risks.  
 
Moreover, to the extent that neoliberalism is not the same as 18
th
 century 
classical liberalism, likewise it is not the same as 19
th
 century laissez-faire 
Western capitalism, despite their many similar ideological premises, ontological 
presuppositions, and normative prescriptions. That is, self-conscious neoliberal 
intellectuals are not calling for a total elimination of the state, as they concede that 
it has an active role to play in maintaining a sound national and global economy, 
and even recognize the need for fiscal policies to fund social safety nets (Friedman, 
1948:2002; Hayek, 1994). However, they argue that the scope of the state should 
be reduced and that its role be redefined vis-à-vis the market (Plehwe et al., 2007). 
As Gutstein (2010, p. 5) notes: 
 
Key was their belief that the market society they desired would not 
come about without concerted political effort and organization. They 
were certainly  not laissez-faire conservatives who believed 
government should just not interfere in economic affairs. They were 
30 
 
radicals who demanded dramatic government action to create and 
enforce markets. 
 
Therefore, neoliberalism is perhaps more accurate conceptualized as a sort of 
‘reverse Keynesianism’ that synthesizes lessons, insights, and philosophical 
arguments from the 18
th
, 19
th
, and 20th century history of Western political-
economy to argue that a sound and prosperous economy necessitates government 
intervention that shores up markets and holders of financial capital (Chomsky, 
1999; Friedman & Schwartz, 1963; Hall, 2011).
8
 For instance, traditional 
Keynesian economists argue that macroeconomic policies should be concerned 
with aspiring to full employment via progressive taxation and government 
investment in education, healthcare, social security, infrastructure, and research 
and development. Neoliberal economists, however, argue that inflation, not full 
employment, should be the primary concern for macroeconomic policy, even 
though inflation, provided that it is kept under extreme hyperinflation levels, 
disproportionately impacts the wealthy, while unemployment is a more prevalent 
concern for the other sectors of society (Baker, 2006; Chang, 2010). As Baker 
(2006, p. 19) argues, in practice, combating inflation depends on, “keeping 
unemployment high enough to prevent inflation from rising above the rates it [the 
US Federal Reserve] views as acceptable. When the Fed raises interest rates to 
slow the economy, the people who lose their jobs are disproportionately those at 
the middle and bottom of the wage distribution”. However, the neoliberal 
economic rationale for this is that, by adopting monetary policies aimed at 
controlling inflation coupled with policies that lower marginal income and 
corporate taxes, governments and central banks can help to increase and stabilize 
the real value (as opposed to nominal value) of financial assets (Chang, 2010). 
This, according to neoliberal economists, puts more money into the hands of 
individual investors and entrepreneurs, and incentivizes them to make investments, 
                                                 
8
 Hence, for example, the 2007-2008 UK and US government bailouts of troubled banks, insurance 
firms, and hedge funds can be seen as actually coinciding with, rather than contradicting, 
neoliberal theory (Mason, 2010). These bailouts included the implementation of measures known 
as ‘quantitative easing’, i.e., the immediate and heavily discounted injection of massive amounts of 
digital money into large and state-approved financial firms via central banks (Taibbi, 2010). Such 
measures were enacted by Federal Reserve Chair and noted Milton Friedman disciple Ben 
Bernanke, who was convinced by Friedman’s argument that the 1929 Great Depression was largely 
caused by the Federal Reserve’s failure to provide banks with an emergency influx of capital 
(Friedman & Schwartz 1963). 
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which in turn will lead to the creation of jobs and more efficient economic growth 
than it is possible to attain by means of government fiscal stimulus policies (Steger 
& Roy, 2010). Indeed, some neoliberal economists even go as far as to argue that, 
high tax rates actually lead to decreasing government revenues as they cause the 
wealthy to invest less and to work fewer hours and, hence, be taxed less. Therefore, 
decreasing the tax rate on the wealthy encourages them to work more hours and 
make investments that lead to the creation of more jobs, which will have the 
ancillary effect of increasing government revenues (Adler, 2010). Overall, these 
and other neoliberal macroeconomic prescriptions are aimed at incentivizing 
investment, facilitating entrepreneurship and competition, and preserving 
individual freedom by limiting the state’s ability to intervene in how individuals 
choose to utilize their earned and/or inherited capital. While these policy 
prescriptions may not constitute an ideal free-market system, Friedman 
(2002:1948) argues that they can best approximate the meeting of the long-term 
objectives of political freedom, economic efficiency, and equality of economic 
power.  
Throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century members and affiliates of the 
MPS founded and honed several influential theories which maintain and claim to 
empirically demonstrate that, given a choice, human beings will predominantly 
behave in accordance with their perceived self-interests, e.g., public-choice theory, 
rational-choice theory, and game theory (Spies-Butcher, 2002). They wrote 
extensive position papers on subjects varying from welfare and education reform, 
to environmental and labour standards. In every instance they argued against 
Keynesian, socialist, and even feminist positions (which argue that the state should 
play an active role in securing women’s rights in the workplace), in favour of so 
called scientific and, thus, ideology-free, free-market solutions (Plehwe et al., 
2007). Their theories and studies gained them enormous prestige and authority in 
the fields of sociology, political science, international relations, and particularly in 
economics; with several members winning Nobel prizes in economics. To spread 
their ideas, as part of what Harvey (2005) argues was a conscious and key strategy 
in their war of position, i.e., the intellectual struggle over acceptable political-
economic and socio-cultural ideas (Gramsci, 1971), they formed academic 
strongholds at the London School of Economics and the University of Chicago. 
Furthermore, with the help and funding of powerful business lobbying and policy 
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groups like the US Chamber of Commerce, the Trilateral Commission, the 
Council On Foreign Relations, and the Business Roundtable to name just a few 
(Gill, 2003), they also founded several national and international think-tanks. 
These include the Institute of Economic Affairs (UK), the Heritage Foundation 
(US), the Fraser Institute (Canada), and the Lion Rock Institute (Hong Kong).
9
 
While some important differences exist between these think-tanks and other 
similar think-tanks not directly affiliated with the MPS,
10
 the main ideas of this 
now extensive market-oriented think-tank network can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Human beings are inherently rational self-interested actors that predominantly 
display rational self-interested behaviours. These behaviours are best 
channelled through free-market economic structures (where cognitively 
unhindered individuals are engaged in perpetual cost-benefit analysis, and are 
free to choose between market allocated options and practices that will be in 
accordance with their perceived self-interests), in order to produce positive 
societal outcomes that meet all human needs.
11
  
2. Markets must remain free from government regulation: free-market capitalism 
is the par excellence economic system that promotes technological innovation, 
global peace, democracy, and individual freedom and prosperity. 
3. All businesses must be allowed to self-regulate, as market mechanisms will 
ensure punishment for businesses that behave inappropriately, e.g., by 
committing fraud, delivering poor service, practicing discriminatory hiring 
policies, or producing hazardous and dangerous products.  
                                                 
9
 Currently, the MPS has expanded its membership from its original 38 individuals, to over 1000, 
acting as an umbrella organization that encompasses a well-organised global network of neoliberal 
think-tanks that also includes the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (US), the Liberty 
Institute (Brazil), and Unirule (Beijing) (Plehwe et al., 2007). 
10
 E.g., the Cato Institute which adopts an even more right-wing libertarian position, or the Project 
for the New American Century which adopts more socially-conservative and militaristic views, 
both nonetheless arguing for the promotion of free-market economic systems and values, and both 
thus more or less in line with the policy prescriptions detailed above.  
11
 The discourse of negative freedom and liberty, as advanced by classical liberalism, meant that of 
freedom from coercive, intrusive, and oppressive authority and social-relations of any form, not 
just state forms. However, the neoliberal discursive reformulation of freedom, as Gutstein (2010) 
and Patel (2010) argue, refers specifically to the freedom to choose between competing consumer 
products and services. It does not include the freedom to resist corporate rule, and specifically 
denies the right to challenge the sphere of private property, regardless of the autocratic powers and 
actions of large (or other) property owners over non-property owners (Chomsky, 1999; Patel, 
2010). Moreover, the neoliberal consumerist reformulation of negative liberty and emphasis on 
unrepresentative technocratic government, implicitly suggests a freedom from politics and civic 
responsibility.  
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4. There should be liberalization/deregulation of domestic and international trade 
and commerce (i.e., financial, labour, production, commodity, and 
transportation markets), and relatively uniform import/export tariffs between 
nation-states in order for all parties involved to gain from their respective 
comparative advantages. 
5. Natural resources should be privatized, as the private sector is better suited to 
take care of the management of natural resources than would governments or 
the commons. 
6. State enterprises including education, health-services, security, and municipal 
services should be privatized. In such cases where state enterprises and 
services are not privatized or completely dismantled, they should be 
transformed into market apparatuses (via the implementation of neo-
managerial policies and accountability metrics and targets to measure 
outcomes, eliminate wastefulness, and incentivize positive performances), 
which redefine government workers and administrators as public entrepreneurs, 
and citizens as consumers or ‘clients’.  
7. Governmental welfare institutions should be dismantled and replaced with 
voluntary private charities. In such cases where welfare institutions are not 
completely dismantled, they should be turned into market apparatuses (via the 
implementation of accountability metrics and targets to measure outcomes, 
eliminate wastefulness, and incentivize positive performances) that help to 
train welfare dependent individuals to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial 
workers that can better compete in the labour market.
12
 
8. Taxes, including income, corporate, capital gains, and property taxes should be 
reduced or eliminated. 
9. The government’s main responsibilities are to curb budget deficits, combat 
inflation, ensure and protect legal contracts, copyrights, private property rights, 
national security, and help open up and enforce new markets, by 
overwhelming military force if need be.
13
 
                                                 
12
 Related to the neoliberal tenets 6 and 7, is the theory that state public sectors operating as market 
apparatuses can help individuals enhance their human capital by instilling individuals with a 
Protestant work ethic, a dedication to instrumental education, and a sense of work discipline and 
flexibility (Harvey 2005).  
13
 See Klein’s (2008) account of the forced market liberalization of Chile in 1973 and Iraq in 2003.  
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10. Formal democratic institutions where citizens vote for government 
representatives should be maintained, but key policy-making and 
implementing power should be held by an appointed and publicly 
unaccountable market-oriented technocratic elite (e.g., Central Bankers), that 
can bypass or overturn decisions made by formal democratic institutions when 
necessary, i.e., when they go against market principles.   
  
 Together the ideas discussed in this section form the philosophical, 
intellectual, and policy foundation of neoliberalism. When taken to its logical 
conclusion, neoliberalism is more totalizing in scope than any other previous 
theoretical conception of capitalism, as it calls for the extension of market logic 
and practices into all forms of government, civic, public, and even private life. As 
Lemke (2001) puts it, in a neoliberal world there is no longer a separation between 
the market and society; everything is economic. Nonetheless, according to the 
MPS, and the now global network of market-oriented think-tanks,
14
 if 
governments follow the basic propositions listed above, and if individuals can 
embrace their self-interested nature, then a prosperous, dynamic, and self-
regulating global society will emerge. Yet despite its narrow and cynical 
ontological presuppositions, neoliberalism, as I will explain in the following 
sections, has to a significant extent shaped, and embedded itself into, the political-
economic and socio-cultural structural and discursive fabric of Western society, 
and continues to influence the perspectives and policies of UK and US governing 
elites. 
 
1.2 Neoliberal Globalization: the End of History 
The second half of 20
th
 century world order was characterized by a series of 
global crises and transformations that, among other important factors, brought 
about the end of Keynesianism and its system of global capital controls (Chomsky, 
1999; McNally, 2009). By the 1980s, members of the MPS had gained momentum 
in their war of position, i.e., the move from ideological struggle to political power 
(Gramsci, 1971), and helped to form the political platforms and administrations of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). Once in 
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 Since the 2008 financial crisis, the intellectual representatives of these institutions have been 
working overtime to assure both government officials and the public on the soundness and 
superiority of a free-market system (Mirowski, 2011).  
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office, and at the urging of their MPS connected economic advisors, Thatcher and 
Reagan implemented a host of tax cuts and deregulatory economic policies which 
cut taxes on corporations and the wealthy, shrank the power and size of regulatory 
state agencies, and loosened or lifted financial, safety, labour, anti-trust, and 
environmental regulations. These and other economic policies, in conjunction with 
the global trade policies and multi-lateral agreements spearheaded by the UK and 
US controlled World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade 
Organization, helped to initiate, facilitate, and accelerate the processes of 
neoliberal globalization, which are characterized by the free-flow of capital within 
and across nation-states, the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of 
national economies, and the rise and dominance of transnational corporations and 
financial institutions (Gill, 2003; Harvey, 2005). Successive UK and US 
administrations, regardless of their traditional political positions, whether left, 
right, or centre, continued with similarly business friendly economic policies, and 
spread similar policies across the globe through their control of the World Bank, 
the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (incidentally all organizations with 
close ties to the MPS).
15
 After the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, and throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s, neoliberal ‘globalization’ was legally cemented by 
multilateral international free-trade agreements like the 1994 World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights.
16
 These types of agreements, in addition to ongoing World Trade 
Organization, European Union, and G7 negotiations, formed what Gill (1998, p. 
16) refers to as the ‘new constitutionalism’; i.e., sets of:  
 
Policies and legal measures that are intended to reinforce the rights and 
political representation of investors, and in so doing to strengthen the 
power  of capital on a world scale. This process involves dominant 
state apparatuses in the Group of Seven, the international financial 
institutions, and transnational corporations, and it seeks to reproduce, 
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 The imposition of neoliberal policies on developing countries via, for example, the IMF’s and 
World Bank’s structural adjustments programmes is also widely referred to as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Chomsky, 1999). 
16
 When the interconnectedness of national economies on a global scale actually occurred is a 
matter of ongoing debate with some authors suggesting that it started when Columbus landed in the 
Americas (Ellwood, 2002). For the purposes of this thesis, I am using the term neoliberal 
globalization to refer to the spread of neoliberal economic reforms and policies via supra-national 
organizations like the WTO, World Bank, and IMF (Gill, 2003; Harvey, 2005).  
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politically and legally, disciplinary neo-liberalism and the main 
discourse and strategy for creating what Karl Polanyi called the 'stark 
Utopia' of a market society on a world scale.  
 
 Consequently, this has led to the commodification of seemingly everything 
e.g., rain water, plant seeds, public utilities, organs (Braedley & Luxton, 2010; 
Patel, 2007), and to the global consolidation of markets whereby a handful of 
oligopolies control the majority of the world’s manufacturing, financial, 
transportation, communications, commodity, cultural production, and 
(increasingly) education markets (Coghlan & MacKenzie, 2011; Patel, 2007; Roy, 
2012; Vitali et al., 2012). These economic policies have had a number of domestic 
effects on UK and the US, chief among them being the deindustrialization of their 
economies, as they allowed and effectively encouraged Western corporations to 
bypass domestic labour markets and outsource their operations to other nation-
states with abundant cheap labour and even fewer regulations (Ellwood, 2002). As 
a result, since the 1980s the UK and US economies have transformed from an 
industrial to a post-industrial service sector economy. (As of 2011, the service 
sector comprised 77.7% and 76.7% of the UK and US GDP respectively). 
Neoliberal globalization is far too complex a phenomenon to be discussed at any 
further length in this thesis. Nonetheless, it merits mention since it sets the context 
and justification for the socio-economic restructuring of the UK and the US of the 
last thirty years, in that major social policies since the 1980s have been premised 
on the discourse that the liberalization of global market forces is inevitable and 
beyond the control of any one nation-state (Friedman, 2004; Giddens, 1998; Gill, 
2003). Therefore, in order to survive in the new global economy, i.e., maintain 
market credibility and attract foreign direct investment, UK and US governing, 
intellectual, and media elites have argued that the major components of their 
respective state, economy, and civil society need to facilitate market operations 
and help prepare citizens to better compete in the global markets. In the following 
section, I briefly examine a set of UK and US welfare and education policies from 
the last thirty years that are premised on the above argument, and I pay particular 
attention to the discourses used to justify these policies in order to help set up what 
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I refer to as discursive barometer that will help with the empirical component of 
this thesis, and that I will elaborate on in Chapter 4.
17
   
 
1.3 Neoliberal Governance (We Will Force You To Be Free) 
 Central to the neoliberal domestic project was and is the transformation of 
the welfare state. Upon taking office, Thatcher and Reagan began the dismantling 
of welfare institutions, arguing that they produced generations of lazy welfare-
dependent citizens that were a drain on the economy (Harvey, 2005). Extolling the 
virtues of markets and competition, Thatcher and Reagan urged citizens to wean  
off their dependence on welfare services and invest in the property owning 
democracy (Hall, 2011). As Larner (2000) argues, the 1980s UK and US 
neoliberal discourses of the minimal state and individual responsibility marked the 
beginning of ‘market governance’, where both individuals and institutions are 
encouraged, if not coerced, to conform to the norms and values of the market. The 
subsequent Blair and Clinton administrations took a more moderate ‘third way’ 
approach, and implemented some important social reforms. These included 
increased funding to public education and the implementation of the minimum 
wage (in the UK), and the raising of the federal minimum wage (in the US). 
However, their ‘third-way’ approach stressed the importance of economic growth 
and entrepreneurship in solving social problems (Giddens, 1998),
18
 and hence both 
governments continued the transformation of welfare by reducing its scope, and 
by transforming welfare institutions into market apparatuses that force welfare-
dependents into the labour market (Cloward et al., 2001). In 1996, promising “to 
end welfare as we know it”, Clinton passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Act, which among other provisions included: ending welfare as an entitlement 
                                                 
17
 While I am aware of, and sympathetic to, the critique that neoliberalism is filtered through, re-
constituted, and contested across different localities, making the top-down ideal-typical description 
that I am describing in this chapter contestable (Wilson, 2004), I maintain that this critique 
overlooks the reality of the fact that no matter how unpopular and contested certain neoliberal 
policies may be, UK and US governing elites at both the national and local/city level have 
nonetheless implemented them, e.g., the UK’s higher education tuition fees that took effect in 2012, 
and the US’s 2008 unprecedented Wall St. bailout. For UK and US city level examples see Hayes 
& Home (2011) and Pedroni (2011). Overlooking this fact by overly focusing on minor instances 
of resistance that have not, to be blunt, really changed anything, seriously underestimates and even 
mystifies the role of elites and powerful vested interests in crafting and carrying out important and 
consequential policies. 
18
 Anthony Giddens’s “third way” can be considered a type of second-wave neoliberalism that 
unlike the first-wave neoliberalism of Thatcher and Reagan, emphasizes social justice discourses, 
but maintains that social justice can only be accomplished through competitive market mechanisms 
and concordant neoliberal policies (see Steger & Roy, 2010). 
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programme by requiring recipients to begin working after two years of receiving 
benefits, and placing a lifetime limit of five years on benefits paid by Federal 
funds. The following Bush administration passed into law the 2005 Deficit 
Reduction Act, which further increased the numbers of hours that welfare 
recipients are required to work in order to qualify for benefits (Parrott et al., 2007). 
While in the UK, in 1998, the Blair government passed the New Deal policy. This 
primarily focused on helping or ‘empowering’ welfare recipients to gain 
employment and enhance their human capital by providing state subsidized job 
training programmes, employment, and employment-derived tax incentives 
(Cochrane et al., 2001). The Brown government that followed continued with the 
Blair’s tax-credit incentive schemes, believing that welfare recipients can be 
financially incentivized to work and save to lift themselves out of poverty (Field, 
2002). Overall, British welfare, Cooper (2008) argues, along with the nation state 
itself, has been transformed in accordance with the principles of neoliberalism. As 
he puts it, “contemporary welfare policy is that the work of welfare is now to 
produce, maintain, and if possible repair a workforce that can help this market-
state be a contender in the new economic order of the 21st century” (2008, p. 36). 
This turn in welfare policy is known as workfare in the US, where the traditional 
Keynesian system which allotted rights-based benefits has been replaced with a 
Schumpeterian workfare-state that according to Jessop (1995) better suits the post-
industrial neoliberal economy. While the old Keynesian system was designed to 
accompany an industrializing economy and was ambiguous about the causes of 
poverty, the current Schumpeterian system is meant to accompany a post-
industrialized service economy where poverty is held to be the fault of the 
individual – one that can and must be remedied by individual effort (Cloward et al., 
2001). In a neoliberal society, there are no social problems, only individual 
hurdles and challenges. Hence, while the Keynesian inspired governments of the 
post-war period could be thought of as having a paternalistic relationship with 
their citizens, neoliberal governments, according to Rose (1992), govern by 
enabling individuals to govern themselves and making them responsible and 
accountable for their own life choices and actions. As Gibson (2008, p. 12) puts it: 
 
In summary, the Keynesian welfare state was to be dismantled and 
replaced by a Schumpeterian workfare, one where the state’s role is to 
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create the structures for the successful operation of the market in which 
individuals will increasingly need to compete and plan for themselves 
as individuals, or as individual family units.  
 
 Furthermore, along with welfare reform policies, education systems, argue 
Boyles (2008) and Gibson (2008), have become one of the primary carriers of the 
neoliberal political-economic project, such that, the UK and US governments of 
the last thirty years have maintained the neoliberal position that state institutions 
should both resemble corporate structures and facilitate market operations. Since 
Thatcher and Reagan, public education has been presented as failing to adequately 
prepare students to compete in the global market. To remedy this crisis, UK and 
US education policies, including the UK’s 1988 Education Reform Act and 2008 
Education and Skills Act, and the US’s 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, and 2009 
Race To The Top Initiative, have been implemented and had the effect of 
significantly marketizing and commodifying education. In both subtle and overt 
forms, these policies orient students, parents, teachers, and school administrators 
towards market subjectivities and neoliberal discursive practices of competition, 
consumption, and performativity. For example, the UK’s 1988 Education Reform 
Act, and the US’s 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, began the ranking and public 
listing of schools’ performance measured primarily on completion rates (in the 
US) and by how well students perform on standardized tests (in the UK and the 
US). The supposedly objective measures produced by standardized testing are 
meant to provide parents with the necessary information to make a sound and 
rational choice of which schools best serve their children’s needs. The rationale is 
that public funding for schools should be allocated based on market principles of 
cost effectiveness, accountability, and satisfying customer demand (i.e., parental 
demand for a quality education for their children). For example, Lawy & Tedder 
(2011, p. 2) argue in the UK context that, since 1997: 
 
Further Education Colleges no longer received block grants but were 
funded on the basis of numbers and completion rates. Managers were 
now no longer solely concerned with the curriculum and pedagogy, but 
were charged with achieving effectiveness and efficiency at lower 
costs in a competitive and heavily marketised environment.  
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 Additionally, in the US, contemporary education policies have also allowed 
for the growth of business-school partnerships where businesses and corporations 
provide funding to underfunded schools in exchange for publicity and 
advertisement space (Boyles 2005). Hewitt (2005) argues that this, can go a long 
way to fostering within students an unquestionable faith in, and inherit 
benevolence of, the corporate world. In anything from curriculum creation to 
fund-raising, corporations have and continue to step in where the state has 
neglected or been unable to fund services, and, in the US in particular have turned 
many schools into shopping malls where parents can purchase anything from 
chocolates to wrapping paper (Breault, 2005). As Molnar notes (1996, p. 25), “the 
problem with this is that students and teachers become subsumed in market logic 
that, in part because of its pervasiveness, appears (therefore becomes) impervious 
to critique”. Recent education acts like the UK’s 2010 Academies Act and the 
US’s 2009 Race to the Top initiative take the corporate infiltration of public 
schooling even further, and strongly in line with the neoliberal voucher conception 
of education, have facilitated the privatization of education where schools are 
entirely run by private institutions. These privatized academies or free-schools in 
the UK, and charter schools in the US, have the ancillary benefit of being able to 
hire non-unionized teaching staff, which if their expansion continues, may have 
the spiraling effect of depressing wages for all teachers and school staff.  
 In brief, these acts, which have been largely influenced and in some cases 
directly crafted by unelected business leaders, neoliberal think-tanks, and venture 
capitalists (Lipman, 2011), serve as pointed examples of neoliberal policy and 
governance, and have to varying degrees in respect to the UK and US education 
systems: 
 
 Narrowly defined education values giving primacy to 
economic/instrumentalist purposes, and viewing education as job training 
for the global market (Robinson, 2000).  
 Marketized schools, by making school rankings public, and expecting 
parents and students to become rational and responsible consumers of 
education (Gutstein, 2010). 
 Corporatized schools, by introducing neo-managerial organizational 
strategies and accountability metrics where schools are to be run like 
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corporate entities, in part by having to compete with other schools for 
funding, and have their success and accountability measured by how well 
their students perform on standardized tests (Gewirtz & Ball, 2000; Valli et 
al., 2008).  
 Begun the privatization of public schools, where entire schools are 
reconstructed on profit models, or where selective school functions are 
outsourced to the private sector, e.g., school-business partnerships (Boyles, 
2005).  
  
 Other state institutions, like the UK and US criminal justice systems and 
military apparatuses, have undergone similar neoliberal reforms and 
transformations (Graham, 2010). I have chosen to specifically highlight the 
neoliberalization of UK and US welfare and education, in part because as stated 
earlier, the reformulation of these public institutions is central to the neoliberal 
domestic project (Braedly & Luxton, 2011; Gutstein, 2010), and because these 
institutions arguably most directly impact the lives of my youth participants. For 
instance, even if some of my participants do not in any way directly benefit from 
welfare provisions, they, unlike previous generations, have been surrounded by an 
unprecedented mass-media-led anti-welfare/state discourse that essentially 
stigmatizes the poor and unfortunate, and promotes a very unsympathetic and anti-
empathetic disposition that is a key feature of neoliberal ideology as described in 
the previous sections. Education, which should also be seen as a sub-branch of the 
welfare-state, has undergone an extensive restructuring that has primarily 
impacted the lives of the post-1980s generations. That said, while there are 
numerous similarities between the UK’s and US’s neoliberal public-sector reforms, 
there are several key distinctions. For example, even with the recent election of 
Conservative David Cameron, the UK still has, compared to the US, a fairly 
generous welfare state that includes a universal healthcare system and relatively 
affordable higher education (although this may soon change given the current 
political climate). Conversely, the US, even under the recent half-hearted attempts 
by the Obama administration, failed to institute a single-payer universal healthcare 
system, and the costs for higher education continue to rise making it realistically 
unattainable for working-class families, and increasingly unattainable for middle-
42 
 
class families as well.
19
 However, it should also be noted that both administrations, 
in light of the current global recession, continue to resort to neoliberal policies. 
These include, among others, the implementation of quantitative easing to 
stabilize major banks and financial markets (Mason, 2010), the lowering of taxes 
on the wealthy, and the implementation of fiscal austerity measures that are 
cutting state funding for their welfare and education institutions (McNihol et al., 
2010; O’Grady, 2010). In the final two sections of this chapter I describe some of 
the ways that neoliberalism has impacted the urban landscapes and cultural 
spheres that are inhabited by contemporary UK and US young people.  
 
1.4 Neoliberal Urbanization and Non-Profits 
 The implementation of the UK and US neoliberal policies that I have 
described thus far, have had a particularly noticeable and transformative effect on 
the landscape, social structures, and economies of UK and US cities. Extolling the 
neoliberal virtues of ‘decentralization’ and ‘localism’ post-1980s UK and US 
central governments, including the current Cameron and Obama administrations, 
have rolled back state funding in favour of decentralized approaches. According to 
these discourses, local city and town governments have to make do and figure out 
their budgets with less federal monies, based on the theory that decreased federal 
funding will generate civic enterprise and social responsibility (Featherstone et al., 
2012). In the UK, Featherstone et al., (2012, p. 177) describe the Coalition 
government’s 2010 Green Paper as:  
 
A radical shift in the way in which the local is envisioned in UK policy 
discourse and practice. This underlying agenda for a ‘truly radical 
localisation’ (Conservative Party 2010, 14) lies at the centre of the UK 
Coalition government’s political agenda, with decentralisation 
‘described as the biggest thing that government can do to build the Big 
Society’ (HM Government 2010, 2). This articulation of localism is 
taking place in a climate of pronounced austerity as the Conservative-
led Coalition government has enacted a programme to dramatically 
curtail government spending. 
                                                 
19
 University tuition in the US has increased dramatically during the 1981-2005 time frame. For 
example, state universities have increased their tuition by 472%, while private universities have 
increased their tuition by 419% (Adler, 2010).   
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 Moreover, as industrial jobs were being outsourced from cities like Detroit 
and Manchester to developing countries due in large part to neoliberal trade 
policies, city governments during the last thirty years have, nonetheless, turned to 
neoliberal policy prescriptions to restructure their fledgling economies (Harvey, 
2005). For example, in an effort to attract financial capital, policies implemented 
in major world-cities like London and Los Angeles neglected much of their 
industrial sectors, and instead offered tax breaks and subsidies to non-industry 
based corporations, curbed their budget deficits to appease the bond and credit 
agencies, outsourced many of their municipal (and increasingly their education) 
services to private companies, and instituted an elaborate system of private-public 
partnerships  (Brenner, 2006; Featherstone et al., 2011; Harvey, 2005). This has 
led to the current division of major cities along class lines, where the city’s 
wealthy residents enjoy extravagant and increasingly gated communities, private 
municipal services, and twenty-four hour armed protection. As Adler (2010, p. 70) 
describes in the US context, “ City governments across the country now provide 
packages of services and taxes in the form of Business Improvement Districts, 
which are tailored to the means of the neighbourhoods that finance them, so that 
no subsidization of the poor by the wealthy occurs”. Meanwhile, the majority of 
urban dwellers have to pay increasing fees and taxes to municipal services with 
declining quality, and deal with ever increasing rent, food, and transport costs as 
their wages stagnate or decline, and as unemployment and crime rise. Incidentally, 
the discourses of responsibility, individualism, and freedom that neoliberals 
invoke often obscure the more authoritarian and disciplinary arm of neoliberal 
policies, which have largely criminalized poverty and anti-corporate democratic 
dissent (Graham, 2011). For example, the US boasts the highest incarceration rate 
in both the developed and developing world, while the UK has, after the US, the 
highest incarceration rate in the developed world.
20
 Armed with the latest military 
technology and surveillance equipment, sold to them by private corporations, 
police forces across UK and US cities monitor, track, and target urban dwellers of 
mostly non-elite backgrounds, and continue to militarize urban space (Graham, 
2010). As Davis (1992, p. 155) in describing Los Angeles argues: 
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 Retrieved from:  
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/30/zakaria-incarceration-nation-2/ 
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We do indeed now live in “fortress cities” brutally divided into 
“fortified cells” of affluence and “places of terror” where police battle 
the criminalized poor. [..] The old liberal attempts at social control, 
which at least tried to balance repression with reform, have been 
superseded by open social warfare that pits the interests of the middle 
class against the welfare of the urban poor. In cities like Los Angeles, 
on the hard edge of postmodernity, architecture and the police 
apparatus are being merged to an unprecedented degree.  
 
 In between these militarizing enclaves exist a number of non-profit 
organizations that have proliferated since the onset of neoliberalism. Strapped for 
funds, and preoccupied increasingly with security, the non-profit sector has 
stepped in where the state has rolled back. Offering services ranging from 
healthcare to youth gang prevention, the demand for the services that non-profit 
organizations offer has increased as the effects of neoliberal policies become more 
apparent. Increasingly, however, the non-profit sector has itself undergone 
neoliberal inflection, as in a constant struggle for funding, a significant number of 
non-profit organizations have adopted the organizational methods and logics of 
for-profit corporate structures (Dempsey & Sanders, 2010). This includes, for 
example, the use of excessive marketing strategies to secure funding from large 
corporate donors (Frankiln, 2002; Kerlin, 2006), which for those non-profits 
working with youth, often means touting their college prep and job training 
programmes that offer to prepare disadvantaged young people to compete in the 
‘business world’. This shift to neoliberal market-based solutions to social 
problems positions the non-profit sector as yet another cog in the neoliberal 
machine, which, as Demspey (2009) argues, takes our attention away from 
viewing social problems as structural problems in need of systematic and 
collective solutions. While some non-profit organizations can resist this shift, and 
offer a space for community and non-market solutions to social problems, a 
significant portion of the non-profit sector has yielded to market pressures. This 
trend is likely to be amplified by the ongoing economic recession and cuts to 
public spending.  
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1.5 Contemporary Youth Culture Under Neoliberalism 
Lastly, neoliberalism has also significantly shaped the youth cultural sphere 
that contemporary young people are predominantly exposed to, and voluntarily 
engage with. Facilitated in large part by a combination of neoliberal deregulation 
and trade policies, as described above, and economic imperatives, transnational 
corporations have conglomerated and become so massive that they are now 
themselves part of the cultural zeitgeist. The McDonalds arches, the Nike Swoosh, 
or the Apple logo, for example, are now permanently embedded into the collective 
cognitive framework of the majority of Western and increasingly non-Western 
consumers (Beader et al., 2009; Jun et al., 2007). And, to be certain, even a casual 
read of the last fifteen or so years of the leading business newspapers, magazines, 
and academic journals, e.g., the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and the Journal for 
Consumer Marketing, will indicate that this has been a deliberate marketing 
strategy on the part of corporations and marketing firms. As Klein (2000) argues, 
the 1980s neoliberalization of the US (and I would add the UK) economy and 
accompanying recession, forced hitherto prominent corporations to compete with 
cheaper big box stores who were selling their own generic products. As a result, 
marketing companies restructured their approaches, and promoted their corporate 
clients not as producers of everyday commodities, but as unique sellers of dreams, 
experiences, and lifestyles (Klein, 2000). Many commercial industries like fashion, 
sports, car, and food corporations operate under what economists refer to as an 
oligopoly: a competitive market condition in which a handful of firms produce 
nearly identical products as that of their competitors. Therefore, to stay in business, 
individual corporations have to differentiate themselves through brands, labels, 
and mass advertising. For example, H&M, TopShop, Zara, American Apparel, and 
the Gap all sell relatively similar clothing to youth demographics: what is different, 
however, are mostly the labels and marketing approaches. For, in order to 
maintain their market share, these companies have to keep the costs of production 
low, but also have to market ideas and identities, not products; the manufacturing 
of which is outsourced and contracted out to elaborate networks of second and 
third parties, e.g., free trade or export processing zones (Klein, 2000). Thus, 
Starbucks, for example, does not sell coffee like Dunkin Donuts or Pret does; it 
sells community and ambiance, i.e., ‘the third space’. Nike does not sell shoes; it 
sells athleticism and competitive drive. Furthermore, while financial investment in 
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traditional forms of manufacturing and infrastructure has dramatically declined 
during the neoliberal era, Harvey (2005, p. 158) points out that “interestingly, the 
main arenas of production that gained were the emergent cultural industries (films, 
videos, video games, music, advertising, art shows), which use IT as a basis for 
the innovation and the marketing of new products”.  
What this all means for youth culture is that contemporary culture industries 
have merged to labyrinthine extents with a plethora of non-media commercial 
industries to create an omnipresent consumer media culture that relentlessly 
targets youth demographics (Kenway & Bullen, 2001), and co-opts all forms of 
youth styles, trends, and music. From sponsoring art exhibits, music concerts, and 
fashion shows, to enforcing legal restrictions over the use of trademarked cultural 
artefacts, to deciding on the content and distribution of music, films, books, and 
television shows, there are fewer and fewer spaces left in contemporary UK and 
US society where youth cultural production is not controlled or mediated by a 
handful of transnational corporations (McGuigan, 2010a). Correspondingly, the 
discourses disseminated by this corporatized media-culture tend to 
overwhelmingly valorise self-interestedness, competition, upward mobility, 
individual wealth, entrepreneurialism, and consumerist forms of political and civic 
practice, all of which are congruent with neoliberal political-economy (McGuigan, 
2010). As a result, today’s young people are subject to a constant bombardment of 
branded sounds, images, and even tastes and smells that entice them to consume 
and tell them what to aspire to and believe in, but not to question the night-time 
production of those branded commodities or to examine their underlying 
ideological discourses. With perhaps some hyperbole, it can be claimed that most 
young people are literally immersed in this culture. As Klein (2000, p. 131) 
describes: 
 
The Kinkos, Starbucks, and Blockbuster clerks buy their uniform of 
kakis  and white or blue shirts at the Gap; the “Hi! Welcome to the 
Gap!” greeting cheer is fuelled by Starbucks double espressos; the 
resumes that got them the jobs were designed at Kinko’s on friendly 
Macs, in 12-point Helvetica on Microsoft Word. The troops show up 
for work smelling of CK One (except in Starbucks, where the colognes 
and perfumes are thought to compete with the “romance of coffee” 
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aroma), their faces freshly scrubbed with Body Shop Blue Corn Mask, 
leaving apartments furnished with IKEA self-assembled bookcases and 
coffee tables.  
 
 This is not to suggest that young people are shaped inexorably by this 
rampant and omnipresent corporate media-culture. The 1930s hypodermic needle 
or magic bullet model of the media has been largely discredited, but that said, at 
least two things need to be taken into consideration. The first is that contemporary 
corporate media and advertisements are unprecedented in scope, size, space, and 
scientific development and in no way resemble the corporate advertising of the 
past. By conservative estimates, Western populations are now exposed to 
anywhere from 1500-3000 scientifically honed corporate messages a day (Fogel, 
2006), while corporations continue to research, enhance, and use psychological 
marketing and publicity strategies that target individual consumers at the 
unconscious and subliminal level so as to incite desire, and override their 
rationality in order to mold them into eternal and loyal consumers (Crisp, 2004; 
Olson, 2009; Patel, 2010). As Rowan (2008) reports, corporate-sponsored 
neuroscientists are in hot pursuit of the holy grail of marketing; the buy button. 
Researchers are using MRI machines (originally meant to scan for tumours and 
brain damage) and other sophisticated tests and instruments to carve out the most 
objective ways to predict which logos, sounds, and adverts will most trigger an 
unconscious/automatic cognitive response from consumers. Given that advertising 
and these types of research cost corporations billions of dollars, an Occam’s razor 
deduction would conclude that corporations would not spend billions on it if it did 
not work to gain them a competitive advantage and satisfy their bottom line. In 
other words, modern advertising and media does not work like a magic bullet fired 
from the media gun directly into the consumer, it works more like a sawn-off 
shotgun, scatter shooting multiple messages in the direction of the consumer with 
hopes of hitting a target. Hence, the potential socializing effects of media-culture 
should not be underestimated.  
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1.6 Political Messages: There is No Alternative 
“The role of the media in contemporary politics forces us to ask: What kind of a 
world and what kind of a society we want to live in, and in particular in what 
sense of democracy do we want this to be a democratic society”. –Noam Chomsky 
(2002, p. 9) 
 
Democracy is in the worst interest of national goals and the modern world is far 
too complex to allow the man or woman on the street, to interfere in any way with 
its management. - Time Magazine (1996) 
 
 In addition to disseminating consumer ideologies, contemporary media-
cultural oligopolies, monopolies, and conglomerates also disseminate the ideology 
that free-market capitalism and republican forms of democracy are the only viable 
political-economic arrangements. Thus, media-cultural corporations help to 
perpetuate the hegemony of neoliberalism by circumventing criticism of it on at 
least two levels. At the first level they saturate audiences with discourses and 
practices that affirm and legitimize capitalism and hierarchical forms of 
institutional organization. Such discourses stress self-interestedness, competition, 
greed, an appeal to and valorisation of corporate hierarchy and authority, and an 
overall uncritical culture of hyper-consumerism. In contemporary neoliberal 
societies, this hyper-consumer culture stretches to the extent that even political 
and civic participation is conflated with consumerist practices like voting heavily 
marketed candidates into power, or other acts of what can be termed as politics 
from a distance, e.g. digital petitions, donations to NGOs, or ethical consumption. 
As Chomsky (2002, p. 22) argues: 
 
The people in the public relations industry aren't there for the fun of it. 
They're doing work. They're trying to instill the right values. In fact, 
they have a conception of what democracy ought to be: It ought to be a 
system in which the specialized class is trained to work in the service 
of the masters, the people who own the society. The rest of the 
population ought to be deprived of any form of organization, because 
organization just causes trouble. They ought to be sitting alone in front 
of the TV and having drilled into their heads the message, which says, 
the only value in life is to have more commodities or live like that rich 
49 
 
middle class family you're watching and to have nice values like 
harmony and Americanism. That's all there is in life.
21
 
 
At the second level, if the first level of inculcation is not achieved, and 
individuals become critical of the established order, then, in constantly promoting 
the idea that there is no alternative to the established societal order, and in 
reducing political discourse to images, sound-bites, catchphrases, vacuous slogans, 
and personalities, media-culture corporations help to stymie the political-economic 
imagination of the public. This is not to suggest that corporate media outlets are 
uncritical, but rather that the field of criticism is narrowed and constrained by the 
opposing views of elite interests and dominant groups (Herman & Chomsky, 
2002). Western mainstream media debates over major issues like war and 
education, financial, or welfare reform, for example, are framed and inflected by 
state-corporate interests that often obscure non-elite criticisms, alternatives, and 
minority voices (Chomsky, 2002; Coleman, 2012; deMause & Rendall, 2007; 
Goodman & Goodman, 2007; Jackson, 2011).
22
 Alternatives to hierarchical 
institutional organizational forms such as workplace democracy are rarely 
showcased by mainstream media with the occasional exception featuring a usually 
condescending story about an upstart worker’s co-op.  
 However, it is not the case that political-economic alternatives are non-
existent, or that Francis Fukuyama (1992) is correct in famously declaring the end 
of history. Millions of individual activists and organizations both in Western and 
non-Western countries continue to actively struggle against neoliberal hegemony, 
in some cases in the face of outright violent state-corporate repression. For 
example, Klein (2000), Graeber (2009:2004), and Patel (2010) point to several 
anarchist and anti-neoliberal groups from all over the world which are not only 
fiercely anti-neoliberal, but which are also made up of dedicated practitioners of 
alternative political-economic practices based on values of altruism, generosity, 
                                                 
21
 Chomsky (2002) draws this conclusion from reviewing state policy papers, business literature, 
and influential papers by leading theorists of 20
th
 century US democracy including Walter 
Lippman, Edward Bernays, and George Kennan (all of whom showed contempt for the general 
public, and saw propaganda as an essential tool needed to check the democratic impulses of the 
masses).  
22
 In the US, for instance, studies by the media watch-group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting 
(FAIR), have repeatedly shown that mass-media news outlets like major newspapers and television 
news shows tend to predominantly invite elite pundits, academics, and politicians to debate and 
discuss major policy issues. These people tend to express opinions that favor elite interests which 
often go against public opinion (see http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=12).  
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cooperation, and direct/participatory and non-hierarchical forms of democracy and 
economics. Other alternative and recent political developments include the 
election of, and popular support for, several South American left-leaning 
Presidents who are staunchly opposed to the Washington Consensus. Alternative 
institutional organizational projects continue to spring up all over the Western and 
Non-Western world from the factory takeovers in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to the 
participatory budgeting practices of the residents of Porto Alegre Brazil, to the 
workplace democratic practices of IT firms in California (e.g., SemCo Enterprises). 
However, even if one does not agree with these or other non-elite criticisms and 
alternatives, their erosion from or demonization by mainstream mass media 
(Herman & Chomsky, 2002) has, as stated earlier, a potentially debilitating effect 
on the public’s political and economic imagination, and on their abilities to 
conceive of a genuine alternative to the dominant neoliberal model. As Habermas 
(1991) and McChesney & Nichols (2009) argue, our democratic public spheres 
continue, and at a historically unprecedented pace, to be co-opted, cheapened, and 
stripped of substance by media conglomerates, all while the lively, diverse, open, 
and free presses that informed generations of radical democratic activism 
throughout the 18
th
, 19
th
, and early 20
th
 centuries continue to disappear, be bought 
out, or worse still, turned into manufacturers of ridiculous infotainment that 
celebrates the opulence of the rich and famous. One can hardly go a day using the 
tube or buses in London, for example, without spotting leftover Sun or Metro 
newspapers featuring the latest celebrity gossip. And in Los Angeles, for example, 
and as likely in other parts of the US, there are at least four evening television 
shows specifically dedicated to celebrity gossip in daily circulation across the 
channels of the major television networks (e.g., Fox’s TMZ, NBC’s Access 
Hollywood, NBC’s Extra, and CBS’s Entertainment Tonight). The few 
independent non-corporate media that report non-elite interests and voices are 
marginalized, constantly under-funded, and often have to compete with the highly 
psychologically developed and far reaching spin of state departments and their 
ever expanding corporate media conveyer belts (Goodman & Goodman, 2007). It 
cannot be stressed enough that the range of ideological messages that publics are 
exposed to via mass media is becoming narrower and narrower (McGuigan, 
2010:2010a). As Kellner (1998a, p. 11) in the US context argues, “giant media 
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conglomerates are producing a new world culture that is in fact a rather shallow 
reflection of the American Way of Life”.  
How contemporary UK and US young people engage with, reject, or are 
influenced by this neoliberal consumer media-culture at the micro subjective and 
socio-cognitive level will be theorized, explored, and discussed in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. For now, it is sufficient to argue that at the macro-level, 
neoliberalism, in addition to the economic, welfare, and education institutions, 
urban landscapes, and civil society institutions thus far discussed, has also, and to 
a significant extent, inflected the major cultural institutions and cultural and 
political-philosophical discourses which they disseminate, and which UK and US 
young people are largely surrounded by. 
 
1.7 Summary 
In sum, I have briefly reviewed some of the intellectual history of 
neoliberalism, and described how neoliberal theories and ideology have inflected 
some of the major societal structures, institutions, and discourses of the UK and 
the US, creating a plethora of hegemonic constellations that converge to a 
significant extent to legitimate and promote neoliberal discourses and practices. 
The contemporary world that UK and US young people inhabit is underpinned by 
a rather disconcerting and astonishingly pervasive political-economic and socio-
cultural structure that values unrestrained capital accumulation and self-interest 
above all else, and which jealously pushes away alternative modes of thinking 
(Patel, 2010). Hence, despite the current global crisis in neoliberal capitalism, the 
reports of the demise of neoliberalism have been greatly exaggerated (Braedley & 
Luxton, 2010). Neoliberal intellectuals, international business leaders, and the 
other components of the hegemonic constellations described, have, at least for 
now, won the wars of position and movement (Hall, 2011). However, it is not my 
intention to argue that the disparate institutions that I have discussed, and the 
people that manage or work for them, or even the everyday people that they 
subject, have completely and without contestation adopted neoliberal ideology. As 
Gramsci (1971) argues, society is marked by a constant dynamism of competing 
forces. Indeed, many factions and individuals operating within the political, 
economic, education, and media-cultural spheres, disagree with the neoliberal 
paradigm, and actively work against it. Examples of this can include: nationalist 
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elites who push forward protectionist economic policies that fly in the face of the 
free-market globalization paradigm, conservative educationalists who believe 
education should emphasize the classic humanities instead of a narrow 
economistic pedagogy, and left-leaning artists who navigate through the corporate 
controlled culture-industries to spread counter-hegemonic messages.  
 However, while neoliberal hegemony is being constantly contested by both 
internal and external social forces, it is still the dominant paradigm of 
contemporary UK and US society, which is puzzling given that the benefits of 
neoliberal policies have gone mostly to the wealthy sectors. To be certain, the last 
thirty years of neoliberal policies are strongly correlated to increasing levels of 
global and domestic social inequality where the highest UK and US earners 
continue to make record incomes, while those on low incomes continue to see 
their wages fall and their benefits cut. For instance, in the UK, Elliot and Curtis 
(2009, p. 1) report that: 
 
Overall, the poorest 20% saw real income fall by 2.6% in the three 
years to 2007-08, while those in the top fifth of the income distribution 
enjoyed a rise  of 3.3%. As a result, income inequality at the end of 
Labour's 11th year in  power was higher than at any time during 
Margaret Thatcher's premiership.  
 
And in the US, a study by economist Emanuel Saez (2009, p. 2) reports that, “the 
top decile share in 2007 is equal to 49.7 percent, a level higher than any other year 
since 1917, and even surpasses 1928, the peak of the stock market bubble in the 
‘roaring’ 1920s”. Congruently, union membership in both the UK and US 
continues to dramatically decline (Blanchflower & Bryson, 2008; Greenhouse, 
2011), and unions have lost much of their historic bargaining power and hard won 
benefits as the majority of industrial jobs continue to be outsourced to developing 
countries. In the US for example, a study by Bronfenbrenner (2009) reports that 
US employers have been emboldened by the current economic recession to take 
more aggressive and punitive actions against workers attempting to organize.
23
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 According to Bronfenbrenner (2009), more than 70% of employers hold one-on-one closed-door 
meetings with employees during a unionization drive. 54% of employers threaten workers in such 
meetings, while 57% threaten to close the worksite. Moreover, 34% of employers fire workers 
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Incidentally, both the UK and the US currently rank amongst the lowest in 
measures for socio-economic mobility in the developed world, where young 
people in particular are finding it difficult to climb the social ladder as compared 
to populations from other developed countries that have implemented less extreme 
neoliberal reforms (Elliott, 2010; Harvey, 2005).  
Thus, as mentioned in the preface to this thesis, this begs the question, why is 
it that the majority of the UK and US population have not mobilized to seriously 
challenge the neoliberal order, even though significantly high proportions of those 
populations continue to be disadvantaged by neoliberal policies and practices? In 
the following chapter, I outline a series of theories that can be used to explain how 
neoliberalism came to be supported, or at least not significantly contested, by a 
majority population, and lay out a theoretical framework that is designed to 
comprehensively investigate the reproduction of neoliberal discourses and 
practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
during a union campaign, 47% of employers threaten to cut wages and benefits, and 75% of 
employers bring in outside anti-union consultants. 
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Chapter Two 
Towards A Theory of  
Neoliberal Social Reproduction 
“Our task, surely, is to examine how consciousness, sentiment, and attachment are 
constituted under prevailing conditions; why class has become a less plausible 
basis for self-recognition and action when growing disparities of wealth and 
power would point to the inverse”. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000, p. 300) 
 
“For there is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly 
determined by what lies outside it”. -George Eliot, Middlemarch 
 
 In the previous chapter, I briefly described some of the broad and converging 
dimensions of neoliberalism that help to explain its hegemony at the macro-
structural and institutional levels. However, this provides an account of only one 
side of the hegemonic coin. To understand how hegemonic political-economic 
forms endure and reproduce themselves, it is important to understand how it is that 
everyday people, particularly those of non-elite backgrounds and those who are 
not situated within the upper-income brackets of society, consciously and 
unconsciously recreate social discourses and practices that maintain, support, and 
ultimately reproduce specific forms of political-economic organization. In other 
words, we need a theory of social reproduction that can help to describe and 
explain how the current neoliberal conjuncture has been accepted, or at least not 
significantly contested at the micro-subjective level, by the majority of the UK and 
US population.  
To this end, this chapter will chronologically review, critique, and assess 
some of the key arguments from some of the more prominent theoretical 
frameworks of the last seventy years of Western social theory. These can be used 
to describe, explain, and research the phenomenon of capitalist ‘social 
reproduction’, where social reproduction is defined as, “all the mechanisms, 
processes, and practices by which multiple social hierarchies, divisions and 
relations of wealth, power, and influence are sustained and re-created over time” 
(Gewirtz & Cribb, 2009, p. 86). The theoretical frameworks under review in this 
chapter can be loosely categorized as following three broad approaches. First, the 
political-economy approach, represented here by the classic Frankfurt School, is 
concerned to explore the dynamics between the state, the economy, and dominant 
cultural institutions and their socializing effects on individual subjects. Second, 
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the culturalist approach, represented here by the classic Birmingham School of 
Cultural Studies, is concerned with a micro analysis of how individuals produce, 
decode, use, and interpret media culture. The third, is what Kenway & Bullen 
(2000, p. 28), refer to as a, “both/and approach, which is sensitive to the vertical 
dimensions of power and ideology and to the horizontal dimensions of contexts 
and everyday life”, represented here by Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu. 
These three overarching approaches can be used to explain and describe different 
aspects of how the current neoliberal conjuncture came to be supported and 
reproduced by majority populations, and can be used to investigate the micro level 
effects of neoliberalism on contemporary UK and US young people. By drawing 
on all three approaches, this chapter will propose a reformulated ‘both/and’ 
approach that utilizes and synthesizes lessons, arguments, and theoretical concepts 
from each approach, and couples them with specific socio-cognitive and political 
philosophical insights and concepts that are often overlooked, yet I would suggest 
crucial to a more comprehensive understanding of neoliberal social reproduction. 
This reformulated approach will serve as the theoretical guide for the rest of this 
thesis, and will inform the research methodologies and data analysis discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
 
2.1 False Consciousness and the Frankfurt School: The Relevance of Dead 
Germans 
“Socialism never took root in America because the poor see themselves not as an 
exploited proletariat, but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires”. 
-John Steinbeck
24
 
 
“Why do certain definite changes of man’s character take place from one 
historical epoch to another? Why is the spirit of the Renaissance different from 
that of the Middle Ages? Why is the character structure of man in monopolistic 
capitalism different from that in the nineteenth century? Social psychology has to 
explain why new abilities and new passions, bad or good, cone into existence”.  
-Erich Fromm (2001, p. 9) 
 
 During the 1930s, a group of exiled German sociologists, psychologists, 
philosophers, and literary scholars collectively known as the Frankfurt School fled 
to the United States. Disheartened by what they saw as the totalitarian nature of 
both German and US societies, members of the Frankfurt School sought to explain 
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 Quoted in Wrigth (2006, p. 177).  
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why the working classes of the industrialized West failed, among other things, to 
instigate a proletarian revolution. By combining the psychological insights of 
Sigmund Freud with the historical-materialist perspective of Karl Marx, the 
Frankfurt School developed and coined ‘critical theory’- a broad interdisciplinary 
political-economy approach that analyzes how macro-power structures shape and 
mediate the cultural practices, experiences, and consciousness of individuals. 
What follows is a brief overview of some of the main arguments that are most 
relevant to contemporary Western society, as presented by leading members of the 
classic Frankfurt School - Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert 
Marcuse - who explained US capitalist hegemony in terms of interrelated 
ideological, structural, and psychological factors. 
 In 1944, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno published their seminal piece 
Dialectic of Enlightenment.  In the landmark chapter titled “The Culture Industry: 
Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” they argued that post-war US capitalism has 
in essence created a techno-bureaucratic Weberian ‘iron cage’ that attempts to trap 
individuals (particularly those of the middle- and working-classes) into perpetual 
cycles of alienating work and consumption. US popular culture, they argued, in 
the form of television shows, films, fashion, literature, art, and music, is for the 
most part industrialized, standardized, and commoditized state-corporate 
propaganda that promotes consumer capitalism and societal conformity while 
simultaneously distracting the public from the source of their economic hardships 
and alienating work. Horkheimer & Adorno (1944/1993, p. 1) opened the chapter 
by arguing: 
 
The sociological theory that the loss of the support of objectively 
established religion, the dissolution of the last remnants of pre-
capitalism, together with technological and social differentiation or 
specialization, have led to cultural chaos is disproved every day; for 
culture now impresses the same stamp on everything. Films, radio and 
magazines make up a system which is uniform as a whole and in every 
part. Even the aesthetic activities of political opposites are one in their 
enthusiastic obedience to the rhythm of the iron system.  
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 In the rest of the chapter Horkheimer and Adorno described how market 
logic creates systemic rules that inflect cultural values, artefacts, and aesthetics to 
the needs of capitalism, thereby helping to turn critical individual citizens into a 
mass of intellectually passive consumers. Starting from the classic Marxist idea 
that ideological obfuscations are rooted in the material structures of capitalist 
production (Villa, 2008), Horkheimer & Adorno (1944/1993) argued that culture 
and media industries, like film, music, and television, disseminate an array of 
ideological discourses that serve to reinforce the capitalist order and agenda while 
eroding alternative political-economic possibilities. The formulaic Hollywood 
films, generic pop-music, and banal television shows, they argued, are saturated 
with affirming US state-capitalist ideal discourses of rugged individualism, private 
property, financial success, meritocracy, and anti-communism. Audiences of these 
texts are therefore left with a rather narrow, distorted, corporatized, and 
conformist reality; characterized by the presumption that one should not resist or 
challenge the political-economic order since there exist equal opportunities for all 
to prosper from. As Villa (2008) argues, anyone that thinks that Horkheimer and 
Adorno overstated this claim need only look at contemporary Western movies and 
television shows which continue to pronounce the explicit American Dream thesis 
that with enough hard work, persistence, and a little luck, absolutely anyone can 
become rich and famous regardless of their race, class, or gender. Access to 
success is perceived to be democratic (i.e., open to everyone), and, therefore, 
supersedes structural inequality. As Villa (2008, p. 154-155) argues, “with one 
ideological catchphrase-endlessly recycled in TV and movie dramatizations of 
individuals who ‘overcome the odds’, the grounding myth of society is established. 
An entire landscape of structural inequality and injustices is banished from our 
horizon”.  
 According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1993), while the ideological 
dissemination of the culture industries is meant to be manipulative and serve 
ruling class interests, the individuals that run these industries are guided by 
structural imperatives, not by malice or necessarily by conspiratorial 
coordination.
25
 As a rule, corporations are structured to behave in a strictly 
                                                 
25
 Culture industries, like other modern corporations, are legally structured in such a way that their 
managers have to uphold practices that promote the interests of their respective corporations and 
their shareholders ahead of competing interests. In practice this translates into decisions made by 
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instrumental rationalist pursuit of what they perceive as their own self-interests 
that require constant economic growth and the elimination of the competition. The 
corporate structure thus exerts a metaphysical level of agency that guides the 
behaviour of the individuals that run it to actions that will ensure its survival 
amongst competing interests, and secure its owner’s profits. Cultural-media 
corporations, argued Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1993), are no different, and 
are embedded with these same economic structural drives that lead to 
monopolistic behaviours (e.g., the merging of Warner Brothers with Time Inc. to 
create Time Warner), interlocking directorates with other business corporations, 
and the dissemination of self-serving ideologies.  
 
The dependence of the most powerful broadcasting company on the 
electrical industry, or of the motion picture industry on the banks, is 
characteristic of the whole sphere, whose individual branches are 
themselves economically interwoven. All are in such close contact that 
the extreme concentration of  mental forces allows demarcation lines 
between different firms and technical branches to be ignored 
(Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1993, p. 2).  
 
The subsequent and highly influential theses of Mills’ (1956) The Power Elite, and 
Herman & Chomsky’s (2002) Manufacturing Consent, tease out and further 
empirically validate different aspects of this argument,
26
 but like Horkheimer & 
Adorno (1944/1993), Mills (1956) and Herman & Chomsky (2002), essentially 
argue that mass media-cultural corporations monopolize and/or become 
interlocked with other private and state institutions. These in turn are all 
structurally driven and designed to spread ideologically charged discourses that 
consequently endorse, legitimate, and promote the interests of the ruling classes, 
                                                                                                                                            
corporate executives that have and continue to lead to mass lay offs, and to a disregard for 
regulations concerning securities fraud, human rights, worker safety, public health, and or 
environmental standards (Achbar et al., 2003; Patel, 2010; Taibbi, 2010).    
26
 Mills (1956) analyzed the concentration of power in the US, demonstrating that the control of 
the major executive, economic, and military branches lies with a handful of interlocking elite 
families and individuals. Herman & Chomsky (2002) argue that the corporate news media in the 
US effectively act as a propaganda arm for the state and US Pentagon that serves to protect, justify, 
and legitimate the interests of society’s elite. These same arguments apply to all contemporary 
capitalist societies controlled by a now mostly transnational capitalist class (see Domhoff, 2009: 
Rothkopf, 2008; Sklair, 2000).  
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which happen to own and control most of society (Domhoff, 2009; Rothkopf, 
2008).  
 In addition to arguing that structural imperatives push corporations to 
disseminate consumer ideologies that are in tune with their economic interests, 
Horkheimer & Adorno (1944/1994) argued that culture industries work on a 
psychological dimension to target individuals at the unconscious libidinal level. 
This Freudian inspired aspect of critical theory was developed further by Herbert 
Marcuse to describe the social-psychological component of capitalist hegemony. 
In his classic text One Dimensional Man, Marcuse (1964) argued that media and 
culture industries prey on the individual’s libidinal psychological drives in order to 
elicit consumerist and conformist behaviours. According to Marcuse, the 
seemingly omnipresent, insidious, and subliminal advertising produced and spread 
by profit oriented media-culture industries is designed to incite desire in audiences 
for any number of manufactured wants and needs. These manipulative and highly 
psychologically developed advertisements thus attempt to socialize individuals 
into consumptive modes that, Marcuse argued, can trap people in perpetual cycles 
of arousal, desire, consumption, and frustration. Marcuse termed these perpetual 
traps of consumption ‘repressive desublimation’– a social-psychological process 
that is promoted and generated by late capitalist societies, and internalized by their 
members. To wit, while early capitalist societies were characterized by a 
protestant work ethic that promoted ascetic values and sublimating practices, late 
capitalist societies implicitly and explicitly encourage their members to give in to 
their unconscious and repressed libidinal desires, but only through socially 
sanctioned consumerist practices; such as the consumption and fetishization of 
commodities like jewellery, clothing, pornography, sports cars, or violent video 
games. However, once purchased and used, these consumer goods fail to fully 
deliver the satisfaction and gratification that followed from the initial point of 
purchase, leaving consumers perpetually frustrated, and requiring them to 
consume more and more items in order to fulfil their initial consumptive high.
27
 
Therefore, according to Marcuse (1964), desublimation via consumption is 
inherently repressive because it generates a condition that incapacitates critical 
                                                 
27
 It is worth noting that terms like shopaholism and shopping therapy have become popular 
concepts in Western societies, while compulsive buying is now considered a growing and global 
psychiatric disorder which researchers specifically attribute to the cultural norms, values, and 
mechanisms of market-based societies (Black, 2007).  
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thought by fostering the illusion of material well-being, individual originality, 
creative self-expression, and freedom. Hence, Marcuse (1964) noted that, rather 
than resisting state-corporate rule, Western populations, and in particular Western 
working-classes, are instead manipulated by the hypnotic powers of mass media, 
and washed in a state of ‘euphoric unhappiness’, mistakenly conflating the 
freedom to choose between products in the market, with more genuine and 
substantive freedom.
28
 Meanwhile, the environmental impact, labour exploitation, 
or structural inequalities associated with the production and consumption of those 
goods and services should at best be an afterthought. 
 Whatever critical culture does develop to challenge the corporate-state order, 
like the 1960s environmentalist, feminist, and civil rights movements, Marcuse 
(1964) warned that the inclusive and economic rationalist nature of the culture 
industry means that it co-opts even counter and sub-cultures, strips them of their 
revolutionary potential, and sells it back to the public in sanitized or banal forms. 
Thus, according to Marcuse (1964), if not fully resisted and refused, the 
continuing corporate standardization and sanitation of culture, coupled with the 
spreading of repressive desublimation via insidious and psychologically honed 
consumerist discourses of mass media, may lead to a one-dimensional society of 
alienating work and vapid consumption. In this one-dimensional society, 
consumer ideology becomes so cognitively ingrained into the public, and thus 
hegemonic, that an appetite for critical resistance to it becomes non-existent, or 
what little of it remains becomes ineffective in changing or seriously challenging 
the status quo. Therefore, instead of creating a state of genuine freedom, advanced 
capitalism and the consumer ideology and practices that it generates, disseminates, 
and depends on represent merely another and even more effective form of 
totalitarian social control; i.e., a form of totalitarianism that is largely self-imposed 
and more reminiscent of Huxley’s Brave New World than Orwell’s 1984, as 
individuals in some form or another become complicit in, and content with their 
own domination. According to Marcuse (1964, p. 7-8) this form of totalitarianism 
                                                 
28
 Among the other central interests of the members of the classic Frankfurt School, was a focus in 
exploring the specific kinds of freedom that advanced capitalist societies practiced and promoted.  
They generally argued that capitalist societies and their corresponding consumerist norms and 
values were premised on negative liberty (freedom from external restraints e.g., the state, church), 
but at the cost of positive freedom (freedom to fulfil one’s potential) which is significantly 
inhibited by the social inequalities inherent in, and caused by, capitalist economic structures and 
social relations (Fromm, 2001).  
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consists of an environment where all human relations are mediated by commodity 
and exchange relations and values, and where: 
 
Liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The 
range of choices open to the individual is not the decisive factor in 
determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and 
what is chosen by the individual. Free election of masters does not 
abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a variety of goods 
and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services 
sustain social controls over a life of alienation. And the spontaneous 
reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not 
establish autonomy, it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls.  
 
 Overall, the major insights from classic ‘critical theory’ that I have discussed, 
as developed by Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, in summary, are that the 
state-corporate nexus operates on an ideological, structural, and psychological 
level to inculcate the public with a false consciousness; creating a state of cultural 
hegemony that mostly benefits the interests of the state-corporate elite. By 
distracting the public (with a variety of mostly manufactured and false needs and 
mundane entertainment) from the source of their economic hardships, the 
capitalist ruling class maintains power and domination over an otherwise aloof, 
apathetic, and complicit mass that is mostly accepting of, or comfortable with the 
status-quo.  
 There is certainly much to critique about the classic Frankfurt School thesis. 
For instance, their theories take an overtly pessimistic outlook that all but denies 
the possibilities for popular culture to serve as a force for progressive social 
change. Their over-reliance on elaborate theoretical constructs comes at the 
expense of comprehensive empirical support. And most notably, they seem to 
under appreciate the role that human agency and more emancipatory forms of 
reason like communicative rationality play in influencing socio-structural and 
institutional arrangements (Habermas, 1991), relying instead on a deterministic 
view of the role of instrumental reason in shaping modern societies. However, for 
all of their faults, pessimism, and rhetorical exaggerations, there are a number of 
things that the classic Frankfurt School got right, which for the purposes of this 
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thesis are worth taking into consideration.  
 First, as they predicted, the corporatization and consolidation of media-
culture is unprecedented in scope with only a handful of corporations controlling 
just about everything that Western and increasingly non-Western audiences read, 
listen to, and watch (Shah, 2009). Second, the content of most media-culture 
artefacts is predominantly composed of discourses that promote rigid 
individualism, narcissism, consumerism, competition, and fame, and is seemingly 
devoid of discourses that valorise community, empathy, altruism, and genuine 
forms of democracy (Babe, 2009; DeWall et al., 2011). For example, the 
contemporary UK and US reality television shows listed below (which vary in 
popularity) all depict working and middle-class contestants (many of whom are 
not especially gifted, talented, or educated) in cut-throat competition for the lure 
of fame, money, and/or materialistic gains: 
 
UK Shows US Shows 
X-Factor Gladiators American Idol True Beauty 
The Apprentice Fame Academy The Apprentice Joe Millionaire 
The Dragons’ 
Den 
Ladette to Lady America’s Next Top 
Model 
Who Wants to 
Marry a Multi-
Millionaire? 
Big Brother Shipwrecked Survivor I Love Money 
Britain’s Got 
Talent 
Britain’s Next Top 
Model 
Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire 
Survival of the 
Richest 
 
 Third, as the classic Frankfurters warned it is certainly the case that oppositional 
and resistance cultural artifacts in many instances serve as fodder for the selling of 
commodities whose production comes at the expense of exploited workers and the 
natural environment (e.g., Apple Inc.’s use of Martin Luther King Jr. and Cesar 
Chavez images under their motto of ‘think different’). As McGuigan (2010a) 
argues, it is a vital feature of contemporary neoliberal ‘cool capitalism’ that 
cultural signs and symbols of rebellion and resistance are themselves incorporated 
into the neoliberal economic system of production and exploitation, consequently 
excluding genuine opposition to it, and ensuring its hegemony. Finally, critical 
theory’s psychological arguments, and in particular Marcuse’s (1964) concept of 
repressive desublimation, offer a convincing account that in many ways describes 
and explains many of the seemingly unconscious ‘shopaholic’ consumer practices 
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rampant in contemporary Western societies. Neoliberalism as a practiced political-
economic system certainly depends on eternal, perpetual, and self-interested 
consumers. Moreover, it is well known that contemporary corporations fund 
research in search of the elusive ‘buy button’- a hypothetical cognitive reflex that 
when triggered by specific commercial mediums will completely override 
individual autonomy (Rowan, 2008). Nonetheless, it may be impossible to fully 
investigate what the unconscious effects of insidious and sexually charged media 
and advertising may be, and equating perpetual consumerist behaviours with a 
means to satisfy repressed sexual needs may risk a charge of unsubstantiated pop-
psychology. Therefore, what I want to draw on is not the Freudian inspired aspects 
of classical critical theory, but rather its attention to psychology in the first place. 
As I will elaborate in section 2.5, the unfalsifiable Freudian arguments can be 
replaced with the more empirically grounded concepts of cognitive and social-
psychology, but arguably not since or after the classic Frankfurt School has there 
been a body of sociological theory that so explicitly tried to incorporate the much 
needed insights of psychology to the study of capitalist social-reproduction. 
Therefore, I will maintain that the classic Frankfurt School’s critical theory offers 
a powerful and comprehensive theoretical descriptive and explanatory model that 
has continued relevance, and that I will tweak and build on in the following 
sections. 
 
2.2 The Birmingham School of Cultural Studies 
What of resistance to capitalism? How can progressive social change occur 
given the totality of corporate control as described by classic critical theory? 
Around the 1960s-70s, in reaction to what was viewed as the elitist and overtly 
pessimistic social theory of the earlier Frankfurt School, the Birmingham Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies rejected its more totalizing claims. Leading 
members, including Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige, and Paul Willis, 
argued that far from being merely passive and manipulated cultural dupes, 
consumers of popular media-culture are active agents that often demonstrate 
resistance to capitalist hegemony. The classic Birmingham School drew their 
inspiration from Gramsci’s (1971) more open concept of hegemony which views 
culture as a continuously contested terrain, rather than a fixed or determined and 
determinizing structural entity. Whilst classic ‘critical theory’ can be read as an 
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open and shut case which suggests that capitalism has created a totalizing 
hegemonic culture which has trapped, or will trap us all into its instrumentalist 
grasp, Birmingham theorists were skeptical of such deterministic outlooks. Instead, 
they were more interested in examining instances of counter-hegemony (i.e., those 
instances where individuals demonstrate forms of critical consciousness and 
practices that run counter to established societal norms and values), and they 
sought to document how ordinary individuals resisted, interpreted, reformulated, 
and used popular media-culture. Indeed, Western capitalist societies were never as 
homogenized and ‘massified’ as the classic Frankfurt theorists implied them to be 
(Kellner, 1998), and in fact contained a number of subtypes, subcultures, and 
critical public-spheres that had not been co-opted by commercial interests. Hence, 
the classic Birmingham School set out to salvage the Marxist normative political 
agenda, and the working-class consciousness that the Frankfurters had all but 
abandoned.  
Classic texts, like Willis’ (1977) Learning To Labour, and Hall’s (1980) 
Encoding/Decoding, argued that institutional and media-culture socialization 
processes are not as totalizing as classic critical theory logically implies. Willis’ 
(1977) detailed ethnography of a group of working-class lads showed that 
institutional capitalist socialization (disseminated by the school the lads attended) 
could be circumvented and ignored. Rather than conforming to school rules, and 
blindly accepting the standard capitalist discourse that financial success followed 
from academic merit, Willis’ participants were well aware that their chances for 
upward mobility were hindered by their ascribed social positioning. Thus, rather 
than conform to school rules and values that they believed would not benefit them 
anyway, they displayed an array of anti-school dispositions and behaviours; 
preferring instead to develop values that would prepare them for their future 
working-class jobs. Hall (1980), on the other hand, focused his seminal work on 
individual media interpretation, and argued that while hegemonic ideology is 
inscribed as the ‘preferred reading’ in most media-cultural texts, not all readers 
automatically adopt such a reading. The social positioning and historical contexts 
of individual readers/consumers of media-cultural texts may lead them to adopt 
readings different from the intended meaning and they can adopt a range of 
stances towards the texts. These can range from accepting, negotiating, or 
completely opposing the intended intended messages. These and other classic 
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Birmingham works demonstrated the importance and significance of focusing the 
gaze of cultural studies onto the micro-subjective and contextual level. In doing so, 
they provided valuable insights into exactly how individuals living within 
capitalist societies interpret and live out the discourses and practices that they are 
surrounded by, and how they can resist and reformulate them.  
 However, for all their differences, the classic Frankfurt and Birmingham 
schools have a number of affinities. Many of the Birmingham theorists agreed 
with many of the basic positions of the classic Frankfurt School. For instance, both 
schools agreed that mass culture was playing an important function in integrating 
the working classes into existing capitalist societies, and that a new consumer and 
media culture was forming a new mode of capitalist hegemony (Kellner, 1998). 
As Kellner (1998) argues, despite their differences from and criticisms of the 
Frankfurt School, the Birmingham School’s version of critical theory can arguably 
be seen as a complementary addition to classic critical theory. In other words, 
what the Frankfurt theorists overlooked, i.e., the in-depth investigation of media-
culture readership and active cultural production at the individual level, can be 
remedied by applying Birmingham ethnographic approaches to contemporary 
social-reproduction research that takes an overtly structural approach. Nonetheless, 
the fact remains that despite all of the instances of counter-hegemony documented 
by the Birmingham School, neoliberal discourses have, as described in the 
previous chapter, won the wars of position and movement (Harvey, 2005; 
McGuigan, 2010:2010a; Patel, 2010). Hence, purely macro or purely micro 
approaches to explaining the current neoliberal conjuncture which, however 
nuanced, are nonetheless mired in the Marxist ghost of false-consciousness, will 
simply not suffice. As Bourdieu (2000, p. 172) argues in reaction to the Marxist 
academic pre-occupation with consciousness: 
 
Another effect of the scholastic illusion is seen when people describe 
resistance to domination in the language of consciousness as does the 
whole Marxist tradition and also the feminist theorists who, giving way 
to habits of thought, expect political liberation to come from the 
‘raising of consciousness’ ignoring the extraordinary inertia which 
results from the inscription of social structures in bodies, for lack of a 
dispositional theory of practices.  
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In the next section, I discuss approaches that attempt to surpass this 
‘either/or/consciousness’ dilemma and move towards a theory of cognitive 
dispositional and rationalizing practices.  
 
2.3 Beyond Consciousness: The French Turn  
“But there is something in our worldview, something about the lens we look 
through that keeps us from building something new that’s better for all of us.” 
       -Ryan Harvey
29
 
  
 In the 1970s, around the same time as the initial flourishing of the 
Birmingham School, a number of French social theorists developed influential 
theoretical approaches to the study of culture and capitalist society. Of particular 
note are the works of Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu. Like the classic 
Frankfurt and Birmingham Schools, Althusser and Bourdieu were concerned with 
how capitalist social arrangements reproduced themselves, and constructed 
nuanced understandings of ideology and socialization. The concept of hegemonic 
ideology as discussed by the Frankfurt school conceived of ideology as something 
that is disseminated and legitimated from above by dominant social institutions 
and groups to obscure an otherwise objective class reality. Therefore, individuals 
are assumed to consciously consent to the dominant order, no matter how stratified 
or unjust, because they cannot conceive of alternatives to the capitalist system, 
and/or because they believe that upward class mobility, despite nearly 
insurmountable structural constraints, is within grasp given enough hard work and 
effort; i.e., they are the victims of false consciousness. However, Althusser (1971) 
invites us to think of capitalist ideology as the sum of material structures and 
practices, which works at a fundamentally unconscious level, growing naturally 
from our everyday mundane practices. For example, when paying rent, buying 
food, or depositing a check, all of which further cement and reproduce the 
capitalist order, we are not consciously or falsely consenting to capitalism, but 
rather are behaving in a habitualized, ritualized, and largely unconscious manner.  
As Althusser (1971, p. 158) explains: 
 
                                                 
29
 Lyrics from Tea Party, by Ryan Harvey.  
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To take a highly ‘concrete’ example, we all have friends who, when 
they knock on our door and we ask, through the door, the question 
‘Who’s there?, answer (since ‘it’s obvious’) ‘It’s me’. And we 
recognize that ‘it is him’, or ‘her’. We open the door, and ‘it’s true, it 
really was she who was there’. To take another example, when we 
recognize somebody of our (previous) acquaintance ((re)-
connaissance) in the street, we show him that we have recognized him 
(and have recognized that he has recognized us) by saying to him 
‘Hello, my friend’, and shaking his hand (a material ritual practice of 
ideological recognition in everyday life – in France, at least; elsewhere, 
there are other rituals).  
 
Althusser (1971) notes that this kind of unconscious habituation, or ‘interpellation’ 
as he terms it, is the result of an individual’s exposure to ‘ideological state 
apparatuses’, like the family, the media, and the education system that expose 
individuals to the discourses and practices of those systems, and as a result we are 
always immersed in ideology. An individual is said to be ‘ideologically 
interpellated’ when his or her social identity/subjectivity reflects the discourses 
and practices of the ideological state apparatuses (i.e., social institutions) that he or 
she has interacted with, and/or been largely exposed to. As Auogustinos, et al., 
(2006, p. 297) argue, “Althusser suggests that our lived relations are largely 
unconscious and affective in nature. In this way ideology becomes a spontaneous, 
unconscious, and affective way of responding to our lived relations, a way of 
being which has a strong affinity with the recent work of automaticity in social 
cognition”. While this theory of ideological interpellation can be read as 
deterministic since it entails that ideology is inescapable and pervasive, Althusser 
(1971) also argues that there are multiple breaks, contradictions, and points of 
contestation between different ideological state apparatuses that leave room for 
critical distance, agency, and resistance. For example, individuals who refuse to 
join repressive state forces because they come from religious and pacifist 
backgrounds, or conscientious objectors who refuse to take up arms, or feminist 
and anti-racist activists signify that, as Van Dijk (2011, p. 380) notes, “ideologies 
as we define them, may be used not only to dominate or to oppress others, but also 
in order to resist and struggle against such domination”. Dominant ideological 
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interpellation is, therefore, never fully totalized and always contested by the 
complexities and variances of multiple social systems and sub-systems that expose 
individuals to any number of different, and in some cases, conflicting ideologies. 
This allows room for individual agency, as subjects are thus free to negotiate, and 
to some indefinite extent, consciously choose between the ideologies and practices 
that they have been exposed to. Interpellation, as I will argue in the following 
section, can therefore be coupled with insights from more contemporary theories 
of social cognition, in particular schema theory, to form a more context and agent 
sensitive theory of socialization that can be employed for the exploration of 
neoliberal social reproduction. 
 Pierre Bourdieu developed very similar arguments to Althusser’s 
interpellation theories, but was less concerned with ideology and more focused on 
describing and investigating the everyday habits and unconscious behaviours of 
individuals that make up and reproduce society. Bourdieu’s (1977) ‘habitus’ is a 
term used to describe the sum of an individual’s acquired schemes of thoughts, 
dispositions, tastes, and perceptions that guide their actions, and that result from 
exposure to and interaction with autonomous structured social spaces like schools, 
courts, and work. In occupying various social spaces or ‘fields’, an individual 
mentally internalizes any number of observed and experienced discourses and 
practices, which form generative schematic structures of unique cognitive and 
embodied dispositions that enable him or her to learn, follow, and modify the rules 
of those spaces. However, while generative, those same internalized ‘structuring 
structures’ are also ‘durable structured structures’ that predispose subjects to 
unconsciously act in accordance with the knowledge and experiences that they 
have been predominantly exposed to. Therefore, for Bourdieu, submission to and 
reproduction of the dominant order is a matter of habitus not consent, as 
individuals are so unconsciously immersed in everyday social practices that they 
may view them as natural, or are more likely completely unaware of them, and are 
thus unable to recognize how those practices may reproduce social inequalities 
(Burawoy, 2008). Thus the enforcement of the dominant order is not primarily 
reliant on overt and repressive state forces, but is rather a more subtle and mostly 
dispositional cognitive process enforced through what Bourdieu (1990, p. 1-2) 
refers to as, "symbolic violence, a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible 
even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels 
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of communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or 
even feeling". For example, racist or sexist attitudes are in many instances implicit. 
These can be stimulated and manifested in subliminal ways that negatively affect 
persons from dominated social groups, but that neither the holder of these attitudes 
or their victims are able to perceive or recognize as racism or sexism (e.g., job or 
housing discrimination). In this sense, therefore, symbolic violence enforces what 
can be understood as socio-cognitive domination, whereby individuals 
unconsciously conform to their own domination. While Bourdieu’s theories in 
many ways resemble the structural socialization theories of the classic Frankfurt 
school and Louis Althusser, they help to erase the problematic distinction between 
structure and agency, and unite them as a simultaneous and reciprocal social 
process (Gewirtz & Cribb, 2009). In engaging in everyday practices, we in effect 
reproduce social structures “in a system of circular relations which unite structure 
and practices” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977. p. 203). Hence, habitus is 
simultaneously structure and agency.
30
  
 However, Althusser and Bourdieu’s theories are even more pessimistic about 
the prospect of social change than the Frankfurters ever were. In a nutshell, their 
theories seem to suggest that capitalist socialization is so ingrained into the psyche 
of individuals living in capitalist societies that social change is essentially a moot 
point. Nonetheless, I argue that socio-cognitive domination via symbolic violence 
and/or ideological interpellation is a necessary component for understanding the 
micro subjective side of the hegemonic coin that can be used to describe and 
explain different aspects of how neoliberalism comes to be supported and 
reproduced by majority populations. More specifically, as will be discussed in the 
following two sections, the sociological concepts of interpellation, and habitus can 
be coupled with ideas from cognitive and social psychology to form a more 
comprehensive theory of social reproduction that accounts for both conscious and 
unconscious emotions, thoughts, and practices, and their key roles in the 
                                                 
30
 Bourdieu’s (2000), concept of agency is not one that tends to emphasize conscious actions, but 
rather one that lays stress on how the seemingly volitional strategies that agents employ in their 
everyday practices stem from unconsciously primed dispositions (Burawoy, 2008; Gerrans, 2005). 
Bourdieu seems to reserve conscious agency for the few that are privileged enough to have the 
time and luxury for deep reflective thinking (Bourdieu, 2000). For instance, in response to notions 
of false consciousness, Bourdieu (2000, p. 172) argues, “While making things explicit can help, 
only a thoroughgoing process of countertraining, involving repeated exercises, can, like an 
athlete’s training, durably transform habitus”. 
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enactment and maintenance of existing macro-structures. As Ridgeway (2006) 
argues, it is in the coupling of socio-cognitive theories with sociological theories 
that we can begin to better understand, explain, and explore how individuals 
internalize, reproduce, modify, and alter macro-level social patterns, such as 
dimensions of stratification, social institutions, or widely shared cultural norms 
and values.  
 
2.4 A Schematic Reconciliation 
 Developments in the fields of socio-cognition and cognitive psychology offer 
a middle ground that can help to resolve the consciousness/unconsciousness 
dilemma that is left unresolved by the available sociological theories of social 
reproduction. To wit, while the French and German theorists thus far discussed 
took seriously the role that the unconscious plays in social reproduction, the 
cognitive dimension of social reproduction remains under-theorized in their work. 
For instance, Althusser never elaborated on his cognitive theoretical 
presuppositions, while Bourdieu seemingly underplays the conscious dimensions 
of agentic practice (Gerans, 2005), and the Frankfurt School adopted a largely 
unfalsifiable and overtly classical Freudian psychosexual approach that reduces 
consciousness to economic and biological determinants. To move beyond these 
limitations, the concept of schema/schemata (also known as schemas, mental 
models/modules/representations/states, scripts, frames, and domains) developed 
by cognitive and social psychologists offers a theoretical solution that accounts for 
both conscious and unconscious cognition, and can also help to provide a more 
thorough explanation of what a habitus actually is and how it works. Schemata, 
according to cognitive and social psychologists, refer to subjective, generative, 
and mentally stored knowledge frameworks that provide a means to organize 
memories, and ideas about a concept, its attributes, and its relationship to other 
concepts, as well as facilitate learning by enabling the rapid integration of new 
associations linked to incoming information. These are stored in episodic, working, 
and long-term memory, are acquired throughout a person’s life via their exposure 
to socio-environmental experiences and stimuli, and function as heuristics that 
help guide the way individuals consciously and unconsciously perceive, interpret, 
synthesize, and react to all of the various forms of socio-environmental stimuli 
that they encounter as they navigate through their daily lives (Baars & Franklin, 
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2003; DiMaggio, 2002; Maqsood et al., 2004; Ren et al., 2013; van Kesteren et al., 
2012). 31  Moreover, schemata also embody an individual’s cognitive 
representations of his/her self-awareness, on the one hand, and the shared beliefs, 
norms, and values of his/hers respective social group on the other (Hull et al., 
1988). Congruently, these culturally shared cognitive representations can be 
networked with and activated by other schemata, which can thereby contribute to 
cultural reproduction and stability. As Sperber & Hirschfeld (2004, p. 6) note: 
 
Representations belonging to a complex system such as a religion 
(which involves not only representations but also practices, artifacts 
and institutions) need not be all anchored in one and the same 
cognitive module [or schema]. On the contrary, multiple anchoring in 
several cognitive mechanisms may contribute to the cultural system’s 
stability. 
 
 Schemata also incorporate or consist of elaborate networks of event 
structures, discourse processing structures, semantic structures, situational/context 
structures, emotion/affect structures, and motivation structures (Izzard, 2007; 
Salzman & Fusi, 2010; Sutton, 2006; Van Dijk, 1997; Zemack-Rugar et al., 2007), 
which in an aggregate form, generate and contain sets of corresponding, embodied, 
and transposable dispositions. Dispositions, in the socio-cognitive context, refer to 
an individual’s unconscious or implicit yet context-specific attitudes, emotions, 
orientations, expectations, and behaviours which have been learned or acquired 
via exposure to specific socio-environmental experiences and stimuli, and which 
manifest automatically according to specific stimuli (Cerulo, 2010; Edwards et al., 
2002; Fishbach & Shah, 2006; Raney, 2004; Sheperd, 2011, Swartz, 2003; Vaisey, 
2009). As Baumeister & Bushman (2008, pp. 151-152) note with reference to the 
automaticity of dispositional schemata, “their pervasiveness, interconnectivity, 
and accessibility are largely determined by the frequency by which they are 
encountered, imagined, and used. With great frequency, even complex knowledge 
structures can become automatized - so over learned that they are applied 
automatically with little effort or awareness”. Moreover, dispositions are also, in 
                                                 
31
 Additionally, schemata are hypothesized to be mental correlates that are enabled and encoded in 
physiological and interconnected neural networks located in the pre-frontal cortex, medial temporal 
lobe, and amygdala structures of the brain (Salzman & Fusi, 2010; van Kesteren et al., 2012).  
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effect, the empirically observable and articulated manifestations of unconscious 
schemata in that they can to some extent be inferred from people’s automatically 
manifested emotions, thoughts, practices, and body language (Bohner & Dickerl, 
2012; Bourdieu, 1990; Danna-Lynch, 2010; Rydell et al., 2006; Van Dijk, 1997). 
To put it more simply, all of our experiences, social understandings, and acquired 
knowledge lie at an unconscious or dispositional state, and are organized in 
specific schemata. However when stimulated, and depending on the context of the 
stimulant and stimulation, these schemata can guide our emotions, thoughts, and 
practices to manifestations that are either dispositional or reflective (Lodge et al., 
1991; Ridgeway, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). As Damasio (1999, p. 332) puts it:  
 
All our memory, inherited from evolution and available at birth, or 
acquired through learning thereafter, in short, all our memory of things, 
of properties of things, of persons, of places, of events and 
relationships, of skills, of biological regulations, you name it, exists in 
dispositional form [...] waiting to become an explicit image or action. 
Note that dispositions are not words. They are abstract records of 
potentialities. 
 
 Although schema theory informs Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of habitus, and 
indeed an argument can be made that a habitus is simply the aggregate set of an 
individual’s socially acquired schemata as I will suggest in Chapter 4, its 
application by cognitive and social-psychologists differs in that schema theory 
distinguishes between, and explores both, automatic and deliberative forms of 
cognition (DiMaggio, 1997); that is, cognition is seen as operating on an 
automatic level when triggered by socio-environmental stimuli, but can also 
operate on a conscious level, e.g., in the form of reflective thought and the 
conscious restructuring of existing schemata. This is especially the case when 
people are exposed to new information and experiences that run counter to their 
established expectations or beliefs, which can trigger an instance of cognitive 
dissonance that pushes individuals to consciously engage with the expectations, 
attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies that make up their pre-existing schemata, and 
which may then lead to the reification or modification of those pre-existing 
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schemata (Briñol et al., 2009; Gawronski & Strack 2004; Ramaprasad, 1993).
32
 As 
Allison & Allison (1993, p. 132) explain: 
 
As such they (schemata) can serve as mental templates for imposing 
conceptual order on complexity, for linking isolated pieces of information 
together into more coherent wholes, and for recognizing non-obvious 
patterns in situations. Prolonged exposure to a given knowledge or action 
domain can reasonably be expected to provide opportunities for 
individuals to acquire information about phenomena, processes, and 
problems characteristic of that domain. Information captured through such 
experience forms the raw material, as it were, for the construction, 
modification, or elaboration of schemata, which then function to guide 
future perception, interpretation, and action. 
 
 Schema theory, and more generally, the theorization and exploration of an 
individual’s cognitive processes of categorization, contextualization, framing, 
perception, interpretation, meaning making, rationalization, and collective 
memory, which in turn guide individual identity-construction and behaviours 
(DiMaggio & Markus, 2010; Van Dijk, 1996), are often ignored in contemporary 
social reproduction studies. Equally overlooked is the fact that social structures are 
also cognitive structures, or what Zeruvabel & Smith (2010) refer to as thought 
communities (e.g., schools, nations, and political movements). These disseminate, 
but are also structured, reproduced, and constrained by the prevalence and 
dominance of specific ideas/discourses, within a specific socio-historical and 
geographic context. While durable, they can be altered or changed through the 
volitional actions of groups and individuals who, in the first instance, reinterpret 
and reframe a given set of specific ideas and discourses. I will argue that schema 
theory and other insights from the cognitive sciences (e.g., cognitive dissonance) 
offer sociologists and other social scientists concerned with the phenomenom of 
social reproduction a more systematic way of making sense of the human mind 
and how it has been influenced by the social world. More specifically, it offers, I 
                                                 
32
 Unlike the Freudian psychodynamic model of the unconscious, the unconscious as 
conceptualized by cognitive and social psychologists is conceived of as an information processing 
centre made up of countless and interconnected schemata, as Riso et al., (2007, p. 12) note,  
“schemas exert their influence through unconscious information processing, rather than through 
unconscious libidinal and instinctual drives”. 
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suggest, a set of organizing principles from which to map out an individual’s 
interpellating experiences and corresponding practices in a way that is more open 
to empirical investigation than standard and classical sociological conceptions 
(e.g., false consciousness, interpellation, and habitus), but which can complement 
and strengthen them, as I will attempt to briefly demonstrate in the following 
section, and in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  
 
2.5 Political-Economic Formation: Habitus and Cognitive Dissonance  
Rather my point is that the pursuit of interest (understood in its most 
vulgar and unmediated form) has become so ingrained in our political 
culture and character that it has made other, more authentically 
political attitudes and practices all but impossible. By universally 
taking up an exploitative, instrumental, and fundamentally strategic 
approach to politics and political action, we have rendered the public 
sphere an unfit place for human habituation (Villa, 2008, p. 6). 
 
 In most sociological and social-psychological accounts, including the ones 
discussed in this chapter, and regardless of their specific theoretical background or 
epistemological emphasis, it is generally agreed that the maintenance and 
reproduction of social structures and institutions of a given society is dependent on 
most of the members within that society consciously and/or unconsciously 
accepting and reproducing dominant and widely shared and specific discourses 
and practices (Bourdieu, 1990; Gill, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Ridgeway, 2006; van 
Dijk 2003). Therefore, in the context of neoliberal reproduction it is important to 
note, as discussed in Chapter 1, that neoliberal discourses promote a specific form 
of political-economic organization and corresponding conception of human nature, 
which can have a significant influence on the formation of people’s political-
economic schemata and concomitant imagination. For example, in the context of 
democratic theory and practice, dominant UK and US social institutions, and mass 
media in particular, seemingly take for granted that most people of Western 
inhabitance know about the many variations of democratic philosophy, and prefer 
representative/consumer strands of it, even though these tend to concentrate power 
in the hands of representatives of mostly elite backgrounds, or in the hands of 
those that mostly serve elite interests. As Babe (2009, p. 37) notes, “commercial 
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media rarely call for picketing or boycotting; rather, voting (for pre-selected and 
heavily marketed candidates) is set forth as the hallmark of democratic 
expression”.  
 I suspect, however, that most from neoliberal societies know as much about 
democratic philosophy and its broad canon and organizational and institutional 
application, as they know about neoliberal theory, i.e., very little. I could of course 
be terribly mistaken about this, but contemporary media-cultural, political science, 
and social reproduction research has lagged in exploring this very crucial 
hegemonic aspect of neoliberal societies. What little work does exist on how UK 
and US non-elite people - viz., people of working and middle-class backgrounds - 
conceive of, interpret, and reproduce democracy (of whatever strand) is often 
relegated to fringe historical or anthropological accounts that are not particularly 
concerned with the role of socio-cognition (e.g., Graeber, 2009:2004; Thompson, 
1993; Zinn, 2003). However, tentative and I would argue necessary points of 
convergence between political-philosophical discourses and practices and socio-
cognitive development can be drawn and laid out for future empirical exploration. 
For instance, according to cognitive linguist Lakoff (2007), repeated exposure to 
the same political messages via mass media can form deep and unconsciously held 
schemata, which predispose people to think and act in accordance with those 
repeated political messages. Therefore, it theoretically follows that repeated 
exposure to the ‘there is no alternative’ discourse, as disseminated by mass media 
and as discussed in section 1.6, can a) predispose individuals to solely and 
automatically conceive of political-economic organization in neoliberal terms that 
now frame the left/right political spectrum, which in the current UK and US 
representative forms usually manifests as voting for the lesser of two or three evils, 
and/or b) generate a sort of cognitive dissonance prompting those who are 
disadvantaged by neoliberalism to rationalize their misfortunes in ways that 
directly correspond to neoliberal discourses (Jost et al., 2003).
33
 Dias et al. (2009) 
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 For example, in a study of how Canadian elders are dealing with cuts to social services, Luxton 
(2010) found that many of her participants, despite having paid taxes and worked hard their entire 
lives, nonetheless blamed their personal choices for their impoverished situations rather than 
expressing a more structural analysis of the complex structural factors that significantly contributed 
to their hardships. The strong emotions that their responses evoke, hint to a pronounced inclination 
on the part of these participants to want to rationalize their existing condition and quell their 
internal dissonance, even if that entails entirely blaming themselves, and thereby inadvertently 
reproducing neoliberal discourses. Luxton (2010) suggests that her participants reflect a form of 
false consciousness whereby they have internalized the neoliberal discourse of rugged 
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argue that human beings have both a conscious and unconscious tendency to avoid 
internal dissonance. Whether this is a natural or learned human cognitive 
predispostion, it follows that individuals who have throughout their lives been 
overexposed to neoliberal ideas (or any other) will seek to consciously and 
unconsciously avoid alternative or conflicting ideas and rationalize their existing 
beliefs, which in effect, contributes to social continuity.  
This thesis starts from the position that research on neoliberal social 
reproduction must take into account and investigate where and how non-elite 
Western inhabitants constitute, practice, rationalize, and reproduce democracy and 
democratic institutions of whatever variety, and how dominant social institutions, 
and mass media in particular, help to shape and inform those specific individual 
and shared cognitive frameworks and their underlying ontological presuppositions 
of human nature. As Jost (1995, pp. 413-414) argues:  
 
Of course, the question of whether some (or most) people do indeed 
possess highly sophisticated and integrated systems of political beliefs 
is a valid and useful empirical question […] but it is important also to 
recognize the opposite, namely the degree to which errors in social 
cognition serve as an  impediment to accurate and useful 
representation of the political world. 
 
2.6 Towards Yet Another Third-Way: A Reformulated Both/And Framework  
 Thus far, I have reviewed and critiqued the last seventy years of some of the 
more prominent social reproduction theories as they apply to Western capitalist 
societies, with specific references to the UK and the US. In sum, these comprised: 
1) the political-economy approach, as employed by the classic Frankfurt School, 
and others, which argues that societal structures disseminate a market-centred 
hegemonic ideology that significantly shapes and frames the socio-cultural 
                                                                                                                                            
individualism. However, false consciousness alone does not account for the strong reactive and 
emotive dissonant cognitive processes that can pressure people to convince themselves of their 
existing beliefs. Hence, in order to better explain how individuals hold and reproduce discourses 
and practices that run counter to their interests and that contribute to theirs and their group’s 
disadvantaged social position, both external socio-structural ideological mechanisms and internal 
cognitive processes must be looked at together (Elster, 1982; Jost, 1995). In other words, cognitive 
dissonance is a phenomenon that, in addition to the other cognitive factors identified above, can 
contribute to neoliberal false consciousness and unconsciousness, but as I will discuss in Chapter 8, 
can also contribute to contesting it.  
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experiences and socio-cognitive development of individuals living in capitalist 
societies; 2) the culturalist approach as employed by the Birmingham School, 
which argues that individuals are active agents in the interpretation and use of 
media-culture; and 3) the both/and approach, employed by Louis Althusser and 
Pierre Bourdieu that calls for a rejection of the structure/agency dichotomy, and 
that pays attention to the role that socio-cognitive dispositions play in reproducing 
society. All of them have useful ideas that can be synthesized and coupled with 
insights from cognitive and social psychology and political philosophy to create 
the kind of more holistic both/and synthesis needed to theorize, study, and 
research the multi-faceted, insidious, and surreptitious effects that neoliberalism 
levies on contemporary young people.  
 Therefore, in order to move beyond the proverbial cul de sac in social 
reproduction theory and towards a reconciliation of the key insights from all of the 
ideas described in this chapter, it is sufficient to argue the following: dominant 
social structures and institutions work to interpellate individuals through a 
hegemonic and discursive set of norms and values which, if internalized, can form 
into a durable habitus comprised of cognitive schemata and corresponding 
dispositions that can predispose agents to beliefs, attitudes, emotions, orientations 
and practices that reproduce those same dominant social structures. A key task for 
social science is to empirically investigate how, if at all, this hegemonic and 
discursive set of norms and values has been cognitively interpreted, framed, 
negotiated, rejected, rationalized, and/or contested by individuals living in 
neoliberal societies. In the current UK and US context, this implies that dominant 
social structures work to interpellate individual agents through a neoliberal habitus, 
and therefore, this investigation requires that research on neoliberal social 
reproduction takes the guidelines below into consideration. These guidelines do 
not constitute a theory per say, but rather offer an orienting conceptual framework 
from which to critique, situate, and synthesize existing theories and develop new 
ones: 
 
 The examination of everyday contexts, social positioning, and cultural 
practices of individuals must be balanced with equal attention to and 
exploration of how existing power structures create and disseminate self-
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serving ideological obfuscations meant to distract, manipulate, and 
interpellate social subjects through neoliberal discourses and practices. 
 It is important to analyze and document how far and in what ways the 
public sphere is being contaminated and inflected by neoliberal interests 
and discourses, and to investigate how corporate mass media and other 
dominant social institutions might influence the political-philosophical 
cognitive frameworks and corresponding practices of audiences. 
 It is important to couple any critique of neoliberal culture and political 
economy with an analysis of oppositional cultures - in part by 
investigating and documenting counter-hegemonic movements and groups, 
and studying the history and habitus of individuals from those movements 
and groups. This can help to guide research away from deterministic or 
reductionist approaches and conclusions.  
 
 While these are admittedly broad guidelines with perhaps overly ambitious 
aims, I will to varying degrees attempt to apply them in the following chapter 
which critically reviews the existing literature on Western and urban young people 
and youth culture. Additionally, and by drawing on the lessons discussed in this 
chapter, I will operationalize these guidelines in the empirical component of the 
methodology for this thesis, which is described in Chapter 4. This 
operationalization consists of a critical ethnographic, inductive, and discourse 
analytic methodology that incorporates the study of macro power structures and 
ideologically charged discourses, the micro processes and contexts of everyday 
life, cultural and textual analysis, political-philosophical critical analysis, and 
socio-cognition inspired depth-investigations into discourses, audiences, and 
effects.  
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Chapter Three 
Young People and Neoliberalism  
What We Don’t Know 
 
 This chapter uses some of the insights and considerations from, and the 
guidelines outlined at the end of, the previous chapter to critically examine the 
substantive empirical literature concerning (mostly Western and urban) young 
people and youth culture. My aims here are to identify some of the gaps in this 
literature, and to point to some of the ways that this thesis will attempt to fill those 
gaps. The literature on young people and youth culture is broad and encompasses 
a variety of academic disciplines, however, some of the most prevalent and central 
themes within it, and those most relevant to this thesis include 1) young people’s 
agentic engagement with media-culture, 2) young people’s agenttic construction 
of their identities, 3) the effects of media-culture on young people’s cognitive 
development and subjectivities, and 4) youth political and civic participation. In 
the following sections, I will review and critique the literature relating to each of 
these themes separately. I end the chapter with a summary of some of the lessons 
that this broad literature has to offer. While aware of the debates around how to 
classify teenaged young people (e.g., adolescents, youth, young people, emerging 
adults etc.), in which some scholars argue that terms like ‘adolescent’ denote a 
pejorative developmental stage, I will sidestep these concerns on pragmatic 
grounds, and use different terms to classify young people interchangeably 
according to the disciplinary background of the studies being reviewed. As stated 
above, the literature reviewed in this chapter, encompasses a variety of disciplines 
from sociology, to psychology, to political science, each with their own assigned 
terminology, which I use accordingly but in a neutral and non-normative manner.  
 
3.1 Cultural Populism: There Is No Such Thing As Society   
 From the 1980s onwards, the mainstream of youth cultural studies diverted 
its attention away from more political engagements, and became increasingly 
focused on the exploration of how audiences manipulate cultural-media texts for 
personal enjoyment. Influenced by French post-structuralist theorists like Jacques 
Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean Baudrillard, this new wave of cultural studies, 
now loosely referred to by McGugian (2000) as ‘cultural populism’, shifted the 
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ontological approach from what can be considered a critical realism of the past 
traditions mentioned in the previous chapter, to a radical subjectivity/interpretative 
approach (Babe, 2009). Popular works like Fiske’s (1988) Television Culture and 
Angela McRobbie’s (1994) Postmodernism and Popular Culture, exemplify this 
post-structuralist turn in cultural studies. These seek to demonstrate some of the 
various ways that audiences manipulate and make their own meanings out of the 
cultural texts that they engage with free from the manipulative influence and 
vested interests of the culture industries and other social institutions. In other 
words, unlike the classic Birmingham theorists who were interested in the 
influence of political-economic and socio-cultural structural constraints on 
audience reception, cultural populist works seem to dismiss such constraints in 
favour of an optimistic and overt celebration of audience autonomy (Shildrick & 
MacDonald, 2006), and/or a celebration of audience consumption and sub-cultural 
practices as sties of political resistance (Gibson, 2000). As cultural populism 
continues to be a dominant and influential strand in the contemporary literature on 
youth cultural studies, it merits attention and consideration. However, in this 
section, I shall only review a brief sample of recent case studies that are 
representative of the cultural populist approach, and pay more attention to 
critiquing it, as this thesis is largely a reaction against this field of academic work.  
Among the most dominant characteristics of the cultural populist literature is 
a redefinition of the term political, which is manifested in the ways cultural-
populist researchers draw on post-subcultural and neo-tribe theories in order to 
extract political meaning from the banal cultural practices of young people. For 
example, in a case study describing the electronic dance music (EDM) youth 
culture in the UK, Riley et al., (2010) argue that youth cultural practices, such as 
raving and clubbing, should be viewed as examples of ‘everyday politics’ that 
highlight how young people demonstrate sovereignty over their own existence. 
According to Riley et al., (2010), the traditional conceptions of political activism 
and practices as tied to social change agendas is problematic, as political 
participation does not have to entail dedicated projects aimed at changing society. 
Since the EDM culture is seen as autonomous and bottom up, directed and created 
by young people themselves, it is, therefore, according to the authors, political as 
although it may not change the world, it does offer a means for young people to 
escape from the complacency and conformity of mainstream neoliberal society. In 
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a similar study on the Psytrance music community, Greener & Hollands (2006) 
argue a similar point, stating that Psytrance music provides a space for autonomy 
and aloofness that should be recognized as examples of ‘everyday politics’. As 
they note: 
 
In contrast to earlier counter-cultural movements, for whom political 
protest was seen as intrinsic to the invocation of social change […] the 
communal utopian ideologies of the virtual psytrance community point 
to the idea that simply living a psytrance lifestyle is a powerful tool for 
social change and transformation of human consciousness […] 
Although the meanings given to psytrance music do not directly lead to 
political protest or activity that challenges society directly […] they do 
offer some form of challenge to modern hegemonies by offering 
psytrancers a means of escape or ‘transcendence’ from regular society. 
(2006, pp. 403-405). 
  
Taking this line of thought even further, Beck (2001) and Farthing (2010) argue 
that contemporary generations of young people have internalized modes of 
democracy that are entirely different from those of previous generations. These 
modes are generally invisible to most theorists and adults whose only conception 
of political falls along a spectrum from active political participation to apathy. 
Instead, Beck (2001) and Farthing (2010) argue for a third conceptualization that 
views young people as what they refer to as  ‘radically unpolitical’. According to 
this alternative view, young people’s withdrawal from engaged and participatory 
forms of politics in favour of lives of self-actualization, is itself a deliberate 
political act that characterizes the new politics of fun that contemporary young 
people are creating in the current globalizing environment. As Farthing (2010, p. 
190) argues:  
 
Young people who refuse to engage in traditional politics, but instead 
watch The Simpsons and buy Nike, are perhaps unintentionally acting 
very politically by depriving politics of their attention and labour, and 
ultimately challenging its monopoly of power. Issues of power, the 
core of politics, are effectively dealt with by simply staying away. 
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 The works described above explicitly argue for a political reinterpretation 
and recognition of youth cultural practices. However, in other parts of the cultural 
populist literature, there is sometimes a conscious and explicit omission of 
political-economy in favour of a seemingly exclusive focus on the shared cultural 
content and experiences of young people (Babe, 2009; McGuigan, 2010). Take, 
for example, Booth’s (2008) textual analysis of users of the social-networking site 
MySpace. In this analysis, Booth (2008) documents how dedicated fans of popular 
media texts not only co-opt and rewrite media texts, but in doing so also reinvent a 
more interactive form of fandom. While traditional notions of fandom paint fans 
as passive and doting recipients, Booth’s (2008, p 517) analysis indicates that new 
media forums allow fans to, “create personas of fictional television characters, and 
through role-play with these characters, identify with, and insert themselves into, 
the narrative of that show”. According to Booth, these new digital practices of 
contemporary audiences necessitate a shift in the focus of the analysis of 
audiences away from concerns about political-economy and towards a critical 
analysis of shared cultural content. Other recent examples of this exclusive focus 
on shared cultural content include works by Demant & Ostenguards (2007) and 
Deadman (2011). In Demans & Ostenguards’ (2007) anthropological account of 
what partying means to Danish young people aged 14–16, they observed that 
partying and drinking for their youth participants is an integrated part of their lives 
that serves to reaffirm friendships and create new meanings; while Dedman’s 
(2011) ethnography of UK hip-hop and youth grime subcultures offers an account 
on how groups of young people create and protect the authenticity of their 
independent music scene, and details the differences between casual and dedicated 
practitioners. In rejecting mainstream hip-hop, Dedman (2011) argues, those 
dedicated practitioners, who he terms ‘purists’, claim a sense of ownership and 
connection to their unique variant of hip-hop music.  
 Admittedly, this has been a brief review. However, the vast majority of what 
can be considered cultural populist or ‘post-subcultural’ research, in some way or 
other makes similar overall arguments, and draws similar conclusions on youth 
cultural practices to the ones described above (Shildrick & MacDonald, 2006). 
Like the classic Birmingham School before them, the cultural populist literature 
offers useful and in depth accounts that demonstrate young people’s inherent 
agency and creativity. However, as Babe (2009) and McGuigan (2000:2010) note, 
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unlike the Birmingham School approach, this now dominant trend in 
contemporary youth cultural studies often takes an apolitical stance that 
completely ignores the constraints of power, culture, and macro structures, or 
seemingly denies that these factors have any influence on individuals whatsoever. 
As Gill (2008, p. 3) notes in direct reference to the cultural populist literature, “A 
paradoxical aspect of the current ‘critical’ writing on this topic is that it reduces 
culture to a mere epiphenomenon, rather than seeing it as a collection of practices 
that can and do have real, material effects”. If taken to their logical conclusion, 
cultural populist arguments imply that individuals are completely sovereign and 
autonomous agents that are impervious to structural manipulation and fully 
conscious of the cultural practices and beliefs that they exhibit.  
 Furthermore, in narrowing the analytic lens to the interpretation and personal 
manipulation of cultural texts and artefacts, the fact that the night-time production 
of cultural commodities is done by workers from the developing world, often in 
deplorable and slave-like conditions, gets completely ignored (Klein, 2000). It is 
no exaggeration to claim that the luxury for Western consumers to interpret signs 
and symbols, which are embedded in material commodities, is reliant on the 
exploitation of third-world workers (often children) and the natural environment. 
This fact can potentially and understandably be left unnoticed by Western 
audiences, as all corporatized culture presents them with are finalized products 
and enticing advertisements where the exploitation is hidden. Worse still, not only 
are these political-economic realities ignored by cultural populist approaches in 
their valorisation of audience interpretations and uses, but they are in some cases 
replaced by disconcerting and overly relativized notions that seemingly read any 
individual use of popular culture and youth style as political (Barker, 2011). The 
fact that young people can in some cases produce their own culture rather than 
ceding it to the market, underpins this central cultural populist argument that 
seems to claim that media-culture consumption can be, or is indeed, politically 
revolutionary (Holt, 2002), as hinted at by the Riley et al., (2010) and Hollands 
(2006) studies described above. However, as Holt (2002, p. 89), inspired by the 
classic Frankfurt School arguments, notes: 
 
Consumers are revolutionary only insofar as they assist entrepreneurial 
firms to tear down the old branding paradigm and create opportunities 
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for companies that understand emerging new principles. Revolutionary 
consumers helped to create the market for Volkswagen and Nike and 
accelerated the demise of Sears and Oldsmobile. They never threatened 
the market itself. What has been termed “consumer resistance” is 
actually a form of market-sanctioned cultural experimentation through 
which the market rejuvenates  itself. 
 
 Therefore, and as noted at the end of the previous chapter, while it is 
important to document how audiences consciously interpret and use culture, the 
cultural populist approach is problematic because it is exclusively centred on 
micro and individual contexts, and that does not take into account how large 
macro forces are at play. We may never know how we internalize socially 
constructed ideas, and make them authentically our own, but there is an explicit 
danger in completely ignoring the socializing effects of mass media and culture in 
favour of arguments for the fully active and fully sovereign consumer (McGuigan, 
2010:2010a). Such notions, argue Gill (2008) and McGuigan (2000), mirror 
neoliberal ontological claims of the fully rational and free-choosing agent, and 
ignore the manipulative ideological intent of power elites. Therefore, if neoliberal 
social reproduction is to be more comprehensively researched, it is crucial to take 
a more reflective and humble stance that acknowledges manipulation, and to 
investigate and recognize the ways in which contemporary social institutions 
influence, condition, and manipulate our everyday practices and conceptions of 
the social world. As Babe (2009, p. 4) argues: 
 
To study culture without taking into account either the influence of the 
political-economic base or the political-economic consequences of 
cultural activities is to be naïve in the extreme. These oversights can 
cause one to misconstrue oppression as pluralism, persuasion as 
democratic, and elite control as popular freedom. 
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3.2 Beyond Identity: So What? 
We wonna live for now, wanna live while we’re young, want money to go out 
with, wanna go with women now, wanna have cars now. 
      -Joey (in Willis, 1977, pp. 97-98) 
  
 The second, and equally dominant strand in post-structuralist research on 
young people focuses on youth identity construction. While the concept of 
‘identity’ is often used in vague, abstract, and theoretically convoluted ways 
(Gewirtz & Cribb, 2009), post-structuralist/constructivist accounts tend to define 
‘identity’ as a fluid, multiple, and fragmented product of competing discourses, 
whereby young people actively construct their identities around the competing 
socio-cultural discourses available to them (Barbosa, 2008; Brubaker & Cooper, 
2000: Gewirtz & Cribb, 2009; Nila & Feixa, 2006). Like the cultural populist 
literature discussed in the previous section, these post-structuralist accounts also 
draw on the theoretical contributions from the landmark works of the classic 
Birmingham School. In this section, I will review and critique a selection of 
ethnographic accounts that are representative of this work. 
 A prevalent concern in this literature is the documentation and critical 
examination of how marginalized young people develop a sense of self in reaction 
to oppressive institutional constraints. For example, in a study of minority ethnic 
working-class identities and schooling, drawing on interviews and focus groups 
with 20 pupils from an inner-city secondary school in London, Archer and 
Yamashita (2003) highlight the conflict between active youth identity construction 
and academic success, arguing that their participants, being aware of their 
devalued and subordinate societal position, resisted normative White middle-class 
discourses of the ‘good student’. Instead, their participants drew on a number of 
available discourses that ranged from anti-school ‘bad boy’ identities, to Black 
Caribbean identities as a means of being recognized and valued against a backdrop 
of societal disenfranchisement. In a similar study on working-class minority ethnic 
young women, Archer et al., (2007) documented how working-class female 
students resisted instances of symbolic violence through agentic practices such as 
‘speaking my mind’. According to this account, the female participants rejected 
gendered, racialized, and classed norms and acted loudly and combatively against 
their teachers as a means of gaining visibility and worth for themselves within the 
school. As Archer et al., (2007, p. 558) note: 
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In this sense, we would suggest that gender, class and ‘race’ relations 
between teachers and pupils mean that schools can be experienced as 
alien spaces for ‘other’ femininities. The girls’ data also conveys the 
impossibility for working class girls to attain valued (and respected) 
forms of middle class  female ‘goodness’— which remained a desired 
yet refused subject position. The girls also appeared to be constrained 
by the lack of a discursive space within which to enact an acceptable, 
or accepted, ‘bad girl’ femininity.  
 
Hollingworth & Williams (2010) provide yet another corroborating analysis in 
their study of the ‘chav’ subculture. Exploring the class and racial dimensions of 
(this ‘chav’) subculture, they argue that white working-class pupils identified as 
‘chavs’ as a means to symbolize what they viewed and valued as a more authentic 
‘whiteness’ that is otherwise lost in the normative middle-class discourses of the 
good student.  
Other researchers have focused on the role that space and place play in 
helping young people shape their own identity as they transition into adulthood 
(Blackman, 2007; MacDonald & Marsh, 2005). For example, in an ethnographic 
study that explored how a group of young people used a secluded area in a public 
park in London, Robinson (2009) argues that, in between the increasingly 
commodified and heavily surveilled public spaces, other public spaces like parks 
can function as a site of agency and empowerment for young people. Her youth 
participants, Robinson (2009) noted, were able to carve a sense of history and self-
identity away from the more constraining, authoritative, and regulated youth 
centres and after-school programmes. Moreover, in addition to physical space, 
recent research explores how new media forums accessed via the Internet have 
created virtual spaces, providing contemporary Western young people with yet 
another site to engage with and develop their identities, one that is unique to the 
post-1980s generation. For example, in a study on the discursive dialectical 
dynamics between female teen identities and fashion blogs, Chittenden (2010) 
draws on open-ended email interviews with ten teen girls (mostly from the US), 
and argues that the Internet provides a virtual space which facilitates social 
patterns, conversation discovery, and which allowed her participants to signal 
meaningful cues about themselves. Other studies have noted how the Internet, and 
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in particular social networking sites like Facebook, provide Western youth 
entering universities with the discursive space to build on their existing identities 
as they try to negotiate between keeping their old friendships, and forming new 
friendships as they navigate through their university experiences (Abeele & Roe, 
2011; Stephenson-Aberz & Holman, 2012). As Stepehonson-Abetz & Holman 
(2012, p. 189) argue: 
 
Facebook is not a window into students’ inner, fixed selves, but a 
puzzle  where the anticipation of responses from varying ‘‘others’’ 
connects with culturally constrained understandings and students’ own 
contextual desires, constructing and communicating a meaningful 
picture. Perhaps our new media relationships have fully ‘‘saturated’’ 
ourselves [….] leading us to a more complicated fragmentation of the 
self, as we are constantly and often contradictorily defined by a 
saturation of interactions. 
 
 These studies all make convincing cases that demonstrate that young people 
are not ‘docile subjects’ that are determined and permanently socialized according 
to the ideals of their respective societies. However, they, and in particular those 
concerned with marginalized youth, still do not provide a sufficient answer or 
explanation for the classic question posed by Golding and Murdoch (1977): how is 
it that the gross injustices and inequalities of contemporary capitalism come to be 
understood as natural, inevitable and legitimate by those who benefit the least 
from them? That is, while the marginalized young people discussed in some of the 
above accounts recognized their subordinate social positioning to be the result of 
racial, class, and/or gender inequalities, it does not follow that their recognition of 
structural inequalities, and the consequent recusant attitudes and behaviours that 
they developed as a result of such recognition, represent genuine resistance. 
Resistance has a revolutionary overtone, it implies actions directed at changing 
and overthrowing established social-structures and institutions. It was not clear 
that the young people in these studies constructed anti-school identities for the 
purposes of social change; particularly as such identity constructions are unlikely 
to change school culture. In fact, these studies produce no in depth insight into 
these young people’s politics, or of their knowledge or conceptions about their 
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respective political-economic systems, or how they think they can change or 
influence those systems. And in the case of Archer & Yamashita’s (2003) and 
Hollingworth & Williams’ (2010) studies, their male participants’ active 
construction of the ‘bad boy’ or ‘chav’ identity included practices of conspicuous 
consumption (e.g., the wearing of jewelery and stylish clothing) that actually serve 
to sustain and perpetuate global systems of economic and environmental 
exploitation. Is the fact, that the branded clothing and accessories, which are 
central to their sense of masculinity, are mostly produced by exploited workers 
from the developing world for the profit of a few corporations and their upper-
class owners acknowledged, or in any way addressed by these marginalized 
youth? Furthermore, is the ‘bad boy’ or ‘bad girl’, or even ‘chav’ identity really an 
authentic, organic, and unique expression of localized anti-school rebellion, or is it 
yet another commodified signifier cribbed from popular media-culture? As Walker 
(1985) argues, in direct response to the ‘resistance interpretation’ attributed to 
Willis’s (1977) landmark study, marginalized young people are not usually 
resisting oppressive school authorities when they adopt anti-school attitudes and 
practices (an explanation which carries political connotations); in the vast majority 
of cases, they are simply being recalcitrant for any number of non-political reasons 
(e.g., to seem cool or to fit in better with friends). 
It is not my intention to devalue the complicated ways in which the young 
people described in these studies navigate their ways through oppressive social 
settings to find a sense of self. However, these active constructions of the self, 
operate on a mostly symbolic level that does not threaten the political-economic 
material system that generates those oppressive social settings. As Hebdige (1980, 
p. 84) argues: 
 
Youth sub-cultural styles [or identities] are meaningful mutations 
capable of embodying a symbolic refusal of the social consensus upon 
which Western democracies depend. But in the end, no amount of sub-
cultural incantation can alter the oppressive mode in which the 
commodities used in a sub-culture [or to signify an identity] have been 
produced.   
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A more critical approach to youth identity construction is offered by Estrada & 
Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (2011) ethnography of Latino immigrant street vendor youth 
in Los Angeles. Estrada & Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (2011) study sought to answer the 
question of why it is that youth street vendors, despite being taunted by their peers 
and chased by the police, consented to such work. Drawing on participant-
observation and in-depth interviews, they argue that the young people in their 
study dealt with the experiences of stigma, shame, and humiliation associated with 
their work by constructing affirming identities around what Estrada & 
Hondagneu-Sotelo call intersectional dignities (i.e., inversions of popular negative 
stereotypes of marginalized groups). For example, some participants identified as 
hard-working Mexicans in direct contrast to those Latino youth that they viewed 
as lazy cholos [gangsters] and fresitas [spoiled princesses]. While these identity 
constructs served to create a sense of pride and self-worth in their work, Estrada & 
Hondagneu-Sotelo explicitly stopped short of viewing such constructions as 
resistance. They note, “their counter-narratives of intersectional dignities will 
probably help them in the long run, fortifying self-esteem, but in some ways, the 
narratives reify negative stereotypes of others, and in doing so, reproduce 
ideologies that uphold social inequalities” (2011, p. 125). In other words, a focus 
on identity construction and its symbolic meaning, which seems to always lead to 
the conclusion that social subjects actively position themselves around contingent 
identities that fluctuate across different social settings, lacks, if not ignores, a 
coherent and important political-economic/material context in which these 
identities are constructed; particularly one necessary to make the claim of 
resistance more valid. Drawing on Hebdige’s (1980) and Estrada & Hondagneu-
Sotelo’s (2011) analysis, I argue that it is more important to focus on young 
people’s socio-cultural and political-economic dispositions, thoughts, emotions, 
and practices (which are situated within a socio-cultural and political-economic 
context and which may, or may not, be related to an identity); and to explore the 
extent to which young people are cognizant of the link between their values and 
practices, and the perpetuation or challenging of existing and unjust social 
structures. The literature on the anti-neoliberal globalization movement gives 
examples of this by providing accounts that move beyond youth identity/socio-
cultural symbolic agency, to descriptions of material, and I would argue, 
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genuinely resistant youth political-economic agency (e.g., Graeber, 2009; Klein, 
2000).  
 For instance, Graeber’s (2009) ethnography describes his participant-
observation of a group of young anarchist activists. In this account, Graber notes 
how the group members reified their anarchist identities through their experiences 
and practices protesting and organizing against the 2001 Free Trade Area of the 
Americas Summit and other neoliberal institutional events. He details how and 
why the anarchists differed from the more liberal and authoritarian socialist groups. 
But rather than giving primacy to what the young activists chose to identify as, 
Graber’s concern is to describe the group’s decision making processes and actions 
(informed by a principled political philosophy of direct democracy), that 
demonstrated both material resistance and alternatives to oppressive social 
structures, and not just ‘partial penetration’ or symbolic resistance. More to the 
point, Graeber points to a crucial distinction between lifestyle anarchists, who are 
revolting against alienation, and those revolting against oppression. The former 
enact a drop-out culture of dumpster diving, squatting, and train hopping as a 
direct rejection of the mainstream capitalist culture (note here the parallels to the 
young people who are the focus of the identity construction studies), while the 
latter are more preoccupied with building alternative institutions than with image 
and identity. The dilemma for revolutionary coalitions, Graber (2009, p. 240) 
argues, is how to synthesize the two: 
 
As anarchists and revolutionaries, therefore, they are faced with the 
same dilemma: whether to try to create an alternative culture of their 
own, or to concentrate on alliance work, supporting the struggles of 
those who suffer most under the existing system, but who are also 
willing to work with them as allies. To put it crudely: they have to 
choose between whether to focus on their own alienation or others' 
oppression. 
  
Klein’s (2000) more journalistic account, on the other hand, reviews how the 
neoliberal political-economic processes of the last thirty years have inflected 
Western youth culture, and describes several actions that young people from 
across the US and Canada have taken against the ongoing corporatization of their 
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culture and public spaces (e.g., culture jamming, street reclamations, and strategic 
anti-corporate boycotts). Of particular note, she describes how a group of social-
workers from the ghettos of New York City educated hitherto Nike obsessed 
impoverished Black and Latino boys about Nike’s contribution to the loss of US 
manufacturing jobs and exploitation of overseas workers. This led to a city-wide 
campaign demanding that Nike address the charges of labour exploitation, 
culminating in a large demonstration with several teenage boys tossing their Nike 
trainers at Nike’s flagship store in Manhattan. While recognizing that 
impoverished youth wear Nike clothing as a way to feel important, Klein (2000, p. 
156) notes: 
 
The African-American and Latino kids outside Nike Town on Fifth 
Avenue, the ones swarmed by cameras and surrounded by curious 
onlookers, were feeling pretty important, too. Taking on Nike "toe to 
toe," as they said, turned out to be even more fun than wearing Nikes. 
With the Fox News camera pointed in his face, one of the young 
activists, a thirteen-year-old boy from the Bronx, stared into the lens 
and delivered a message to Phil Knight: "Nike, we made you. We can 
break you". 
 
 From both Graber’s (2009) and Klein’s (2000) accounts, we get an insight 
into marginalized young people’s politics, their knowledge and conceptions of 
their respective political-economic systems, and how they think they can change 
or influence those systems. They help to provide such insights by situating young 
people’s cultural agency within larger political-economic concerns, and in that 
regard, move beyond an overemphasis on the fluidity and fragmented nature of 
identity construction, to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced picture of 
counter-hegemony. While the anti-neoliberal globalization movement may 
constitute a unique case of young people’s cultural and political agency, the 
majority of the literature on youth identity construction all but ignores questions 
about young people’s political-economic knowledge and sense of political efficacy 
providing little insight into the possible future political trajectories of 
contemporary young people. And in particular, there is a relative inattention given 
to how certain manifestations of youth agency reproduce and reinforce unequal 
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power structures, and whether or not young people are aware that their views and 
concurrent practices may contribute to the maintenance and reproduction of social 
structures that generate social inequalities. My primary interest in this thesis is 
thus to move the focus of sociological exploration of young people from identity 
construction to specific accounts of social reproduction and social change. To wit, 
I am interested in how young people cognitively process and frame both the socio-
cultural and political-economic discourses that they are exposed to, and how far 
these cognitive processes and frameworks are reflected in unconscious 
dispositions and practices that affirm, maintain, and reproduce existing social 
structures, and/or into conscious practices that directly challenge, and seek to 
replace existing social structures. This is not to suggest that research on young 
people should abandon identity construction all together, but rather that accounts 
of identity construction need to be situated within a larger political-economic 
context if they are to avoid mirroring the ‘Neo-Romantic’ trappings of cultural 
populism. 
 
3.3 Media-Culture Effects: Cognitive and Others 
“Neuropsychology has proven that whenever rational thinking conflicts with 
emotion, emotion will win - if harnessed this can be a very powerful tool for 
marketing.” (London Kid Power Market research conference, 2002)34 
 
 Media-culture is at the centre of the majority of Western young people’s 
leisure activity, if not their lives. The recent advancements in communications 
technology have made it possible for contemporary Western young people to draw 
on a range of cultural artefacts from which to create their unique sense of cultural 
identity. From the Morrissey obsessed ‘cholos’ in East Los Angeles, to the trend-
setting hipsters in Shoreditch London, contemporary Western youth culture is a 
bizarre amalgamation of past and present styles, music, art, and literature drawn 
from seemingly all over the world. The UK’s Channel Four sponsored an in-depth 
nation-wide quasi-ethnography that identified twenty-four separate ‘youth tribes’, 
e.g., the ‘get paid crew’, ‘indie scenesters’, ‘trendies’, ‘young alts’, and ‘sports 
junkies’. According to this extensive, albeit non-academic and corporately 
motivated, research, each of these twenty-four subcultures consist of young people 
                                                 
34
 Marketer cited in Beader et al., (2009, p. 47). 
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with specific shopping, viewing, listening, and dressing practices and a correlated 
set of values and aspirations. Members of the ‘get paid crew’, for example, are 
mostly disadvantaged youth who wear Nike trainers, read the Financial Times, 
and aspire to take business study courses and be wealthy and famous. Their 
biggest influences/role models include rap moguls Jay Z and Damon Dash, and 
television personality and business mogul Alan Sugar. In this section, I will look 
at academic studies that, like the UK’s Channel Four Youth Tribes research, are 
concerned to describe some of the influences and effects of mass consumer media 
culture on young people’s subjectivities and practices. Rather than representing a 
return to a deterministic structuralism that posits young people as passive 
recipients of media discourses, this nascent literature offers more sophisticated 
insights on the interplay between media-culture, socio-cognition, and subjectivity.  
 To return to the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, it is important to note that 
the post-1980s generation of young people’s socio-cognitive development has 
been underpinned by an unprecedented exposure to corporatized media-culture 
(Beader et al., 2009; Linn, 2004). Additionally, constant exposure to specific 
socio-environmental stimuli can have a significant influence in shaping an 
individual’s socio-cognitive schemas and dispositions (Achenreiner & John, 2003; 
Fishbach & Shah, 2004; Lewicki & Hill, 1987). Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that the powerful advertising and discourses of consumer media-culture 
are to some extent succeeding in turning large numbers of youth into what 
Brookes & Kelly (2009) refer to as ‘artefacts of consumption’. Several studies 
seem to suggest that, faced with such culture, most of today’s young people are 
hard-pressed to significantly refuse it (Beader et al., 2009; Becker, 2004; Hamilton, 
2012). For example, a US study on the effects of food advertising on children by 
Story & French (2004) found that there is a strong correlation between the food 
industry’s intensive and increasing media marketing of fast-food, sweets, and soft-
drinks, and the rising rates of diabetes and obesity. According to the findings, 15% 
of US young people are overweight, as compared to only 3% in 1980 when 
regulations on marketing to young people were stricter. In another example, a 
survey study of 79 UK secondary school students by Cassidy and Schijndel (2011) 
explored the effects of ‘cool marketing’ on teenage identity development. The 
authors drew on a developmental model of identity, which categorizes teenagers 
as passive (if they display traits of low self-esteem and low social adjustment), or 
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active (if they display traits of high self-esteem and are socially mobile and active). 
Their methodology consisted of a questionnaire that, in part, included questions 
about participants’ taste in music, subcultural identification, peer influence, and 
sense of community. According to their findings, 62% of the respondents 
expressed passive traits, which corroborated their hypothesis that most of the 
Western teenage demographic is passive. Cassidy and Schijndel (2011), described 
passive teenagers as the primary target of cool marketers who seek to manipulate 
and take advantage of their insecurities: 
 
The findings, though limited to only one locality, show that the 
majority of the sample was identified as being passive, implying that 
the majority of these teenagers were aspirational in their quest for cool. 
In addition, more of the participants felt a part of web-based 
communities such as Bebo than of their local community. The study 
suggests that marketers, ethically or otherwise, are able to target the 
passive majority by encouraging feelings of being un-cool encouraging 
the empty self to then profit from the sales of a cool fulfilling product 
(p. 163).  
 
It bears repeating that this does not suggest that the majority of young people 
who are beholden to consumer media culture, lack agency. The research discussed 
in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter, clearly refute this. However, it is imperative 
to recognize that contemporary young people are faced with a seemingly infinite 
slew of influential celebrities telling them to wear certain jeans, skirts, shirts, 
shoes, as well as a barrage of overt and subliminal adverts via music, film, 
television, and the Internet that tell them that how they look and what they have is 
inadequate. Any claims to young people’s agency must be qualified by this fact. 
For example, a content analysis of the popular and tween girl oriented Australian 
magazine Dolly, conducted by Brookes & Kelly (2009), revealed that, despite 
their targeted readership being only 10-13 years old, Dolly issues contained highly 
sexualized representations of slim and attractive young women. Describing the 
tween phenomenon as a pre-adolescent stage, Brookes & Kelly (2009) argue that 
appearance magazines like Dolly make extensive use of young celebrity pop and 
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movie stars to situate the tween identity within consumerist and commodified 
discursive spaces: 
  
Our proposition is that the resources Dolly presents to its readership, 
including tweenies, are powerful, commodified and pre-packaged, and, 
at the same time, limited in scope and form. Tweenies can fashion an 
active,  healthy, attractive self from these resources, but this self must 
take a particular form (p. 606). 
  
 Other researchers are beginning to explore the relationship between 
subjectivity and media culture. For example, DeWall et al., (2011) conducted a 
psycholinguistic and statistical analysis of the lyrics from the US’s Hot 100 
Billboard songs from the years 1980-2007. The researchers found that, since 1980, 
the use of words like ‘I’ and ‘me’ have appeared more frequently in popular music, 
while words like ‘we’ and ‘us’ are used less often. DeWall et al., (2011) argue that 
the statistically significant rise in the self-cantered and narcissistic discourses 
found in popular music correlates with several large-scale psychometric survey 
results indicating that contemporary young people are more narcissistic than ever 
before. DeWall et al., (2011) are not making a direct link between the music and 
narcissistic subjectivities, but rather, as they put it, “these findings offer novel 
evidence regarding the need to investigate how changes in the tangible artefacts of 
the sociocultural environment can provide a window into understanding cultural 
changes in psychological processes” (p. 200). Two other recent studies by Uhls & 
Greenfield (2011) and Twenge et al. (2012) draw similar conclusions. In the 
former, Uhls & Greenfield (2011) conducted a mixed quantitative and qualitative 
study to explore how popular media are interpreted by a cross-sectional sample of 
preadolescents from Los Angeles, and how those interpretations relate to their 
media practices and life aspirations. Drawing on a theory of human development 
and social change, which predicts that as societies become more technologically 
developed, urbanized, educated, and wealthier, psychological development should 
follow a direction of increasing ‘individualism’, Uhls & Greenfield (2011) argue 
that the advancements in communications technology, and particularly the Internet 
found in Western countries are driving a cultural shift towards individualism. 
Specifically, the researchers found that ‘fame’, as a discourse that is historically 
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more cognitively accessible to current Western youth via media-culture, is the 
most sought after goal by the highest percentage of their participants. They 
conclude that, “adolescents and young adults have, over the decades, become 
more focused on the self, unrealistically ambitious, and oriented toward material 
success—all individualistic values that resonate with the value of fame,” (2011, p. 
1). The Twenge et al., (2012) study, examined two sets of extensive longitudinal 
surveys that gauge American high school and university freshman respondents for 
intrinsic values (e.g., self-acceptance, community) and extrinsic values (e.g., 
money, fame). They compared the responses from three generations; the Baby 
Boomers (born 1946–1961), GenX’ers (born 1962–1981) and Millenials (born 
after 1982). While not offering an explanation as to why, Twenge et al., (2012) 
conclude that the Millenials express more extrinsic values than the previous 
generations, and contrary to popular notions, are less caring, community oriented, 
and politically engaged than previous generations.  
 Overall, the studies described in this section suggest that the effects of 
popular media-culture on young people’s subjectivities cannot be underestimated. 
Notably, they suggest that there exists a significant correlation between the 
consumerist and self-cantered discourses disseminated and valorised by mass 
media-culture, and the values, concerns, and aspirations that contemporary 
Western young people who are entering adulthood, express. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that popular music, magazines, television shows, movies, 
and websites have vast interpellating potential, and help form or shape 
contemporary young people’s aesthetic agency, identity, and biography (Boyles, 
2008). To be certain, media-culture videlicet in the form of music which lies at the 
centre of media-culture,
35
 has a powerful semiotic affect that can help to conjure 
up past experiences, or to reinforce one’s beliefs, aspirations, and identity (De 
Nora, 2007). However, like the post-structuralist accounts discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter, the studies discussed in this section also fail to 
                                                 
35
 Contemporary popular music is mutually interwoven with other mediums of popular media 
culture, including films, television shows, magazines, newspapers, adverts, and the Internet, 
making it the centre of popular culture. Recent advancements in technology mean that the sheer 
amount of music readily available at the click of a button is staggering and unprecedented in 
history. An iPod for example (a staple accessory of a significant portion of Western youth) can 
carry anywhere from 500-40,000 songs depending on the model. Other types of mp3 players offer 
similar capacities. These technological advancements alone mean that a significant portion of 
Western young people who own iPods or other kinds of mp3 players are probably more exposed to 
popular music than to any other forms of media culture like films, television, or magazines.  
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adequately connect their participants’ accounts with the wider neoliberalization of 
Western societies that has occurred over the that last thirty years. That is, they do 
not make the connections between the materialistic and hyper self-interested and 
self-cantered discourses promoted by neoliberalism and neoliberal institutions as 
discussed in Chapter 1 and those self-interested and self-cantered values expressed 
by their participants. The Uhls & Greenfield (2011) study drew on Greenfield’s 
(2009) theory of human development. This theory takes a technological 
deterministic view of social change, and conflates individualism (e.g., self-reliance 
and independence in thought and self-expression) with self-centeredness and self-
interestedness (e.g., a preoccupation with one’s image, needs, and advantages 
without regard for others), which, reminiscent of Fukuyama’s (1994) central thesis, 
sees the progression of societies towards marketization and self-interested values 
as natural and, therefore, inevitable. There is, however, a nascent literature that, 
ala the classic Frankfurt School, is beginning to explore the relationship between 
the dominant socio-cultural values of market societies and psychological traits and 
distress (Black, 2007; Hamilton & Dennis, 2005; James, 2007:2008; Kasser et al., 
2007). The central premise of this growing literature is that the selfish and 
materialistic values overly promoted by market societies are highly correlated with 
an increase in psychological distress and disorders, as, in a never ending race for 
the accumulation of wealth and commodities, individuals become alienated and 
unfulfilled. The literature reviewed in this section sensitizes us to some of the 
values that current young people may hold. It also highlights the need to situate 
the effects of media-culture on an individual’s subjectivitiy within a historically 
specific political-economic context. As Erich Fromm (2001, p. ix) (one of the 
major psychologists from the classic Frankfurt School) argues:  
 
The basic entity of the social process is the individual, his desires and 
fears, his passions and reason, his propensities for good and for evil. 
To understand the dynamics of the social process we must understand 
the dynamics of the psychological processes operating within the 
individual, just as to understand the individual we must see him in the 
context of the culture which moulds him.  
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3.4. Civic/Political Participation 
 In addition to the literature thus far described, there is another substantive 
body of work that focuses on the processes of young people’s political 
socialization, i.e., how young people come to understand and participate in the 
political and civic institutions of their society. Unlike the cultural populist 
accounts described in the earlier sections of this chapter, the term political in this 
literature has a specific and non-elastic definition. It is generally used to denote 
those contesting or supportive interactions with the state and its institutions that 
include individual actions as well as those collectively undertaken with fellow 
community members around matters of shared concern (Flannagan & Faison, 
2001; Roogers et al., 2012). In this section, I will review a sample of studies form 
this literature in order to draw out the main insights these studies offer into how 
young people today practice politics. 
 One of the more prevalent issues in the literature on youth politics concerns 
young people’s disengagement from formal democratic institutions, where 
democracy is practiced through the ballot box (Edelstein, 2001). For instance, US 
authors, Liu & Kelly (2010) argue that there is a generation gap between past and 
present voters, with contemporary young people having a lower voting rate than 
previous generations. In an effort to explore how to address this gap, Liu & Kelly 
(2010) conducted a service learning study. As part of this study, students from 
their upper division political sociology class (equivalent to 3
rd
 year university level 
course in the UK) were required to serve some of their time at a non-profit 
community centre, and apply what they were learning in the classroom to real life 
political situations. Their study coincided with the 2008 US presidential election, 
and students were placed in an organization that focused on voter drives. The 
authors noted that getting young people to be civically engaged in this fashion 
proved to be a rather difficult task, as, out of the 35 plus students originally 
enrolled for the class, only half stayed and agreed to the service-learning 
requirement. For the ones that stayed, the authors argue that the process of 
democratic engagement, as messy and difficult as it is, is facilitated by direct 
involvement in the local community. According to Liu & Kelly, their students 
used their technological savvy to spread voter initiatives, and through their use of 
technological mediums, gained a lasting sense of civic empowerment. As one 
student in the study wrote:  
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After my experiences in this course, I have implemented a lot of these 
elements into my daily life. I have increased my knowledge in the 
political process. I have changed my mind set and have become more 
open to other beliefs and ideas. I have also encouraged those closest to 
me, to exercise their civic duties by voting. In addition, I understand 
the power in numbers. We as citizens do have the power to make a 
difference (p.12). 
  
 Other research focuses on the effects of a political and civics formal and 
informal education on young people’s political socialization. This body of work 
attempts to understand the extent to which educating young people about political 
and civic issues influences their long-term political beliefs and practices. While 
there is no consensus on what amount of civic and political exposure, and at what 
age, leads to a significant rise in the politicization of young people, at least four 
factors are agreed upon. First, the current level of civic and political education 
offered to Western young people is minimal. Second, even minimal exposure can 
lead to young people being politically involved. Third, the longer the exposure the 
more likely is it that they will form lasting politically active dispositions. And 
fourth, political and civics education, both formal and informal, is most effective 
when the lessons are put into practice, and when young people are treated as active 
citizens and allowed a meaningful role in decision making (Davies et al., 2005; 
Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Vromen & Collin, 2010; Youniss et al., 2002). For 
example, Davie et al., (2005) conducted a project in a local education authority in 
the north of England aimed at developing a comprehensive civics programme that 
would train young people in more participatory forms of democratic action. 
Among other initiatives, the researchers organized events that involved “large 
numbers of young people and adults, provided opportunities for young people to 
learn by doing in a structured environment, e.g. class debate, voting on a topical 
issue, and facilitated opportunities for young people to get involved for real, e.g. 
shadow voting at local, General and European Parliament elections” (p, 5). At the 
conclusion of their project, Davies et al., (2005) concluded that a formal civics 
education programme where young people are allowed meaningful and active 
input in their civics education can effectively help to train young people to act as 
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responsible citizens within and beyond schools. A similar conclusion is drawn by 
Vromen & Collin (2010), who, in the Australian context, argue, based on their 
discussions with youth groups and policy makers concerned with youth political 
engagement, that participation and active involvement in civic and political 
decision making is meaningful for young people when it is youth-led, fun, 
informal, and relevant to their everyday experiences. Rogers et al., (2012) argue, 
in their review and analysis of young peoples as organizers in marginalized 
communities across the US, that youth organizing that goes beyond formal politics 
(e.g., voting) has the potential to enhance civic learning and development amongst 
marginalized young people, and can foster norms that promote the public good in 
distinctive ways. However, while these studies advocate for young people’s 
engagement in participatory forms of democracy, the explicit teaching of theories 
and ideas of participatory/direct democracy is not suggested. For example, while 
the young people in the Davies et al., (2005) and Rogers et al., (2012) accounts 
were given outlets to practice direct forms of democracy, there was no mention in 
these accounts of whether or not young people were exposed to the corresponding 
theoretical perspective that could have informed them of how what they were 
doing is different from the standard form of representative democracy. For 
example, Torney-Purta et al., (2001) conducted a survey study of students’ 
knowledge of formal democratic institutions and practices (e.g., voting, political 
parties) in twenty-eight countries. The researchers found a consistent correlation 
across all countries between the use of democratic practices in the classroom, such 
as open and respectful discussion of political issues, and young people’s 
knowledge of representative forms of democracy, which was, in turn, correlated 
with students’ intention to vote. As in all the other accounts discussed in this 
section, Torney-Putra et al., (2001) take voting and the representative forms of 
democracy that they generate and sustain for granted, and neglect to explore the 
extent of students’ knowledge of other forms of democracy e.g., consensus, 
demarchy, direct. The informal participatory practices that these researchers 
advocate are ultimately more important, and can in theory lead young people to 
uncover for themselves how their experiences differ from the standard approaches, 
as advocated by Liu and Kelly (2010). But as I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 8, a more direct engagement and education in political-philosophy, and in 
the broad canon of democratic theory in particular, might help to contribute to that 
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end. However, research on how young people’s knowledge and understanding of 
different types of (non-liberal democratic) political-economic systems and 
practices contributes to their individual political practices is largely absent. The 
empirical component of this thesis will attempt to explore this area.  
 Related to above literature is the existing developmental psychology research 
that explores the initial formation, crystilization, and durability of young people’s 
political attitudes. A minority of studies suggest that political beliefs and attitudes 
are fluid and can change with relative frequency throughout a person’s life. 
However, the bulk of this literature, at least from my initial meta-analysis, argues 
that adolescence is the crucial age when young people start to form political 
dispositions and attitudes that once formed are relatively stable, and will guide 
their political orientations throughout their lives (Eckstein et al., 2011; Krosnick & 
Alwin, 1991; Loughlin & Barling, 2001; Sears & Levy, 2003). This is referred to 
as the ‘impressionable years hypothesis’ described below by Krosnick & Alwin 
(1988, p. 416): 
 
According to the impressionable years hypothesis, the socializing 
influences individuals experience when they are young have a 
profound impact on their thinking throughout their lives [….]. The 
historical environment in which a young person becomes an active 
participant in the adult world shapes the basic values, attitudes, and 
world views formed during those years. Once the period of early 
socialization has passed, this hypothesis argues, its residuals are fixed 
within individuals, and these core orientations are unlikely to change. 
 
 Finally, a nascent but growing topic in the youth civics and political 
participation literature focuses on how new media technology is changing the 
modes of political participation amongst young people. This literature argues that, 
contrary to the supposed crisis in democracy whereby Western young people are 
presented as largely apathetic, social media sites like Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter are new tools that provide contemporary young people with new means 
with which to be politically engaged that differ from the more traditional forms 
(Coleman, 2006; Harris, 2008). For example, Harris (2008) explored young 
women’s use of online do it yourself culture, social networking sites, and blogs to 
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open up questions about what counts as politics, and what political practices are 
possible for young women at the present moment. In this exploration, Harris 
(2008) argues that contemporary young women’s use of media-technology 
signifies a shift away from conventional civic and political spheres and into a 
virtual public sphere where young women often position themselves as neoliberal 
consumer subjects, but where they can also develop new modes of political 
activism and subjectivity. As Harris (2008, p. 492) notes, “it is important to 
recognise the ways that simply participating in online cultures and networking is a 
form of developing citizenship skills, regardless of any specific involvement in 
political causes”. However, while this nascent literature gives insights into the new 
modes to which young people are turning to be civically engaged, Morozov (2011) 
argues, that we should not romanticize the role of the Internet as many young 
people are still mostly using it to watch pornography. In fact, the Internet “makes 
it harder, not easier to get people to care, if only because the alternatives to 
political actions are so much more pleasant and risk free (Morozov, 2011. pp. 74-
75)”. To be certain, the use of such media, however social it may be, and despite 
its potential to be a democratizing agent, is still practiced from the confines of an 
individual and private space, one that, as Gibson (2000, p. 262) argues, “continues 
to pose a serious challenge to the project of building progressive social-democratic 
movements, since historical experience indicates that genuinely oppositional 
practices must at some point connect with alternative social movements to become 
politically effective”. Therefore, the political exploration of media use must be 
linked to actual, by which I mean non-digital, practices. This is something I will 
attempt to do in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  
 
3.5 Lessons relevant for this thesis 
 The literature concerning youth covers a vast array of topics and spans 
several disciplines. By reviewing and critiquing studies that focus on youth 
identity construction, the effects of media culture on youth cognition and 
subjectivity, and youth civic and political participation, several useful lessons 
emerge. Among these are, first, that descriptions of identity/cultural construction 
need to avoid a neo-romantic emphasis on agency, and be situated within the 
wider political-economic context within which identities are constructed. Without 
meaning to sound irreverent, the fact that young people actively construct their 
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identities by making use of available discourses is so well established that it 
borders on sociological cliché, and offers few insights into young people’s 
awareness of their central roles as agents of social reproduction or social change. 
Second, psychological and socio-cognitive inspired approaches to audience 
readership and effects need to also be situated within wider political-economic 
contexts. The discourses presented to, and relentlessly pushed onto, young people 
by the omnipresent media consumer culture are not ideologically neutral. As I 
have discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, they are the direct product of the neoliberal 
paradigm, and serve to spread and reify neoliberal hegemony. And third, an 
exploration of young people’s politics and political use of media should, in 
addition to the investigation of the various political practices that young people 
engage in, also explore young people’s political-economic knowledge and attempt 
to uncover the relationship between the two, if one exists.  
 One of the major reasons why culture is such an important terrain for young 
people is because it is one of the few ‘social facts’ that they have some 
autonomous and relative control over. They do not get to pick which families, 
political, or economic systems they are born into, and in many instances, and for 
the majority of their youth, they cannot even choose which schools to attend. 
While it is true that they do not have control over which culture they are born into 
either, they do have a choice over which cultural forms to accept or reject 
regardless of the culture they were born into. Contemporary media-
communications technology has facilitated this choice for the majority of Western 
young people, giving them several options to use to combat the alienation incurred 
by the on-going corporatization of their culture and geography. How far these 
hybrid, fluid, and fragmented cultural forms and corresponding identities serve as 
explicit political tools with which to challenge societal oppression and work for 
social change, or are meaningful, but ultimately apolitical expressions aimed at 
battling alienation, which do not threaten the perpetuation of oppressive ideologies 
and social structures, will be explored in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 104 
Chapter Four 
Methodology 
____________________________________________
                               
 So far in this thesis, I have described some of the key mechanisms and 
practices that constitute and maintain the contemporary neoliberal societies of the 
UK and the US, focusing specifically on their implications for the socio-cultural 
environment young people inhabit. By combining a critical political-economic 
analysis, derived from the Frankfurt and Birmingham Schools, and the works of 
Althusser and Bourdieu, with some of the presuppositions and insights from recent 
developments in cognitive and social-psychology, I have suggested that the 
hegemony and durability of neoliberalism depends on the convergence of power 
elite interests in addition to structural and socio-cognitive factors. I have noted, in 
particular, that contemporary UK and US young people are subject to an 
omnipresent barrage of neoliberal discourses, which can, in theory, interpellate 
them in ways that can predispose them to enact discursive practices that reproduce 
neoliberalism. However, I have also noted that the sociological and psychological 
literature on identity construction and socio-cognition suggests that, while durable, 
a person’s self-identity and associated cognitive schemata are not fixed and static, 
but are subject to change given exposure to different socio-environmental 
experiences and reflective thought (Barbosa, 2008; Bohner & Dickel, 2011; 
Cerulo, 2010; DiMaggio, 1997; Kesebir et al., 2010; Maqsood et al., 2004). The 
purpose of this thesis is not to offer yet another pessimistic and totalizing account 
about the hegemony of neoliberalism, nor to overemphasize the agentic and 
creative manipulation of self-identities and cultural artefacts by young people. 
Rather, this thesis is concerned with a third way that offers an exploratory account 
on how neoliberal discourses are influencing, or being contested by, contemporary 
urban UK and US young people who are entering adulthood, and who will have to 
deal with the more negative consequences of ongoing neoliberal policies and 
practices.  
 In this chapter, I will synthesize the lessons derived from the approaches 
discussed in the previous chapters, and explain how they have informed my 
methodological approach. The chapter is divided into three main segments. The 
first segment deals with the overall research framework, and explains my 
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ontological position, political stance, and approach to designing the research. The 
second segment deals with the process of fieldwork, including my choice of 
research sites, how I negotiated access and entry, how I selected participants, my 
relationships with them, the interview process, and ethical considerations. The 
third segment discusses the process of data analysis and interpretation.  
 
4.1 Methodological Orientations: Critical This and That 
 In the tradition of the classic Frankfurt School’s ‘critical theory’ that 
originally inspired this thesis, the exploratory aims and methods described in this 
chapter are underpinned by a critical realist ontological perspective of the social 
world. This perspective holds that positivist notions of value-free observation and 
interpretation of the social world, and post-structuralist notions of a radical 
subjectivity that seemingly deny the existence and/or the socializing influence of 
an objective social reality, are both insufficient in their ontological foundations. 
Instead, critical realism takes a dialectical middle ground where it is accepted that 
objective social phenomena like class structures, converging elite interests, and 
forms of government are objectively real, have material implications that effect 
and affect human beings, and can be observed and documented (Bashkar, 2008). 
However, critical realism also holds that the interpretation of objective social 
phenomena is necessarily subjective, as the researcher’s social positioning and 
biases will, to a significant extent, guide how he/she will observe and interpret 
objective social phenomena. This implies that researchers should be as reflective 
as possible about how their own social positioning and biases may influence the 
way that they gather and interpret data in a more intellectually honest effort to 
attempt to approximate objectivity. Furthermore, critical realism recognizes that 
the social scientist is researching a second order world that has been acted upon, 
shaped, and created by human agents (Bashkar, 1998). Therefore, the ongoing flux 
and fluidity of the human world requires provisional, contingent, and conditional 
theorizations that seek to describe and explain historically contextualized instances 
of social reality. For the purposes of this study, critical realism allows for a limited 
generalization, abstraction, and presupposition of the underlying unobservable and 
observable psychological and sociological phenomena (e.g., cognitive schemata, 
socialization processes, social institutions) that generate social practices and 
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discourses (Houston, 2001), which can in turn lead to the continuity or changing 
of existing political-economic and socio-cultural realities.  
  
4.1.1 Research Design: Operationalizing a Both/And Approach 
 Following the reformulated both/and theoretical guidelines discussed at the 
end of Chapter 2, and the critical realist ontological presuppositions that underpin 
it as discussed above, the data collecting methods used for this study consisted of 
an improvised form of critical ethnography. Critical ethnography, as Thomas 
(1993) argues, is the research implementation of critical theory that seeks to 
extract ideology from action, and understand the socio-cognitions and practices of 
research subjects within historical and socio-cultural frameworks. Unlike standard 
approaches to ethnographic research, critical ethnography proposes that 
researchers do not merely document and interpret culture, but actively critique and 
situate it within dominant and ideological power structures (Anderson, 1989). This 
gives an impetus for the researcher to explore how cultural forms may perpetuate 
dominant and oppressive practices and ideologies (Madison, 2011). While this 
study is not fully ethnographic in the traditional sense, as I could not dedicate the 
months long participant-observation that is the sine qua non of a standard 
ethnographic exploration, critical ethnography, nonetheless, captures the general 
research approach and political objectives that guide this study. That is, my 
concern in this research is to both explore the possible socio-cognitive effects of 
neoliberalism on young people and their socio-cultural institutional settings, as 
well as to propose points of intervention that may help to disrupt its more negative 
consequences. As Madison (2011, p. 5) argues: 
 
Critical ethnography begins with an ethical responsibility to address 
 processes of unfairness or injustice within a particular lived domain. 
[……]. The conditions for existence within a particular context are not 
as they could be for specific subjects; as a result, the researcher feels a 
moral obligation to make a contribution toward changing those 
conditions toward greater freedom and equity. 
 
 My improvised form of critical ethnography incorporated socio-cognitive 
insights to help operationalize my both/and guidelines by documenting and 
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analyzing UK and US young people’s socio-cultural and political-economic 
schemata. This improvised form mostly consisted of individual in depth semi-
structured single and focus group interviews, and documents some participant 
observations of youth centres, music concerts, and online social networking sites. 
In this section, I present a series of figures that help to illustrate and describe the 
rationale for, and underlying presuppositions of, the construction of an interview 
schedule designed for the documentation of UK and US young people’s socio-
cultural and political-economic schemata and corresponding experiences.  
 
4.1.2 Institutional Interpellation: Habitus and Schema Theory 
 Prior to entering the field, I first had to decide on what specific socio-cultural 
institutional settings I would need to take into consideration. Figure 4.1, below, 
describes the institutional settings that this research explored.  
 
Figure 4.1:  
 
The two-sided arrows represent the potential institutional interpellating influence and the relaying 
mechanisms - i.e., the various means by which individual agents actively and implicitly negotiate 
between discourses in ways that can maintain, modify, or significantly challenge and alter existing 
social structures, institutions, and discourses.  
 
These settings were selected on the grounds that they are the ones that the majority 
of young people are exposed to the most. Moreover, these settings are each 
independent fields with interpellating potential, but in many cases these fields are 
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not mutually exclusive, and interact, interrelate, and reinforce each other in 
various ways. An individual learns, adopts, and negotiates between the discourses 
and practices of those fields, and, given the generally relatively limited life 
experiences of young people, these are likely to inform the bulk of most young 
people’s socio-cultural and political-economic habitus. Figure 4.1, like all of the 
subsequent figures in this section, offers a rough conceptualization, but one that 
helped me to select my initial research sites. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
‘interpellation’ signals a process by which an individual’s subjectivity and 
unconscious beliefs and practices are influenced by their exposure to 
ideologically-charged discourses that are disseminated by society’s systems and 
multiple sub-systems. The multiple ruptures and variances that exist within social 
systems allow individuals some degree of agency over the discourses and practices 
that they articulate and adopt, as they may experience, and therefore have to 
choose between, competing, contesting, and/or conflicting discourses and 
practices. However, not all of these choices are consciously made. Institutional 
interpellation refers to the socio-cognitive processes by which an individual 
unconsciously and consciously acquires, develops, and forms their individual 
identity and underlying habitus through their exposure to specific socio-
environmental experiences. This process is a life-long and fluid phenomenon, 
during which an individual interacts with and becomes shaped by their social 
environments. However, basic and durable socio-cultural and political-economic 
schemata begin to crystallize around adolescence (Eckstein et al., 2011; Krosnick 
& Alwin, 1991; Loughlin & Barling, 2001; Sears & Levy, 2003). As Eckstein et 
al., (2011, p. 9) argue in their study that explored the developmental trajectories of 
German young people’s attitudes toward political engagement and their 
willingness to participate in politics:  
 
The correlation analyses pointed to significant interrelations at each 
measurement occasion. From a theoretical point of view […] it can be 
assumed that attitudes toward a certain behaviour predict people’s 
behavioural intentions. Correspondingly, Diener, Noack, and Gniewosz 
(2011), for example, showed that attitudes toward political behaviours 
actually predicted changes in young people’s intentions to participate 
in politics. However, irrespective of the relation between both 
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behavioural orientations, the results of the developmental trajectories 
and stabilities of the present study confirmed the adolescent years to be 
a crucial period in life for the development, emergence, and 
consolidation of political points of view. 
 
My study, employed more in-depth interviews than Eckstein et al., (2011), 
coupled with some participant observations. However, like Eckstein et al., (2011), 
I will make very tentative and provisional claims on the current and possible 
future political-economic trajectories of my participants. Namely, whatever sort of 
political-economic attitudes, knowledge, and practices they expressed and/or 
displayed during my research, and given their 16-19 age range, will likely, 
although not certainly, I will suggest, orient them towards those same or similar 
political-economic attitudes, beliefs, and practices in their futures.  
 Following figure 4.1, and as also discussed in section 2.3, Bourdieu’s (1990) 
concept of habitus, in some interpretations, can be read as a closed-loop theory of 
social practice that dismisses concious thoughts and actions (Burroway, 2008; 
Lizardo, 2009). Moreover, Bourdieu’s (1990) emprical application of the habitus 
concept has been overtly and primarily concernced with people’s socio-congitive 
dispostional practices, with little attention given to people’s dispositions and more 
conscious socio-cognitive thoughts and emotions. However, as the concept of 
habitus is significantly informed by schema theory (Bourdieu, 1990), its 
theorization should equally incorporate and emphasize the concious or reflective 
elements of social practice and cognition, and its empirical application should thus 
more explicitly incorporate an exploration of both the dispositional and more 
conscious dimensions of people’s cognitive frameworks of the social world. As 
van Dijk (1998, p. 47) argues: 
 
The concept of 'disposition' in the definition of this concept is 
psychologically inadequate, if not circular, because it defines cognitive 
structures in terms of their 'output' (such as social practices) which 
precisely need to be explained in terms of other, cognitive 
representations. For instance, prejudice as a social habitus should not 
be described as a 'tendency to discriminate’, but be analysed in terms 
of mental structures in such a way that discrimination, verbal 
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derogation, disclaimers (We are not racist, but…), as well as many 
other manifestations of prejudice can be explained. 
 
Therefore, habitus, in my theoretical application, is used to represent the aggregate 
set of socially acquired schemata, and their corresponding dispositional and 
reflective content, that, while durable, are subject to change given exposure to new 
socio-environmental experiences and/or reflective thought.  
 As I argued in section 2.4, schema theory offers sociologists and other social 
scientists concerned with the phenomenom of social reproduction a systematic 
way of analyzing human thought, how it has been influenced by the social world, 
and how that might lead to specific practices. Simply put, as Lodge et al., (1991, p. 
1358) argue, “the cognitive message is clear: if we want to understand why people 
act as they do, we must understand how they picture the world around them”. My 
concern, therefore, is in using the concept of schema/schemata to investigate and 
map out my youth participants’ memory-stored cognitive frameworks of the social 
world, which can manifest and be articulated as both dispositions (viz., automatic 
or habitual attitudes, emotions, inclinations, and practices) or more conscious or 
reflective thoughts and practices, which, as I will explain in section 4.3.3 of this 
chapter, can, to a significant yet provisional exent, be gauged and infered by 
analyzing their discursive, facial, and emotional responses to my questions.   
 
4.1.3 Neoliberal Institutional Interpellation: Meet Homo Economicus 
 The guiding assumption for this study is that contemporary UK and US 
young people are surrounded by, if not directly exposed to, neoliberal discourses 
via their positioning within neoliberal societies. Moreover, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, the hegemony of the neoliberal political-economic 
system depends on its ability to inflect major societal structures and institutions 
with a rigid market logic and discourse where all forms of human organization and 
decision-making are expected to be economic. With this in mind, I found it useful 
to tease out how the major institutional settings that young people are exposed to 
would operate under an ideal neoliberal system, as well as to construct a 
concomitant ideal neoliberal habitus. Figure 4.2 below, is meant to elucidate how 
some of the major societal structures, as described in Chapter 1, that are most 
prevalent in the lives of contemporary UK and US urban young people, are 
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supposed to operate under an ideal neoliberal system. The four distinct societal 
institutions shown in this figure, in contemporary practice, operate according to 
neoliberal discursive lines to varying degrees as described below. Major cultural 
and education institutions for example, as a result of government policies and 
corporate imperatives, have been mostly transformed to meet the demands of 
neoliberalism (Boyles, 2008; Gewirtz & Ball, 2001; Harvey, 2005), while 
oppositional discourses and practices can be more readily found amongst different 
sections of civil society and individual family units (Graber, 2009; Klein, 2000). 
Nonetheless, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 (described in the following paragraphs) depict 
what can be considered a discursive barometer or set of sensitizing concepts that 
helped me to focus my investigation and guide my subsequent data analysis. 
Specifically, they serve as a reference point from which to compare the actual 
institutional experiences and corresponding socio-cognitive frameworks of my 
youth participants.  
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Figure 4.2 
 
 
Figure 4.3 below, details some of the specific dispositions and reflective thoughts 
(e.g., values, attitudes, beliefs, and inclinations) and concomitant practices of an 
ideal neoliberal habitus, which correspond to neoliberal discourses that are 
disseminated via ideal neoliberal institutions, as described above in Figure 4.2. Of 
course this is a theoretical composite, which describes how ideal neoliberal 
subjects think and behave according to the principal tenets of, and socio-cultural 
and political-economic framework generated by, neoliberalism. In so doing, as in 
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the Weberian tradition, it sacrifices the subtleties and complexities of social reality 
for an heuristic device, which can be used to explore and compare how and why 
real cases diverge from or converge with the ideal (Lopreato & Altson, 1970). f 
 The conceptualization of this ideal neoliberal type has been facilitated by the 
observation that the last thirty years of the neoliberalization of UK and US 
societies have generated a historically unique socio-cultural discursive framework 
that brings together neoliberal discourses on education, politics, economics, and 
civil society (Harvey, 2005; McGuigan, 2010a). This dominant framework offers a 
specific worldview that exalts and promotes rational consumption as the primary 
human activity which satisfies all human needs. Therefore, this logically implies 
that a pure neoliberal subject thinks and behaves as am embodied corporation, i.e., 
a hyper-rational, competitive, and utility-maximizing consumer who chooses 
between products, services, jobs, schools, interpersonal relationships, and even 
politicians according to which will best serve his/her self-interests (Curtis et al., 
2007; Friedman, 2002; Hayek, 1994; Klein, 2008; Patel, 2010). Moreover, the 
neoliberal system, in more subtle ways, possesses an undercurrent of 
authoritarianism, which orients neoliberal subjects to think in terms of hierarchical 
notions of upward mobility, status, and uncritical submission to authority. In other 
words, for example, while not everyone will become a CEO, the pure neoliberal 
subject works and aspires to become a CEO, as the rewards for such a position, in 
addition to a higher wage, also include status and power over subordinates. One 
can consider this neoliberal self-actualization, where hard work and rational 
choices are rewarded with financial, social, and even sexual power (Penny, 2010). 
In sum, neoliberal political-economic systems generate and promote a supporting 
set of socio-cultural discourses and practices that stress, “the maximization of 
short term individual gains, submissiveness, obedience, and an abandonment of 
the public arena” (Chomsky, 1989; p. 22). Therefore, a rough composite of an 
ideal neoliberal subject’s habitus, as can be extrapolated from the literature that I 
have discussed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, displays the following attitudes, beliefs, 
values, inclinations and corresponding practices, all of which can manifest in more 
involuntary/dispositional and/or more reflective forms.  
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Figure 4.3: Ideal Neoliberal Habitus  
Dispositional and/or Reflective Attitudes, 
Values, and Inclinations 
Corresponding Practices 
-An uncritical acceptance of capitalism as 
the only viable economic system. 
-A dismissal of alternative political-
economic systems  
Practices that maintain or do not challenge 
capitalist economic structures. 
-E.g., a primary or significant preoccupation 
with consuming/acquiring commercial goods, 
services, and/or property. 
-E.g., supporting financially, and/or through the 
electoral process, free trade and anti-union 
government policies. 
 
-A ‘me-first’ self-interested tendency in 
which an individual is primarily concerned 
with his/her own needs, often with a great 
disregard for the needs of others. 
-Uncritical consumption of goods and services 
regardless of their possible exploitative 
production and/or negative environmental 
impacts. 
-Overtly competitive, particularly in the pursuit 
of social aspirations and upward mobility, often 
with a great disregard for those he/she is 
competing with. 
-Instrumentalist/consumerist approaches towards 
the selection of schools, friends, politicians, and 
cultural artefacts. 
 
 
-A person-blame outlook towards social 
problems and overall negative/judgmental 
attitudes towards welfare recipients and 
those that do not enjoy the benefits of 
capitalism (e.g., the working poor). 
-Callous actions towards the homeless and/or 
other individuals suffering from poverty. 
-E.g., supporting welfare reform policies that 
place more stringent conditions on the amount of 
benefits that welfare recipients can claim.  
 
 
-An acceptance of hierarchical and corporate 
structures of power and authority. 
 
-Uncritical submission to and/or enforcement of 
work and state authority. 
-Uncritical support for elitist forms of 
government.  
-E.g., supporting either through financial means 
or via the electoral process liberal-democratic 
and/or more authoritarian forms of government 
that prioritize order, stability, and the 
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enforcement of property rights over human and 
civil rights. 
 
 
4.1.4 Research Sites and Interview Schedule Design 
 To then be able to explore how the actual and more complex and dissonant 
habituses of my young participants would compare to the ideal-neoliberal 
characteristics described above in Figure 4.3, and taking into account the socio-
cultural institutional settings described in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, I elected to conduct 
in depth semi-structured interviews and focus groups with a cross-sectional 
sample of young people ages 16-19 across schools and youth centres in LA and 
London. The specific demographic makeup and research sites are explained in the 
next section. The age range 16-19 was selected based on the age of available 
participants and because it falls within the period when young people being to 
crystallize their socio-cultural and political-economic perspectives (Eckstein et al., 
2011; Loughlin & Barling, 2001; Sears & Levy, 2003). Using Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
as a guide, I constructed a thematic interview schedule consisting of subsets of 
various open-ended questions that corresponded to the following themes (see 
Appendix A for full interview schedule):  
 
• Views on education 
• After school activities 
• Consumption practices  
• Opinions on socio-economic issues and politics 
• Leisure time and family life 
• Media-culture interests and interpretations 
• Personal aspirations  
 
 By organizing my interviews along these thematic lines, I sought to elicit 
data that would provide a descriptive and in depth insight into my young 
participants’ habituses, and some of the main influences on these. For example, 
the questions relating to the media culture interests and interpretations theme, ask 
young participants about their interpretations and the significance of their 
preferred songs, films, media outlets/Internet sites, and other media-cultural 
artefacts, which in turn helped me to build up a detailed picture of the nature of the 
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key media images and messages to which they are exposed and potentially 
influenced by. I did not simply pull questions out of Figure 4.3 - e.g., do you have 
a negative attitude towards recipients of welfare provisions? Such a format would 
have been too leading. Instead, the questions were designed to be as neutral as 
possible in order to provide spontaneous free-recalls - e.g., what do you think 
about government benefit/welfare programmes? Moreover, while I did not employ 
the more controlled methods and settings employed by cognitive and social-
psychology schema theorists (they typically rely on structured surveys, computer 
programmes, and incorporate more controlled laboratory settings), the open-ended 
questions of my interview schedule coupled with in depth non-leading 
interviewing can be reasonably expected to elicit data that reflect participants’ 
socio-cultural and political-economic schemata (see e.g., Danna-Lynch, 2010). As 
Lodge et al., (1991, p. 1372) note, “schemas presumably affect the retrieval of 
information from memory; thus the content and structure that appear in recall 
statements should reflect the abstract impressionistic representation of this 
information in memory”.  
 Furthermore, by organizing my interview schedule around the above 
thematic lines, I was able to more easily organize my participants’ responses and 
analyze the data. I will elaborate on this in the data-analysis section of this chapter. 
Lastly, for purposes of triangulation, I also conducted in-depth one to one 
interviews with youth workers and asked them about their observations, and 
interpretations of the cultural and political environments inhabited by the young 
people with whom they work (see Appendix B for interview schedule). 
Additionally, I also participated in youth club meetings, attended music concerts, 
and listened to, watched, or visited, some of the songs, flims, TV shows, and 
Internet sites that my praticipants divulged to me, in order to get a feel for aspects 
of the cultural milleu in which they were immersed.   
 
4.1.5 Putting it all Together: Final Research Objectives 
 The ontological orientations that underpin this study take a critical realist 
perspective that views the social world as something that is shaped and 
constructed by human agents, but that is nonetheless an objective phenomenon 
that can to some extent be documented and explained. Therefore, the improvised 
methodological approach discussed in this section, operationalized the 
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reformulated both/and theoretical guidelines outlined at the end of Chapter 2, in 
order elicit data that can offer provisional insights on the influence of neoliberal 
discourses on the socio-cultural and political-economic cognitive frameworks of 
UK and US young people, and what this might mean for the social reproduction or 
contestation of neoliberalism. Specifically, this improvised methodological 
approach is designed for the exploration and documentation of thought processes, 
dispositions and their outcomes, and the relationship of these to specific 
institutional settings. In sum, by drawing on the lessons and insights from 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3, these methods are designed to gather provisional accounts to 
help investigate:  
 
 How far and in what ways the socio-cultural and political-economic 
dispositions, emotions, thoughts and practices of contemporary urban 
young people in London and LA are infused or inflected by neoliberal 
discourses and practices. 
 What critical educators dedicated to progressive social change can learn 
from a socio-cognitive approach to the analysis of youth culture and 
politics. 
 
4.2 Entering the Field: Los Angeles and London 
 Having lived in both LA and London, and being familiar with their 
demographics and geographies, I elected to use these cities as the urban settings 
for my research. But in addition, LA and London are both neoliberal alpha world-
cities that share similar education policies, corporate conglomerates, uniquely 
cross-sectional and multi-ethnic populations, and cosmopolitan cultural structures 
that, especially in the field of youth culture, directly influence one another 
(Brenner, 2006; Fairbanks 11 & Lloyd, 2011), making them ideal locations for my 
research. In this section, I will give details of each of the specific research sites 
within LA and London where I conducted my research, how I was granted access, 
how I selected my participants, the interview process and relationships with 
participants, ethical considerations, and the limitations of my sample populations. 
Additionally, where relevant, I will also provide ethnographic descriptions of 
some of the educational and non-profit institutional settings that most of my youth 
participants spent time in, and were selected from. I begin with a description of 
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each of the LA research sites, as they were the first ones that I visited, and then 
move on to a description of the London sites.  
 
4.2.1 South-Central LA: Collecting the Data 
 After fine-tuning my interview schedule as described earlier in this chapter, I 
elected to begin my research in my hometown in South-Central LA. Prior to flying 
over, I had contacted one of my politically conscious relatives who self-identified 
as an anarchist, and who was eighteen years old at the time. I explained my study 
to her, and asked if she knew of any political young people around the ages of 17-
18 who might be interested in volunteering for my study. I specifically asked her 
to help me recruit political young people, because I was only going to be in LA for 
a month, and wanted to interview a sample of LA young people who were overtly 
political rather than rely on purely random sampling methods in the hopes of 
encountering them by chance. Furthermore, as part of my both/and framework 
calls for the investigation of counter-hegemonic groups and individuals, a sample 
of leftist political youth were key to my research. She agreed, and told me that I 
could meet up with them at her house during one of their usual weekend hangouts.  
However, as I will describe in later sections, only two of the four participants that 
I interviewed there expressed overtly political dispositions.  
 On the day of the first interviews, I dressed in casual attire consciously 
attempting to utilize my relatively young age and appearance to downplay any 
authoritative aura that I may otherwise give off in order to try to create a more 
relaxed atmosphere so that my participants would feel comfortable talking to me 
(Scott & Usher 1999). When I arrived at my relative’s house, I was introduced to 
four young people, all of whom resided in and grew up in the working-class 
district of South-Central LA and attended their nearby high-schools with the 
exception of one who attended a more privileged school in West LA (the full 
demographic makeup of all of my participants is provided in section 4.2.9 and 
Appendix C). After introducing myself, I explained the general nature of my study 
telling them that I wanted to explore their views on politics, consumption, their 
taste in music, and what they do in their free time. I was originally going to give 
them a pre-interview schedule and arrange meetings with them at a later date. 
However, I decided against this as this as I thought it might stifle spontaneity and 
lead to more modified and tailored responses. Once I finished describing my 
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research, I asked them if they would like to volunteer for it, while also telling them 
that they were under no obligation to do so, and that I would be digitally tape-
recording the interviews. Once they all agreed, I gave them all information sheets 
regarding my study and consent forms. I also explained to them that if they did not 
wish to answer any of my questions or at any point during the interview wanted to 
opt out for any reason then they were entirely free to do so and no explanation on 
their part would be required. Lastly, I ordered a few pizzas to further lighten the 
mood, as well as to give them a small token of my appreciation for their time, and 
began an impromptu focus group discussion. About half way through the process, 
one of the participants had to go, but arranged an individual interview appointment 
with me for a later date. Overall, the focus group ran smoothly, with my interview 
schedule working to guide the conversation from one topic to the next, whilst not 
disrupting the free-flowing stream of consciousness that my participants expressed 
as I moved, for example, from questions about consumption to questions about 
politics. I did not ask every single question from the schedule, but instead 
employed a more fluid approach cutting some questions out because of time 
limitations, and in some cases my participants would launch into the next topic 
without me having to ask anything. As all the young people knew each other, and 
perhaps because none of my questions were particularly personal, the focus group 
discussion format, as frequently recommended in research with young people (e.g. 
Thomas & O’Kane, 1998), was effective in sparking a lively conversation in 
which the participants appeared comfortable sharing their views with me. 
Evidence of this is suggested by the fact that throughout our conversation the 
participants would joke around, and occasionally interrupted each other and 
started offshoot conversations as I simply sat back and observed. The whole 
procedure lasted about an hour and a half, after which I thanked them for their 
time. 
 
4.2.2 North Hollywood Zoo Magnet 
 My second research site was my old high school. Having maintained a good 
friendship with my old English teacher who had since become the magnet 
coordinator [head teacher] for the school, I emailed him and asked him if he would 
allow me to recruit participants at his school. He agreed, and informed some of the 
teachers who teach juniors and seniors [the US equivalent of A-level students] 
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about my research, and asked them if it was okay for me to recruit participants 
from their classes, and subsequently pull students out of their classes should they 
volunteer. I arrived at the school on a Monday, and introduced myself to the 
teachers who agreed to allow me to recruit in their classrooms, and throughout the 
day visited four different classrooms where I explained my research to students as 
I had done with the South-Central group, and arranged interviews with sixteen of 
them throughout the week. The following day, the magnet coordinator provided 
me with an empty classroom to hold the interviews, and I pulled students that had 
volunteered out of their classrooms throughout the day and for the rest of the week. 
The interviews consisted of a mix of one to one interviews and focus group 
discussions. Before each interview, I took a few minutes to engage in small talk 
with my participants in an attempt to create a friendly and safe environment, as 
well as to explain to them the basic interview process and nature of my study. As 
with all of my interviews, I gave them information sheets regarding my study, 
consent forms to sign, and explicitly informed them that the interviews would be 
tape-recorded, and that they were under no obligation to answer any of my 
questions if they did not want to, that their teachers would not be given access to 
their responses, that their names would be changed during the transcription 
process, and that they could opt out of the study whenever they wished and with 
no need to give an explanation. Overall, the interviews with these sixteen 
participants ran smoothly, and it seemed that they felt comfortable during the 
discussions, although some of them commented that they had never been asked 
about some of the subject matter that I probed them about, and thus abstained from 
answering certain questions, or would simply nod in agreement to what some of 
the other participants would say. This was a situation that occasionally recurred in 
some of my interviews across LA and London, and that I account for in the next 
chapter concerned with data analysis. Moreover, as the focus group discussions 
were varied in size from two to four participants, and despite being allowed two 
hours with each participant or set of participants, I decided that three participants 
was the most that I should allow for future focus groups discussions when possible, 
as anything larger is much too time consuming and does not allow for sufficiently 
in depth conversations. Most of the participants from this site come from low to 
upper middle class backgrounds and reside in middle-class neighbourhoods from 
the San Fernando Valley, or the Los Feliz area, with the exception of two 
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participants that reside in South-Central LA and are from working-class 
backgrounds.  (As with all of my participants, I was able to infer their socio-
economic standings by asking them questions about their parent’s occupations, in 
addition to asking them about the specific areas where they live.) 
 
Other Relevant Information 
 The North Hollywood Zoo Magnet High School is a specialized satellite 
school (affiliated but otherwise independent from the main North Hollywood High 
School campus and curriculum) that focuses on environmental and biological 
sciences. Zoo magnet students frequently score above the state average on 
California’s annual standardized tests, and the magnet now offers several 
advanced placements classes (introductory university level courses) in several 
subjects including Environmental Science, History, and English.  It hosts a diverse 
student population consisting of mostly middle-class White and Latino students 
who are bussed in from the San Fernando Valley, as well as a smaller population 
of working-class Black, Asian, and Latino students who are bussed in from the 
South LA, Hollywood, and Echo Park areas. From 25 hours of direct ethnographic 
observations, past visits to the school and retrospective accounts having attended 
the Zoo Magnet school myself 7 years ago, and conversations with teachers and 
students, I can report that the Zoo Magnet, while hosting a uniquely cross-
sectional student population from all over the city of LA, is not fully 
representative of LA schools or students. The school is the only off-campus 
Magnet in the country, has an active, involved, and relatively affluent P.T.A 
(parent teacher association), and attracts a subsection of the Los Angeles Unified 
School District student population that is primarily interested in zoological and 
environmental studies, and a small learning environment that requires bussing and 
segregation from the main North Hollywood Campus (which is more 
representative of LA secondary schools and student populations). However, from 
my interviews and observations, I found that the students themselves, including 
those from suburban, White, and middle-class backgrounds, are not substantively 
different in terms of cultural consumption and other sub-cultural practices from 
the urban working-class Latino, Black, and Asian young people that I observed 
and interviewed, who attended less privileged schools. Nonetheless, this must be 
noted as I expected, and did find, a higher proportion of non-mainstream (I will 
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discuss this in section 4.3) young people than I would have been likely to observe 
in a more conventional high school.  
 
4.2.3 The Bresee Foundation Non-Profit Community Center 
 My third LA research site was the Bresee Foundation, a non-profit 
community centre located in the central LA district of Koreatown/Rampart. The 
centre provides health, counselling, and after-school services and programmes for 
low-income young people (ages 11-18) and their families who reside in and 
around the Koreatown/Rampart district. The after-school youth programmes offer 
college prep-courses, sports and recreational activities such as camping and 
cycling, and multimedia technology training (the centre’s main focus). The young 
people who attend Bresee are predominantly working-class Latinos and Asians 
many of whom are first generation immigrants and considered at risk of gang 
involvement. As a teenager I took multimedia training courses at this centre, and 
kept in touch with staff members. When I arrived in LA for my study, I contacted 
some of the staff members and told them about my study. They granted me access, 
and allowed me to recruit at the centre. During my last week in LA, I made 
periodic stops at the centre and hung around in the computer lab to observe what 
types of websites the young people were visiting. With the help of one of the staff 
members, I recruited four youth participants, all of whom are working-class 
students who reside in the Koreatown/Rampart district and who attend or attended 
their nearby high-schools. I was allowed a private room to conduct my interviews 
in. The interviews consisted of two one to one interviews and one focus group 
discussion with two participants. The single interviews lasted around thirty 
minutes, while the focus group discussion took about an hour. While there I also 
interviewed three adult youth workers to elicit their experiences and observations 
of working with young people ages 16-18. These observations were documented 
to serve as a type of secondary ethnography. Each of the youth workers works 
with young people in different settings: multimedia training, community service, 
and college/university prep courses. However, they all focus their pedagogical 
endeavours on activities that attempt to foster a sense of community and social 
consciousness amongst the young people they work with.  
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4.2.4 World Vision Youth Empowerment Programme 
 Coincidently, and serendipitously, when I was finishing up an interview with 
one of the youth workers from the Bresee Foundation, he told me that he and some 
of the youth members were going to a planning meeting of LA non-profit 
organizations and their adult and student representatives to organize a Youth 
Summit that was to be run and coordinated by youth (ages 13-18). He invited me, 
and I attend three meetings in all. During the first meeting, student and youth 
representatives from around four different non-profits showed up, and all were 
invited and encouraged to present their ideas. I was particularly struck by the 
student representatives of the World Vision Youth Programme (four of them), as 
their ideas for the youth conference were, as I will describe in the following 
chapter, politically charged. After the meeting, I approached and recruited them as 
interviewees for my study, and conducted an ad hoc focus group discussion that 
was very lively but cut short due to the facilities needing to be closed. However, 
one of the participants met with me two days later at a McDonalds, and brought 
another young person from the World Vision Programme to join in the interview. 
This interview lasted about an hour and half. All of these young people are 
working-class and reside in the Downtown LA and Pico Union areas. One female 
participant attended a more affluent public school in West LA. The rest all 
attended their nearby high-schools, which included a social-justice oriented high 
school attended by the participants Arlene and Lisa.  
  
Other Relevant Information 
 The World Vision Youth Empowerment Programme in LA is part of the 
World Vision International Christian humanitarian organization, and is a 
programme designed to teach high-school students from working-class 
neighbourhoods namely from the Downtown LA and Pico Union areas leadership 
and community organizing skills. To quote from their website, “World Vision is 
committed to overcoming poverty and injustice in the world—including here at 
home. Poverty in the United States exists in the midst of prosperity, and is 
characterized by a lack of safety, security, and access to basic resources”.  
 
 
 
 124 
4.2.5 London: Bermondsey Youth Centre 
 While my recruitment in LA went far better than I expected and was largely 
facilitated by the generous assistance of my various high school and non-profit 
contacts, my London recruitment proved to be difficult. However, I caught a break 
after attending a youth worker academic discussion group meeting consisting of 
graduate students who were undertaking research with young people. During the 
meeting, I asked if anyone knew of some non-profit youth centres that are 
responsive to our kind of research. One of the attendees happened to be working at 
a youth centre in the Bermondsey area in South London, and put me in touch with 
one of their youth workers named Miranda.
36
 After emailing Miranda, and telling 
her about my study, she agreed to help me recruit participants, and arranged for 
me to conduct two focus group discussions each consisting of three youth 
members who doubled as volunteers who mentor younger members. On the day of 
the interviews, I arrived two hours early so that I could interview Miranda about 
her experiences of working with young people. She also showed me around the 
facilities and programmes offered to young people. The centre was spatially quite 
large, and even included a rock-climbing wall and a flying trapeze. The main 
services provided were sports and youth mentorship programmes that prepared 
young people to be future youth workers. After my interview with Miranda, six 
youth participants showed up, and I initiated the same procedures that I had 
deployed with my LA participants. However, a couple of glitches occurred during 
these discussions. For the first one, the batteries on my tape-recorder ran out half 
way through the discussion without me realizing it. Once the interview was over, I 
noticed that the recorder had switched off, and immediately wrote down as many 
of my participant’s responses as I could remember in my notebook. Fortunately, 
Miranda was kind enough to provide me with some spare batteries for the second 
group. This second discussion was somewhat sporadic with the participants 
engaging in too many tangential discussions, but still providing enough data for 
me to analyze. Both discussions lasted about forty minutes each. All of the 
participants from this site are working-class and grew up around the Bermondsey 
area  
 
                                                 
36
 Miranda is a pseudonym as are the names used for all the participants in the study. 
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4.2.6 Islington Political Youth 
 My second London research site presented itself to me after I received a 
Facebook message from my younger sister that Ryan Harvey (anarchist folk-punk 
singer/guitarist from Baltimore, USA) was going to perform a benefit show in an 
activist centre in East London. I attended the event hoping to find and recruit 
young participants for my study. The venue was small and dank, but cosy. The 
walls were covered with posters featuring prominent anarchist figures like Peter 
Koprotkin, Emma Goldman, and Mikail Bakunin, and event flyers for future 
political demonstrations and an anarchist book fair. The tables were covered with 
books ranging in subject matter from the Spanish Civil-War to anarchist-feminism. 
Overall, it was a typical anarchist hangout similar to the others I have visited in 
LA, New York City, Chicago, and Barcelona. Four acts performed culminating 
with Harvey playing crowd favourites like Once We Bury Fascism and Manifest 
Democracy. To my surprise, I discovered that the event had been organized by a 
17 year-old girl named Aimee, who donated the benefits of the show to the legal 
defence of activists who were facing trial for street fighting with members of the 
British National Party. After approaching Aimee, I realized that I had briefly met 
her before at an anti-Bush demonstration at Parliament three years earlier when I 
was studying for a Masters Degree programme. After a brief chat, I told her and 
her friend James about my study, and arranged individual interview meetings with 
them. They also informed one of their colleagues named Sam about my study, and 
I arranged an interview with him as well. I held my first interview with Aimee in a 
café near the Angel tube station, and the subsequent two in an empty classroom at 
the international college that I work at, also near Angel station. Each interview 
lasted around fifty minutes. All three of these participants are middle-class and 
grew up in Islington. 
 
4.2.7 Hackney Youth Centre 
 My final research site was located in a youth centre in the Hackney area of 
London. I came across this centre through one of my colleagues from my PhD 
programme who is a youth worker. She provided me with a list of members of her 
youth worker network.
37
 After emailing several people from the list, a youth 
worker named Tipi emailed back agreeing to help me recruit at his centre. Prior to 
                                                 
37
 She is a detached youth worker who works with youth in Hackney. I also interviewed her.  
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conducting any recruitment, I met Tipi at his office (which was in a separate 
location from the actual youth centre) for a meeting to further explain my research 
and fill out some legal paperwork as required by the larger youth charity 
organization that runs the youth centre Tipi works in. He suggested that the best 
time to come in was during what they refer to as their ‘peer’ meetings. These 
meetings are part of youth development programmes which, according to the 
organization’s website, are aimed at training young people aged 16 to 25 to be 
qualified in a range of areas related to youth work. The organization also supports 
them to gain paid work experience in the areas of youth work, sports coaching, 
multi-media tutoring, and refereeing football and basketball. The overall goal of 
the organization is to provide young people with stepping stones between training 
and the world of work, and to encourage them to think about becoming self-
employed, gain further paid employment, and develop their own small businesses 
or social enterprises. On the first day of recruitment, I showed up at the youth 
centre, and found several young people playing pool and ping-pong. I noticed that 
the bulletin boards contained flyers for youth entrepreneurial competitions. As I 
was reading the flyers, a young person named Sean, who would later volunteer for 
my study, invited me to play a game of pool, which I accepted. After losing badly 
to him, Tipi gathered all of the ‘peers’ to sit in a circle for their weekly meeting. 
During this time, Tipi introduced me to the group and allowed me to talk about my 
research. Prior to asking for volunteers, however, Tipi allowed me to lead that 
week’s meeting, which consisted of me fielding questions about university life. I 
offered this as a small gesture of appreciation for their time. The conversation, 
which included about eight young people, was actually quite lively and enjoyable. 
Unfortunately, I did not record it as it was not part of my original research, but 
interestingly enough their main concern revolved around having to pay for a 
university education, and how much money they would be able to make with a 
university degree. They were also especially curious about how much money I 
would make after my PhD. After our meeting, three ‘peers’ agreed to an ad hoc 
focus group discussion, and Tipi provided us with a room. The discussion went 
well, and lasted about an hour. I then showed up later that week for their second 
scheduled meeting, but due to rainy conditions, only a handful of young people 
showed up. However, two ‘peers’ that had showed up for the previous meeting, 
volunteered and I conducted a focus group discussion with them. This one lasted 
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about forty minutes. All of my participants from this site are working-class and 
grew up in the Hackney area.  
 
4.2.8 Confidentiality And Other Ethical Considerations 
 Throughout the data collection and writing up process, I protected the 
personal information and privacy of my participants by ensuring privacy when I 
was alone with participants during our interviews in all but one case where a youth 
worker was present due to the ad hoc nature of the focus group discussion, and by 
using pseudonyms in the write up of this report. In the London cases, I omitted the 
names of the youth centre research sites. I have named the LA research sites 
because their uniqueness is relevant to the study, and after acquiring permission 
from their respective representatives. I also took great care to construct my 
interview schedule in a way that is as general as possible, and that did not ask 
participants for information or experiences that may evoke painful memories and 
emotions, or that they would find distressful to talk about with me. And while I 
did occasionally stray from my schedule to probe them on certain interesting 
topics that they would bring up during our conversation, I made it a priority not to 
pry into any aspects of their lives that might cause them distress or anxiety. 
Moreover, in all of the interviews, I made it explicitly clear to them at the 
beginning of our discussions that they did not have to answer any questions that 
they were not comfortable with, and that they could walk out at any time and 
without having to give a reason. They were also given an information sheet with 
the relevant contact details, should they wish to remove their responses from my 
study, or need to contact my supervisor to report any negative incident. However, 
no one terminated an interview, and it did not seem that my participants were 
bothered by my questions; they mostly seemed to enjoy talking about their 
interests.  
 
4.2.9 Sampling Limitations and Demographic Breakdown 
 Overall, sampling from LA and London proved to be a sound choice. The 
sample populations that volunteered for my study are uniquely cross-sectional, and 
adequately represent the gender, ethnic, and class variances that make up the Los 
Angeles and London city youth population. Furthermore, my respondents were 
friendly, active, talkative, and from my observations, appeared perfectly 
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comfortable and uninhibited in answering the questions I posed to them, thereby 
providing me with insightful accounts and rich data. However, my sample of 
young people from LA consisted of only twenty-nine participants who were 
selected from mostly non-conventional sites, while the LA city youth population 
of ages 15-21 as measured by the US census, approximates 250,000. Moreover, I 
did not (due to time and access limitations), gather the accounts of working-poor 
Black and Latino youth that inhabit the deeper regions of South-Central LA, or of 
more affluent youth from West LA. (I should note that the city of Los Angeles is a 
massive geographical land mass that encompasses 498.3 square miles.) Due to 
similar access and time constraints, my London sample of young people only 
consisted of fourteen participants that centered around three districts in the central 
London transport zones 1 & 2, while the 15-19 youth population approximates 
335,000 according to a 2007 City of London resident population analysis. 
Therefore, for now, I will maintain that my sample sizes simply offer a reliable 
exploratory starting point for future research. More interviews, and possibly large-
scale survey studies with young people, coupled with more purposive sampling 
methods, are needed to gather data from which to make more comprehensive 
generalizations about the overall LA and London youth populations. Additionally, 
larger sample-sizes may also uncover significant differences in the roles that the 
different national settings may play in influencing young people’s socio-cultural 
and political-economic cognitive frameworks that were not apparent from my 
current sample (which did not throw up any significant differences that I could 
observe). The basic demographic breakdown of my participants is presented below 
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
Table 4.1: General Information about Los Angeles participants 
No. of 
young 
participants 
29 altogether. 
Age Range 16-18 years old. 
Gender 10 males, 19 females. 
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Race 
and 
Ethnicity 
The racial/ethnic composition of this sample of young people 
is uniquely cross-sectional and is representative of the multi-
cultural nature of LA. The specific composition is too mixed 
and varied to break down, but the majority of participants 
were of White or Latino backgrounds. Jewish, Asian, and 
Black students make up the rest of the sample. 
Class 15 participants are from working to lower-middle class 
backgrounds, while the other 14 are from middle to upper-
middle class backgrounds.  
Youth 
Workers 
3 adult youth workers from the Bresee Community Center 
were also interviewed.  
 
Table 4.2: General Information about London participants 
No. of 
young 
participants 
14 young participants altogether. 
Age Range 16-19 years old.  
Gender 9 males, 5 females. 
Race 
and 
Ethnicity 
The racial/ethnic composition of this sample of young people 
is uniquely cross-sectional and is representative of the multi-
cultural nature of London. The specific composition is too 
mixed and varied to break down, but the majority of 
participants were from White or Black backgrounds.  
Class 11 participants are from working class backgrounds, while 
the other 3 are from middle to upper-middle class 
backgrounds.  
Youth 
Workers 
2 adult youth workers: one from a community youth centre 
in Bermondsey, and one detached youth worker from the 
Hackney area were also interviewed.  
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4.3 Data Analysis: Constructing A Socio-Cognitive Typology 
If qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful results, it is 
imperative that the material under scrutiny is analysed in a methodical 
manner (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 187).  
 
 The data collection methods discussed earlier in this chapter relate to the first 
step of my both/and framework which was to collect data on Western young 
people’s socio-cultural and political-economic views, preferences, practices, and 
some of the major institutional settings that they are exposed to. However, this is 
only one half of the operationalization, the second half involves an analysis of the 
data that incorporates the study of macro power structures and ideologically 
charged discourses, the micro processes and contexts of everyday life, cultural and 
textual analysis, political-philosophical critical analysis, and socio-cognition 
inspired depth-investigations into discourses, audiences, and effects. In this 
section, I will present a step-by-step overview of this analysis and how it led to the 
construction of what I will refer to as a socio-cognitive typology. The content of 
this typology is discussed in the following empirical chapters. 
 
4.3.1 Initial Thematic Analytical Groupings 
 Once the data was collected and transcribed, and after attempting several 
complicated schemes to organize the responses from my participants, I found that 
the most effective way to begin my analysis was to methodically organize the data 
based on how my respondents had answered the questions relating to the themes 
of my interview schedule, e.g., views on education, opinions on socio-economic 
issues and politics, personal aspirations (see Table 4.3 below). I then compared 
these answers to the ideal neoliberal habitus described in Figure 4.3 in section 
4.1.4). For example, I would look at participant X’s answer to the question that 
asks about opinions on capitalism, consumption, and personal aspirations, and 
then carefully examine if X’s answers demonstrate an uncritical acceptance of 
capitalism. I also examined if X’s answers demonstrated an instrumentalist view 
of education, materialistic aspirations, or negative opinions on welfare or welfare 
recipients. Furthermore, if participant X did express materialistic aspirations, then 
in order to draw a possible link between those aspirations and possible media-
culture influence, I conducted a content analysis of most of their preferred media-
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cultural artefacts that they divulged to me. From this content analysis, I could then 
analyse the relationship between the media-cultural discourses that they actively 
engage with and their socio-cultural and political-economic views and practices. 
Likewise, I also examined if my participants’ responses and in some cases 
practices, demonstrated critical views on capitalism and corporate media-culture, 
or more humanist conceptions of education. I also applied a political-philosophical 
analysis to my participants’ answers to the questions on socio-economic issues and 
politics, whereby I examined what type of political systems their political 
knowledge, views, and practices most corresponded to. I conducted this thematic 
and ideal comparison for all of my participants’ answers to all of the questions that 
they answered. However, not all of them answered all or most of the questions in 
my interview schedule due to time constraints and other unexpected complications 
that are typical of the more uncontrolled settings where the research was 
conducted. Nonetheless, overall there was enough data to be able to group 
interviewee’s responses with the similar responses of others. Lastly, I grouped all 
of my respondents into three basic categories for the first level of analysis based 
on a strong, middle, and weak correspondence to neoliberalism, characterized by 
some of the specific and consistent ways in which their responses reflect, differ 
from, or contest neoliberal discourses and practices.  
 
Table 4.3: Representation of the Thematic Ideal Analysis 
Themes discussed 
(Each theme contained a number 
of related open-ended questions). 
Ideal neoliberal habitus 
(dispositions, thoughts and 
practices) 
Sample of participants’ slightly 
paraphrased answers that 
strongly correspond to the 
neoliberal habitus 
 
Views on education 
 
 
Consumption practices  
 
 
 
 
 
Opinions on socio-economic 
issues and politics 
 
 
 
 
Media-culture interests and 
interpretations 
 
 
 
 
Instrumentalist view of 
education. 
 
Uncritical consumption of goods 
and services, regardless of their 
possible exploitative production 
and/or negative environmental 
impacts. 
 
A person-blame outlook towards 
social problems and overall 
negative/judgmental attitudes 
towards welfare recipients  
 
 
A preference for media-culture 
artefacts that contain pro-market 
or apolitical discourses. 
 
 
 
I think that schools should teach 
me about business. 
 
When I’m buying clothes, I think 
about the price and how they’re 
going to fit me, I don’t think 
about anything else.  
 
 
I think that welfare should be cut 
because people take advantage of 
it, and are just lazy and don’t 
want to work. 
 
 
I really like Jay Z because he raps 
about how anyone can become 
rich if they just work hard 
enough. 
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Personal aspirations  A preoccupation with the 
accumulation of capital. 
 
I want to run my own business 
and be rich.  
 
 
 
 This is a basic breakdown of how I analyzed and grouped each of my participants’ answers. The 
answers shown in this figure represent a high neoliberal variant, with other the two groupings 
representing a lower and middle variant, which I will elaborate on in the next two chapters.  
 
4.3.2 The Socio-Cognitive Interface 
Our selves demonstrate continuity in their emergence in the practices 
of different settings and that occurs to the extent that patterns of 
participation in different settings elicit similar meanings and practices. 
Our selves are not simply embodied and revealed in narratives we 
carry with us (our self-concepts) but also in our attempts at sense 
making, in our actions and interactions in settings i.e. in the ways in 
which we interpret ourselves and contexts (Edwards et al., 2002, p 53).  
 
 For my second level of analysis, I drew inspiration from van Dijk’s (2006) 
socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis, which originally introduced me to 
the concept of schemata. van Dijk’s (2002) analytic toolkit consists of a three-
prong framework that treats discourses, firstly as phenomena that are manifested 
in, among other means, text and speech; secondly, discourses are examined for 
their ideological underpinnings and the vested interests that they serve. Thirdly, 
discourses are treated as context specific (i.e., relevant aspects of situations and 
society), and subjective representations of the social world that are stored and 
processed via an individual’s schemata. As van Dijk (2006, p. 163) explains: 
 
 If contexts ‘control’ discourse at all, this is only possible when we 
conceive of them as cognitive structures of some kind. And only in this 
way are we able to define the crucial criterion of ‘relevance’, that is, in 
terms of a selective focus on, and subjective interpretation of some 
social constraint as defined by the participants. This also explains why 
discourse may be influenced by alternative, fictitious or misguided 
definitions of the social situation, as long as the speaker or writer ‘sees’ 
it that way. Thus, it is not ‘objective’ gender, class, ethnicity or power 
that control the production or comprehension of text and talk, but 
whether and how participants interpret, represent and make use of such 
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‘external’ constraints, and especially how they do so in situated 
interaction. 
 
 van Dijk (2006) uses this basic framework in conjunction with more 
traditional linguistic methods that incorporate the study of semantics, syntax, 
metaphors, and other linguistic criteria. While I do incorporate some of these 
linguistic criteria by analyzing my participant’s semantic and lexical associations 
(e.g., the frequency, connections, order, and connotations of some of the specific 
words that they use, as well as their categorical and procedural functions), what I 
mostly borrow from van Dijk (2006) is the socio-cognitive ontological position. 
This position presupposes that discourse processing and storage occurs in the 
generative cognitive structures of individuals, and that discourse processing, 
despite being a mostly unconscious phenomenon can to some extent be inferred 
and extrapolated from transcribed interview data. That is, in the context of this 
study, the discursive ways that young people express their views and attitudes, 
provide a window into their habituses, i.e., the underlying schematic content and 
organization of the societal discourses and practices that they have been exposed 
to, which guide their socio-cultural and political-economic views and practices in 
both conscious and unconscious ways.  
 Additionally, van Dijk’s (1998) socio-cognitive approach urges researchers 
to describe the structures of socially shared mental representations, as well as the 
processes or strategies of their social acquisition, use and change, With this in 
mind, and after reviewing the initial thematic/ideal analytic groupings described 
above, it became more apparent that, in addition to the explicit views, attitudes, 
and modes of cultural consumption, what certain young people share and differ in, 
is in the ways that they understand and process socio-environmental 
stimuli/information (e.g., social experiences, interactions, discourses, images, 
sounds). For instance, while all of my LA and London youth participants 
expressed critical stances towards certain neoliberal discourses and practices, 
certain participants expressed a more substantial understanding and knowledge of 
political-economic issues and theories, and were able to explain their political-
economic views and practices in more detail and critical depth than my other 
youth participants, and connect them to their socio-cultural preferences and 
practices. Furthermore, they were able to do it very quickly in a seemingly 
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automatic fashion. According to some of the methods used by cognitive and 
social-psychologists (e.g., priming, think out loud tests), the quicker a participant 
responds to a controlled stimuli (in this instance semi-structured questions), the 
more likely it is that their reactions, or certain aspects of their reactions, are 
beyond their conscious awareness (Fishbach & Shah, 2006). While my study was 
not designed to incorporate such methods, the quick response times from those 
young people to certain questions suggest that they have highly informed and 
instantly available political-economic schemata from which to draw. More 
importantly, these highly informed political-economic schemata seem to correlate 
to the ways that they engage with dominant socio-cultural discourses and practices, 
which are markedly different from the other groups of young people. Additionally, 
I also observed that with all my youth participants, the stronger the valence (i.e., 
negative or positive emotive tone or evaluation of an object, situation, or subject 
which influences judgments and choices) of their dispositions or expressed 
thoughts, the more detailed their reflective accounts tended to be. This valence 
strength could be approximately gauged from their voice intonations (as captured 
on my digital recorder) and facial expressions (which I paid special attention to 
during the interviews and wrote down in my notes). Hence, while the explicit and 
expressed, and in some cases displayed, socio-cultural and political-economic 
emotions, thoughts, and practices of my youth participants are valuable in helping 
to establish lines of delineation between groups of them, their dispositional 
tendencies, as can be inferred from their discursive, facial, and emotive responses, 
can help to add an extra level of socio-cognitive categorization. Therefore, and 
given that I did not feel that I had spent sufficient time with these young people 
and in their specific habitats to be able to provide a comprehensive account of 
their daily social practices, detailing some of their implicit and explicit socio-
cultural and political-economic emotions, thoughts, and practices, as can be 
derived from their responses and body language, is the next best thing in gauging 
an approximation of their habituses’ key cognitive, normative, and affective 
components, and serves as the foundation for further and even more in depth 
research. Lastly, I used an operationalized schema mapping framework to 
explicitly illustrate some of the lexical and semantic associations of some of my 
participants’ socio-cultural and/or political-economic schemata and their affective 
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and normative elements. I will elaborate on this in the following chapter in section 
5.2 in order to better contextualize this operationalization.  
 
4.3.3 Towards a Socio-Cognitive Typology of LA and London Youth 
 After I had examined the response times, voice intonations, facial 
expressions, and overall socio-cultural and political-economic semantic and 
lexical associations and their underlying affective and normative components of 
my participants’ responses, and having established the initial groupings discussed 
above, I roughly followed stages 3 and 4 of Kluge’s (2000) guidelines for creating 
a typology (see Figure 4.4 below), and constructed three actual ‘types’ of young 
people: Critical/Political, Artsy/Indie, and Mainstream. In other words, these 
types represent real and observed characteristics and dispositions rather than ideal 
ones. In the following data analysis chapters, I will fully elaborate on the 
characterizations and points of delineation for each of the three types. However, 
before I continue, I want to emphasize that I constructed this typology as an 
heuristic. It is not meant to be a neat representation nor to pigeonhole my 
participants into any type; particularly as they displayed a variety of messy and 
scattershot views sometimes making their placing into a particular type difficult. 
In fact, three of my participants’ accounts (Zoo participants Emir and Becky, and 
World-Vision participant Desmon) were not included in any grouping.
38
 Rather, 
this actual/real yet proto typology is meant to elucidate some of the most salient 
and specific ways in which certain young people with shared information-
processing and other characteristics engage with the dominant institutional 
discourses and practices of their society, how they are potentially influenced by 
them, and what strategies they employ to reject or resist them, e.g., via the 
internalization of opposing or counter-hegemonic discourses and practices.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 In the case of Desmon, I simply did not have enough data to warrant placing him in any group. 
Emir was a recent Turkish immigrant, and while his socio-cultural practices very much resembled 
those practiced by Mainstream youth, his political-economic knowledge concerning US issues, 
was by his own admission, underdeveloped due to him being primarily raised in Turkey. Becky’s 
account, was a uniquely complicated one in that it reflected a hybrid between Mainstream and 
Artsy/Indie characteristics. Nonetheless, these three cases presented excellent learning 
opportunities that forced me to carefully construct my existing three-fold typology, as well as to 
think carefully about future categorizations and methodological fixes.  
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Figure 4.4: Model of empirically grounded typology construction 
 
   
 Typologies are often criticized for not specifying the causal mechanisms or 
processes operating within each type of organization or classification scheme 
(Scott, 1981). I will attempt to sidestep this issue somewhat, and argue that while 
non-determined, the causal mechanisms underlying each of the three typologies 
that I have created are of socio-cognitive origin. That is, and however vague that 
may sound, I have positioned my young participants within a particular type 
because of the ways they interpret, frame, react to, and discursively express social 
information, arguing throughout that these interpretations, framings, reactions, and 
discursive expressions are the result of the intersubjective interplay between 
existing societal discourses and their own unique, subjective, and acquired socio-
cognitive schemata (van Dijk, 1998). The specific positioning of my participants 
into a particular type is listed in the following tables. 
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Table 4.5: LA Youth Types 
Critical/Political Artsy/Indie Mainstream 
Anthony (17) Zoo 
Joey (17) Zoo 
Ben (17) Zoo 
Arlene (17) World Vision 
Lisa (16) World Vision 
Senai (16) World Vision 
Elizabeth (17) World Vision 
Lupe (17) South-Central 
Luz (18) South-Central 
Jasmin (17) Bresee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jesse (17) Zoo 
Evyn (17) Zoo 
Phillip (18) Zoo 
Zack (17) Zoo 
Diana (16) Zoo 
Jocelyn (18) Zoo 
Gloria (18) South-Central 
Tiff (18) South-Central  
Veronica (18) Bresee 
Jose (18) Breese 
 
 
 
 
Ela (18) Zoo 
Dennis (18) Zoo 
John (17) Zoo 
Karina (17) Zoo 
Maurine (17) Zoo 
Maria (17) Zoo 
Fernanda (17) Bresee 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: London Youth Types 
Critical/Political Artsy/Indie Mainstream 
Aimee (17) Islington 
James (17) Islington 
Sam (16) Islington 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tirian (17) Hackney 
Sean (17) Hackney  
Tyrone (19) Hackney 
Iris (17) Hackney 
Jenkins (18) Hackney 
Jack (17) Bermondensey 
Lindsey (17) Bermondensey 
Alice (17) Bermondensey 
Anthony (18) Bermondensey 
Dylanda (16) Bermondensey 
Josh (16) Bermondensey 
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Chapter Five  
Critical/Political Youth 
Challenging Neoliberalism 
 
Rudy: How do you guys think these [social and environmental] problems 
could be fixed? 
Joey: By the youth.  
Rudy:  Explain.  
Joey:  When you’re a teenager and they say like you think that way now but 
you don't have a job, you don't have a car, you don't have to deal with 
this. And it's like yes, I don't owe mortgage money to a bank, I have 
nothing to give to bank, they don't have any hold on me, the 
government doesn't have any hold on me, I'm not 18 yet. I don't have 
to pay car companies, I don't have to pay oil companies, I don't give 
anything to any of these things. I don't have responsibilities; I don't 
owe anything to anyone. I'm completely free to think what I want to 
think, and I know what I see, and it's like once you're an adult and 
you're sucked into the world that is, and It's really hard to change it, 
but when you're not yet considered part of it, and having to like, work 
in it. […] So it's up to the youth. (Zoo participant) 
 
Rudy: So what kind of actions do you think then are necessary to make 
governments responsive for instance to the views or the wants of their 
citizens? 
Aimee: Threatening the mechanisms that they rely on, and the interests of the 
people who fund them. I think there is something that’s said quite 
often, if all the people who marched against the Iraq War had rioted 
against the Iraq War, we wouldn’t have gone to war. (Islington 
participant) 
 
 Thus far  I have reviewed and described some of the dominant socio-cultural 
and political-economic institutions, discourses, processes, and mechanisms that 
constitute contemporary US and UK neoliberal societies. While taking a non-
deterministic position that emphasizes the active role of agents in accepting, 
rejecting, reformulating, or negotiating between the societal discourses presented 
to them, I have nonetheless argued that current US and UK young people are 
subject to a hegemonic media driven neoliberal culture that is hard to ignore. In 
order to begin to explore the complicated micro-level interactional dynamics 
between this neoliberal culture and individual agents, I now turn to an analysis of 
my LA and London interviews and observations using extracts from my data. In 
this chapter, I present a detailed characterization of one of the three actual “types” 
of LA and London young people that I will refer to as Critical/Political. 
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Throughout this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate how these young people 
exhibit transposable socio-cognitive dispositions; viz., mentally stored and 
unconsciously manifested subjective societal attitudes, beliefs, preferences, affects, 
and inclinations,
39
 that are predominantly politically and critically charged, and 
that orient them towards more reflective views and practices that are critical of, 
and which challenge, existing neoliberal discourses. By pointing to some of their 
socio-cultural experiences and agentic practices, and by unpacking the substantive 
content, i.e., central tendencies, and conceptual, semantic, and lexical associations 
of their underlying socio-cultural and political-economic schemata as can be 
extracted from their accounts,
40
 I seek to highlight some of the ways that those 
critical and political dispositions are actively reified. Lastly, I will end this chapter 
with a section that describes how some of these young people’s schemata for 
political-economic organization and human nature, nonetheless mirror or 
correspond to existing neoliberal discourses, and the potential implications this 
may have for neoliberal reproduction. 
 
5.1 Critical/Political Youth: A Leftist Disposition 
 As mentioned in section 4.2.4, after interviewing one of the youth workers 
from the Breese Foundation, he invited me to a meeting that, entirely by 
coincidence, involved the planning of LA’s first ever youth-led youth conference. 
At the meeting, there were representatives, both adults and young people, from 
several of the city’s non-profit organizations. While the adults were in charge of 
the major logistics including the provision of funds and a venue, the main purpose 
of these planning meetings (there were five in total, of which I attended three) was 
to let the young people decide how the conference was going to be run, who was 
going to speak, and what topics were going to be discussed. As the meeting was 
taking place, five young people and their adult youth worker representing the 
World Vision Youth Empowerment Programme walked in about ten minutes late. 
Once the meeting’s adult facilitator opened the floor for the first major decision 
                                                 
39
 Given the time and access restraints I faced when conducting fieldwork, I do not feel that I 
observed and documented enough of my participants’ practices to be able to comment on them in 
depth. Therefore, in this chapter, as in the next two, I will be referring to their thought processes, 
and from those, tentatively inferring a homologous relationship to their expressed practices. 
40
 As stated in Chapters 2 and 4, these refer to hypothesized mentally encoded, compartmentalized, 
and dynamic cognitive representations of their acquired socio-cultural and political-economic 
knowledge, experiences, and orientations (Lodge et al, 1991; Torney-Purta, 1995; van Dijk, 2012). 
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(the length of time that each workshop should last), the adults, myself included, 
stepped back and observed as the young people discussed amongst themselves 
what they felt would be the appropriate amount of time for each workshop. As we 
were looking on, the adult next to me leaned over and said exactly what I was 
thinking, “this is direct democracy”. While all of the young people (about thirteen 
spanning the ages of 9-17) could be seen weighing in on the consensus, three of 
the World Vision young people (Senai, Arlene, and Elizabeth) took on de facto 
leadership roles. Very mindful of not wanting to dominate the decision making 
process, they actively encouraged input from the shyer and younger youth, and 
facilitated rather than dictated the final decision. The meeting ended with each 
group of young people from their respective non-profit organization proposing a 
topic for their workshop. While most of the groups decided on rather apolitical 
subjects including health issues that affect teens, a teen suicide hotline, and 
college/university prep, the World Vision group decided to run a workshop to 
raise awareness on the exploitative conditions of Los Angeles’ sweatshops. After 
the meeting, I approached the World Vision group, and conducted an ad hoc 
interview with them. I begin this section with a description of the above event as a 
means of evoking a sense of some of the political practices that the young people 
who I will refer to as Critical/Political, engage in. It was only after witnessing 
these young people, and in particular Senai, Elizabeth, and Arlene, enacting what 
can be considered consensus democracy, and pushing the youth conference 
towards more social justice orientations, that I was prompted to more carefully 
define what I actually meant by political. Originally, I was prepared to define my 
participants as political if they held explicit and comprehensive views, whether 
negative or positive, on the political-economic system, their government’s policies, 
and corporate culture. However, wanting to avoid falling prey to cultural populist 
tendencies, and in light of what I had observed at the event described above, I 
found that my original conception of political was too loose. In order to do justice 
to the dedicated activism, community involvement, and overall political 
knowledge and concerns that some of my youth participants expressed and/or 
displayed, it was necessary for me to distinguish between deeper and shallower 
conceptions of political. For these participants, their political characteristics took 
the form of a more deep seated disposition, viz., one that oriented/predisposed 
them to consistently express and/or display, in a seemingly automatic fashion, and 
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despite the neutrality of the prompting stimulus (e.g., interview questions), 
attitudes, views, preferences, and opinions that differ from, and are critical of, 
existing socio-cultural and political-economic discourses and practices.
41
 In other 
words, throughout my interviews with them, these participants consistently 
expressed critical dispositions (i.e., the automatic tendency to question and 
critique taken for granted assumptions), and/or political dispositions (i.e., the 
automatic tendency or inclination to want to connect or infuse otherwise neutral 
topics with political concerns or overtures). For example, during my ad hoc focus 
group with the World Vision group, and after briefly explaining the nature of my 
study, I asked them to tell me a little bit about themselves and some of the 
activities that they like to do on their free time, to which Senai and Elizabeth 
answered respectively: 
 
Senai: On my free time, I like to run through the polluted air of Los Angeles, 
and I like to play guitar, hang out with friends, and save our 
community and make different changes for the better of the new 
generation that is going to come after me. 
 
Elizabeth: In my free time this is what I’m doing [referring to the youth 
conference planning meeting described above] gathering with youth, 
talking, and making change.  
 
There could be a number of reasons for why they answered my seemingly neutral 
question in such a way, not least of which, could be that their adult youth worker 
representative was in the room, or that the non-profit organization that they were 
representing at the planning meeting was politically charged (hence predisposing 
them to particular answers when talking to other youth workers, adults, or 
researchers like myself), or that they simply presupposed the types of answers, 
they thought I was looking for. However, the World Vision young people, along 
with all of the other young people that I have categorized as Critical/Political, and 
regardless of their gender, race/ethnicity, social class, and national setting, 
repeatedly demonstrated this tendency to immediately articulate critical and 
political thoughts. This tendency is one of the major characteristics that 
distinguishes them from the other two groups, which I discuss in the next two 
                                                 
41
 As will be discussed later in this chapter, a more deep-seated political dispositional characteristic 
can also entail more conservative viewpoints and practices. However, my sample of youth 
participants did not include any young people who displayed or expressed a more conservative 
political disposition. 
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chapters. For example, note the following extracts, where the information 
contained in them about the participants’ political identities and activities was 
volunteered at the very beginning of each interview: 
  
Rudy: Tell me a little something about yourself. 
Aimee: I’m 17. I live in Hackney in North London, at the moment I’m going 
to college studying history, politics, and history of art. I identify as  an 
anarchist, and I have for the past 4 years.  
Rudy: So what do you do on your free time? 
Aimee: I go to gigs, organize gigs. Do DIY art, crafts kind of stuff, and then 
just usual spending time with friends and the Internet, and reading. 
(Islington participant). 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little something about yourself and some of the things you 
like to do on your free time. 
James: I like to play guitar, and do a lot of art like graffiti, paintings collages, 
and reading and writing is quite a big factor both for college and 
leisure. 
Rudy: Are there any after school clubs that you’re a part of? 
James: I’m part of a press gang. 
Rudy: What is that? 
James: It’s the Waltham Forest borough Forest Flava press gang, and they’re 
all sort of my age, and younger around 18, and we just write articles 
for our website and for the local Guardian. [….] I have an opinion 
piece in it.
42
 (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Let’s start with a few starter questions; tell me a little something 
about yourself. 
Sam: I live in London in Leytonstone, and go to college. 
Rudy: What do you like to do, like hobbies and stuff? 
Sam: I mostly like to read. I like films, mostly old ones, and am interested 
  in politics and philosophy and such. 
Rudy: So during your free time what do you do? 
Sam: I read quite a lot and go to social events and music stuff. 
Rudy: Are you a member of any after school clubs or organizations? 
Sam: I go to a politics one on Wednesdays, which is quite good, and 
[discusses] topical issues, and sometimes they have speakers and that 
which are quite good. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about yourself, name, age, and some of things you 
like to do. 
Luz:  My name is Luz Hernandez. I’m 18. I like to hike a lot. Watch movies. 
 I’m a film fanatic. 
Rudy: Anything in particular?  
                                                 
42
 In this piece James writes about broad topics covering art and politics.  
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Luz: Horror, old movies, not so much the new ones. Music, you know 
music culture, counterculture. 
Rudy:  Counterculture, like what? 
Luz:   Like shows and venues, counterculture as in opposed to the 
mainstream culture; music that isn’t that much out there, Metal and 
sub genres of punk. I also like to read a lot and learn. (South-Central 
LA participant) 
   
 The instant account of their political identities and activities, as in Senai, 
Elizabeth, and Aimee’s case, or of their preference for counter-cultural activities 
as in James’s graffiti art and Luz’s music consumption, presented in the above 
extracts, suggests that politics was fundamental to these young people’s self-
identities. This came through also in these (Critical/Political) participants’ 
responses to some of my other questions that probed them about other aspects of 
their everyday socio-cultural experiences. These responses indicate that these 
young people have developed ways of thinking that allow them to automatically 
connect personal factors like their socio-cultural experiences with larger political 
issues and concerns. For example, when I asked members of the World Vision 
group what they felt the role of education should be, the following back and forth 
discussion broke out between Arlene and Senai: 
 
Arlene: I mean in general. There should be more clubs to interact and build 
relationships with others. I mean my school has a lot of clubs, and it’s 
an awesome thing. Obviously, school is about education, but it should 
teach you more than just that. [….] Like me, I had trouble expressing 
myself when I was younger. I was a nerd and all I did was write and 
write, [but I did not have a social club to express myself], like the one 
I’m in now which is preparing me], and this is what schools should 
have more of.  
Senai: But look at you, like you don’t need school to teach. Did school teach 
you how to do this? The community itself did, your passion for the 
community, and make change and stop violence and be a part of that 
peace vigil. It gives you the pressure to be talking like this, and you 
didn’t learn this from school. 
Arlene: Yeah but we also have to think about kids who do not have the 
opportunity or who are not aware of these programmes Kids whose 
parents don’t let them go out. Kids whose parents just say you know 
do your homework study that’s what you’re going to need to do later 
in life [to] pay you. But I wanted to add to something she said. I’m 
taking a US history class, and I sometimes think why aren’t we 
talking about the history that’s going on right now. Like, sincerely I 
have always asked that question, why are we in a war with Iraq. There 
are so many contradictions with that, and I just want a sincere and 
honest answer. And my history class doesn’t provide a straight answer, 
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and that sucks because for whatever reason that we’re in a war with 
Iraq, we could fix it, and come to some peaceful arrangement. But 
because the government is so corrupt, and we’re not aware of all of 
this things, and government just puts people to sleep. 
              
Admittedly the train of thought is a bit difficult to follow, but given that, however 
brief, this a was free-flowing discussion between the two participants, with no 
interruption on my part, Arlene and Senai simultaneously express (discursively), a 
counter neoliberal view of education, and a dispositional capacity to move from 
private problems to public issues (Mills, 1959).
43
 In the above extract, both Arlene 
and Senai convey anti-instrumentalist views of education with Senai passionately 
(her voice intonation takes a more impassioned tone at this point in the interview) 
lauding a community-based social justice oriented education which she appears to 
have experienced, while Arlene argues for after-school clubs that offer young 
people a safe space to express themselves and for a school curriculum that 
seriously discusses current political issues like their government’s war in Iraq. 
Moreover, what was rather striking in this conversation is that Arlene and Senai 
moved from the specific domain of education to the war in Iraq in under one 
minute. Arguably, although I can only speculate as I did not ask them this directly, 
their thoughts were so sporadic, spontaneous, and free-flowing that it is very 
possible that they were not even aware of the connections they were making.  
 This propensity to automatically connect personal socio-cultural experiences 
with larger political-economic concerns, with little to no prying on my part, and 
sometimes within one breath, was particularly noticeable during discussions 
concerning shopping and brand clothing. For example, when I asked my London 
participant James about his opinions on shopping centres and brand fashion, he 
responded as follows. 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to the malls or shopping centres? 
James: [....] I go to them sometimes, but I’m not a fervent consumer. 
Rudy: So what do you do when you go there? 
                                                 
43
 While not explicitly connected to macro political concerns, Elizabeth’s response to the question 
regarding her educational experiences was loaded with micro political concerns, whereby she 
expressed that her education was being hampered by racist and discriminatory school policies and 
practices that negatively impacted working-class pupils of colour. Indeed, all of the young people 
in this group who were asked the question about what the role of education should be expressed the 
view that schools, in addition to teaching standard subjects like Math and Science, should provide 
young people with an opportunity to self—direct their education, and develop critical thinking 
skills. These views run largely counter to the neoliberal view of education which stresses 
instrumentalist/job training values.  
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James: Well when I was at secondary school I used to go with my friends to 
Tottenham Court Road and Covent Garden and places like that. We 
mainly just goofed around, and we were the mall rats, and we never 
really took part in what it was meant to be. 
Rudy: Really, what was it meant to be you think? 
James: Well it was meant to be just people buying things. 
Rudy: Is there a particular reason for why you didn’t buy stuff? 
James: Well we didn’t really have money for one, [...] but we probably didn’t 
have an interest in most of the things they were selling. 
Rudy: Ah, like what? 
James: I don’t know popular fashion is not really a big thing for me. 
Rudy: Why not? Brand clothing is a relatively staple accessory of young 
people, so why... 
James: But they’re still brands when you get them in second hand stores.  
Rudy: But why doesn’t it appeal to you, you think? 
James: Um I don’t know because it’s all pretty glossy and just a bit, and off 
putting.  
Rudy: I’m curious as to how you manage to avoid it or I guess resist it, since 
everywhere you go there are advertisements trying to sell you 
something, on the tube, everywhere. [...] 
James: Well it probably does have a big part that I don’t have much money to 
play into the system, but I suppose it also has something to do 
because I’ve cultivated quite an objective view of it. It’s detrimental 
you shouldn’t buy into it. It gets everyone into a culture of 
consumerism.  
Rudy: How is it detrimental you think? 
James: It’s detrimental because it keeps the rich richer and poor poorer.  
  
Although there is much to examine in the above extract, including James’ 
pragmatic constraints on shopping (i.e., he does not have the money for), along 
with his expressed political objections to it, the following train of thought 
demonstrates his disposition and capacity to connect everyday socio-cultural 
practices with larger political-economic issues. After a few minutes of 
conversation, I then asked James if he knew about the environmental impact of 
what he referred to above as the culture of consumption. (I highlight James’s 
response times to demonstrate the speed of his connections). 
 
Rudy: Now this culture of consumption that you mention, do you understand 
 the relationship between that and the environment, the natural 
 environment? (Time: 13:47). 
James: (13:49) Well yeah it’s quite bad isn’t it (13:51)? 
Rudy: (13:53) In what way? (13:54) 
James:  (13:56) Well I don’t know how to feel about climate change to be 
honest  I mean there’s lot of scientists that have conflicting views and 
lots of people have loads of views and opinions. I don’t know, I mean, 
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at base level I obviously agree that all these chemicals and toxins that 
we pump out aren’t going to be good for us in the long run (14:28).  
Rudy:  (14:31) I see I was wondering that, because when I mentioned 
consumption  and the environment you immediately thought of 
climate science, so I was wondering why, what was that connection 
you made in your head? (14:44) 
James:  (14:48) I don’t know, I thought of cars, and thought of mass produced 
 cars coming out of factories, everyone buying them and buying lots of 
 petrol and then driving their cars to work (15:07).  
Rudy:  Oh right, that’s a very logical connection between overconsumption 
 and the state of the environment.  
 
James’s disposition and capacity to connect consumerism to political-
economic issues of labour and environmental exploitation (as further elaborated in 
the extracts below) was a prominent characteristic expressed and/or displayed in 
some way by all the Critical/Political young people. They all tended to instantly 
express (either discursively, and/or via changed facial expressions and pronounced 
voice intonations) an emphatic aversion to consumerism, and in most cases 
conveyed a principled political rationale for their rejection of consumerism, one 
that incidentally, is reminiscent of the classic Frankfurt’s School’s critique of the 
commercialization of modern society and the individual passivity and conformity 
that it creates, as discussed in section 2.1.   
 
Rudy: For instance do you know where clothing and things are made?  
James: Over shores. 
Rudy: And do you know under what conditions? 
James: Very bad conditions.  
Rudy: Like what? 
James Well you got women in the Congo working for like 5p doing back 
breaking work. You know getting the little pieces that you need for 
your laptop or your phone. I read an article recently that said that 
women have been joining in the mines for gold because rape is one of 
the biggest problems in the Congo, so they rather work in the mines 
than in the fields. […..] That was a pretty grim article. But yeah it’s 
elsewhere as well. It’s most of the third-world countries you can pick 
out. It’s all happening there. 
Rudy: So does this contribute to your not wanting to? 
James: Well yes obviously. But in another way I do feel quite trapped by it as 
well because I can’t really help having a phone that has those pieces 
in it or a laptop that has those pieces in it. I mean I did buy my own 
phone but my parents bought my laptop, but either way I still feel 
responsible for anything my parents buy me, especially in moral 
terms.  (Islington participant) 
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Rudy: Do you ever go to shopping malls? 
Luz:  No, I don’t like the bustle I guess, people pushing and shoving. I 
don’t really like anything about it. Consumerism is kind of blah to me. 
I’d rather make my own shirts.  
Rudy: What do you mean that consumerism is blah to you? 
Luz: For lack of a better word, as it doesn’t really appeal to me. You know 
I don’t want the latest trendy pants [trousers] or something, Apple 
Bottom jeans, I don’t care you know, it doesn’t catch my attention at 
all. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to shopping malls? 
Joey: In previous years since 8th grade to 11th grade malls used to 
 make me nauseous and sick. At first I didn’t understand. It was just 
overwhelming how many faces there are. It’s just overwhelming how 
retarded it is, how retarded people get. It’s just the animalistic way 
they do it. They just go there to spend money and get things. I don’t 
usually go to malls. I hang out at a friend’s house for fun. I hate going 
to malls and I hate looking at ads. […….] I think a lot of kids our age 
are not really interested in the whole controversy of like you know, 
wow, they’re ads like this everywhere, like buy this buy that 
everywhere. A lot of kids aren’t really interested in that, and you 
know it’s because a lot of training like capitalism is good, it’s what 
makes the world go round. You know you want things and that’s why 
you work harder, so that’s the whole theory behind it and kids aren’t 
really interested. And for Black Friday [in the US, refers to the day 
after Thanksgiving sales similar to the UK’s Boxing Day], it’s also 
‘Buy Nothing Day’ for Add busters [a counter-culture magazine that 
focuses on the anti-globalization movement and anti-corporate 
activities], and I was trying to organize and assemble a freedom ride 
thing on the subway which is just like wearing black and dance, and 
don’t buy anything and free your soul kind of thing, and not a single 
person showed up, except Josh and me. So it just kind of shows you 
how few people are interested in anything like that. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to shopping malls? 
Ben: Absolutely not. It’s depressing to me. The mall is the symbol of 
corporate dominance. It’s gross to me. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy:         What do you think of brand clothing? 
Jazmin: I hate brand clothing, it’s so stupid. I mean when you go to the ghetto 
you see […] families where parents are wearing nicer brand clothing 
than their kids, their kids are practically in rags, and they’re spending 
so much money on clothes that are made by slave labour. I’d rather 
wear some cheap ass pants that work the way I want them to work. 
[…] 
Rudy: Now explain the slave labour part, what do you mean by that? 
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Jazmin. Well a lot of clothing companies make their clothes in Indonesia or 
China, in poor areas where they don’t pay their workers right, they 
mistreat their workers, and people keep buying stuff from them. Like 
Nike, used a lot of slave labour, I don’t know if they still do it, but I 
know that they did, and people don’t fucking care. They still keep 
wearing, and they still keep contributing to their profits in the end, I 
choose not to contribute. 
Rudy: So you think knowing this […] affects the way you consume certain 
things? 
Jazmin: Yeah, like for instance you know McDonalds how they make their 
meat, and the hormones that they put in it. I, till like four years ago, I 
didn’t eat McDonalds at all, and I still don’t really eat it, but there was 
a certain point where I couldn’t afford anything, so that’s all I could 
get, but before that, I didn’t buy it. (Bresee Foundation participant) 
 
 
Rudy: So do you ever go to places like the Brent Cross Shopping Centre or 
 Oxford Street or places like that? 
Aimee: No 
Rudy: Any particular reason? 
Aimee: It’s funny because it’s not even like an ethical thing. I don’t really 
have a problem with that. I know loads of anarchists who do go
 shopping and buy designer clothes. It’s nothing to do with that. I 
 don’t know I just prefer to find things that are second hand. I don’t, I 
 like old things and improving them.  
Rudy: So like brand clothing doesn’t do anything for you? 
Aimee:  No 
Rudy:  But it just doesn’t, there’s no ethical reason as you mentioned? 
Aimee: Like I know obviously, I understand all of the reasons why people 
 have ethical objections, and I have ethical objections to the fact that 
 it’s made in sweatshops and all that stuff. But I don’t really believe in
 consumer boycotts as a tactic I guess. [She goes on to articulate a 
very critical view of ethical consumption]. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to malls or shopping centres? 
Sam: Rarely, I’m not a big fan of those. It feels, it kind of feels like you’re 
sort of outside of reality when you’re in those. It’s just like, like loads 
of consumers in that and it makes me sad. 
Rudy: Why, elaborate on that, explain? 
Sam: It just kind of depresses me the way that society has become so 
consumeristic, and you see people flocking to buy things they don’t 
need. It depresses. But see I very rarely go to malls and that. 
Rudy: But why does it depress you? 
Sam: Just because people’s lives are reduced to acquiring commodities 
rather than. [Inaudible]. Just the way that society has become so 
consumeristic, but I can’t explain it. 
Rudy: What do you think of brand clothing then? 
Sam: I personally don’t wear it. It’s for a number of reasons. First of all I 
don’t see the point in paying large prices for  items that are just labels. 
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Also for an ethical point of view they often are made by people who 
are working below the minimum wage in areas of high poverty and 
exploitation. And also, I generally dislike kind of large multi-national 
 companies. But obviously don’t abstain from all of them because that 
would be too difficult a task but I generally avoid those sorts of 
products. (Islington participant) 
 
In the cases of Anthony, Luz, and Lupe, where the connection between 
consumption and its larger political-economic consequences was not made during 
their responses to questions that asked whether they go to shopping malls or like 
brand clothing, they did make this connection in response to the next set of 
questions about whether they knew where their consumer goods come from:
44
 
 
Rudy: Do you guys know where your clothes are made?  
Anthony: China. Slave labour. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you guys know where your clothes are made?  
Luz: Like Forever 21, sweatshops and stuff like that. I’m aware where they 
come from so that’s why I try not to buy anything from them. I guess 
it’s the reason I don’t purchase brand name clothing.  
Lupe: I learned in school. I believe it was in my eight-grade history 
 class. My teacher was really into that stuff. He would show us 
 documentaries about stuff like that. Not only would they exploit 
people but it also harms the environment. 
Rudy:   What about the impact on the environment that occurs because of the 
production of these items, do you know anything about that? If so, 
what are your thoughts? 
Luz:  Yes, like every item of clothing is not just affecting the person 
making it or the person wearing it, the materials that it comes from 
[....] makes pollution, factory work, deforestation depending on the 
item.  
Lupe:   Yeah, like a radio for example, the metal is from Brazil and the plastic 
is from China. Just stuff from all over the world to make a radio. Just 
to make it cheaper for you, so it could be worth like $2 they could 
down forests and stuff. (South-Central LA participants) 
 
In addition to their critical and political dispositions, these extracts also 
demonstrate these young people’s informed understanding of how seemingly 
benign cultural artefacts like branded goods are intimately interlocked with wider 
political-economic processes, and noticeably highlight these young people’s 
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 Due to the ad hoc nature of the first World Vision focus group, I was not able to ask them 
questions about their consumption habits. However, they all worked together to present a 
sweatshop awareness workshop for the LA Youth Conference, indicating their critical stance 
towards mainstream fashion and the labour practices of the garment industry. 
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significant degree of empathy for the suffering of others. Additionally, they 
suggest that when this understanding or schemata, as I will discuss in the next 
section, is activated (e.g., via my questioning, or presumably by some other 
stimulus during their everyday experiences), it initiates a strong emotional reaction 
in these young people, which can influence their consumption practices, as 
described in James, Jazmin [note her statement above in bold], Sam, and Luz’s 
accounts, and in the following accounts by Ben, Arlene, and Lisa.
45
 
 
Rudy: Do you guys know where your clothes are made?  
Ben: Indonesia, China. I don’t know specifically where they are made. But 
I feel awful about wearing it, because you know. I don’t really know 
too much about this and can’t buy anything and be sure. But I have 
the feeling that the majority of the clothes I wear were made 
essentially out of slave labour and that’s why I got them so cheap. It’s 
because people in South America were making this sneakers for like a 
quarter a day. And frankly I don’t know how to circumvent that and 
wear what I want without having to spend a lot of money. (Zoo 
participant) 
 
 
Rudy:  So what do you think about brand clothing for instance? 
Arlene: I don’t mind, I really don’t care, it’s not a topic that I really look at. 
Although sometimes I really do look at brands and who makes their 
clothes. For example, the coach bags, they’re like little kids weaving 
these bags with their hands, and that’s incredibly cruel. And like for 
example, the See’s Candies, there are little kids [extracting] the cocoa, 
and like they don’t get paid for this, their parents get paid, because 
kids are volunteers, and if they get caught eating a cocoa eating a 
chocolate they get punished. So most of these have never tried 
chocolates in their lives, and that’s where they work at. So that’s 
incredibly sad. So I do not eat any See’s Candies at all. 
Lisa: I’m not going to eat See’s Candies from now on too, oh my god. 
Arlene: You didn’t know that (directed at Lisa)? And I love See’s Candies, 
but I don’t eat it since I found out. It’s been over two years since I 
found  out, and since then [I haven’t]. (World Vision participants) 
 
Their critical and political dispositions were also particularly prevalent during 
discussions that centred on their preferred media-cultural tastes. In most instances, 
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 At this point I should I also note that, with the exception of the World Vision participants’, Senai 
and Elizabeth, I had repeated encounters with all of the Critical/Political young people. During my 
interviews with them, and subsequent run-ins, I paid attention to what they were wearing, so as to 
compare their views with their actual practices. At the time of those few encounters at least, these 
respondents either wore non-corporate DIY ensembles or simple clothing with no obvious or 
flashy brand labels. More corroborating evidence for the consistency between their views and 
practices can also be found in their critique of mainstream corporate media-culture as discussed in 
this section.  
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these young people tended to automatically express their preferred media-culture 
interests while simultaneously distancing themselves from, and critiquing, what 
they view as mainstream culture and its celebrity representatives. Correspondingly, 
and in general, as with most young people, Critical/Political young people tended 
to express a strong emotional attachment to their media-culture preferences. 
However, they often coupled that attachment with an in depth critical textual and 
political analysis of their preferred cultural artefacts. This is again another key 
characteristic that distinguishes them from the other two classifications of young 
peoples, who, as I will demonstrate in the next chapters, appreciate and engage 
with media-culture mostly for its affective and/or entertainment properties. 
Furthermore, even for contemporary young people who have broad access to a 
multitude of media-cultural artefacts from all over the world, another general 
characteristic is that these young people’s media-cultural tastes are very esoteric 
and generally non-corporate, which suggests that they go to extensive lengths to 
either escape mainstream culture, or to simply find something different from it.  
 
Rudy: What types of like film or music do you listen to and why exactly? 
Luz:  […] Music wise, not really mainstream music, it doesn’t catch my 
attention, I think it’s very bland, it has no challenge, but I guess I’m 
being judgmental. I like a lot of guitar music, classic rock, old music. 
Rudy:  Ok so like some of these media that you’re like exposed to, what 
messages do you get from them, or how do you interpret them.  
Luz:  You should dress super fancy and spend all your money on clothes or 
   be dumb. Like Lady Gaga and everything, be Gaga, no, no thank you. 
Rudy:  But well for like the ones you do like. 
Luz:  I guess it’s kind of like don’t take shit, you know be your own person 
   express yourself, always be yourself. 
Rudy: So these films and the music you listen to, do you think encourages 
   that more? 
Luz:  Yeah as opposed to like mainstream culture yeah. 
Rudy: Can you give me an example, like you said Lady Gaga? 
Luz: Oh I don’t like her, I hate her music, but I do like Bony Vare, it’s a 
band. It’s very different from normal genres. It’s like grind core, it’s 
not what most people listen to, but I think it’s really expressive. I  
think that’s what counts.  
   [...........] 
Rudy: Lupe [....] movies or TV? 
Lupe:  […..] Music wise I haven’t really stuck to a genre I just listen to  
   whatever is recommended. 
Rudy: But the stuff you do like, what types of messages do you get from  
   them? 
Lupe: Awareness, do it yourself, be yourself. 
   [……..] 
 152 
Rudy:  Do you listen to any political music? 
Luz: […] Music wise I like Anarcho-Punk, Crust Punk. Anarcho-Rap like 
Dead Prez [US Political Rap Duo], Immortal Technique [Independent 
and staunchly political US rapper] and stuff like that. 
Rudy:  Why do you listen to Anarcho-punk music? 
Luz: Because I can relate to it, being oppressed and stuff. It’s kind of good 
that there is a message, it’s not just booty shaking.  
Rudy:  Do you actively pursue this music? 
Luz:  Yes I do, I go to venues where this music plays. I focus more on that 
as oppose to other music.  
Rudy: What kind of messages do you get? 
Luz:  There’s a lot of feminism, bringing down capitalism, class, standing 
up for yourself and for your rights, being independent, not 
succumbing to what everyone else, being aware. (South-Central LA 
participants) 
 
 
Rudy: I guess for the purposes of disclosure, I should state that I recruited 
you at the Ryan Harvey gig, which I was then told you helped 
organize. How does that come about, why did recruit Harvey and 
such? I mean I’m assuming you like his music, and his stuff is 
explicitly political. 
Aimee:  I guess I’m quite interested in like music as like a tool for social 
change I guess. And you’re saying that his music is all like really, 
really, really, explicitly political which is true. But I think also he 
sings quite a lot about personal stuff, which is things that like 
personal things to being an activist. And obviously that’s not 
something you get from like mainstream artists. And it’s a really 
specific thing, but there’s a lot of emotional challenges that come 
with being an activist and being really invested in things. So yeah I 
kind of relate to his music on an emotional level as well, because a lot 
of the struggles that he sings about, in terms of activist burn out and 
feeling disillusioned with things. Yeah things, that are really 
important for me to kind of have a way of thinking about and 
processing, and it’s not really something you get from any 
mainstream artist. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: What kind of music do you listen to? 
Sam: I mostly listen to 60’s and 70’s Prog rock, Psychedelic stuff, quite a 
lot of Bob Dylan and Pink Floyd stuff. I think in recent decades music 
has become quite banal and mediocre. The only good ground 
breaking stuff was from back then. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Ben: Princess Mononoke, it’s a Miyazaki film, and it is the most beautiful 
movie I’ve ever seen. And it’s ultimately a movie about 
environmental destruction. It’s in village in like medieval Japan with 
demons. […..] And so the guy gets cursed when he kills this giant 
boar demon that’s been essentially infected with technology. […..]. 
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And when the guy finally kills the boar demon, there is this lump of 
iron inside of it. That’s what cursed the boar, and it’s a subtle 
metaphor for technology, and how technology is destroying the world. 
And there’s this woman who is the leader of the village, and they’re 
cutting down the forest to make jobs. And what’s interesting about 
the movie, is that it’s not clear-cut, the villain is not like evil and “I’m 
going to destroy the forest and burn it down”. She’s a person who 
basically saved many many many poor people and gave them jobs 
with the industry of cutting the forests down and hunting the wild 
animals. She is saving these humans’ lives. So it’s multi-dimensional, 
it’s not just good and evil. It shows the balance of is it worth 
destroying the environment for economic purposes? So it’s very very 
applicable to modern society and it’s just a beautiful movie. (Zoo 
participant) 
 
James:  There’s this band called Andrew Jackson Jihad [Independent US 
anarcho-folk-punk band] and I think they’re folk punk. They have 
quite good lyrics. They’re very satirical and they’re very introspective 
and they have commentary on a lot of things but mostly about living. 
Rudy:  How do you interpret some of their lyrics? 
James:  Well they definitely seem to have a moral standing, they have moral 
attitudes and moral views that they put across and I sympathize with 
them. 
Rudy:  Give me an example? 
James:  In one song called Personal Space Invader they say how can you put 
that straw up your nose when you know how coke is manufactured, 
but the general gist is about third world countries’ exploitation. It’s 
the same thing [coke] it’s a commodity like cars and everything else. 
(Islington participant) 
 
The extracts discussed in this section, while brief, open a window into some 
of the complex inner thought process and socio-cultural experiences of this group 
of young people and their reactions to, and interpretations and cognitive 
representations of those experiences. Through a number of varying interpellating 
influences, including schools, youth centres, media-culture, and friends and family, 
these young people have developed a host of transposable dispositions, attitudes, 
views, opinions, preferences, affects, and inclinations that orient or predispose 
them towards more reflective critical and political perspectives on varying topics 
like education, culture, and, as I will elaborate on in the following section, 
political-economy. Furthermore, these critical and political dispositions, at least 
according to these young people’s accounts, to varying extents, guide them to 
ethical, empathetic, and compassionate views and practices. These practices vary, 
but generally revolve around challenging corporate culture, with these young 
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people employing a plethora of strategies ranging from partial abstinence from it, 
to active boycotts, to DIY alternatives and consciousness raising activities. Overall, 
the socio-cultural views and practices discussed in this section run counter to the 
more uncritical, materialistic, apathetic, and self-interested discourses and 
dispositions promoted by the neoliberal culture that they are, nonetheless, 
surrounded by. 
 
5.2 Schema Mapping: Operationalized Framework: 
In Chapters 2 and 4, I argued that socio-cognitive dispositions, when 
specifically referring to an individual’s instantly and discursively expressed 
attitudes, affects, inclinations, preferences, and practices, are some of the 
empirically observable, manifested, and articulated content that correspond to an 
individual’s schemata (Bourdieu, 1990; van Dijk, 1997). In the context of socio-
cultural and political-economic knowledge, discourses, and socialization, thinking 
in terms of schemata can help us to understand and map out some of the 
substantive content, context and structure of a young person’s frameworks for 
making sense of the societal discourses and practices that they have been exposed 
to throughout their lives, and more specifically, how they store, process, react to, 
and make meaning of those discourses and practices. For instance, some of the 
extracts discussed in the previous section, suggest that the Critical/Political young 
people’s schemata are organized in such a way that cultural ideas and artefacts like 
‘brands’, ‘clothes’, and ‘shopping malls’, are associated, networked, and encoded 
with political-economic concepts such as corporations’, ‘labour and environmental 
exploitation’, and ‘consumerism’. So, for example, whenever their schemata for 
say music were activated via my questioning, their inner thought processes 
automatically drew on their specific semantic and lexical networks of associated 
and relevant concepts,
46
 that resulted in them tending to dichotomize music by 
framing it negatively as mainstream (as associated with bland materialistic 
discourses and superficial lyrics), and/or positively as non-mainstream, associating 
it with more empowering and socially and politically conscious discourses and 
lyrics (e.g., see Figure 5.1 Luz’s Music Schemata below).  
                                                 
46
 As Ferguson & Bargh (2004, p. 33) note, “research suggests that the perception of any social 
stimulus will inevitably activate in memory a diverse array of related knowledge”. 
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In the following sections, I will analyze some of the substantive content of 
these young people’s schemata for political-economic knowledge. In doing so, I 
seek to highlight their extensive knowledge of political-economic topics 
(specifically welfare, voting, and political-economic systems) and their abilities to 
quickly recall substantial, detailed, and relevant information. Moreover, by 
drawing out the range of their political-economic knowledge, conceptual 
associations, and opinions, I can more explicitly highlight how these correspond to, 
and/or diverge from, neoliberal discourses. From this, I can then provisionally 
situate their political orientations along a theoretical spectrum of neoliberal 
interpellation, i.e., the extent to which their political-economic schemata highly, 
moderately, or weakly reflect or contest dominant neoliberal discourses. Lastly, 
the schemata diagram shown below,
47
 along with the others that will be illustrated 
throughout the rest of this thesis, are operationalized illustrations that are based on, 
and that roughly follow, Lodge and colleagues’ (1991, p. 1360) hypothetical 
memory structure, and the following framework set by Torney-Purta (1992, p. 12-
13): 
A framework for understanding the content and structure of a young 
person’s cognitive representations of politics should meet several criteria: 
first, it should be appropriate to political situations that usually lack clear 
structure and political problems that lack agreed-upon solutions; second, it 
should take account of the role of discourse and dialogue about social 
representations; and, third, it should integrate attitudes with cognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 This figure represents a major portion of Luz’s (South-Central LA Participant) actual thought 
processes and conceptual connections (which comprise her more unconscious and affect loaded 
critical and political dispositions, as well as her conscious reflections about her music preferences), 
as evidenced from her responses to questions concerning music. As demonstrated in this figure, 
and as is the case with the other Critical/Political young people, socio-cultural preferences, 
experiences, and discourses are intimately and intricately intertwined with political-economic 
knowledge and serve to mutually reinforce each other. I do not have enough data to state whether 
these young people’s media preferences influence their politics, or vice versa. However, the point 
is that, as the figure demonstrates, they are intimately interconnected.  
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Figure 5.1: Luz’s Music Schemata and Schemata Key 
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5.3 Welfare And Poverty Schemata: 
How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or 
compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we 
either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That 
we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact 
too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like 
all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means 
confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it 
with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most 
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it 
(Smith, 1759/1839, p. 4). 
 
 In Chapter 1, I argued that contemporary generations of UK and US young 
people are surrounded by neoliberal discourses that negatively depict government 
welfare services and their recipients. It follows that a good start to gauge the 
effectiveness of neoliberal discursive interpellation on young people would be to 
explore their views on welfare and the causes of individual poverty. This area of 
youth political research is scarce, but in this section, I will attempt to partially fill 
this gap by unpacking the Critical/Political young people’s schemata for welfare 
and causes of poverty (which will later be compared to that of the other two 
classifications of young people). Generally, as is the case with their views on 
education and labour exploitation, these young people expressed a consistently 
humanist and compassionate view, whereby they supported welfare services with 
few if any restrictions, contrary to standard neoliberal discourses.
48
  
 
 
                                                 
48
 This was generally the case for all the Critical/Political young people who were asked these sets 
of questions with the exception of Jazmin (Bresee Participant), who while first expressing the view 
that welfare services are necessary to keep people afloat, particularly in the current economic 
recession, followed her statement with views that reflect more standard neoliberal negative 
representations of impoverished people having more children in order to receive more welfare 
benefits.  
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Rudy: So on that note what do you think of government welfare 
programmes? 
Aimee: I think they’re the least they can do. It’s kind of compensation, 
because we didn’t sign up for this, we’re forced to live under this 
system, we’re  forced to live under the state and under capitalism. The 
least you [the  state] can do is not let us starve when it inevitably 
fucks us over. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: What do you think of government welfare programmes then? 
Sam: Yeah well I would advocate more investment in a better welfare 
programme. I think it’s very important that a society looks after those, 
who in those kind of lower positions, economically and socially, and 
that basically that a lot of money is invested in helping them. I think 
that in the programmes we’re seeing now, I think that is obviously 
things get a lot worse, and unemployment rises, yeah I think an 
effective welfare programme is important. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: So what do you guys think about welfare programmes? 
Luz:   Being in these systems you know, I actually think favourably of them 
because I think they've helped out a lot, and then they get a bad rep 
from people because you know they're saying, these people are living 
off government and they're not going to want to get a job. But, 
actually, if you're in it, you notice that it's people that actually need it, 
these people cannot survive you know, it's not just moochers, 
although some people suck you know. Most of the time it is people 
that need it, and without it they would probably be homeless and stuff. 
But I think very favourably of them.  
[....] 
Lupe:  I think it does help people, and I think it's really good to have them. 
(South-Central LA participants) 
 
 
Rudy: Earlier you brought up Kucinich [Denis Kucinich a well-known 
progressive Congressman from the US] and you mentioned 
something about a socialized society along those sorts, what do you 
mean by that? 
Ben: Well socialized society. I’m a strong believer in a socialized 
democracy. So you should be able to elect officials so that’s the 
democracy part. The public should have some say in what’s going on. 
The socialized part is what the government provides for you. What’s 
the point of government if it’s not going to protect you? By protect 
you I’m going to include the police department, the fire department, 
and maybe not just protect, but provide, so the roads, the public 
facilities that they produce, and healthcare. Healthcare is a right that 
people have. I think it’s the government’s responsibility to provide its 
citizens with free-healthcare. I think it’s a right because in this 
country, the healthcare system it’s so confusing. […] But I still have 
the feeling that it’s somewhat like the old system, where if you have 
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lots and lots of money, you’re good. If you have a stroke or a heart 
attack, don’t worry you have lots of money, and you can pay for that 
or that cat scan or MRI or whatever test you need. If you’re an 
immigrant from Mexico, illegal immigrant, some of those people are 
dirt poor, they can barely feed their families. If one of them has a 
heart attack, do you really think they can afford the surgery, and is 
that fair? Does someone with more money deserve that surgery more 
than the immigrant, I’d say no. I think racism is a huge component in 
the people who advocate for a non-socialized healthcare system. (Zoo 
participant) 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Ben’s Welfare Schemata 
 
 
 As with Luz’s schemata for music described in the previous section, Ben’s 
schemata for welfare, is diagrammed above to make his welfare related conceptual, 
lexical, and semantic associations more visible. Of note are the observations that 
Ben never mentions welfare at all, which tends to have a negative connotation, and 
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instead uses the much more neutral concept, ‘government protection’. The 
diagram also illustrates Ben’s accurate conception of a socialized democracy that, 
like his general views on government protection, is not riddled or inflected with 
pejorative anti-welfare discourses or dispositions. Similarly, all but one of the 
Critical/Political young people who were asked these sets of questions did not 
express the standard neoliberal anti-welfare discourses which, in their most 
pejorative and often fraudulent (yet commonly circulated via mass media0 
articulation, depict welfare recipients as lazy welfare queens sponging off the 
government trough. In fact, their views on welfare are arguably emphatically anti-
neoliberal, and reflect a pronounced empathetic disposition that echoes Adam 
Smith’s (1759/1839) account of human nature described above. For instance, Sam 
and Ben strongly argued that government safety nets and services should be a 
given in any society and freely available to all who need them, with Ben going the 
extra step of associating anti-universal healthcare attitudes with racism.
49
 Luz 
disclosed her personal experiences in using welfare programmes, noting that 
people who use such programmes desperately need and are helped by them, while 
Amy tied her arguments for the need for welfare provisions to her anti-statist and 
anti-capitalist views, arguing that it is the very least that the state can do for the 
citizens it subjugates and oppresses.  
Corresponding to their views on welfare, are these young people’s views on, 
and informed explanations for, the causes of poverty. When asked about the 
causes of poverty, Critical/Political young people generally pointed to structural 
political-economic factors, rather than expressing typical neoliberal person-blame 
discourses that emphasize individual choices as the main contributors to 
homelessness and poverty: 
 
Luz:  It could be the capitalist system. There are a lot of people who have 
  tried and owned their own stores but when you have these monstrous 
  companies you’re going to run out of business. And then eventually 
  these people have nothing to live with like no income.  
Lupe:  There are some people that can’t work because they’re immigrants, 
  drugs and companies leaving to different places for cheaper labour so 
  people are out of jobs. (South-Central LA participants) 
 
 
                                                 
49
 A merited view, given that a prominent rationale for the opponents of universal healthcare in the 
US is that it would be overrun by ‘illegal aliens’.  
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Rudy: So our economic system is described as capitalist, where people are 
said to be rewarded on how little or how hard they work. What do you 
think of this? 
Aimee: Um, it’s completely not the case that people are rewarded for how 
hard or how little they work. There are loads of people who work 
really really hard their whole lives and are still really poor. Yeah it’s 
completely, and likewise people who do basically no work who 
inherit loads of money and are really rich and don’t have to work. So 
yeah just the whole idea of trickle down wealth as well, if rich people 
get richer it will ultimately be better for everyone, is just I think, 
proven itself to be completely not the case; especially in terms of 
globalization and stuff.  
[…] 
Rudy: So why do you think that some people are poor or homeless? 
Aimee: Basically because. I think poor people are poor because it’s always 
going to drive up profits if you pay people less. Yeah basically just in 
the system where the ultimate focus is on profit, then it’s always 
going to be about anything that’s going to increase profit rather than 
looking at what’s going to be best for the workers or anything else 
apart from profit. Also, unemployment is linked in, because it’s 
always made an issue in this country with immigration as well 
without looking at the fact that the reason they use labour from 
undocumented workers and stuff is because they can pay them less 
which is an issue of capitalism again rather than. (Islington 
participant) 
 
 Of note in these extracts is Lupe’s mentioning of drugs as a possible cause 
for poverty, which is a commonly held view that corresponds to a general 
neoliberal individualist discourse. However, it is a noticeably quick and almost 
offhand disclosure, which is overshadowed by her other views which stress more 
structural factors like immigration status and job outsourcing as reasons for why 
individuals suffer from poverty. Luz and Aimee strictly stressed structural 
economic factors as the major contributors to the proliferation of poverty, with 
Luz essentially describing the effects of contemporary monopoly corporate 
capitalism in depressing wages and running small businesses out of business. 
While Aimee’s response is interlaced with a rather precocious political-economic 
lexicon including the accurate use of concepts like ‘trickle down wealth’ and 
‘globalization’ to argue that trickle-down (neoliberal) economics have not worked 
to lift the majority of people out of poverty.  
 Overall, the extracts discussed in this section demonstrate that, like their 
socio-cultural schemata, Critical/Political young people’s schemata for welfare 
and poverty are imbued with humanist and empathetic tendencies, and informed 
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and sophisticated understandings of the complex issues of welfare and poverty. 
They also demonstrate a key structural understanding of these issues, and indeed 
seem to be disposed to expressing structural concerns, which is a possible 
explanation for why most of their responses did not evoke or reflect standard 
neoliberal discourses on these topics. It is notable that all of the Critical/Political 
young people’s socio-cultural and political-economic schemata share virtually 
identical central tendencies and conceptual associations, which are for the most 
part, not inflected by neoliberal discourses. However, in the next section, their 
divergent views on voting, capitalism, and human nature are discussed, as well as 
how some of these reflect discourses crucial to neoliberal hegemony.   
 
5.4 A Creeping Neoliberalism and Fatalistic Dispositions: 
This logic is seen as a paradigmatic form in the dialectic of expressive 
dispositions and instituted means of expression (morphological, 
syntactic, and lexical instruments, literary genres etc.) which is 
observed in the intentionless invention of regulated improvisation.  
[…..] In other words, being produced by a modus operandi which is 
not consciously mastered, the discourse contains an ‘objective 
intention’, as the Scholastics put it, which outruns the conscious 
intentions of its apparent author and constantly offers new pertinent 
stimuli to the modus operandi of which it is the product and which 
functions as a kind of ‘spiritual automaton’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 57).  
 
 Despite their broadly left-leaning positions, my respondents from this group 
did have varied views. While they all strongly supported welfare programmes, and 
expressed deep concerns over the state of the natural environment and a 
pronounced contempt for their respective governments, their political sympathies 
varied, across the anarchist, socialist, and social-democratic political spectrum, as 
evidenced, for example, in their views on voting and capitalism. The following 
extracts demonstrate this spread. 
 
Rudy: That leads us to segway into the political part of our discussion, so 
what do you guys think of the current political system. 
[....] 
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Joey: The people have a lot to do with it, because the ignorant masses, a lot 
of people are ignorant masses, and a lot of people are not involved in 
what’s going on at all, and a lot of people are made to feel that role of 
like, I’m just here to buy things, and I’m not really here to whatever. 
That’s the government’s problem, that’s scientists’ problem, that’s 
this person’s problem, like all my job is to do this. And you know, a 
lot of things that they build into us, like you need to work really hard 
so you can get what you want, or you need to do what you need to do 
so you can get the money so you can tell someone what to do, 
because otherwise you’re just going be told what to your whole life, 
and you need to work for money cause and that’s the most important 
thing. [.......] You know that capitalism, they say that communism 
doesn’t work, because it doesn’t take into consideration human 
behaviours or like human desires or whatever, but capitalism working 
with those like animalistic behaviours and like encouraging those 
things isn’t a good thing either. Just because it works with those 
things doesn’t mean it’s good, that means it’s worse, because the 
human species doesn’t progress in any direction it just allows it to be 
barbaric. 
 [.....] 
Rudy: So do you know about any other economic alternatives? 
Joey: Yeah communism. Communism is great. Every time it was tried it 
failed, yeah but that’s because every time, every person who tried to 
do it was a fascist dictator, it’s not like fascist dictators like 
communism. That was right, is that communism doesn’t mean that 
you have to have a fascist dictator, what it means is no government, 
no fascist government, you know what I mean. And I don’t mean just 
pure communism, because I guess because at some level that might 
just be impossible for people as a whole, but I mean some level of 
that general idea of sharing, caring, helping, you know the whole 
community. We’re too big as a group to be about individual income, 
you know what I mean. We’re a huge community, and it has to go 
around [income], and it has to be levelled out, and everyone needs to 
pull in the same amount. Our teacher [biology teacher] told us about 
this thing, the tragedy of the commons, that whole thing. You know a 
lot of people will do that, and not care, and that’s why communism 
doesn’t work, and that’s why we’re destroying our eco-system.  
[...] 
Rudy: Voting, do you think it’s effective? 
Anthony: I defiantly think voting needs to be there. But, I think one problem is 
the system is an unsolvable problem unfortunately. When you vote 
for a senator, you don’t know what they’re going to do what they say 
when they campaign for it, and if they don’t you have no say over it 
because you that they’re just there until their turn is over. Even during 
it, you don’t know if they’re going to vote towards your interests or 
not. You know what they stand for but they really, once they’re in 
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office, they can really do whatever they want, and you can’t really 
stop them unless they start breaking the law.
50
   
Rudy: So how would you change that Anthony? 
Anthony: That’s the problem, I don’t know how it can be changed. I know how 
to identify the problem but. 
Joey: Revolution 
[......] 
Rudy: If you guys could vote who would you vote for? 
Anthony: Green Party. 
Joey: Gore. (Zoo participants) 
 
 Of note in this discussion are Joey and Anthony’s seemingly dissonant views 
on voting, and Joey’s reference to the prominent argument made in Hardin’s 
(1968) influential paper; Tragedy of the Commons. On the first point, both Joey 
and Anthony have pointed critiques of capitalism and the voting system 
respectively, with Joey referring to capitalism as ‘barbaric’, and Anthony 
summing up a key structural flaw in the US’s representative democratic system: 
namely that elected officials are not under any legal requirement to uphold their 
campaign promises or the interests of their constituents. However, both still 
support the voting system, despite the hopeless outlook they express. While Joey 
does mention revolution as a possible remedy to the electoral system, she does not 
elaborate on this, and later discloses that she would vote for Al Gore who was a 
mainstream neoliberal politician (and for example, an ardent supporter and 
spokesperson for NAFTA). Moreover, while Anthony’s ambivalent support for the 
voting system, and the Green Party is consistent with his overall politically 
progressive views, engagement with critical but still liberal media, and relative 
under exposure to information on alternative political-economic systems (which 
the media he engages with is loath to talk about or accurately depict), Joey’s 
inconsistent political views seem to be at least partially influenced by Hardin’s 
(1968) famous essay. Hardin’s (1968) essay is a thought experiment outlining how 
overpopulation coupled with natural human self-interestedness can lead to an 
unregulated use of the commons and consequent environmental catastrophe. This 
essay has been critiqued for a number of reasons, the most significant of which is 
that it is a thought experiment with no empirical evidence to support its broad 
theoretical claims. In fact, recent economics research has demonstrated that 
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 Due to word limits I cut this extract short, but of note, Anthony references several prominent 
political media figures that inform his views including Jon Stewart [US political comedian], Rachel 
Maddow, and Jim Lear [US openly liberal news anchors].  
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collective societies, which tend to promote more co-operative and altruistic norms 
and values, practice environmentally sustainable management of natural resources 
(Ostrom, 2010). However, Hardin’s (1968) thesis continues to influence 
contemporary neoliberal economists who commonly site it as a reason to fully 
privatize the commons. According to the above extract from Joey’s interview, 
Hardin’s (1968) essay, introduced to her in a biology class, clearly makes her 
question the merits of her communist sympathies, and seems to lead her to the 
conclusion that, because of natural human selfishness, communism, and 
particularly the anarchist branch of communism she seems to be alluding to, will 
not work. This suggests a fatalist disposition, i.e., an automatic belief that human 
beings are naturally selfish and therefore cannot enact viable political-economic 
alternatives. As Hawkins (1997, p. 22) argues: 
 
Among the various elements within a world view, the concept of 
human nature usually occupies a pivotal role. This concept purports to 
describe the fundamental motives which govern human conduct. […..] 
Thus a theory which posited the primacy of instincts and human 
passions in human behaviour and which saw only a limited role for 
reason and self-discipline could infer the necessity for authoritative 
political [structures]. In contrast, a theory in which people were 
depicted as inherently altruistic, rational, and cooperative, but liable to 
the corruption of vicious institutions and practices that warped their 
spontaneous proclivities, might recommend anarchism as the system 
most in harmony with human nature. In both instances, human nature 
acts as the reference point for specification of ideal but plausible 
modes of social and political organisation.  
 
 The kind of fatalist disposition expressed by Joey, which can, in effect, 
contribute to the reproduction of neoliberalism, as it stops the imagining of 
political-economic alternatives in its tracks, and the begrudging acceptance of 
existing political-economic modes, was prominent amongst the majority of the 
Critical/Political young people, despite their substantial critiques: 
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Rudy:  Do you know about any other political and economic alternatives?  
Luz:  When you see capitalism as a bad way you look for alternatives like 
socialism or Marxism different things such as that but all in all it’s 
hard to implement them since you live in a capitalist society. 
Rudy:  What do you know about these alternatives? 
Luz:  I know that it’s equal. Like Marxism it’s like a class revolution. 
Where the class takes over where they can make things to benefit the 
people other than just commercialism.  
Lupe:  There’s socialism, communism all that stuff. I think the problem 
would be with the people. Like in socialism if you have a corrupt 
leader it’s not going to work. The problem is with the people not the 
system.  
[…] 
Rudy:  What do you think about voting; do you think it is effective as a way 
to get the government to do what citizens want, or to influence 
government policies?  
Luz:  For the people that can vote I think they should since that’s one of the 
best way to voice your opinions. Well then again I’m being biased 
since I can’t vote. I think whomever lives here should be able to vote 
since we are all affected.  
Rudy: If you could vote do you think it would change anything? 
Luz:  I think it’s like I don’t have a choice. If that’s the only way I can then 
I will. 
Lupe:  I don’t think it will change anything since it’s ultimately not up to us 
to decide in the end. (South-Central LA participants) 
 
Interestingly in the following extracts Lisa demonstrates an informed 
understanding of anarchist political philosophy, but like Joey, rejects it outright on 
the premise that people are ignorant and naturally selfish.
51
 In contrast, without 
apparently realizing it, Arlene expresses support for the anarchist ideal of direct 
democracy, which is premised on a more positive view of human nature, arguing 
that it would produce a more effective system of government: 
 
Rudy: What about voting, what do you guys think about voting? 
Lisa: Oh my god that’s George Carlin [Polemical US comedian]. I mean 
the whole voting I disagree with George Carlin on that actually 
[Carlin is known for his anti-voting views]. I believe that because our 
community is not represented because we don’t vote. I mean we don’t 
vote, like Hispanics don’t, and because of that we’re not getting 
represented. When I talked to Lucy Arroiba (Congresswoman), our 
house of representative, she told me that she had money, and she 
wanted to give the money to Boyle Heights [working-class Latino 
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 Incidentally, in the following extract Lisa also mentions political media texts (e.g., George 
Carling, Fight Club), which she cites as influences on her rather astute political knowledge. This 
further demonstrates the interconnectedness between these young people’s socio-cultural and 
political-economic schemata.  
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community in East Los Angeles] to [give them] computer 
programmes and all that, but she got another offer from this principal 
from like Beverly Hills, and they just want to expand their swimming 
pool. I mean she would rather give the money to the people in Boyle 
Heights, but because the people in Beverly Hills vote, she needs to 
give the money to them so that they can vote her into Congress a year 
later. So I just believe that if our community, we vote, and if we have 
a voice, and if we show the politicians, hey we’re voting and we’re 
going to vote who is going to be in office, than they’re going to be 
terrified and they’re going to be in our favour. 
Rudy: What about you Arlene, what do you think about voting? 
Arlene:  I think it’s corrupt. I don’t think they follow, for example, Bush was 
running, and how all of those votes were missing, and how all that 
contradiction that there was, I think that happens every time there is 
an election, every time you have to go vote. I just think it’s a way of 
telling you that you’re being heard, that you mean something... 
Lisa: (Directed at Arlene) You should watch George Carlin, everything you 
say is just. 
Rudy: So what type of government would you prefer, how would you 
change it? 
Arlene:  How would I change it? I think that there shouldn’t be no government, 
I think that we should run it. I think that if there was no government, 
that we would be a lot more united, it wouldn’t be as corrupt, and we 
would know what’s going on around us, exactly what’s going on 
around us. I don’t think there would be any contradictions [she’s 
referring to voting irregularities] about anything, because we 
wouldn’t be keeping anything away from anybody around us. 
Rudy: Like what do you mean by us running it? 
Lisa: [instantly] Direct democracy,  
Arlene: Yeah 
Lisa. Anarchy. 
Arlene: Yeah, not anarchy no,  
Rudy: Direct democracy for instance like Lisa said? 
Lisa: I don’t support direct democracy at all. 
Rudy: Ok why not? 
Lisa: Because they’re stupid people in this nation, are you kidding me? Oh 
my god.  
Arlene: But I mean, I don’t think so. I think that if [we had] direct democracy 
than I think that good people, people with knowledge would stand up, 
and try to lead it in a way, I think it would just go good.  
[......] 
Rudy: But Lisa, you mentioned direct democracy and then you mentioned 
anarchism right away, why did you do that? 
Lisa: Um, I forgot what anarchy is. I know that in anarchy there is no 
government, where are we getting at again? 
Rudy: Oh because you mentioned direct democracy and then anarchy right 
after it, I was just wondering why you did that? 
Lisa: I don’t know, I believe that they’re both the same. 
Rudy: Where did you learn that? 
Lisa: Fight Club [US movie] (World Vision participants). 
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Moreover, a consistency between critiques of existing political-economic 
systems and support for alternatives was also expressed by Sam who supports 
voting as a means to an end, and James and Aimee who rejected representative 
forms of democracy in favour of more direct models.  
 
Rudy:  So what do you think of the current political system? 
Sam:  I’m anti-capitalist in generally because I believe that the system itself 
is one of the main causes of inequality and environmental degradation 
etc. In terms of the political climate at the moment, I’m very anti the 
current agenda of the government on the count of the fact that the 
austerity programme is essentially the largest attack on working-class 
living standards since 1945. And basically it will make society far 
more unequal, raise unemployment a lot, and also the gap between  the 
rich and the poor will get a lot larger. And at the same the upper 
echelons of society line their pockets and are doing fine.  
Rudy:  This anti-capitalist view, can you elaborate on that, I mean what is 
your critique of capitalism since you brought it up. 
Sam:  Well capitalism itself relies on the exploitation of the wider working 
class by the ruling class, and basically through that wealth is 
redistributed to the upper end of society. And then, so they exploit the 
working class and then, and so basically society is brought up on 
profit rather than need, and if society were to be run on the basis of 
need rather than profit obviously things would be a lot better because 
basically when the profit motive [inaudible] the ruling class exploits a 
lot of people. 
Rudy:  So what political economic alternatives would you favour? 
Sam:  I’m personally a socialist in that I advocate a society based on need 
rather than profit, and basically through the revolutionary actions of 
the working class. Capitalism can’t really be reformed the way the 
Keynesians think because it’s the very intrinsic nature of capitalism, it 
can’t really exist without poverty and an exploited working-class 
because it relies on that mode to work. 
[…..] 
Rudy: So what do you think of voting then? 
Sam: I would vote because it’s pretty much the only democratic 
involvement one can have, but as a principle, I don’t really think it’s 
genuinely democratic because you know once every four or five years 
you vote for someone who allegedly will represent you. But they 
cannot be recalled and not accountable in any meaningful way once 
they are representing you, and essentially the kind of structures of 
society like Parliament and the judiciary, and the police force, all 
grew up under capitalism designed to protect its interests, so you 
cannot really achieve genuine socialism through the parliamentary 
route, but I advocate the importance for reforms as a measure towards 
that kind of society. (Islington participant) 
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Rudy: So as an individual do you think you can have a say in this 
government if you wanted to? 
James:  In this government? 
Rudy: In your government. When you turn 18 for instance, do you think you 
  can have a say? 
James: I probably could if I tried, but I’d have to go into politics and become 
  a politician, voting wouldn’t be enough. 
Rudy: Why not? 
James: Because your vote doesn’t count for anything.  
Rudy: You care to elaborate on that? 
James: Well, firstly, as soon as you come into voting there are already main 
parties, and if you want an alternative, you probably have no chance 
of getting most of your ideal laws, policies or the manifesto of your 
party isn’t going to be realized if it isn’t one of the main parties. So 
really you just got to choose from the big three, or whoever it is, or 
the big two. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Since we’re on that issue, moving on to political-economic issues. So 
what do you think of the current political system that we live under? 
Do you think it is effective? 
Aimee: Um, no. I think that trying to have government, which represents a 
society as large, well any society. Well I basically don’t think that 
having one government govern large amounts of people could ever be 
democratic. I don’t believe in government full stop, but I think it’s 
because one of the issues is that it’s impossible to have a society with 
millions of people in it organized democratically. Yeah I’m not 
explaining this very well.  
Rudy: It sounds like you’re taking issue with representative forms? 
Aimee: Yeah. 
Rudy: So what’s your conception of democracy? 
Aimee: I think it basically only works in the context of people having a direct 
say in issues that affect them in their community on like a day to day 
basis. Yeah, and basically people coming together to talk about and 
find solutions to problems that affect them, rather than there being 
someone who represents them and then.  (Islington participant) 
 
 
 All of the members of this group generally shared a distaste for mainstream 
culture, an emphatic and empathetic support for welfare programmes, and highly 
critical views of their respective governments. Indeed, if not for time and word 
limits, I would map out each of these young people’s socio-cultural and political-
economic schemata in order to further illustrate how relatively indistinguishable 
they are from one another in terms of substantial central tendencies and conceptual 
associations. Where they diverged, however, is in relation to their views on 
political-economic systems, possibilities, and human nature, and it is also in 
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relation to these themes that the extent of the influence of neoliberal discourses is 
more visible. Nonetheless, and however brief these accounts may be, they offer a 
glimpse of some of the ways that a cross-sectional sample of LA and London 
young people think about democracy, and how this reflects their dispositions and 
values.  
 
5.5 Triggers of Politicization 
 Before concluding, it is worth briefly identifying some of the initial triggers 
for the politicization of these young people in order to shed some light on the 
types of influences and experiences that may have fed into the development of 
their sophisticated political views. Of particular note in the following extracts is 
the variability of the political influences on these young people.   
 
Rudy: Why are you studying these subjects [politics and art]? 
Aimee: [….] I was very political before I chose to study politics and it kind of 
  seemed like a logical thing to do.  
Rudy: What, I guess since you brought it up, what brought you into politics, 
  why are you drawn to it from such an early age especially? 
Aimee: Um, I think it was obviously like a mixture of factors, so I’m not 
entirely sure. But one of the things, one of my best friends in 
secondary school was like a lot older than me and identified as a 
Marxist. So I learned quite a lot through her. And also because I’ve 
gone to primary school in a very, very middle class area, and moved 
to a very working-class secondary school when I was eleven,  and it 
was like a  massive culture shock. And I guess I just started thinking a 
lot more about, like issues of class and race then, because as a way of 
processing, and because I have a tendency to over think everything, 
that was just my response to it. 
Rudy: Oh, so the move from a different class section sort of like - 
Aimee: Yeah. 
Rudy: Made you analyze things differently - 
Aimee: Yeah. 
Rudy: In addition to your friend introducing you to - 
Aimee: Yeah, I met her at the secondary school. (Islington participant) 
 
 
Rudy: What are some of the things in the world that you care about the 
most? 
Luz: A lot of things, the environment, animals, […] just happiness in 
general, you know freedom of expression, just freedom. 
Rudy: Where do you think you got these [ideals] from? 
Luz: Um, well I guess from growing up the way I did and from hanging 
out with the people I did, and spending time with these people. Yeah 
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just developing my own views on things, as a response to my 
environment. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 
Rudy: How is it that at such an early age you are so community oriented, 
what is it that moved you to do this type of work? 
Senai: I come from a background where I’ve only gone to schools with only 
one Asian and like one African American in my whole life in middle-
school and elementary. And lived around a lot of Latinos, and a lot of 
Latinos and they’re oppressed in this community. My father has 
suffered from police brutality and I have family members who have 
been caught crossing the border. I have [family] members that have 
died [..] in the Guatemalan civil war.  […] And then they [Latino 
immigrants] come to this damn country and are [asked to leave], and 
it’s just so sad, like I have so much passion towards helping my 
community. [..] But yeah I guess it’s the oppression of my people is 
what’s given me the anger which I turn into passion to be helping 
them out. (World Vision participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Where do you think you got your political positions from? 
 Joey:   I have no idea. It’s somewhat of a collective thing. My sources are 
very wide and very scattered.  
 Rudy: Can you think of any dominant sources? 
 Joey: Well I think 10
th
 grade history. Like I never really gave history a care 
in the world, but then 10th grade with Ms. Gotlieb when I was taking 
world history, and like I was like really high the whole second 
semester, and it seemed so much more intense, and it really go me to 
want to do something. (Zoo participant) 
 
 The early age of these young people’s politicization is noticeable. Their 
accounts indicate that they became politicized between the ages of 11-14. While 
this observation broadly coincides with the developmental literature on political 
attitudes which finds that political positions and attitudes begin to from and 
crystallize around adolescence (Eckstein et al., 2011), a more substantial finding is 
that, even at this early age, these young people seemingly possessed intellectual 
capabilities to form initial understandings of quite complex subject matter. Note 
for example, the following accounts by James and Sam:  
 
Rudy: So do you think that your political awareness, your political beliefs 
  were influenced by your parents in any way. 
James: My actual and specific views not at all. By my engagement probably 
has to do a lot with my mom. I mean I started looking into the 
Socialist Workers Party when I was eleven.  
Rudy: So you mom introduced you to? 
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James: No she didn’t but she was quite active and she knew about things. So 
there was this protest outside a hospital and there were these placards 
‘Nurses Not Bombs’. So I went down to it and I got grabbed by some 
of the Socialist Workers and I got recruited so to speak. [..] But yeah I 
went to few of their meetings and demonstrations when I was quite 
young.
52
 (Islington participant) 
 
Rudy:  This might not be a fair question, but can you like think of any 
particular experience that sort of turned you on to it [socialism]? 
Sam: Um, I’d say that I probably got radicalized in that respect around the 
time of the student protest last year. That’s when I got more drawn 
towards the kind of more radical end of the leftist spectrum, I was a 
fairly radical Keynesian for a while, but then I got kind of got 
involved in more ultra-leftist politics and I found that they quite 
suited my beliefs.
53
 (Islington participant) 
 
Additionally, while Ben, Anthony, and Jazmin cited their parents as their initial 
political influences, the rest of these young people who cited a plethora of 
different initial influences, also stated that their political views were markedly 
different from that of their parents. This is in keeping with Flanagan’s (2008) 
claim that young people rarely reflect the same exact political positions as their 
parents despite parents usual status as primary agents of socialization.  
 One of my original objectives for this research had been to find out if there 
were any common experiences or modes that led young people to develop a more 
heighted political awareness. For a number of reasons, which include too small a 
sample size and other methodological limitations that I describe in section 9.2, I 
did not find any. However, while there is little that can be generalized from these 
young people’s politicizing experiences, they nonetheless reinforce the point that 
even a kernel of exposure to critical perspectives, irrespective of the setting, 
medium, or timing, can have both a catalyzing and lasting effect on the 
development of young people’s political views and practices.  
 
5.6 Potential Future Political Trajectories and Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the young people in this group expressed a host of political and 
critical views, which involve significantly contestation of dominant neoliberal 
                                                 
52
 Furthermore, James attributes his introduction to anarchist ideas from a hard drive which he 
received form his uncle which contained over 20gb of videos, some of which were about 
anarchism. 
53
 Given that Sam was 16 years old during my interview with him, his account suggests that he was 
at least a Keynesian sometime around that age of 14 or 15.  
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discourses. While their political ideologies vary, with Aimee, James, Jazmin, Joey, 
Arlene, and Luz expressing anarchist identities or sympathies, and others like 
Anthony (being the elected senior school President), Ben, and Senai expressing 
broadly social-democratic views, all of them fall within a Leftist spectrum. This 
observation, coupled with their detailed political-economic knowledge, support for 
welfare institutions, humanist outlooks on the role of education, and their overall 
highly developed sociological imagination (Mills, 1959), allows me to, without 
too much hesitation, argue that these types of young people are the ones most 
likely to be the potential catalysts for social change. This is perhaps an obvious 
conclusion to draw, and it cannot be assumed that their counter-neoliberal 
dispositions will not change as they get older, nor that highly critical yet non-
activist young people like Ben will join a political organization. However, what 
these young people have provided is the insight that despite their different 
ethnicities, genders and class backgrounds and national settings, they process, 
frame, and interpret social information in surprisingly similar and consistent ways. 
In other words, and in accordance with Althusser’s (1971) theory of interpellation, 
these young people, through whatever different points of ideological contestation 
they have been exposed to, have generated transposable dispositions and 
corresponding views and attitudes that allow them to more readily resist neoliberal 
discursive interpellation. 
 However, while this group is definitely the most leftist in their views, most of 
them cannot be labelled as specifically anti-neoliberal. That is to say, most of their 
views and attitudes were such that they reflect what Willis (1977) refers to as 
‘partial penetration’. For instance, Senai, during our short interview, expressed 
affinities for capitalism in her affirmative opinion of Bill Gates and his wealth. 
Jazmin, Luz, Lisa, and Lupe, however sympathetic they were to socialist and/or 
anarchist ideals, were sceptical of democratic socialist alternatives, believing in 
particular that human beings are too self-interested to make such an ideal system 
work; while Ben and Anthony held a more reformist social democratic political 
outlook, which, whether they are aware of it or not, are still capitalist in form, and 
therefore also inherently premised on the ontological position that emphasizes 
human selfishness. These can all be contrasted to what I believe are the more anti-
neoliberal views of my anarchist participants, Arlene, James, and Aimee, who not 
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only believe in an arguably more authentic form of democracy,
54
 and in egalitarian 
economic systems antithetical to neoliberalism, but also hold a fundamentally 
different ontological view of human nature. This view holds that humans are just 
as capable of being empathetic, just, co-operative and altruistic rather as they are 
of being competitive and self-interested. Furthermore, this is a view that is 
supported by various anthropological, historical, and (increasingly) cognitive, 
developmental, and social-psychological empirical accounts (Graeber, 2009:2004; 
Olson, 2008; Sloane et al., 2012, Zinn, 2003),
55
 and therefore at the very least, as I 
will emphasize in Chapter 8, worthy of consideration and discussion in education 
settings. However, this is not to suggest a normative evaluation of their political 
views on my part, but rather that a more authentic anti-neoliberal disposition 
necessitates a more affirmative view on the possibilities of non-hierarchical forms 
of democracy and the belief that human beings can make it work; without these 
beliefs firmly in place, capitalist and hierarchical organizational forms of thinking, 
and as a consequence practices and forms of organization, may start to insidiously 
manifest themselves, regardless of the critical and humanist views that people may 
have and consciously express (Albert, 2003). As Pynn (1988) argues, for example, 
in talking about organizations as opposed to organization, we afford our dominant 
institutions a supreme level of agency that obscures our own volition in enacting 
them, and crucially, blinds us cognitively to alternative possibilities. However, 
here again is it also possible, given their already established critical dispositions 
and precocious nature that, at some point, and perhaps in the near future as they 
attend university (all of the Critical/Political young people expressed plans to 
attend a university), they will be introduced to more radical politics and 
movements, and will possibly be informed and influenced by them. As stated, 
their current dispositions are such that they are oriented towards a leftist counter 
                                                 
54
 I did not include Sam in this subgroup because of his professed Trotskyist politics, which, while 
socialist, are expressly authoritarian in their organizational commitments. Thus, in this context, 
Sam cannot be placed alongside Aimee, Arlene, and James with their more direct democratic 
political leanings.  
55
 For example, a study by Sloane et al., (2012) found that 19-21 month-old infants have a general 
expectation of fairness, and that even babies are disturbed by displays of injustice even when it 
does not apply to them. This study lends support to the argument that fairness may be a natural 
human predisposition.  
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neoliberalism, and not towards a more conservative neoliberalism. However, 
without the benefit of a longitudinal study, this is only a provisional speculation, 
and it is of course entirely possible that at least some of them will move politically 
to the right or to any other variant; as zoo participant Ben stated, “I’m 17 years old, 
I’m still really young. The way I think is going to change, my opinions on these 
things [political topics] are going to change. So it’s a gradual process from things 
you take here and there”. Having more authentic and cognitively ingrained anti-
neoliberal views does not of course automatically translate into developing anti-
neoliberal practices. However, the former are a necessary precondition for the 
latter. As Buroway argues (2008a, p.29), “habitus plays a secondary role in the 
reproduction of domination, but can play a primary role in the creation of new 
social orders”.  
Lastly, it is not my intention to only define as political those young people 
who only take critical stances towards the existing socio-cultural and political-
economic systems. It is entirely possible, and in fact very likely that, somewhere 
in LA and London there exist groups of teenaged conservatives who are at least as 
politically knowledgeable and dedicated as the Critical/Political young people I 
have described in this chapter. And indeed, it would be interesting to explore if 
these conservative young people shared a similar concern for social justice as the 
Critical/Political ones, or if their concerns were more inflected through, and 
reflective of, neoliberal discourses. In any case, future research would benefit 
from a broader sampling methodology that also seeks out more conservative 
young people. In the next two chapters, I will describe the main characteristics of 
the other two classifications of LA and London young people that I have identified 
as: Artsy/Indie and Mainstream. 
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Chapter Six 
Artsy/Indie Youth 
The Wild Cards 
 
Rudy: What type of media do they [young people] engage with? 
Warren: They watch a lot of TV [shows] and movies on the Internet. There’s a 
  lot of bootleg websites where they stream pirate movies. They have 
  IPods, and they’re really technically savvy. Some of the kids do role 
  playing games on the Internet. But yeah, they all have IPods. Race, 
  religion, creed, class, it doesn’t matter, they all have IPods. But they 
  don’t go to the movies as much, and I don’t think they watch much 
  TV because a lot of the stuff is on the Internet. -(Youth Worker:  
  Bresee  Foundation) 
 
 
Rudy: Last question, is there anyone that you look up to? 
Veronica: I really look up to my friend, he was my ex-boyfriend. He lost his 
eyesight when he was three, and I really look to him because after 
losing his eyesight he didn’t give up. [..] My documentary was based 
on him, the one that I got an award for second place. And it shows 
how he could do so many things without his eyesight, when other 
people who have their eyesight are always saying I can’t do it, it’s too 
hard. [..] It’s really amazing. He was the one who helped me finish 
my video because by then I didn’t have my parents’ support. (Bresee 
participant) 
 
As the title for this chapter, and above extracts suggest, the young people that 
I have classified as Artsy/Indie, expressed a distinctive and pronounced affinity 
with artistic endeavours (e.g., dancing, writing short stories, playing music, film-
making, painting), in addition to a tentative rejection of mainstream popular 
media-culture (which consisted of accounts similar to that described above by 
Warren), and an active engagement with alternative and/or independent Western 
and non-Western media-culture. In this chapter, I will draw out these prevalent 
characteristics, pointing to the socio-cultural experiences, media preferences and 
interpretations, and corresponding affective and apolitical dispositions of these 
young people, and speculate on some of the complex ways that these help them to 
contest dominant neoliberal discourses. As in the previous chapter, I will also map 
out and analyze some of the substantive content, i.e., central tendencies, and 
conceptual, semantic, and lexical associations characterizing this group of young 
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people’s political-economic schemata, and their divergence from, and congruence 
with, neoliberal discourses.  
 
6.1 Leisure Time, Cultural Preferences, and Affective Dispositions: 
 From writing novels, to dancing, to playing in music bands and working on 
independent films, the Artsy/Indie young people can be primarily differentiated 
from my other two classifications of young people by their proactive engagement 
with some form of creative cultural production. This artistic preoccupation, differs 
from the one expressed by the Critical/Political young people described in the 
previous chapter who in addition to artistic endeavours, spent a significant amount 
of their leisure time engaged in activist and community oriented activities and 
informing themselves about political issues. The Artsy/Indie group of young 
people, however, was noticeably more prone to engage, or be mostly interested, in 
non-political artistic activities. 
 
Rudy: What do you do on your free time? 
Jose:  Well that depends, on my free time, either filming, I’m in a couple of 
music projects so I’m in that, and I also like to write and spend time 
with my friends. And well I do consider myself an artist, and as an 
artist we have to punish ourselves for trying to imitate god by 
smoking and drinking. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little something about yourself and some of the things that 
  you like to do? 
Gloria:  I’m Gloria Avila. I’m 18. I went to Santee high school.  I like music, 
reading, I’m attending film school. I like cats a lot. I read a lot, write a 
lot. I’m interested in doing something in the fine arts. I also paint and 
draw. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little about yourself, starting with your name, age, and some 
  of the things that you like to do. 
Jesse:  My name is Jesse. I’m 17 years old. I like playing music. I like to 
learn all sorts of instruments. I’m really interested in guitar and any 
kind of related instruments. I’m also interested in animal sciences and 
I hope to look into a career with that. (Zoo participant) 
 
Rudy: Alright, so first questions I’m just going to ask you to tell me a little 
something about yourself, starting with your age, and some of the 
things you like to do in general. 
Jocelyn: My name is Jocelyn, I’m 18, and usually I like to dance [ballet], or 
read, or watch television maybe. 
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Evyn: My name is Evyn, I like to draw, I read, I also watch television and 
  play video games. (Zoo participants) 
 
 
Rudy: So we’ll start. Tell me a little something about yourself, starting with 
  your name, age, and some of the things you like to do. 
Diana: My name is Diana. I’m 16. I like to write short stories. (Zoo 
participant). 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about yourself, so what are some of things that you 
  like to do. 
Veronica: I like to run, I run the marathon. This is going to be my third year 
running it. I like photography and filming, and I like working with 
little kids.
56
 (Bresee participant) 
 
 Additionally, this central preoccupation with artistic pursuits seemed to be 
accompanied by a pronounced aesthetic rationale for their preferred media texts, 
and with their tentative rejection of mainstream media culture. On the first point, 
the following extracts highlight how when asked about their favourite types of 
music, these young people tended to give an immediate response that elaborated 
on the affective and subjective responses that music conjures up in them.  
 
Rudy:  What types of messages do you get from some of your favourite 
songs? Think of one and tell me how you interpret it. 
Zack:  Ok, like I said Damien Rice [Irish acoustic guitarists/singer]. And 
there’s a song called Delicate. And my friend Austin here in this 
school, she showed it to me [..]And she gave me her iPod and said, 
“here I think you’ll like this song.” After listening to it for the first 
time, I really liked the music and the melody. I thought it all worked 
really well. That’s what first got me to it, but the more and more you 
listen to something, the more and more you think about it I guess. 
Like that song for me, it means more like the beginning of the song 
says, “we might kiss when we’re alone’. And the whole song means 
to me like, things that mean a lot to you are [things you shouldn’t take 
lightly]. (Zoo participant) 
  
Rudy: Name one particular song that you really like? 
 Gloria:  Ocean Breeds Salty by Modest Mouse. I like mellow music and it’s 
  really mellow the lyrics are put well together.  
 Rudy:  What about the lyrics do you like? 
Gloria: I don’t know, it’s nice… I don’t really read a lot into music for some 
                                                 
56
 The interview with Veronica started with a short discussion on her choice of high school in 
which she told me that she decided to transfer to a different school because of its filming and 
photography programs.  
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reason, a lot of people get the whole be your own person and do 
whatever you want, but I think I mostly listen to it for the sound 
aspect of it. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 Rudy: What are some of your favourite types of music? 
 Tiff:  With music, right now I’m really into EDM [electronic dance music]. 
  One of my favourite artists is a house DJ. I got into it like two years 
  ago when I went to my first music event. I don’t know, I feel like it’s 
  pretty calming music.  
 Rudy:  House music is calming? [laughs]…..  
 Tiff:  I guess because I like to dance. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 
 Rudy: Do you have a favourite song? 
Diana:  I don’t really have a favourite song. I like a lot of songs. For me 
music depends on my mood, whether I’m happy or sad or working, or 
working on writing anything like that. […] I kind of use music to 
inspire me. (Zoo participant) 
  
These extracts also demonstrate the importance to these young people of the 
aesthetic and affective dimensions of their social worlds. They are automatically 
inclined to be attracted to media-cultural texts primarily for their aesthetic and/or 
sound dynamics, and for the emotions that they stir. For example, Zack’s initial 
liking of the song Delicate was due to its melody, which, after more reflective 
consideration, led him to a more interpersonal and evaluative interpretation and 
liking of the song; while Gloria, Tiff, and Diana forego more interpersonal 
interpretations of their favourite types of music, in favour of their mood inducing 
properties, with Diana adding that listening to music helps her with her creative 
writing.  
 On the second point, Artsy/Indie young people tended to share a tentative 
rejection of mainstream media culture as evident from their indifference to brand 
clothing and the emphasis they place on a use-value rationale for their 
consumption preferences. Note for example, Gloria’s rationale for buying Vans 
[brand] shoes, Veronica’s opinions on brand tags, and Zack’s thought processes 
when buying clothing:  
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Rudy:          Do you pursue brand name clothing?  
Gloria:  Well, I’ll go to the mall if I need something or just to spend time there. 
The only brand name thing I’m guilty of buying a lot would be Vans 
shoes, cause they’re comfortable.  
Rudy:  Is it just because they’re comfortable? It has nothing to do with the 
  commercial appeal to it? 
Gloria:  Not really. They’re just kind of simple and comfortable and that’s 
what I like about them. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go the mall or shopping centres? 
Veronica: Sometimes. 
Rudy: How many times do you go? 
Veronica: I hardly go. I don’t really like going. I don’t think I’m the type of 
person that likes to go the malls and stuff. 
Rudy: Why not? 
Veronica: First of all, because I’m from a low-income family, and if I like 
something I can’t afford it, so it’s like, I rather not go. If I do, it’s 
partly on Black Friday [the US equivalent of Boxing Day] or back to 
school. 
Rudy: What do you think about brand clothing? 
Veronica: I don’t believe in that, I think the only thing that changes are the little 
ticket thingy [labels]. I could wear any type of clothes. My uncle 
works, he makes the cloths, not really makes, he puts the buttons and 
stuff, […] and he gives me clothes. […] But I could wear any type of 
clothes, I don’t really care if it’s a cool brand or not, it doesn’t really 
matter. (Bresse participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to the mall or shopping centres? 
Zack Yeah. 
Rudy: How often? 
Zack: Maybe like once a month, if I’m hanging out with friends I guess, not 
  too often.  
[…] 
Rudy: What about brand clothing, does that mean anything to you? 
Zack: No I don’t really care for specific brands or anything.  
[....] 
Rudy: What’s going on when you do purchase these items, what do you 
think about? 
Zack: I just think if I’ll, right before I purchase, I think it’s something I can 
  use often so it’s more worth the money.57 (Zoo participant) 
 
 Congruently, their indifference towards mainstream fashion was also 
accompanied by a tentative rejection of mainstream media-culture in favour of an 
active engagement with alternative media-culture. 
                                                 
57
 From my preliminary observations, the young people in this group wore relatively simple and 
non-flashy clothing, in accordance with their accounts.  
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Rudy: What are some of your favourite songs, like what’s on your iPod? 
Evyn: My iPod is connected to me, it’s on me right now. But I listen to 
anything but country and rap.
58
  
Rudy:  Why not rap?  
Evyn It’s not singing, it’s people talking, plus the subject matter. People 
shooting each other and going to clubs. But I do like techno music. 
I’m a big techno fan. My favourite band is Owl City [a US 
Electronica band]. My favourite songs are Japanese, cause I’m a huge 
Anime fan.  
 Rudy: What type of TV shows do you like? 
Jocelyn: I like superheroes. I’ve always liked cartoons and I don’t think I’m 
ever going to stop. I like them better than regular shows, like I would 
never watch Jersey Shore [An MTV reality TV show featuring a 
group of Italian-American young people living together in a beach 
house New Jersey, also the US equivalent of the UK show the 
Geordie Shore].  
 Evyn:  Me neither. 
 Jocelyn: I don’t understand the appeal to that. 
 Evyn: I don’t understand why people like MTV. (Zoo participants) 
 
 
 Rudy: What kind of music do you listen to? 
 Jesse:  Mostly rock. I won’t listen to any Disney thing. It’s crap. (Zoo 
   participant) 
 
 
Rudy: What kind of music do you listen to?  
Jose: […] Some people like it because it is mainstream music. I don’t know 
if I could relate to it like in a whole sentiment the way that other 
people can relate to it, but I can relate to it as in it kind of how it 
makes me feel, it keeps me normal, it keeps me open minded. If you 
can’t really be open minded about music than what can you be open 
minded about? […] So you know you hear some Taylor Swift You 
Belong With Me or Mylie Cyrus The Climb [US pop singers], and I 
was listening to those songs, and thinking, these are some nice songs. 
[….] But the thing I also hate about mainstream music is that it’s also 
one of those things that are really fake. You know there’s a level to it 
where music producers and music labels want to hear a certain thing, 
and they control it. That’s why you have seven happy songs about 
partying, being happy, and just living life, and then you have two 
depressing songs, and two kind of political songs, and then back to 
happy. You try to show everyone everything, but then you gotta keep 
it at a level. [….] Like in radio you never really hear thrash [a 
subgenre of metal],  [….] and you never really listen to the other 
options that are out there, and that kind of sucks. (Bresse participant) 
                                                 
58
 Evyn and the other young people who mentioned country are referring to contemporary country 
Western music from the southern states of the US. It is well known that the overwhelming majority 
of urban US young people do not like country music, as it is viewed as music white people from 
the South listen to. 
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It is tempting to read Evyn and Jocelyn’s emphatic disliking of MTV, and Jesse’s 
automatic mentioning of, and strongly dismissive attitude towards Disney music, 
and argue that what is demonstrated in the above extracts is a form of cultural 
resistance to the mainstream. However, as I argued in Chapter 3, the term 
resistance has a political connotation, and thus I argue that, if not for any other 
reason, it should be used appropriately for the sake of conceptual accuracy. Hence, 
the Artsy/Indie young people do not like most mainstream media culture because it 
clashes with their aesthetic preferences. This is not the same as having a political 
and ethical objection to it as expressed by some of the Critical/Political young 
people. To put it simply, the Critical/Political young people tend to resist 
mainstream media-culture, the Artsy/Indie young people tentatively reject it. 
Jose’s response is especially exemplary of this more tentative rejection, where he 
expresses an informed and sophisticated structural understanding of why 
mainstream music and radio are so bland and formulaic, but at the same time 
admitting, and rather surprisingly given his obvious Heavy-Metal look and 
identity, that he listens to some very mainstream pop songs, again noting their 
positive affective properties as his rationale for doing so.  
 
6.2 Apolitical Dispositions 
Another key characteristic of the Artsy/Indie young people is that they tended 
to separate their aesthetic agency from their political agency, keeping the two 
forms relatively mutually exclusive. Although pronounced affective and aesthetic 
dispositions can be arguably expected from individuals that partake in cultural 
production of whatever form, what struck me as interesting is that these young 
people’s aesthetic agency was not explicitly linked to a form of political agency. 
Indeed in some instances the Artsy/Indie young people seemed hostile to the 
fusing of musical aesthetics with politics. Phillip, Zack, Tiffany, and Gloria, for 
example, (all of whom I asked specifically if they engaged with political media) 
seemed to prefer to keep the domains of music and politics separate: 
 
Rudy: What type of music do you listen to mostly? 
Phillip: Pink Floyd, is most definitely my favourite band. I don’t only like it 
  because it’s different from other bands, but because it’s sombre. I like 
  sombre and it’s really good music with a really good message? 
Rudy: Like what kind of messages do you get from it? 
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Phillip: Like in The Wall [song by Pink Floyd], I don’t like how Roger 
Waters turned it into a political message, but before it was the social 
message [that I liked]. Like how little things can break down a 
person’s stability and make them be ostracized from society. […] 
Music is very important you know it’s kind of like a drug.59 (Zoo 
participant) 
 
 
Rudy:  Do you listen to any political music?  
 Gloria:  I don’t really listen to music to get a meaning from it. I mean some 
  people do and good for them, but I really don’t. (South-Central LA 
  participant) 
 
 
 Rudy: Do you listen to any political music? 
 Zack: Like what?  
 Rudy:  I don’t know, like Rage Against The Machine or something like that. 
 Zack Um. Not really. I mean I listen to them, and I’ve heard a few of their  
  songs… 
 Rudy: But political music in general doesn’t do it for you? 
 Zack: No I guess not.  (Zoo participant) 
 
  
 Rudy: Do you ever listen to any types of political music? 
 Tiff:  Not really?  
 Rudy:  Any particular reason why not? 
Tiff: I don’t know, it doesn’t really interest me. (South-Central LA 
participant) 
 
 These strong valence apolitical dispositions, manifested in an automatic 
avoidance of, and/or disinterest in politics, can also be inferred from the rationales 
they gave for their consumption practices, which, while use-value oriented, did not 
tend to invoke any political or ethical concerns. For example, in the following 
extracts, Gloria seems to be aware of the exploitative origins of her clothes, but is 
admittedly unconcerned about this, while in the cases of Zack and Veronica, their 
awareness of the likely exploitative origins of their products is noticeably absent.  
 
Rudy:  Well besides Luz who doesn’t purchase brand name clothing because 
  of where they come from. Lupe and Gloria, how does this affect your 
  shopping? 
[…] 
                                                 
59
 Phillip’s answer can be contrasted to the following short response from the Critical/Political        
youth Luz. 
Rudy: Give me one particular song that you really like? And Why? 
Luz:  Pink Floyd - Comfortably Not. I think it’s a commentary on society. 
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Gloria: I think it’s a biased. Let’s say you don’t like Nike’s so you go and say 
hey you know little kids who get paid ten cents an hour make those. 
But when it’s something you like you kind of ignore it. 
Rudy:  So because it’s a particular brand you don’t like you’re more disposed 
  to say well it’s made by so and so where as if it’s something you like 
  it doesn’t really matter? 
Gloria:  I thinks it’s you try but you don’t really care. I’m not trying to sound 
  mean but yeah. (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Now some of the stuff that you do purchase in these malls, do you 
know where they’re usually made? 
Zack: No, I’m not sure. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy:  Are you aware of some of the conditions where certain clothes are 
made? 
Veronica:  kind of. 
Rudy: Can you sort of elaborate on that? 
Veronica: Like what do you mean? 
Rudy: Like you said kind of, what came to your mind when you said kind 
  of? 
Veronica: Like do I really care? 
Rudy: No not necessarily, um just like do you know what kind of conditions 
  certain clothes are made? 
Veronica: I don’t really get the question. 
Rudy: Like sweatshops for instance, stuff like that. Are you familiar with 
these concepts? 
Veronica: Not really. 
Rudy: Or like environmental impact that certain products have? 
Veronica: Sort of I guess, it depends on the person. For me, I don’t really care. 
  I’m more into like my stuff, like pictures and stuff. I don’t really look 
  outside.
60
 (Bresse participant) 
 
 
6.3 Complicated Contestation of Neoliberalism 
 However, this is not to suggest that these young people’s apolitical and 
aesthetic dispositions correspond to, or are reflective of the more apathetic and 
self-interested discourses of their surrounding neoliberal environments. To be 
certain, these young people’s predominant apolitical and aesthetic dispositional 
tendencies appear to be playing a different role entirely in their overall 
                                                 
60
 In Veronica’s case, it did not appear that she understood my questioning, and this is partly to due 
to my failure to explain to her what I meant. Nonetheless, it would seem that she is unaware of 
sweatshop conditions even though she volunteered to me that her uncle works in a garment factory 
in LA (it is an open secret that most of these factories are in fact sweatshops that employ 
undocumented and mostly Latino immigrants like Veronica’s uncle).  
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contributions to, and contestations of, neoliberal reproduction, which seems to be 
one of an unconscious partial avoidance and escape from it. To be certain, these 
young people do not appear to be consciously contesting neoliberal discourses, at 
least not for political and ethical reasons; they simply do not like the majority of 
mainstream media-culture and are indifferent to the consumerist and materialistic 
practices that it promotes. Equally, however, they are not actively and 
significantly contributing to this culture, at least when compared to the 
Mainstream group discussed in the following chapter. A possible partial reason for 
this is that their predominantly apolitical, aesthetic, and artistic dispositions have 
also partly shielded them from buying into the more materialistic, self-interested, 
and dominant political-economic discourses of neoliberalism. For example, all of 
these young people wanted to pursue a career in some form of cultural production 
for the sake of pursuing something they love do, whilst acknowledging that they 
do not expect to become rich or famous out of it. 
 
Rudy: What do you think your parents expect of you, that is, what do you 
think they want you to do in life?  
Gloria:   My mom wants me to do whatever makes me happy. But I think that 
her definition of happy is being financially stable. I just want to do 
whatever makes me happy [which includes pursuing a career in 
independent film-making] I don’t really care about the money. 
(South-Central LA participant) 
 
However, on the flip side, this does also suggest that these dispositions can lead 
them to avoid a more active engagement with political-economy full stop, 
neoliberal or otherwise, as is somewhat evident by their underdeveloped political-
economic knowledge discussed later in this chapter. As Bourdieu (1981, p. 314) 
argues: “differences in dispositions, like differences in [socio-structural] position 
(to which they are often linked), engender real differences in perception and 
appreciation”. 
 Nonetheless, at various intervals concerning different topics, these young 
people did express more politically? conscientious views. For example, some of 
them, as demonstrated in the following extracts, expressed very empathetic views 
when discussing the labour conditions of the people that make their clothes. It is 
worth noting that when articulating the statements below, Jocelyn, Evyn, and Jesse, 
at a seemingly dispositional level, manifested voice intonations and facial 
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expressions that reflected a more solemn tone and appearance, while Tiff 
immediately expressed some remorse as soon as she was asked about where her 
clothes come from. However, despite these instances of cognitive dissonance that 
thinking about labour exploitation seemed to induce in them, their knowledge of 
the sweatshop labour that very likely produces their preferred consumer items, did 
not seem to impact their consumption practices: 
 
Rudy: Do you know under what conditions these clothes are made? 
Jocelyn: I’ve heard of sweatshops [….] I think that they’re really bad, and 
nobody should be treated that way, to work a lot of hours for little pay. 
If could change it I would, but I don’t see myself in the condition 
right now to be able to help anybody. 
Evyn: Companies need to stop going to China for cheap labour. (Zoo 
Participants) 
 Rudy: What do you guys think about these sweatshop conditions? 
Jesse:  The same as John [Mainstream youth]. I’ll buy things if I need to. I’ll 
feel guilty, I think is unfair. Self-conscious thoughts come up. (Zoo 
participant) 
 
 
Rudy:  Can you describe to me what you’re thinking when you purchase 
them? 
Tiff:   Well if it’s in style. Like the colour jeans I bought one pair even 
though I liked the other ones. But I mean, if I’m not going to wear 
them like in a few months from now so what’s the point? That’s what 
I’m thinking, like how often am I going to wear the product.  
Rudy:  Okay, do you know where these clothes are made? 
Tiff:  I know where they’re from. Now you’re trying to make me feel 
guilty. 
Rudy:  Why am I making you feel guilty?  
Tiff:  Because I’m thinking about the sweatshops and that people being 
paid so little for making clothes that they sell here for so much.  
Rudy:  Why do you feel guilty though? 
Tiff:  I guess because I’m supporting the industry that continues to treat this 
people that way.  
Rudy:  How are you supporting it?  
Tiff:   I still keep buying products from them even though I know how they 
are made. It’s like telling them it’s ok to go ahead and keep on doing 
it.  
Rudy:  Now do you think about these issues when you’re buying them? 
Tiff:  No.  (South-Central LA participant) 
 
 
 Moreover, some of these young people did express a liking for some political 
media, and in the case of Tiff, her exposure to a political movie appeared to alter 
her views.  
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 Rudy: Do you listen to any political music at all? 
Diana: Um, Mueban Las Industrias [Get rid of the factories]. Well  like I 
don’t remember the lyrics that well now. But I like the fact that they 
use situations that concerned us all in their songs. Because I don’t like 
the songs nowadays that are just pop and have nonsense lyrics that 
don’t even connect. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: What about a movie? 
Tiff:  One of my favourite movies would be Innocent Voices. It really 
changed my point of view. I didn’t really see the guerilla people’s 
point of view.  
Rudy: What was your perspective before since you said it changed it?  
Tiff:  Well yeah, I didn’t see them [the guerillas] as having families, I saw 
  them mostly as a bunch of men. But when the little boy comes into 
  the picture, and they see the government as bad. 
Rudy: I should ask what is the movie about? 
Tiff: It’s about this little boy who lives in El Salvador during the civil war. 
At the age of 12 the little boys would be taken away from their 
families so they could be in the army for the Salvadorian government. 
And his uncle is part of the guerrilla movement.  
Rudy:  So before that what was your perspective? 
Tiff:  Well I didn’t really see the guerrilla men as having families, I thought 
  they were just a bunch of guys. 
Rudy: So after the movie you were more sympathetic to their cause? 
Tiff:  Yeah to their cause, and to them in general. (South-Central LA 
participant) 
 
 Nonetheless, as Diana’s and Tiff’s above responses exemplify, the 
Artsy/Indie young people’s expressions of political concerns, like their 
interpretations of their preferred political media texts, and their rejection of 
mainstream media-culture, were generally not as prevalent in the interviews and/or 
as in depth as those of the Critical/Political young people. Correspondingly, 
neither Diana nor Tiff expressed a strong valence affective reaction or attachment 
to their respective political media texts, which in conjunction with their non-
elaborate responses, and according to the tenets of cognitive psychology, suggest 
that they do not regularly engage with their preferred political media, or the 
political topics covered by that media (Lodge et al., 1991). On its own, this is not a 
striking observation, but it further highlights how the few Artsy/Indie young 
people who do engage with more critical media, do so to a lesser degree and in 
less depth than the Critical/Political young people. For instance, Jocelyn, Gloria, 
Evyn, and Jesse all mentioned the US adult cartoon Family Guy as a source of 
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political information. While these cartoons do on occasion contain a few instances 
of political commentary, these are limited to mostly US Democrat/liberal concerns, 
last a few seconds, and are otherwise drowned out by what is an overall jarring 
kaleidoscope of the mainly 1980s US television and pop-culture references and 
non-sequiturs that constitute each episode.  
Given that these transposable apolitical dispositions seem to figure quite 
prominently in these young people’s socio-cognitive frameworks, traditional 
consciousness-raising critical pedagogic methods may not be sufficient to create a 
more conscientious political understanding and concern within these young people, 
and by inference, within other young people that can be loosely situated within the 
Artsy/Indie classification as well. This suggests, as I will argue in Chapter 8, that 
critical pedagogic strategies might benefit from more tailor-made and socio-
cognitive approaches that take into consideration the different types of 
dispositions that are prominent amongst different types of young people. 
 
6.4 Artsy/Indie Welfare Schemata 
 The Artsy/Indie young people’s responses to the questions on welfare 
signified another key characteristic that sets this group apart from the others; that 
is, they tended to express very dissonant, ambivalent, and tentative support for 
welfare services that seemed to be more reflective of neoliberal anti-welfare 
discourses. That is, they first and foremost support welfare programmes for the 
underprivileged, and expressed very compassionate views for the suffering of 
others. However, these tended to be accompanied by the standard neoliberal anti-
welfare discourses of self-reliance and temporary assistance  (e.g., see Tiff’s and 
Zack’s welfare schemata below), which are often premised on a more implicit 
belief that that welfare programmes create life-long dependency, and that welfare 
recipients take unfair advantage of them: 
 
Rudy:  Do you think that the government should do something about 
poverty? 
Phillip: They should help out with like welfare and everything. They should 
definitely, and like when you’re unemployed, you know like an 
unemployment check. That definitely helps you know. But they 
should let people deal with it by themselves, like they should create 
more jobs, but then let people go out and find the jobs, but don’t 
control them. You know like how the government [sometimes] has 
control of the people. 
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Rudy: But like you mentioned welfare programmes, what do you think of 
them? 
Phillip: I think they’re good. Like if you’re unemployed, get the welfare 
check, but the minute you become employed stop. It’s kind of like 
corrupt, these people will have like ten children [on their claim forms] 
even though they only have one, just to get that food stamp you know. 
So I think they definitely should be more regulated, but it’s definitely 
a good idea. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy:          What do you think of welfare programmes? 
Jose: I do like welfare programmes, I just think that some people yet again 
abuse it. [….] Everybody does it. I have actually a couple of friends 
that are like, how can we get some money. And they don’t want to 
steal or rob anybody, so they’re like, let’s just go on welfare, and not 
because they needed, but they’re getting that money just for 
themselves. If I needed welfare I would use it to also help out my 
mom and stuff […] but some people lie and just take that money for 
themselves. And you know, and then they wonder why is this 
economy so fucked up, you know it’s because people are stealing 
money. We’re trying make things good you know, yet there is always 
someone that says fuck that it’s going to be all mine, and that’s where 
things always goes wrong. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you think it is the government’s job to do something about social 
problems like poverty? 
Tiff:  To a certain degree I think the government should help but they 
shouldn’t be providing all of it.  
Rudy: What do you mean? 
Tiff:  The government should not be handing out money for free. I think 
they should give them enough money to live but I also I think they 
should come up with programmes to help them out. Like help them 
find jobs. 
Rudy:  So what do you think about government welfare programmes? 
Tiff:  Well I don’t think they should not allow just anybody. I know of 
people that just live off welfare. I don’t think it’s right. They should 
give it to people that actually need it. I think they should be more 
rigorous on checking if people really do need it. (South-Central LA 
participant) 
 
Rudy: You said something about homelessness. 
Veronica:  [...] They [government] should build like buildings and houses for 
them, I know there is, but they should build more than that and help 
them more. But at the same time the homeless people sometimes 
deserve it, because they have chances to work and they’re not doing it. 
And there is jobs out there that they could do, and they’re not doing 
cause they’re lazy. But it’s like half and half. [...] 
Rudy: So what do you think of like government welfare programmes for 
instance? 
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Veronica: I think it’s good, but then at the time, other people who actually have 
  the money are taking advantage of that, and using it when somebody 
  else could be using that money. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Since we’re on this topic, what do you think is the government’s role 
  in dealing with poverty? 
Zack: I think they should offer services to help people who are like in need. 
I think if people are really struggling that they should have the 
opportunity to do something about that, and government should offer 
some opportunity. Yeah I don’t think it’s something that they just not 
think about, I think they should really make an effort to kind of help 
people if they can as much as they can.  
Rudy: So what do you think of government welfare programmes? 
Zack: Welfare like offering money? 
Rudy: Yeah that’s one aspect of it? 
Zack: Um, well can you explain that a little more? 
Rudy: Sure, ah you know like welfare programmes like unemployment  
  benefits for instance, there is some money that is given to people that 
  claim to be in need, extra financial need, food stamps for instance. 
Zack: Ah ok, what was the question I’m sorry? 
Rudy: What do you think of these types of programmes? 
Zack: I think that they’re good, they give people an opportunity. I don’t 
think that people should get to the point where they see all those like 
all those opportunities and just think, oh I’m good with this, I can stay 
with this. I think they should take that and say like, here’s some help 
now, and now I need, I need to figure out, like this is keeping it for 
now, but that they need to go figure out what more they can do to 
kind of get out of that situation.  
Rudy: I understand, you don’t think that they should be dependent on 
welfare? 
Zack: Yeah or at least not for a long period of time. Yeah it’s good to have 
 for like a short period of time to kind of stabilize you a little more, not 
 be as stressful, but from that you should take that as like, as like help 
 to get back to what you think you need to be. So yeah people should 
 just see those as starting points to bettering themselves. (Zoo 
 participant) 
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Figure 6.1: Tiff’s Welfare Schemata 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Zack’s Welfare Schemata 
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 A number of things are interesting about these extracts, foremost of which, is 
that they demonstrate that these young people’s schemata for welfare are all 
almost identical to one another. Tiff’s and Zack’s welfare schemata, as illustrated 
above, highlights the train of thought that was exhibited and generally followed by 
all of the Artsy/Indie young people who were asked these sets of questions. First, 
they all semantically and initially automatically associated welfare with the 
government handing out money to the less fortunate, despite the fact that this is 
technically not correct as welfare programmes can take the form of a number of 
other government services as expressed by the Critical/Political participant Ben in 
the previous chapter. This strongly reflects the neoliberal anti-welfare discourses 
represented in the mass media which tend to negatively equate welfare with 
handing out free money to undeserving people. Second, after their initial reaction, 
all went on to express the more compassionate view that these programmes should 
exist to help the less fortunate. Finally, they circle back to views that reflect 
neoliberal anti-welfare discourses, namely, that welfare should be temporary. Tiff, 
Phillip, and Jose also implied that a significant proportion of people cheat the 
welfare system, and that more stringent controls need to be put in place to ensure 
that this fraud is stopped. There is no indication of what has influenced these anti-
welfare discourses, which are commonly disseminated via mass media, other than 
Jose citing anecdotal evidence to support his claims.  
 Nonetheless, as with their socio-cultural schemata, the welfare schemata of 
these young people expressed what can be tentatively and for heuristic purposes 
be considered a middle variant form of neoliberal interpellation, that involves 
supporting welfare services, and generally appreciating the importance of the need 
for them, while still echoing dominant neoliberal anti-welfare discourses. As their 
welfare schemata reflected incorrect factual information, standard pedagogic 
approaches that seek to inculcate more comprehensive and accurate conceptions 
about policies of welfare may work to help these young people acquire more 
accurate knowledge about welfare. This is another recommendation that I will 
elaborate on in Chapter 8.  
 
6.5 Politics and Capitalism Schemata 
 Generally, as with their views on welfare and their knowledge about the 
labour and environmental consequences of their consumption practices, their 
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political knowledge was limited, and, in the cases of Zack and Veronica, it was by 
their own admission, non-existent. The political economic knowledge that was 
conveyed by the other participants consisted of tentative support for capitalism, 
moderate to strong support for voting, and a partial understanding of alternative 
economic systems.  
 
Rudy: What do you think about capitalism? 
Gloria: I think is somewhat fair since you do have a chance to go up. You 
have people who are born with nothing and then later on in life 
they’ve achieved something because they built a company or 
whatever. But I think the way that it’s actually run it’s mostly 
favouring whoever was already on top.  
Rudy: Have you heard of other alternatives? 
Gloria:  I’ve heard of socialism, communism and Marxism and all those other 
isms. But the problem with those would be the people. (South Central 
LA participant) 
 
Rudy: Our economic system is described as a capitalist system of private 
property rights and competing privately owned businesses where 
individuals are rewarded based on how hard or how little they work, 
what do you think of this economic arrangement? 
Tiff: Well I feel that it’s not good to a certain degree, but it’s better than 
others like communism. 
Rudy: Can you explain to me your understanding of communism since you 
  brought it up? 
Tiff:  Isn’t it when everybody lives at the same level and there isn’t any rich 
  people right?   
Rudy: Yeah that’s one aspect of it, in theory? But what else, and why do you 
  think the current capitalist system is better than communism? 
Tiff: Well because here we have room to grow but it’s really rare when that 
happens. I don’t think our system is an ideal system but it’s better 
than some. 
Rudy: Why do you say that? 
Tiff: Well don’t communists have dictators? I guess that’s their flaw of 
their system, dictators as oppose to a leader that they choose.  
[…] 
Rudy: As an individual, do you think that you have, or can have (if you 
wanted to) a say in government, in your government. 
Tiff:  Well yeah. 
Rudy:  How so? 
Tiff:  I think I do by writing letters to the politicians, actually going out and 
voting.  
Rudy:  So you think voting and writing to your congressmen are effective 
means to get governments responsive to their citizens? 
Tiff:   Yeah, and like signing petitions.  
Rudy:  Do you or would you vote? Why? 
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Tiff:  Yes, because I think it does make a difference. (South-Central LA 
participant) 
 
 
Rudy: So Evyn brought up voting. So do you think voting is important,  
  explain. 
Evyn: Nobody votes nothing gets done. There you go. Some people think 
  that in voting that one person isn’t going to change anything, but it  
  could be a bunch  of one person’s voting that changes something. 
Rudy: Joey? 
Joey: Oh yeah I agree with [Evyn], voting is very important.
61
(Zoo 
participants) 
 
 
 Rudy: Our system is described as [one] where individuals are rewarded on 
  how hard or how little they work. What do you think of this system? 
 Phillip: It’s fair. 
 Rudy: Elaborate on that. 
 Phillip: It makes sense you know. You work hard you get a lot, you work a 
  little you get a little. Even the rich people that never done anything, 
  they still, like the oligarchs they still did something. They went out 
  and innovated. Except the people who like inherited all their millions 
  of dollars, they didn’t deserve it, but the people who found oil, they 
  found it, they cultivated it, they made it into oil. They found out how 
  to do it, so they deserve that money. It makes sense. 
 Rudy: Do you know of any other like political or economic alternatives, or 
  systems? 
 Phillip: You mean like communism or socialism? 
 Rudy: Yeah, yeah. 
 Phillip: I guess I know a little bit about socialism. 
 Rudy: Ok explain socialism, your understanding of it. 
Phillip: My idea of socialism like, the ruling [proletariat], but yeah like the 
working class dominates it. The better the working class, you know 
kind of not have a dictator, like you know Soviet Russia went against 
that. But that’s really all I know, the better the worker or labourer. 
 Rudy: Where did you come about that understanding? 
 Phillip: This book by Upton Sinclair: The Jungle. 
 Rudy: Yeah where did you, why did you read that book? 
Phillip: It was just really interesting. The whole socialist movement you know, 
all the unions and the workers, and how like in 1905 our country was 
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 On alternative approaches to social change, these young people also supported petitions, 
peaceful protests and strikes, but were avidly against what they considered violent protests. 
Correspondingly, they had middle variant understanding of environmental politics and practices 
relative to the high variant and low variant understandings demonstrated by the Critical/Political 
and Mainstream young people respectively. This middle-variant understanding consisted of having 
some awareness that their consumption practices can contribute to environmental degradation, but 
this understanding was not detailed. Furthermore, most of them also favoured individual 
approaches to environmental problems such as recycling, as well as governmental responses with 
Diana and Phillip (Zoo participants) arguing that governments should regulate polluting factories.  
Overall Artsy/Indie young people held what can be considered a moderate level of internal and 
external political efficacy (see Hayes & Beane 1993). 
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a piece of shit with all these factories, and then all of a sudden like 
boom. 1920’s […] the working class definitely improved at that time 
that was so crucial for our society. […] 
 Rudy: Did you have to read that for class, or how did you come about it? 
Phillip: Well I was in history class, and we were talking about like unions. 
And I got into like unions, and why are they bad. I didn’t understand 
why they are bad in our society. So I looked at unions on 
Wikipedia.com and one of the books that came was Sinclair. 
 Rudy: What do you think of unions and the labour movement? 
 Phillip: […] Well I don’t understand why unions, why people make them out 
  to be so bad cause they were helping people. You know most of this 
  country is run by the elite, you know the few elite, and the rest of the 
  country is poor or middle class, so if you better them you better the 
  entire country, and the entire country would be happier.. And I guess 
  life would be enriched. 
[….] 
Rudy: As an individual do you think that you can have a say in how the 
government is run? 
Phillip: Well I can vote, but that’s about it. 
Rudy: Do you think voting is effective? 
Phillip: Yeah I do, because if you vote, the government kind of has to do what 
 you voted for you know. If enough people get together and vote for 
 one thing, the government has to do it you know. And it definitely 
 expresses the public’s opinion on certain issues. I think it works. (Zoo 
 participant) 
 
In the above extracts, both Gloria and Phillip used the word fair to describe 
capitalism echoing the standard discourse of upward mobility via hard work, but 
they simultaneously expressed the view that it is also unfair since if favours 
individuals who inherited their money. Tiff, immediately notes that capitalism is 
not ideal, but seems to premise her support for capitalism on a lesser of two evils 
rationale. In these regard, these young did express a partial structural critique of 
capitalism, albeit not one that was as pronounced as that of Critical/Political 
young people. Moreover, these ambivalent or dissonant views on capitalism are 
especially apparent in Phillip’s extract. Despite commenting throughout the 
interview that he is not interested in politics and finds the subject dry, a casual 
mentioning of unions during his history class led him to read Sinclair’s famed 
book The Jungle, which contributed to his accurate conceptualization of 
democratic socialism, support for unions, and understanding of elite rule. However, 
only seconds before, he had used the word ‘innovate’ to argue for why oligarchs 
deserve their wealth, and in that moment expressed a dominant neoliberal trope. 
Nonetheless, Phillip’s account also highlights how young people can be turned on 
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to politics or political understandings via any number of random events. Phillip’s 
otherwise apolitical orientation may initially predispose him to avoid politics, but 
as his extract demonstrates, and as discussed in section 5.5 of the previous chapter, 
even minimal exposure to political information can have a significant influence on 
an individual’s political schemata. The initial key, however, is direct exposure.  
 
6.6. Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the Artsy/Indie young people expressed a pronounced seriousness 
about, and dedication to, their artistic endeavours and aspirations. These artistic 
proclivities seem to correspond to their affective and aesthetic dispositions and a 
tentative rejection of mainstream media-culture and materialistic consumption 
practices and aspirations. However, while their immersion into alternative and 
indie forms of media-culture shields them to some extent from the more 
commercial, vacuous, narcissistic, and consumerist messages of mainstream 
media-culture, these indie forms are not especially conducive to the formation of 
more refined political perspectives, which more comprehensively question and 
critique neoliberal discourses. For one thing, alternative and indie cultural forms, 
particularly the Anime cartoons, Electro-Techno music, and Internet blog mediums 
mentioned by these young people, are not necessarily conducive to critique. 
Bannister (2006) for instance, argues that Western alternative and indie music 
culture tends to be seen as an autonomous, spontaneous, and corporate-free culture, 
and that this overlooks the fact that it can also be hierarchical, stratified, and 
traditional. Congruently, it does not appear that these young people’s media 
preferences and interpretations have a significant influence on their relatively 
underdeveloped political-economic schemata, at least when compared to that of 
the Critical/Political young people whose socio-cultural and political-economic 
schemata were intricately intertwined. This is particularly noticeable in their 
responses to questions concerning music. As noted in Chapter 3, music lies at the 
centre of media culture, and contains unique semiotic powers and interpellating 
potential, functioning, as De Nora (2006, p. 141) argues, as “a device for the 
generation of future identity and action structures, and a mediator of future 
existence”. In this regard, it stands to reason that these young people’s 
indifference towards political music, or a lack of political interpretation of their 
preferred music texts, representing a further indication of what can be considered 
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an apolitical disposition, which may partially explain why their overall political 
knowledge and views were not as developed as those of the Critical/Political 
group. This is a somewhat surprising discovery, as there is a popular conception 
that more artistically inclined individuals are also politically engaged, particularly 
as in the history of revolutionary movements, as Graeber (2009) argues, there has 
always been a strong relationship and alliance between Bohemians and political 
agitators.  
 However, it may well be the case that upon entering their respective 
universities (as with the Critical/Political young people, all were attending or 
expressed an intention to attend a university), or in future experiences with their 
respective artistic communities, that they will be exposed to more critical forms of 
media-culture, and may potentially be influenced by them. Gloria for instance, 
noted that, in addition to her 12
th
 grade Civics course, she had received a lot of 
political information from music and art festivals stating that, “they always have 
that one activist group that hands out flyers and whatnot”. As it stands, the 
Artsy/Indie young people fall somewhere on the progressive to liberal political 
spectrum, as they have some critical views on capitalism and the current 
government, and favour reforms, but do not believe that alternatives to the current 
political-economic system are viable and they have internalized the dominant 
neoliberal discourse on welfare that exaggerates the problem of welfare fraud. To 
put it crudely, the Artsy/Indie young people are the quintessential wild cards 
whose aesthetic and affective dispositions and artistic endeavours may lead them 
to develop a more in-depth political consciousness, or whose more introverted, 
apolitical, and escapist dispositions may guide them to more passive and apolitical 
practices in childhood. 
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Chapter Seven 
Mainstream Youth 
A More Neoliberal Inclination 
 
 
Rudy:  Why do you think some people are poor or homeless? 
Fernanda: This is how I look at it, you always find a way to come up with 
money, [...]. Put it this way, life is like this, either you hustle or you 
just don’t do nothing about it. If you hustle, you’ll get somewhere, if 
you don’t, you won’t get anywhere. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: So some of these kids, what are their aspirations, what do they want 
to do? 
Jaquie: Some of them don’t know, quite a lot of them don’t know, some of 
  them got a whole in depth plan about careers or what they want to do. 
  Some of them  want to go into the army. 
Rudy: Talk to me about those that have in depth career plans. 
Jaquie: So some of them will say, ‘I’ve got my whole life planned out’, but 
it’s to do with, right I’m going to go to the Army. After I’ve gone to 
the army then I’m going to set up my own business. And you get that 
quite a lot, setting up your own business, and you get quite a lot of 
completely unrealistic things about I’m going to be famous because 
I’m going to become an actress. (Hackney Youth Worker). 
 
 While both the Critical/Political and Artsy/Indie young people described in 
the previous chapters expressed dispositions, thoughts and practices that to 
varying but significant extents run counter to dominant neoliberal discourses, the 
young people I classify here as Mainstream, deployed socio-cultural and political-
economic cognitive frameworks that mirror dominant and widespread neoliberal 
discourses. Although this group of young people was the most varied in their 
views, they all expressed, for example, degrees of self-interested, apathetic, and 
consumerist dispositions, materialistic and/or entrepreneurial concerns and 
aspirations, apathetic attitudes towards political-economic issues of labour and 
environmental exploitation, and person-blame views on the causes of poverty. 
Congruently, these cognitive frameworks seem to be strongly linked or closely 
correspond to a more active and relatively uncritical engagement with corporate 
media culture, and to a lesser extent, to other interpellating settings including 
youth centres and family. As in the previous two chapters, I will begin this chapter 
with an overview of these young peoples’ socio-cultural experiences, media-
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culture preferences and interpretations, and the central and transposable 
dispositions that can be extrapolated from these accounts. This is followed by an 
analysis of their political-economic schemata, and a brief discussion of what these 
young people’s political-economic views and attitudes contribute to the ongoing 
youth politics debate concerning the ‘crisis in democracy’. I will end this chapter 
with a section that details some of the ways these young people, nonetheless, 
contested dominant neoliberal discourses. 
 
7.1 Shopping and Self-interested Dispositions 
The Mainstream young people tended to describe themselves as typical 
teenagers. While the Critical/Political and Artsy/Indie young people also reported 
that they engage in typical teenage activities like surfing the Internet or hanging 
out with their friends, they tended to couple these with more politically oriented 
and/or more artistic endeavours. The Mainstream young people, however, when 
asked about their leisure activities and everyday experiences, generally said that 
they mostly like to hang out with friends at home or at youth centres (with a 
significant number of them also commenting that they actively engage in sporting 
activities).
62
   
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about what do like to do and stuff 
Jack:  I’m Jack I’m 17, I do youth work. I’m volunteering at […] Youth 
Centre. I hang around with mates, go out places, have fun, typical 
teenager. 
Alice: I’m Alice, I’m studying my last year at school, I volunteer at the 
Youth centre. In my spare time I like to dance and hang around with 
friends. 
Lindsey: My name is Lindsey. I’m in my last year at school. I work at [Youth 
Centre] Mondays. In spare time just like to go out with mates, stay at 
friends’ houses, and just do what a typical teenager would do. 
(Bermondsey participants) 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about yourself and some of things you like to do. 
Anthony: My name is Anthony. I’m 18 years old. I like to do mainly sport stuff 
like basketball, football, swimming, going to the gym. That’s the 
main thing.  
Josh:  I’m Josh, I just left school going on to college to do football and 
sports science. I enjoy sports because I like being active and running 
around.  
                                                 
62 All of the Mainstream young people who I interviewed at youth centres received some form of 
monetary or other forms of non-monetary compensation for mentoring younger members.  
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Dilanda:  I’m Dilanda. I like music, basketball, and singing. (Bermondsey 
participants) 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about yourself and some of the things you do on 
your free time. 
John: I’m John. I’m 17 and I’m really interested in any physical activities. 
That’s what I like to do in my spare time.  (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about yourself and some of the things that you like 
to do when not in school. 
Dennis: I’m Dennis, I’m 18 years old. I play sports, I write, kind of you know, 
   hang-out, basically that’s what I do. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Tell me a little bit about yourself and some of the things you do on 
your free time. 
Ela: My name is Ela. I’m 18. I like to hike, I like to dance, model, and 
yeah just hang out with friends, party a lot. I don’t like reading, just 
saying. 
Karina: My name is Karina, I’m 17. Some of things I like to do, I like to read, 
I like to watch movies cause they’re fun, and that’s basically it.  
Maurine:    I’m Maurine, I’m 17. I like animals, and swimming, and water polo,               
and I like to listen to music a lot and watch movies. (Zoo participants) 
  
These typical activities also included shopping. These young people 
expressed a particular preference for specific clothing brands, like Nike, TopShop, 
and Forever 21 (which are all infamous for exploitative labour practices). 
Correspondingly, as shown in the following extracts which centre around some of 
their shopping experiences and concomitant thought processes, there is an initial 
articulation of what might be considered a self-interested disposition; viz., an 
automatic tendency to only be concerned with one’s own interests, often with an 
implicit disregard for the interests of others. This can be inferred, for example, 
from Fernanda’s self-declared ‘selfishness’, and Ela’s consistent use of ‘I’, which 
can in their given context, be interpreted as semantic and lexical indicators of a 
self-interested disposition. Additionally, so can Tyrone, Jenkins, and Iris’ primary 
concern with price and appearance when deciding on which clothes to buy even 
though, as other extracts demonstrate, they are keenly aware of the likely 
exploitative origin of their clothing:  
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Rudy: Do you guys ever go to like shopping centres or high streets? How 
often? 
Jack: […] Once twice every two weeks. 
Rudy: What do you do when you’re there? Do you buy? 
Jack: Nah, I just go over there to have a look cause I get bored, but 
sometimes I go there [to] TopoShop. 
Alice: I go to shop like every two three times a week. Just to buy anything, I 
don’t know. 
Rudy: Do you have a favourite store that you go to? 
Alice: Not really, just anything. 
Rudy: Lindsey? 
Lindsey: Probably like once every two or three weeks just to go look and see 
what’s there. 
Rudy: Any favourite store? 
Lindsey: New Look, Dorothy Perkins, that’s about it? 
Rudy: What about any brands, do you have any favourites? 
Jack:  […] Nike. 
Lindsey: Yeah Nike. 
Alice:  Yeah Nike and Paul’s Boutique. (Bermondsey participants) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to malls or shopping centres.  
Fernanda: Yeah all the time, depends how often I have money. 
Rudy:  How often? 
Fernanda: Every time I have money I’ll hit up the malls.  
Rudy: Any particular brands that you like? 
Fernanda: I like American Eagle, […] Forever 21, H&M. 
Rudy: So give me the process of what’s going on in your head when you’re 
  buying a nice shirt? 
Fernanda: The process? Well I’m kind of a selfish person. Like for Christmas, I 
 went Christmas shopping and I was supposed to get gifts for my 
 friends, but instead of going in there [stores] and looking for gifts for 
 my friends, I kept on buying stuff for myself. So yeah it’s kind of 
 difficult. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Like when you see a pair of shoes, what compels you to buy them? 
Ela: It’s just new things, new ideas, new wardrobe, cause you know, I 
work and I get money, and it’s like a reward for myself. Oh I worked 
hard, so I’ll buy something. (Zoo participant) 
  
 These young people’s consumption practices, at least as they described them 
to me, also seem to reflect apathetic attitudes and an unconscious and/or conscious 
and sometimes callous disregard for the plight of others, despite their sometimes 
implicit (see Jack’s account below), or explicit awareness of their marginal 
contribution to that plight. While the Critical/Political young people abstained 
from and/or expressed politically motivated remorse when purchasing clothing, as 
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did some of the Artsy/Indie young people to a lesser extent, issues of labour 
exploitation associated with the production, and enabled by the purchasing, of 
mainstream fashion, tended not to register in the cognitive frameworks of most of 
the Mainstream young people when asked about their consumption practices. 
 
Rudy:  [………] But these issues [sweatshops] for instance when you’re 
buying your clothes, they don’t come into your head? 
Fernanda: No. It depends, only like. [pause] Nooo. [laughs]. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you know under what conditions these things you buy are made? 
Ela:   No, actually I’ve never thought about that. 
Rudy: So when you’re shopping those things never factor in at all? 
Ela:   No. 
Karina: The conditions? Like the people working for a little bit, but the things 
they make being worth a lot more.  
Rudy:  Yeah, does that factor in?  
Karina: Well, I don’t really buy a lot of expensive clothing. Well I think it’s 
sad obviously, but I don’t know. (Zoo participants) 
 
 
Rudy: What do you guys think about these sweatshop conditions? 
John: I don’t’ mean to sound like a jerk but I don’t really pay much 
attention to that. I look if it fits me, and well I get it. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: I want to know, like when you guys are buying something like a pair 
of trainers or a shirt or something, what is going on in your head 
when you’re buying it and you’re walking to the cash register? 
Jack: I don’t know really, it’s like yeah I’m getting a new t-shirt. 
Alice: I’m thinking about what you’re going to wear it with and stuff. 
Lindsey: Probably the same as Alice. What I’m going to wear it with, and it 
would go right with. 
Rudy: Do you guys know where your clothes are made? 
Jack: I don’t know, it says on the tags. 
Alice: In a factory. 
Lindsey: In a workshop. 
Jack:  Thailand or something. 
Rudy: Workshop, is that a sweatshop or something, like bad conditions for 
workers? 
Lindsey: No like a factory, somewhere where they make loads of things. 
Rudy: So do you guys know anything about like the conditions where these 
things are made, [..] like under what conditions workers are treated 
stuff like that? 
Jack: They’re probably treated really bad so that they can get more stuff 
done every day. 
Rudy: How do you know this? 
Jack: I don’t, I’m just having a guess. 
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Alice: You get them TV programmes though that show you how things are 
made. Every now and then they show us how things are made like, 
they showed you how cups are made with bungs [….] so I don’t even 
want to know where my clothes are made. (Bermondsey participants) 
 
In the few instances where thoughts on labour exploitation or the environmental 
impact of consumption were spontaneously offered, as in the following extracts, 
these thoughts did not seem to influence, or be manifest during, the act of 
consumption, at least according to their own accounts. Nor, with the exceptions of 
Karina (as can be gauged from her “I feel badly” sentiment described above) and 
Tyrone (see extract below), did these young people seem to experience any form 
of cognitive dissonance when asked about these issues: 
 
Rudy: These clothes you like. These Nikes and Ralph Lauren, do you know 
  under what conditions they’re made? 
Sean: What conditions?  
Rudy: Yeah like how are they made these clothes, like how are workers 
treated? 
Sean: Oh, I watched a documentary about Nike, and [..] the place where 
they  work. The Just Do It sign [Nike motto], the motto of ‘Just Do It’, was 
  basically formed from workers basically stepping down, and people 
  saying just do the work.  
Rudy: Um, does that ever factor in when you’re buying them? 
Sean: Nah, nah, not really. 
Tirian: It could have a factor if it was food, cause people saying just do it, 
and people don’t [want rushed food] that might affect you.63  
[..] 
Rudy: What about like the environmental impact that some of these products 
  you guys buy, do you know anything about that? 
Sean: The environmental impact? Meaning like global warming and stuff 
  like that? 
Rudy: Yeah sort of, yeah. 
Sean: It don’t really impact me. Cause uh, I know it’s bad, but at the same 
  time I don’t think about it in the moment. I’m not really that person 
  that, in my language, I don’t give a shit really. (Hackney participants) 
 
Rudy: So these clothes that you guys like, do you know where they’re 
made? 
Tyrone:  With my trainers I do, because you look at the tags and it says made 
in wherever. Most of mine are made in Vietnam or China. I remember 
                                                 
63
 Tirian is attending college where he is being trained to be a chef, and aspires to be a chef like 
Jamie Oliver [UK celebrity chef]. This sudden shift from a discussion on standard garment worker 
conditions to food standards suggests a transposable self-interested disposition whereby Tirian is 
expressing a concern that is directly tied to his vocational training and career aspirations, but which 
significantly diverges from the initial topic of discussion.  
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back in like 2009 a lot of the fake trainers were coming from China, 
so if you look  and it said China, everyone would look at you and 
laugh and say “fake”. It was crazy.  
Iris:  China, yeah. 
Jenkins: I don’t know China, some probably come from Europe 
Rudy:  Now do you know under what conditions these clothes are made? 
Jenkins: Sweatshops [instant answer]. 
Tyrone:  [Sombre voice intonation and facial expression] Bad conditions. The 
people that make them aren’t getting paid a lot of money. Yeah man, 
they go for a lot just to make the stuff that we take it for granted.  
Rudy:  Does that ever factor in when you’re buying these things? 
Jenkins: Well we kind of know where our clothes come from. But the thing is, 
if [they] don’t buy them, you don’t get paid. 
Tyrone:  But to be honest the youth of today don’t actually think about that. I 
think half of them won’t even know where it comes from. 
Jenkins  Plus if they actually pay regular wages the shoe prices are going up 
the roof, and businesses don’t want to do that, so if they could do it 
for cheaper they’ll do it for cheaper, and helping that economy where 
it’s coming from. but you know they’re helping their economy with 
that.
64
 (Hackney participants) 
 
 Indeed, as Jenkins’ above self-description as a ‘shopaholic’ and subsequent 
economic justification, and as the following extracts suggest, there seems to be a 
fair degree of cognitive consonance between these young people’s seemingly 
compulsive shopping habits (which seem to be driven by unconscious drives), and 
their expressed rationale for their consumption practices.  
 
Rudy: Ela, you say you buy shoes and jewellery. What goes through your 
head when you’re buying these things? 
Ela: I don’t need these things. Why am I buying this? But I can’t put it 
down. I have a shopping problem. 
Rudy: I’m curious about that. Like when you see a pair of shoes, what 
compels you to buy them? 
Ela:  But even when I’m buying, as I’m paying, I’m still thinking, oh 
should I back out, should I still go through with this, and I really want 
to. But I still go through with it, and still spend money on it. (Zoo 
participant) 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Jenkins’ account in particular, whereby he justifies the low wages paid to garment workers on 
the grounds of economic development, strongly echoes the standard neoliberal economic argument 
for sweatshops (Henderson, 2000). For example as neoliberal economist Powell (2008, p. 1) 
argues: “Not only are sweatshops better than current worker alternatives, but they are also part of 
the process of development that ultimately raises living standards. [...] When companies open 
sweatshops they bring technology and physical capital with them. Better technology and more 
capital raise worker productivity. Over time this raises their wages.” 
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Rudy: So when you see a nice shirt what do you think? 
Fernanda:  I gotta buy it.  
Rudy:  Any particular reason? 
Fernanda: No not really. 
Rudy:  So you see it, you like, and you buy it? 
Fernanda: Well it depends if I have enough money, if not, I’ll be like, I’ll come 
back for you. 
Rudy: So what draws you back to these malls and shopping centres when 
you have money? 
Fernanda: I don’t know, I just want to go somewhere. I mean I don’t know I 
think I have an addiction. 
Rudy:  Can you explain? 
Fernanda:  So it’s kind of all up on me, and in a way it’s kind of hard to deal with 
it because I don’t I’m just kind of weird. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Do you ever go to the mall or shopping centres? How often? 
Sean:  I go whenever I can go, when I got the money and I see something I 
need to buy, and I buy it. I’m like that type of person that Tirian said 
that get money and spend it, because I wasn’t really brought up in that 
childhood where I had the money then. So as I’m getting the money, 
I’m thinking yeah I need this, I need this now because I didn’t have it 
when I was younger so I buy it now and stuff. (Hackney participant) 
 
While Ela’s account reveals a lack of impulse control despite a striking wish to 
avoid buying things, it can be tentatively assumed, that as one of her 
aforementioned accounts suggests, this dissonance is resolved by her “I work and I 
get money, and it’s like a reward for myself” rationalization. Fernanda’s account 
of her shopping as an ‘addiction’, on the other hand, does not suggest any 
inconsistency between her consumerist disposition and her more cognizant 
awareness of these practices, while Sean rationalizes his ‘need to buy’ using the 
justification that he did not have the money to do so when he was younger. 
Whatever the rationale, these young people’s accounts could be seen to fit 
Marcuse’s (1964) ‘repressive desublimation theory of habitual consumerism (as 
discussed in section 2.1). That is, these young people’s impulsive and compulsive 
consumerist practices could be the result of an acquired arousal-desire-purchase 
feedback loop that is largely promoted by the rampant consumerist norms and 
values characteristic of the advanced capitalist societies that they live under. 
Correspondingly, this habitual consumerism also overlooks or ignores the 
environmental degradation that it engenders; a fact that none of these young 
people were really able to connect to their own consumerist practices. However, it 
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bears repeating that given my limited ethnographic observations, I can only make 
tentative claims about my participants’ material (i.e., non-discursive) practices. 
That withstanding, it can be reasonably assumed that their own accounts of their 
material practices are likely to be strongly reflective of their actual material 
practices. Given this assumption, it can be argued from the above extracts, along 
with the limited ethnographic data that I did collect, that Mainstream young 
people’s consumption practices are more congruent and reflective of dominant 
neoliberal consumerist discursive practices. Thus, they are in effect, via their 
active and uncritical consumption of corporate goods, contributing to the 
neoliberal global economy more than the Critical/Political and Artsy/Indie young 
people.   
 
7.2 Media-Culture Influence and Aspirations: 
Rudy:   Where do you think they get these images and influences? 
Jerald:  They get them from everywhere. Their ads are on MySpace, on 
YouTube, on the Internet, on television, cable television, on screens 
in the market, on billboards. It’s 360. Youth today are immersed in 
this world. (Youth Worker: Bresee Foundation) 
 
 
Sean: I live in the moment, ‘Yolo Yolo’.   
Rudy: Alright. 
Sean: Do you know what that is?  
Rudy: Nah. 
Sean: You only live once. 
Rudy: Ah alright, where’d you get that from? 
Sean: Um Drake [mainstream rapper] (Hackney participant) 
 
 Even though at times critical of mainstream media-culture, another key 
characteristic that distinguishes Mainstream young people from the others, is their 
tendency to appreciate and more directly engage with corporate media-culture. 
This consisted of an engagement with a wide range of media-culture artefacts,
65
 
which did include some ambivalent or indifferent attitudes towards some of their 
preferred media-culture texts. In these cases, these texts were enjoyed solely for 
their entertainment value as suggested in the following extract: 
 
                                                 
65
 For example, Mainstream young people expressed an active use of the social-networking sites 
Twitter and Facebook to follow celebrity news and tell their friends of the (corporatized) music 
that they are listening to.  
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Rudy: Name some of like your favourite songs. 
Fernanda: Well I like Rihanna, The Only Girl In the World, I think. 
Rudy: Is that the name of the song? 
Fernanda: Yeah. 
Rudy: The Only Girl In the World? 
Fernanda: Or something like that. I also like the Rihanna and Drake, What’s My 
  Name I think. 
Rudy: Why do you like these songs? 
Fernnada:  I don’t know, they’re just cool. 
Rudy: Anything in particular, like the lyrics or anything like that? 
Fernanda: Uhm, I think it’s since their focus is all about them, I just like, make it 
  seem like it’s all about me.  
Rudy: What about TV? 
Fernanda: Oh I like the Shore. 
Rudy: Oh you mean The Jersey Shore. [….] Why do you like The Jersey  
  Shore? 
Fernanda: I don’t know, they’re just really dumb, and they do the dumbest 
things ever, but it’s so funny. 
Rudy: Any other shows that you watch? 
Fernanda: I like Bad Girls Club.  
Rudy: Why do you like Bad Girls Club? 
Fernanda: I don’t know they just start fighting. It’s stupid but it’s entertaining. 
  (Bresee participant) 
 
 However, despite this occasional critical distance, in most cases Mainstream 
young people drew direct inspiration from their preferred (and highly 
corporatized) media-texts as demonstrated in the following extracts.  
 
Rudy: So what are some of your favourite [songs]? 
Tyrone: My favourite artist right now? I hate to sound typical but Drake in it. 
  Drake is cutting it man. 
Rudy: Why? Give me a song that you really like. 
Tyrone: Um, Look What You’ve Done on his new album. [..]  
Rudy: Why do you like about that song, what do you get from it 
Tyrone: He tells a story in it, and obviously like, it’s a deep story, and I 
recommend everyone listen to the story. […] Yeah the story he’s just 
chatting about life, and his life and how it went. That’s the thing 
about Drake, he tells stories though his music. I don’t like to listening 
to music that has no meaning to it. 
Rudy: Like what? 
Tyrone: Yeah I got a big gun, sold guns, just typical that. Whatever, I heard it 
  before.
66
 
[….] 
Rudy: What are some of your favourite movies? 
Tyrone: Scent of a Woman with Al Pacino, The Hurricane, Malcolm X,  
                                                 
66
 Ela (Zoo participant) and Josh (Bermondsey participant) expressed this same view and critique 
of mainstream hip hop music.  
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  Uhm, The Pursuit of Happiness with Will Smith. 
Rudy: Why do you like The Pursuit of Happiness? 
Tyrone:  Well it’s like he’s telling my story. He kind of shows you that you can 
come from absolutely nothing, in the worst circumstances, and you 
can strive towards something and always getting. He was sleeping in 
bathrooms with his son, and if you could come from that, than you 
can come from anywhere. 
Rudy: So you like that message then? 
Tyrone: Definitely! I think everyone would. Anyone who doesn’t like that 
message then they just don’t want to be successful.  
Iris:  Colombiana. Anyone that’s in that situation etc. Save the Last Dance. 
Rudy: Why? 
Iris:  Don’t know it’s just good. 
Tyrone: That’s kind of one the ones about chase their dreams as well. 
Iris:  Yeah. 
Rudy:  Is it, is that why you like it [asking Iris]? 
Iris:  Yeah. 
Tyrone:  It gives us hope.  (Hackney participants) 
 
 
Rudy: What’s your favourite song? 
Sean: House Party. 
Rudy:  Who sings that? 
Sean: Meek Mill. 
Rudy: Why do you like House Party? 
Sean: Because it shows me how the successful life is. 
Rudy: Ok, what’s the song about? 
Sean: Hookers, drinks. (Hackney participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Can you name one of your favourite songs? 
Jack: Dappy (UK rapper) No Regrets. 
Rudy: What’s that song about? 
Lindsey: It’s about life 
Jack: No regrets 
Lindsey  and Jack [simultaneously]: Living life to the fullest. (Bermondsey   
  participants). 
   
 
A noteworthy feature in these extracts is that they evoke a strong valence 
relational affinity between these young people and the themes and characters of 
their preferred media texts, which corresponded with their career and materialistic 
aspirations. For example, Tyrone states that the messages of the song Look What 
You’ve Done and the film The Pursuit of Happiness film (both of which promote 
the Horatio Alger ‘pull yourself up by your bootstraps’ discourse) resonate with 
his own struggles and ambitions for upward mobility. Similarly, Iris cites the Save 
The Last Dance film for a similar reason. This film also promotes a ‘chasing your 
 209 
dream’ discourse, which is congruent with Iris’ stated ambition to become a model.  
 It is tempting to use the term passive to describe these young people’s 
affirmation of dominant media-cultural discourses, even if measured along a 
continuum of agency. As Dedman (2011, p. 512) suggests, “passive […] is a 
relational concept, separating those whose cultural engagement is more centred on 
the consumption of mass-mediated products. In this sense the dichotomous 
variables ‘active’ and ‘passive’ should not be considered as fixed states”. However, 
under any interpretation no matter how nuanced, the term ‘passive’ denotes an 
almost unconscious acceptance of exposed to discourses, which I do not believe 
that the participants in the above extracts are displaying. Rather these young 
people appear to have a conscious and affect driven engagement and affinity with 
the media texts and discourses that they expose themselves to, but this conscious 
engagement appears to be relatively uncritical, and does more accurately denotes 
an uncritical rather than passive disposition. For example, Tyrone’s discursive 
interpretation of his favourite movie is thoughtful and deliberative, as are Jack and 
Lindsey’s interpretation of the No Regrets song, (which is incidentally similar to 
Sean’s ‘YOLO’ evocation described above). What is not as apparent, however, is 
an understanding of how their interpretations strongly resonate with neoliberal 
individualist and consumerist discourses. Nor is there is any critical read in these 
accounts as exemplified by Tyrone’s, “Anyone who doesn’t like that message then 
they just don’t want to be successful” affirmations.   
 
7.3 Welfare/Benefits Schemata 
 The majority of these young people’s views and attitudes on welfare 
programmes reflected popular negative conceptions disseminated by major media 
outlets. This marks another important line of delineation from the other two 
classifications of young people. However, as the following extracts demonstrate, 
their views on welfare were also marked by a high degree of ambivalence, 
inconsistency, and in some cases, negative strong valence dispositional attitudes.  
 
Rudy: So you guys brought up benefits, so what do think is the 
government’s role in providing benefits? 
Jenkins: I think benefits should be more lenient: 
Tyrone: No, [stomping his fists on the table] no I disagree. 
Rudy: What do you mean lenient, as in the government should give more 
money 
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Tyrone: No [emphatic] 
Jenkins: They should give money but they should know who they are giving it 
to.  
Rudy: Oh like more restrictions? 
Jenkins: Yeah like if you make a certain amount that’s fine, but as soon as they 
should like have rules, more stricter rules saying that you could only 
get it cause of this. To actually get benefits, [inaudible] you got to 
find work. 
Tyrone:  Yeah I hear what you’re saying [directed at Jenkins], but I think it’s 
really soft this country. Like for instance, a lot of English people in 
this country they say, these whatever people come into our country 
and stealing all our jobs, but it’s these people that come into this 
country that own the chicken shops and the corner shops and they’re 
the people that are working, they don’t just come into the country and 
say yeah here I’ll take a chicken shop and run it. So it’s like the 
English people that are on benefits, so I don’t understand this theory 
of English people saying, they come for our jobs.  
Rudy: But what about benefits in general, what you think about benefits? 
Tyrone: Obviously they help, they help. 
Rudy: Do you think like Jenkins that they should be restricted more? 
Jenkins: Not the amount, but the people that [get them] 
Tyrone: I think, people get a lot of help as it is now, but I just don’t think that 
if someone is on benefits and they’re like 55, you shouldn’t be saying, 
oh you got to go to work. There are young people who are like 17 and 
they can’t get a job, why should a 50 year old get one. 
Jenkins: Yeah but that’s different if they’re 55 he’s got 10 years before he has 
to retire. 
Tyrone: Yeah but that happens though man, trust me, that’s what they do. Is a 
lot of these older people that are on benefits in it, is not people like us 
that are young in it. They’re the ones [that are being told] find a job 
and then you come off benefits, and then their argument is if I get a 
job I won’t even be getting as much as I’m getting now on benefits, 
so why am I getting a job I might as well stay on benefits. 
Iris:  That’s exactly what I was going to say. 
Rudy: So what do you think about that Iris? 
Iris: I was just going to say what he [Tyrone] just said. I agree with him 
[Jenkins] about restricting cause some people might start thinking, 
right if I’m already getting money, some people might see it as a 
reason to not get work. 
Rudy:  Because they’re getting more… 
Tyrone: They’re getting more on benefits for doing nothing especially families 
that you see in the paper all the time man, families that got like seven 
kids just milking the system. 
Iris:  Yeah 
Tyrone: Nice money, housing, and benefits…. 
Rudy:  All of these stories about seven kids where did you hear that? 
Tyrone: [raised intonation] Newspapers, type it in Google, type in. 
Rudy: But which newspapers 
Tyrone: The Sun [UK tabloid newspaper]. There’s people that have loads of 
  kids and milk the system. 
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Iris:   The more kids you have the more money you get. 
Jenkins:  Yeah the more kids you have the money you get. (Hackney 
participants) 
 
 
Rudy: What do you think about government benefit programmes? 
Josh: I think the government should provide these. 
Dilanda: [Nodding her head in agreement.] 
Josh: Some take the piss, but they should [remain]. 
Anthony: I think more needs to be done to stop people from [taking advantage 
  of them]. (Bermondsey participants) 
 
 
Rudy: What about your thoughts on government welfare programmes, what 
  do you think of them? 
Fernanda: Welfare like when they give out money to poor people? 
Rudy: That’s an aspect of it yes. 
Fernanda: [..], I think they’re not doing a good job because I’ve seen people 
around the neighbourhood and I know people who want certain stuff. 
And then it’s funny how I seen this happen to a neighbour of mine, 
she was in need and she went to the welfare office to get food stamps 
she told me, and then another neighbour who like lives with her 
husband, and put on her application that she doesn’t live with her 
husband and has five kids, and her husband has a good job and they 
own three cars. And she got food stamps and my neighbour didn’t.  
Rudy: But do you support them? 
Ferndanda: Like how support them? 
Rudy: Are you against government welfare programmes? 
Fernanda: I’m not against them. If people are in need and there’s money out  
there to give them, well why not you know. (Bresee participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Ok since you guys brought up the government, what do you think of 
  the current Cameron Administration?  
Sean: I don’t really agree with him because he cut down on a lot of things 
that young people and their families really need. He cut down EMA 
(education maintenance allowance) for us, and that’s really brought a 
struggle to us really. I feel like some people’s mums out there can’t 
survive off paying for them every week so the thirty pounds really 
helped them out.  
Tirian:  No but I think it’s good that he cut down benefits so that people will 
  have the incentive to work on their own backside. 
Rudy: Ah so you agree with him then that benefits should be cut so that 
people can be.. 
Tirian: (laughs) Well obviously I don’t because I want my mom to get money 
  so that I can get stuff, but in a way is good. 
Rudy:  Ok explain, please elaborate. 
Tirian: Elaborate, in that parent’s that are now forced to work. Not forced, 
but they’re forcing their own stale mind, cause when they think that 
they’re kids ain’t got clothes, usually they’d be getting five-hundred 
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pounds a month, so they can buy some new trainers, but now they get 
two-hundred pounds a month, so they have to work, and when you 
start working it’s not as bad as you think. (Hackney participants) 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Tyrone’s Welfare/Benefits Schemata 
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Figure 7.2: Tirian’s Welfare Schemata  
 
 
 The above accounts, and as illustrated in Tyrone’s and Tirian’s 
welfare/benefits schema maps, show the range of conflicting thoughts on welfare 
that these young people had. In most cases, as exemplified by Tyrone who cited 
the Sun [a British tabloid newspaper] as his source for his information on welfare 
recipients, these young people’s views and attitudes on welfare largely reflected 
those of negative media stereotypes. Nonetheless, in the final analysis, most of 
these young people with the exception of Maurine (Zoo participant) who also cited 
Fox News (a notoriously right-wing propaganda US cable news network) as a 
source of political news, support some form of welfare provisions; albeit, in some 
instances, as Tirian’s and Sean’s accounts demonstrate, this tentative support was 
motivated by self-interest. However, as suggested by some of the linguistic 
markers in the above extracts (e.g., Tyrone’s “getting something for nothing,” or 
Jenkins, “not the amount but the people that get them”), these young people’s 
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sense of fairness is disturbed when they hear accounts of people cheating the 
system, which are influenced by overblown media and anecdotal accounts of 
systemic fraud which are not vindicated by existing empirical accounts (around 
1% in the UK),
67
 Nonetheless, the strong valence negative dispositional affect 
expressed by these young people, may be the cognitive product that results from 
the clash between the acceptance of widespread anti-welfare discourses (however 
erroneous they may be) and their inherent fairness predispositions, which 
preliminary research suggests are inherent in human beings (see Sloane et al., 
2012) In other words, rather than reflect a simple internalization of neoliberal 
discourses, these young people’s socially generated negative attitudes towards 
welfare programmes and recipients may be related to other unconscious cognitive 
processes and underlying mechanisms, which are nonetheless exploited by, and 
inflected through, neoliberalism. I will elaborate on this point further in section 8.4 
of the following chapter.   
 Furthermore, on the topic of homelessness, these young people’s views 
generally correlated with the person-blame approach found in their welfare 
schemata. To wit, they tended to express a person-blame and (in most cases) 
negatively affective view and attitude when discussing the causes of, and 
government responses towards, homelessness. Moreover, as the following extracts 
suggest, these views and attitudes strongly in some instances strongly reflected 
those that an ideal neoliberal would likely express (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Rudy: Do you think the government should do anything to help homeless 
people? 
Ela: Like homeless people. Like I’m against people that are just standing 
in the corner asking for change. With all that money that they save on 
the street, or go to a homeless centre, they can somehow find a job. 
They can turn their life around. Government should not do anything 
about homelessness. 
Maurine: I don’t think it’s the government’s responsibility to do anything. It’s 
  up to the individual. (Zoo participants) 
 
However, other Mainstream young people, while maintaining that individuals 
have to be responsible for their own lot in life, did express more sympathetic and 
compassionate views on this issue. For example: 
                                                 
67
 Retrieved from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10922261 
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Rudy: Do you think the government should do anything to help homeless 
people? 
Karina: I think the government should help the homeless. Some of them have 
mental problems that they can’t resolve. Some people just want to be 
homeless, but I think the government should help people that want to 
be helped. (Zoo participant) 
 
 
Rudy: Hostels, is that where like.. 
Jack: Is where like young people can go and live there. 
Rudy: Is that right, and they’re charging for it now? And they used to be 
free? 
Jack: Yeah. 
Lindsey: Yeah and they ain’t go nowhere else to live, like homeless people. 
Jack: Yeah when I went to the store a homeless guys was like you got a  
  spare fag? And I was like seriously mate you should be indoors its  
  cold and raining outside.
68
 (Bermondsey participants) 
 
 Nonetheless, despite their varied views, overall, Mainstream young people’s 
thoughts on welfare and homelessness largely mirrored those propagated by 
dominant neoliberal discourses. Correspondingly, while some of these young 
people did point to bad luck as a possible cause of poverty and homelessness, and 
even held more compassionate positions, none of them mentioned any structural 
factors that can contribute to individual destitution. Furthermore, these more 
individualistic views and outlooks also echo the findings of other researchers. For 
example, Sherrod et al., (2002, p. 268) found that “those [young people] high in 
self-interests tend to blame individuals for being poor, unemployed, or homeless, 
whereas those high in public interests [like the Critical/Political young people] 
tend to see the systemic or structural roots of those problems”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 The train of thought from this focus group was difficult to follow. However, these participants 
implied that the price of hostels, food, and transport should be lowered, and presumably by the 
government. Additionally, the Bermondsey participant Josh expressed similar sentiments.  
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7.4 Politics and Capitalism Schemata  
Rudy: So our current economic system is described as capitalist. So 
basically you know competing businesses, private property rights, and 
where people are rewarded based on how hard or how little they work. 
What do you think of this economic arrangement? 
Fernanda: I don’t know. 
Rudy: Are you taking a civics or government class right now? 
Fernanda: I’m taking government. 
Rudy: Ok cool. Can you think of any other political alternatives or economic 
  alternatives? 
Fernanda: Are you talking about how, [long pause] no. (Bresee participant) 
   
 When it came to discussions on government and alternative political-
economic systems, all of the Mainstream young people expressed a disinterest and 
overall limited understanding on these topics that was noticeably less detailed than 
the accounts offered by the Critical/Political and Artsy/Indie groups. Jack, Alice, 
and Lindsey (Bermondsey participants), for example, all chose to skip the 
questions concerning capitalism and their opinions on alternative political systems, 
stating that they did not know much about these topics. Others like Anthony and 
Josh (Bermondsey participants) and Maurine and Dennis (Zoo participants) 
brought up socialism, but expressed a partial and somewhat skewed understanding 
of it describing it as an unfair system that rewards everyone the same regardless of 
how hard they work.
69
  
 When it came to the issue of voting, most of the London participants 
generally commented that politicians are not responsive to the needs of the poor, 
but like most of the LA participants, believed that voting was still necessary.
70
 The 
major difference found on this topic is that LA participants expressed the view that 
voting was a very important mechanism for governmental responsiveness and 
                                                 
69 While these views on socialism were laced with negative sentiments, these may be related to 
their underdeveloped understanding of what socialism actually entails. This partial and skewed 
understanding may also help to explain why their responses to these questions did not evoke strong 
valence reactions that would mark these young people as emphatically anti-socialist. However, I do 
not want to speculate too much on this particular weak/strong valence distinction, as it could be the 
case that I simply did not probe deeply enough into these questions and so did not give my 
participants the opportunity to elaborate in more detail their views on these questions. Had I done 
this, I might have elicited higher level valence responses. But, if my highly speculative weak 
valence assessment is correct, it may have significant implications for strategies aimed at helping 
these young people to develop more comprehensive political understandings. I will elaborate on 
this in the following chapter. Nonetheless, incorporating more systematic priming methods in 
future research may help to investigate this distinction more thoroughly.    
70
 The exceptions were Bermondsey participants Jack and Lindsey and Zoo participant Karina, all 
of who expressed the view that they would not vote because politicians will do as they please with 
little regards to the wishes or interests of the poor.  
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social change. For example: 
 
Rudy: What do you think about voting? 
Maria: [..] If [people] want change strongly, than they have to vote for that 
  change to occur. Otherwise everything is going to stay the same. 
Rudy: So you think voting is an effective way to bring on change? 
Maria: Yes. (Zoo participant) 
 
Rudy: What do you think about voting? 
Ela:  I think it’s very important to vote, because it’s your future, you’re  
  going be the one that is stuck with the problems.  
Maurine: I would vote, [cause] it’s getting your opinion across. (Zoo   
  participants) 
 
However, they were less enthusiastic about ways to effect change outside of the 
ballad box, with only a few of them mentioning that they support peaceful strikes 
and protests (with the exception of Maurine who expressed an emphatic 
opposition to labour strikes).
71
 On issues related to environmental politics and 
practices, the few that expressed an opinion on this issue stated that they recycle, 
and that the government should do something to address environmental problems, 
but did not elaborate on what that should be.  
On the questions concerning their views on capitalism, Mainstream young 
people were also different from the other two classifications in their automatic and 
strong valence attitudes towards capitalism, viewing it as a fair economic system 
that rewards individual effort and ambition. To be certain and similar to their 
views on the causes of poverty, their overwhelmingly positive views of capitalism 
were devoid of structural criticisms in that they contained no acknowledgement of 
some of the negative effects of capitalism. The potential and mild exception to this 
was the acknowledgement by Tirian that luck can play a role in how some people 
are rewarded under capitalist systems as exemplified in the following extract.  
 
Rudy: The economic system that we live under [capitalism], it is assumed 
that if you work hard basically, in this system, that you will get 
rewarded based on how hard you work.  
[…] 
                                                 
71
 The topic on labour unions was something I was hoping would be more naturally brought up and 
elaborated on by my participants. However, while this did occur in some cases, I failed to probe 
my other participants further. Given that dominant neoliberal discourses are generally anti-union, 
future research should incorporate questions that more directly ask young people about their 
feelings and views on labour unions.  
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Tirian: I think it’s kind of true, cause if you work hard anyone can become 
what they want to be in life. I know people say that a lot of the time, 
but sometimes it’s not always true. Because sometimes things can 
[hold] you down depending on what’s happening at home, but I can’t 
really explain it. It’s kind of like fifty/fifty. Some people are just 
brought up in a lucky life. […] But if you want to become something 
in life, you can do it. (Hackney participant)
72
 
 
Nonetheless, even the above extract, in the final analysis Tirian affirms the basic 
premises of capitalist ideology. Indeed, some of these young people, videlicet 
Dennis (Zoo participant), Fernanda (Bresee participant), and Tyronne, Sean, and 
Jenkins (Hackney participants), also expressed entrepreneurial aspirations, with 
Fernanda and Jenkins enthusiastically stating that they hope to someday own 
several businesses. Correspondingly, they primarily equated success with having a 
lot of money.  
 However, while these young people’s general knowledge on political-
economic systems, including their own was limited, this could be partially 
attributed to the limited politics education that all of these young people received 
from their schools. For example, in the cases of the Bermondsey participants, viz., 
Jack, Anthony, and Dylanda cited one year eight civics course where they mostly 
discussed voting procedures as their total formal political education, while Alice 
and Lindsey stated that the civics course they were supposed to take had been 
removed. Although I neglected to ask the Hackney participants about their pre-
college formal politics education, Tirian, Sean, Tyrone, Jenkins, and Iris all 
attended or had attended vocational colleges with no civics or politics curriculum. 
Similarly Mainstream Zoo participants and Bresee participant Fernanda, cited 
their 12th grade civics and economics and 10th
 
grade world history classes as the 
sources of their formal political education, with Dennis stating, “actually school is 
the only political influence I have”. This contrasts significantly from the formal 
political educational experiences of Critical/Political young people like Aimee, 
                                                 
72
 A debate erupted during these questions between Tirian and Sean who was also part of this focus 
group interview. This consisted of Sean asking me where I was from, and after telling him of my 
working-class upbringing in South-Central Los Angeles, Sean directed the following comment at 
Tirian, “see if Rudy can make it, anyone can make it”. I did not intervene during this debate, and 
allowed these participants to express their views with Sean taking an even more affirmative stance 
on basic capitalist ideology than the somewhat more qualified stance by Tirian as noted above.  
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James, and Sam (Islington participants), and Lisa and Arlene (World Vision 
participants) who were each receiving a comprehensive political education from 
their respective colleges and high schools. While this factor alone does not explain 
why other Critical/Political and Artsy/Indie young people who also received a 
limited formal political education still expressed more detailed political-economic 
knowledge than all of the Mainstream young people, the former had institutional 
outlets outside of their schools that played a role in the development of their 
political-economic schemata, the latter did not, and as described in this chapter 
and in sections 4.2.3, 4.2.5, and 4.2.7, are mostly exposed to institutional settings 
that directly disseminate or do not contest neoliberal discourses. Nonetheless, this 
suggests that Mainstream young people are not apolitical per se, but are rather 
apathetic as they did not express an avid rejection of politics as did some of the 
Artsy/Indie young people. Instead, they expressed a disinterest in politics which 
may be related to their limited abilities to connect wider political-economic 
concerns to their everyday lives and/or lack of awareness of alternative means to 
get governments to be more responsive to their citizens. Both of which may in turn 
be tied to the limited formal political education afforded to them. In other words, 
there is no telling what the effects of a more comprehensive and formal political 
education on these young people may be, but given one, it likely could not hurt in 
helping them to develop more critical views and dispositions which may help to 
temper their existing self-interested and consumerist dispositions.  
 
7.5 The “Crisis in Democracy” 
“We do not say that the man who shows no interest in politics is a man who minds 
his own business, we say that he has no business here at all.” Pericles73 
 
 Furthermore, as briefly discussed in section 3.4, much of the literature on 
youth and politics has centred on concerns regarding contemporary young 
people’s lack of interest in formal politics (Biesta & Lawy, 2006; Edlestein, 2001; 
Harris, 2008; Liu & Kelly, 2010). This is generally referred to as the ‘crisis in 
democracy’ whereby the majority of Western young people are deemed to have 
abandoned the civic and political realm in favour of consumer lifestyles and/or 
                                                 
73 Cited in Wolff (1996, p.1). 
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more identity or single-cause politics, and consequently tend to be more 
individualistic and more focused on self-actualizing pursuits than they are on civic 
and social responsibility. While the accounts from my Mainstream participants to 
an extent corroborate these concerns, proponents of the ‘crisis in democracy’ 
thesis seem to overlook the fact that this generational switch has coincided with, 
and largely reflects the omnipresence of neoliberal discourses over the last 30 
years and the extent to which the behaviours of socio-economic subordinates may 
reflect the structural pressures under which they operate. Hence, in the instance of 
Mainstream young people, their political-economic schemata and political 
inactivity, I would suggest, is most likely the result of underexposure to valuable 
forms of political-economic knowledge, and overexposure to neoliberal 
discourses; as Gill (2003, p. 118) notes, a rather disturbing feature of neoliberal 
culture is that it tends to generate a world-perspective that is, “ahistorical, 
economistic, and materialistic, me-oriented, short-term, and ecologically myopic”. 
This is in keeping with Flanagan’s (2004) explanation of young people’s inability 
to conceive of alternatives to their political-economic situation, which she 
suggests is rooted in a lack of access to knowledge about these alternatives.  
 Other researchers, like Biesta and Lawy (2006) and France (1998) argue that 
young people’s lack of interest in civic and political affairs is mostly due to wider 
socio-economic constraints that can hinder their access to political and economic 
resources and opportunities. For example, in a study exploring the relationship 
between youth citizenship, rights, and responsibilities, France (1998) argues that 
his British working-class participants’ dissatisfaction with youth employment 
schemes and job training programmes, and overall dismal view of their town led 
to their apathetic views on active citizenship and community involvement. The 
implication, or logical inference that can be drawn from France’s (1998) study is 
that given more substantial state services that also incorporate cultural rights (i.e., 
rights to unhindered and respectful representation of distinct cultural lifestyles and 
identities), and better employment opportunities, working-class young people 
would be more inclined to be responsible citizens. Yet, despite their respective 
structural constraints, most of the working-class Mainstream young people 
valorized self-reliance, volunteered in their communities, and expressed a general 
appreciation for voting as an important political practice. In this context, they 
reflected a practically ideal form of citizenry and social responsibility as described 
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by France (1998). However, equating citizenry and social responsibility along 
these lines offers a narrow view of democratic citizenship that engenders very 
passive and limited political practices, and thus the ‘crisis in democracy’ reflects a 
more fundamentally semantic and conceptual problem about the meaning of 
democratic citizenship. 
 In other words, if democracy is equated with neoliberal political norms and 
values centred on discourses of self-reliance and community involvement via 
occasional volunteerism and/or systems of electoral representation, than 
Mainstream young people are largely fulfilling their roles and responsibilities as 
citizens despite of their limited political knowledge and political apathy. If, 
however, democracy means a more direct and egalitarian form of collective 
decision-making and problem solving, than Mainstream young people, regardless 
of their social positioning, are neglecting their roles and responsibilities as citizens 
and conscientious political agents. If the first conception is valid, then there is no 
crisis; if the second conception is valid, then there is a crisis. However, whilst 
increasing social services that recognize cultural rights and offer meaningful job 
opportunities to young people as France (1998) suggests, may allow Mainstream 
young people to realize their material aspirations, they may have limited effects on 
their democratic ethos. As I will argue in the next chapter, this requires a more 
comprehensive education and participation in genuinely democratic values and 
practices.  
 
7.6 Contesting Neoliberalism: A Partial Opening 
 However, even participants from this group at times expressed progressive 
and arguably counter neoliberal views, with all but one of them supporting welfare 
programmes to some limited extent, and suggesting that the government should 
step in to help solve large-scale social problems like poverty and global warming. 
Moreover, most of these young people mentored younger students in their leisure 
time. While in most cases they were financially incentivized to do so, they all 
expressed the view that they enjoyed mentoring underprivileged young people, 
and in this respect, expressed more altruistic tendencies.  
 Tyrone (Hackney participant) and Dennis (Zoo participant) brought up 
particularly noteworthy points which I believe signify a point of departure from 
neoliberal discourses as well as a potential opening for pedagogic intervention. 
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When asked if he thought about the conditions under which the clothes he likes 
are made, Tyrone responded: “No but in discussions like this it does [make me 
think]”. This acknowledgment and his display of mild cognitive dissonance, 
whereby he seemed unsettled thinking about these issues (as could be gauged from 
his more sombre tone and facial expressions), was a phenomenon that I observed 
amongst other Mainstream young people. This suggests that further exposure to 
these topics may have an impact on their consumption practices. Dennis instantly 
expressed support for welfare programmes, which is potentially related or 
influenced by his factual knowledge of US welfare services, noting accurately 
some of the limitations of these programmes: 
 
Dennis: And you can’t really get welfare more than five years, It’s not, you 
know, it’s not something that is going to take care of somebody for 
 too long, and the money really isn’t enough to take care of  somebody. 
You can’t really buy, like, you can’t really have more clothes or more 
this or more that, you don’t really have more money for that, from 
welfare. (Zoo participant) 
 
 Although these are highly tentative, the main insights to take from Tyrone’s 
and Dennis’ statements, and others like them from other Mainstream young 
people, are that there is some degree of compassion in their views and beliefs (in 
most instances this is noticeable in their voice intonations which take a more 
sombre tone when talking about issues of poverty and labour exploitation). Hence, 
and crucially, unlike neoliberal economists for instance, and with the exception of 
Jenkins (Hackney participant), these young people do not resort to rationalizing 
their consumptive practices on the grounds that it provides jobs for people in the 
developing world, and in that sense, this discursive engagement differs 
significantly from how a more ideal neoliberal would respond, and sheds some 
light, however dimly, on the moments where these young people contest 
neoliberal discourses.  
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
 I have argued earlier in this thesis that neoliberalism is, in part, maintained by 
a mutually reinforcing material base and discursive superstructure apparatus where 
the labour and environmental exploitation and consequent social inequality is 
coded and mystified by discourses of inevitability, progress, efficiency, economic 
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growth, consumption, materialism, rational choice, and rugged individualism, 
amongst others. Within this system, individuals either ignore the larger political-
economic system or entrust it to elites and technocrats, and focus mostly on forms 
of consumption that can best satisfy their self-interests. And their value as 
individuals is based not on their inherent humanity, but on how much capital they 
can acquire via their individual effort. While neoliberal interpellation is never total, 
and always contested, the majority of the responses from the Mainstream young 
people, indicate that their socio-cultural and political-economic schemata to a 
significant extent mirror those of dominant neoliberal discourses and practices, 
and particularly more so than is the case with the Artsy/Indie and Critical/Political 
young people. This is not to suggest that the Mainstream young people are 
neoliberal automatons, but simply, as I believe Bourdieu (1990a) would argue, 
their socio-cognitive frameworks and homologous practices have been inflected 
by neoliberal discourses to the extent that they appear to be reproducing them at a 
mostly unconscious dispositional level. Nonetheless, mapping out the socio-
cultural and political-economic schematic content of these young people’s sense 
making frameworks revealed potential spaces for neoliberal discursive 
contestation that, I will suggest in the next chapter, can be exploited by pedagogies 
aimed at challenging neoliberalism, or at the very least, of getting young people to 
be more cognizant of their roles in reproducing it. 
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion:  
Towards A Socio-Cognitive  
Approach To Critical And Progressive Pedagogy 
“I think one reason it is so important to break out of the monoculture of the mind, 
is to recognize that this world has so many alternatives. There are so many 
alternatives to the industrial agriculture based on fossil fuels and chemicals. 
There are so many alternatives to a banking system based on fraud. There are so 
many alternatives to the unrepresentative representative democracy”. –Vandana 
Shiva
74
 
 
 In the previous three chapters, a socio-cognitive approach to understanding 
neoliberal and counter-neoliberal discursive interpellation guided the exploration 
and analysis of the substantive content of my youth participants’ socio-cultural 
and political-economic schemata, and led to the construction of a three-fold 
typology of LA and London young people consisting of classifications that I have 
referred to as Critical/Political, Artsy/Indie, and Mainstream. While the young 
people positioned within these classifications did not all share the same exact 
political-economic views or socio-cultural experiences, preferences, and practices, 
they expressed significant similarities to warrant being grouped in one of the 
above three classifications. In this chapter, I will attempt to show how these young 
people’s shared schematic content and unique accounts offer insights that can 
inform the work of critical and progressive educators concerned with progressive 
social change. 
 This chapter begins with an overview of some the basic tenets of the existing 
literature on critical and progressive pedagogy. It then reviews some of major 
characteristics of the Critical/Political, Artsy/Indie, and Mainstream LA and 
London types, with an emphasis on the implications that each of their shared 
dispositions poses for critical and progressive pedagogy. I then move on to 
indicate the curriculum content of what a socio-cognitive approach to critical and 
progressive pedagogy might entail. This is a curriculum designed to help young 
people to be more cognizant of neoliberal discourses and practices, and their roles 
in reproducing or contesting them, in addition to developing within them more 
critical, political, democratic, co-operative, tolerant, and empathetic dispositions 
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that can help to replace, offset, or contest any pre-existing fatalistic, apathetic, 
uncritical, self-interested, and apolitical dispositions. Additionally, I provide 
examples of classroom activities aimed at fostering these dispositions.  
 
8.1 Critical and Progressive Pedagogy and Democracy 
 In this section, I will briefly review some of the central tenets and political 
objectives of the substantial literature on pedagogy concerned with fostering a 
more critical citizenry and participatory democracy. Generally, this literature 
follows and builds on the classic works of Paolo Friere (1996) and John Dewey 
(1990). Both of these traditions and approaches differ from more conventional 
civics education by emphasizing the learning of democracy not just the teaching of 
it. This conception holds that democracy should not be confined to simply voting 
officials into power, but rather as Biesta and Lawy (2006, p. 65) put it, democracy 
should extend to “participation in the construction, maintenance, and 
transformation of all forms of social and political life”. I will start with the 
Frierian (1996) tradition and approaches, then move on to Dewey (1990) and 
contemporary interpretations of his work. I end this section with a discussion of 
some of the potential limitations of both of these that insights from the empirical 
findings of my study may help to address.  
 Critical pedagogy as originally conceived of by Paolo Friere (1996) is based 
on the premise that schools and education systems are not politically neutral 
institutions, but rather function as key political and ideological apparatuses that 
can help to foster either dominant and oppressive discourses and practices, or 
more emancipatory and counter-hegemonic ones. Practitioners of critical 
pedagogy are concerned with the latter, and posit that education institutions should 
be primarily concerned with helping students to develop a critical consciousness. 
This entails pedagogic practices aimed at helping students to develop the skills to 
recognize authoritarian tendencies, unjust social practices, and to take action to 
correct oppressive institutional and individual practices in order to impact wider 
and democratic social change. While there are many forms of critical pedagogy, 
they are all guided by the central assumption that liberation from oppressive social 
settings can be brought about when people acquire a heightened and critical 
awareness of their social positioning, context, and history (Biesta, 1998; Friere, 
1996; McLaren, 1997). In practice, this assumption takes the form of what Friere 
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(1970, p. 452) refers to as conscientization; viz., “the process in which men, not as 
recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the 
socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform 
that reality”. 
 Drawing on the critical tradition of past theorists, like Karl Marx, Theodor 
Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, critical pedagogic approaches seek to demystify, 
decolonize, or otherwise make explicit dominant and oppressive discourses and 
practices that are taken for granted. Initially, critical pedagogy focused on class 
and adult literacy issues (Friere, 1996), however, contemporary forms of critical 
pedagogy have incorporated wider issues of race, gender, space, place, and post-
structuralist concerns over identity and multi-culturalism. For example, 
Gruenwald (2003, p. 9) argues that most critical pedagogy theorizations have 
overlooked ecological concerns, and proposes a critical pedagogy of place that 
seeks to, “(a) identify, recover, and create material spaces and places that teach us 
how to live well in our total environments (reinhabitation); and (b) identify and 
change ways of thinking that injure and exploit other people and places 
(decolonization)”. Other critical theorists like Giroux (2001) and Kellner (1998) 
concerned about the omnipresence of corporate mass media and its potential 
interpellating effects, propose a critical pedagogy of media-culture literacy, 
technology, and leisure time that, as Kellner (1998, p. 104) puts it, “summons 
educators, students, and citizens to rethink established curricula and teaching 
strategies to meet the challenge of empowering individuals to participate 
democratically in our increasingly multicultural and technological society”. 
Nonetheless, despite their many incarnations and permutations, all critical 
pedagogies are, as Biesta (1998, p. 499) argues, “in one way or another committed 
to the imperative of transforming the larger social order in the interest of justice, 
equality, democracy, and human freedom”. 
 Paralleling and overlapping critical pedagogy is work based on Dewey’s 
(1990) classic model of progressive education. Building on the classic 
Enlightenment ideals of reason and critique, and Rousseauian humanist notions of 
community and child-centred approaches to education, Dewey’s (1990) model is 
concerned with the development of essential cognitive, social, and vocational 
skills so pupils can grow to be self-reliant yet critical, conscientious, and 
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responsible citizens who can live in, and maintain, a decentralized democratic 
society.  
 
I believe that the psychological and social sides are organically related 
and that education cannot be regarded as a compromise between the 
two, or a superimposition of one upon the other. We are told that the 
psychological definition of education is barren and formal - that it 
gives us only the idea of a development of all the mental powers 
without giving us any idea of the use to which these powers are put. 
On the other hand, it is urged that the social definition of education, as 
getting adjusted to civilization, makes of it a forced and external 
process, and results in subordinating the freedom of the individual to a 
preconceived social and political status (Dewey, 1897, p. 77). 
 
How to best achieve this balance between nurturing individual abilities and 
fostering community solidarity continues to be hotly debated by contemporary 
practitioners of Dewey’s progressive education model. However, these 
practitioners tend to emphasize hands on experimental learning, co-operative 
educational activities, multi-age classrooms, and in depth conceptual, practical, 
and contextual understanding of scientific, mathematical, and political knowledge 
(Kohn, 2008; Wenglinsky, 2004). These pedagogic approaches are contrasted and 
in direct opposition to the rote learning and behaviourist inspired pedagogies 
epitomized by contemporary neoliberal standards-based educational approaches 
discussed in section 1.3 (Ohanian, 2002). 
 According to Dewey (2011), democracy and education go hand in hand, and 
thus education settings must help students to develop their unique natural abilities, 
in addition to co-operative, empathetic, and tolerant dispositions that can facilitate 
collective decision-making and problem-solving in and out of school. Hence, 
progressive education, like critical pedagogy, is an inherently democratic-socialist 
political project, albeit not one based on Marxism. As Cohen et al., (2010, p. 76) 
note: 
For Dewey, a democratic society was more than just the institution of 
government. It was a way of living together, of learning to 
cooperatively agree and disagree non-violently, and of appreciating 
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and learning from diversity and of coming to support one another for 
the good of the whole. 
 
While there is no universally accepted framework that encompasses the political 
goals of progressive education as envisioned by Dewey (2011), the following 
comprehensive list of skills and dispositions identified by Cohen et al., (2010, p. 
80), largely reflect those advocated by contemporary progressive educators.  
 
Essential skills: 
1. Learning to listen to ourselves and others. 
2. Critical and reflective thinking abilities (e.g. being able to think 
about various points of view and goals; being able to understand, 
analyze and check the reliability of information about government; 
being able to analyze instances of social injustice and decide when 
some action or nonviolent protest is justified; being able to analyze 
how conditions in the community are connected to policy decisions). 
3. Flexible problem solving/decision making abilities (e.g. the ability to 
resolve conflicts in creative and non-violent ways; being able to 
build consensus; being able to reach an informed decision about a 
candidate or conclusion about an issue). 
4. Communicative abilities (e.g. being able to participate in discussion; 
learning to argue thoughtfully and directly for one’s position and use 
evidence in support of it; being able to articulate the meaning of 
abstract concepts such as democracy and patriotism; being able to 
articulate the relationship between the common good and self-
interest and use these ideas in making decisions; being able to 
express one’s opinion on a political or civic matter when contacting 
an elected official or a media outlet). 
5. Collaborative capacities (e.g. working together for a common goal; 
learning to compromise; being able to participate in a respectful and 
informed discussion about an issue; being able to act in a group in a 
way that includes others and communicates respect for their views; 
being able to envision a plan for action on community problems and 
mobilize others to pursue it). 
 
Essential dispositions: 
6. Responsibility (e.g. sense of personal responsibility at many levels 
including obeying the law and voting; respect for human rights and 
willingness to search out and listen to others’ views; personal 
commitment to others and their well-being, and to justice). 
7. An appreciation that we are social creatures and need others to 
survive and thrive, and an overlapping sense of social trust in the 
community. 
8. Appreciation of and involvement with social justice (e.g. a nation is 
as strong as its weakest members; when certain groups are 
discriminated against it is not only unfair to them but, in the long run 
undermines society; support for justice, equality and other 
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democratic values and procedures). 
9. Service to others or an appreciation that it is an honour and a 
pleasure to serve and help others. 
10. Appreciation that – most of the time – others do the best they can 
(e.g. sense of realistic efficacy about citizen’ actions).  
 
 
 However, despite their highly informative insights for educators concerned 
with nurturing democratic and egalitarian values and practices, both the Frierian 
(1996) and Deweyian (1990) traditions, along with the current work that has been 
influenced by them, are potentially limited in the following ways. First, the 
Frierian (1996) approach in all of its various and contemporary incarnations, is 
explicitly premised on the liberatory effects of conscientization; that is, on getting 
students to be more cognizant of their roles as both contributors to, and potential 
liberators from, oppressive modes. However, this emphasis on conscientization via 
classroom practices that, for example, encourage deep reflection, critical 
questioning, and textual deconstruction, no matter how nuanced, still stems from 
the classic Marxist false consciousness presupposition. As Friere (1970, pp. 452-
453) argues: 
 
Since the basic condition for conscientization is that its agent must be a 
subject (i.e., a conscious being), conscientization, like education, is 
specifically and exclusively a human process. It is as conscious beings 
that men are not only in the world, but with the world, together with 
other men. Only men, as "open" beings, are able to achieve the 
complex operation of simultaneously transforming the world by their 
action and grasping and expressing the world's reality in their creative 
language. Men can fulfill the necessary condition of being with the 
world because they are able to gain objective distance from it. Without 
this objectification, whereby man also objectifies himself, man would 
be limited to being in the world, lacking both self-knowledge and 
knowledge of the world 
 
As argued earlier in this thesis, this consciousness presupposition, false or 
otherwise, assumes a phenomenological ontology of human cognition that 
overlooks important socio-cognitive dispositional forces, which play a powerful 
and unconscious role in individual perception, appreciation, and information 
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processing and filtering. These can potentially hinder or significantly constrain 
individual conscious awareness and the overall effectiveness of conscientization 
strategies. As my empirical findings partly suggest, making people cognizant of 
important political-economic issues and alternatives is necessary, but it is not 
sufficient in transforming them into more conscientious agents. Equally necessary 
I will argue, but mostly overlooked in the Frierian tradition is the development of 
pedagogic practices specifically designed to target those deep-seated dispositions 
of young people, which may block out political and social-justice concerns. That 
is, while some of the education practices typically associated with the Frierian 
approach, such as dialogue and open discussion centred lessons, textual 
deconstruction, and learning about the history and struggles of oppressed peoples, 
may help young people develop more critical, democratic, and socially 
progressive views and concomitant dispositions, these education practices may be 
ineffective with students, particularly older teenaged ones, who have developed 
their own unique sets of strong valence dispositions which may predispose them to 
be less appreciative and/or receptive of politics and social-justice concerns (for 
example, apolitical, self-interested, fatalistic, and apathetic dispositions). As 
Bourdieu (2000, p. 172) argues, “while making things explicit can help, only a 
thoroughgoing process of countertraining, involving repeated exercises, can, like 
an athlete’s training, durably transform habitus”. Second, the Deweyian (1997) 
approach, and much of the contemporary work that has drawn on it, tends to use 
the term ‘disposition’ in vague ways that sometimes diverges entirely from the 
original cognitive definition. For example, Edgar et al., (2002) tend to conflate 
dispositions with goals and objectives, while the Cohen et al., (2010) usage of the 
term (as displayed in the abovementioned framework) is unclear if it refers to 
democratic dispositions that should be taught and cultivated to the extent that they 
are enacted automatically by students, or whether democratic dispositions are 
merely values that students should learn and attempt to enact. This may be a minor 
pedantic point, but the concept of ‘disposition’ has a specific origin, application, 
and consequent and important theoretical implications for how to generate them. 
Hence, if such guidelines as those suggested by Cohen et al., (2010) above are 
meant to serve as an educational template for the development of the democratic 
and empathetic habits of minds of students, I believe that, for the sake of 
conceptual and semantic clarity and precision, we need to be more exact with, and 
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explicit about, what is meant by ‘dispositions’ as I will be in the following section. 
Furthermore, a more substantial potential limitation of the Deweyian (1990) 
approach is that it is meant to span a K-12 US education system (UK equivalent of 
primary to college education), where students are immersed in progressive 
educational settings from the very start of their education. While research suggests 
that the teaching and fostering of civic and democratic values and dispositions is 
most likely to take root when initiated during school age, the exact age-grade as to 
when it will be most effective, or more generally, what triggering mechanisms 
lead young people to develop a more critical examination of politics and society, 
is still largely unknown (Sherrod et al., 2002). As Sherrod et al., (2002, p. 265) 
have noted: 
 
More developmental work is needed in fleshing out how, between the 
ages of 10 and 25, young people’s concepts of citizenship expand from 
a focus on obedience and support of the status quo to a more critical 
appraisal of a citizen as one who would be irresponsible if she or he 
blindly obeyed. What happens between childhood and adulthood that 
enables the young person to appreciate the importance of informed 
consent, to support the exercise of good judgment including critique of 
the status quo? 
  
Conversely, the age-grade when progressive education might be the least effective 
is also unknown, but like conscientization strategies, progressive education may 
be less effective with students, particularly older teenaged students, who have 
already formed their own unique socio-cultural and political-economic schemata, 
some of which may significantly hinder or potentially filter out pedagogic 
attempts aimed at fostering civic and democratic values and dispositions. Hence, 
both the contemporary Frierian (1996) and Deweyian (1990) inspired critical and 
progressive pedagogies should take into account the potential socio-cognitive 
dispositions of students who may not have benefited from an earlier exposure to 
political-economic issues and concerns, and incorporate strategies aimed at 
targeting pre-existing dispositions which may hinder the fostering of empathetic, 
democratic, critical, and political values and dispositions. As Dewey (1897, p. 77) 
notes: 
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Without insight into the psychological structure and activities of the 
individual, the educative process will […] be haphazard and arbitrary. 
If it chances to coincide with the child's activity it will get a leverage; 
if it does not, it will result in friction, or disintegration, or arrest of the 
child nature. 
 
 Lastly, both the Frierian (1996) and Deweyian (1990) approaches may also 
benefit from the inclusion of more explicit teaching about key substantive political 
issues. In the context of neoliberalism, my empirical findings would suggest these 
should include comprehensive lessons on welfare policies and services, alternative 
political-economic systems and practices, and human nature that expose students 
to the facts and empirical evidence relevant to these topics, and equip them with 
the ability to identify the errors or half-truths contained in widespread neoliberal 
discourses. Such lessons tend to be absent from existing and more instrumentalist 
US and UK forms of civics and politics education (Biesta & Lawy, 2006).  
 
8.2 Actual Typological Characteristics, Dispositions, and Potential Lessons 
 In this section, I will discuss how some of the shared dispositions expressed 
by my youth participants may both hinder or contribute to critical and progressive 
pedagogy, and will draw out the implications for a socio-cognitive approach to 
critical and progressive pedagogy.  
 In analyzing my data I attempted to discern if there were any significant 
influences on my participants’ political cognitive frameworks that could be 
potentially standardized or somehow transferred over to activist strategies aimed 
at contesting neoliberal discourses and practices. However, this proved to be a 
rather futile search, as all of the political influences on my participants, even those 
on Mainstream young people (who expressed very limited political-economic 
knowledge), have come from a wide array of unique experiences to the extent that 
the only generalization that can be made from them, is that their political 
knowledge has been shaped by various influences. For example, even though, 
Critical/Political young people like Lupe, Jazmin, Arlene, Anthony, and Ben cite 
their parents or close relatives as being the initial catalysts that sparked the 
development of their political outlooks, or like Aimee, and Lisa who cite close 
friends as theirs, there is little that can be learned from these catalysts, other than 
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they can come from anywhere and can take root at anytime as described in section 
5.5. So, rather than focus on the identification of influences I have chosen to 
mainly foreground how young people actively reify their political-economic 
understandings, as well as the socio-cognitive impediments (i.e., dispositional 
barriers) to that reification.  
 Whilst recognizing the need for larger sample sizes, more refined methods, 
and the addition of other and more precise classifications to my original typology 
(see section 9.2), I will for the time being assume that a significantly high 
proportion of LA and London young people ages 16-19, are likely to possess 
characteristics that can place them within one of the three typological 
classifications discussed in previous chapters and summarized below.  
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Table 8.1: Typology: Defining Characteristics and Corresponding 
Dispositions 
 
Critical/Political Artsy/Indie Mainstream 
• They spend a significant 
amount of their time 
reading advanced 
literature on various 
topics, and engaging in 
leftist political and civic 
activities, as well artistic 
endeavours. 
• They express the need 
for education to stress 
critical thinking skills. 
• They consciously avoid 
shopping centres and 
brand clothing whenever 
possible, and display a 
DIY (do it yourself) ethic 
towards clothes, and 
actively engage with 
critical media (music, 
magazines, 
documentaries, Internet 
sites). 
• They express a 
sophisticated 
understanding of political-
economic topics, such as 
welfare, causes of 
poverty, labour 
exploitation, capitalism, 
government, and 
alternative government 
and economic systems, a 
high level of empathy for 
the suffering of others, 
and principle concern with 
social justice issues. 
• They expressed a high 
level of internal political 
efficacy, and low level of 
external political efficacy. 
• Their political 
orientations fall along an 
Anarchist to Social-
Democratic/Progressive 
spectrum. 
• They spend a significant 
amount of their time in 
artistic endeavours and 
engaging with 
independent or alternative 
media-culture.  
• They express a 
pronounced affinity for an 
education centered on art 
and music. 
• They express and 
display a general 
indifference towards 
consumer culture, and 
purchase goods for their 
use value. 
• They express a limited 
engagement and 
appreciation for critical 
media, and are primarily 
interested in media-
culture for its affective 
and aesthetic properties. 
• They express highly 
dissonant views on 
welfare, supporting 
welfare programmes, but 
believing they should be 
temporary.   
• They view the 
contemporary electoral 
process as the main 
medium for political 
change, support capitalism 
(but feel that it should be 
regulated), but are 
otherwise disinterested in 
politics.   
• They express a moderate 
level of internal political 
efficacy, and moderate 
level of external political 
efficacy. 
• Their political 
orientations fall between a 
• They spend a significant 
amount of their time 
hanging out with friends, 
playing sports, partying, 
and hanging out in 
shopping centres.  
• They generally express a 
more instrumentalist view 
of education. 
• They express and 
display a liking of 
corporate products, and 
actively engage with 
corporate media-culture, 
mostly uncritically. 
• They express more 
materialistic concerns and 
future aspirations, which 
are highly reflective of 
their specific media-
culture preferences. 
• They express a mostly 
negative view of welfare 
recipients, viewing them 
as cheats, but maintaining 
some support for welfare 
programmes. 
• They have little to no 
knowledge on their own, 
or of alternative political-
economic systems, but 
seem to believe that 
voting is important.  
• They support capitalism, 
and view it as a system 
that makes people 
independent and self-
reliant.  
• They express a low level 
of internal political 
efficacy, and low to 
moderate level of external 
political efficacy. 
• Their political 
orientations fall between a 
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Left-liberal to Centre-
liberal spectrum. 
Centre-liberal to Right-
liberal spectrum. 
 
• They consistently 
express critical, political, 
empathetic, and fatalistic 
dispositions.  
 
 
• They consistently 
express aesthetic, 
affective, and apolitical 
dispositions. 
 
• They consistently 
express self-interested, 
apathetic, consumerist, 
and uncritical dispositions 
 
List of Dispositions Definitions 
Aesthetic Disposition Automatic inclinations to be primarily attracted to 
media-cultural texts for their aesthetic and/or sound 
dynamics. 
Affective Disposition Automatic inclination to be attracted to media-
cultural texts, primarily for the emotions that they 
stir.  
Apolitical 
Disposition 
Automatic disinterest in, and aversion to, politics. 
Consumerist 
Disposition 
Automatic impulsive and compulsive tendency to 
buy consumer goods.  
Critical Disposition Automatic tendency to question and critique taken 
for granted assumptions.  
Empathetic 
Disposition 
A strong-valence inclination to be concerned with 
the suffering of others. 
Fatalistic Disposition Automatic tendency to assume that human nature is 
predominantly selfish, and therefore be dismissive 
of more decentralized and genuinely democratic 
forms of political-economic organisation.  
Self-Interested 
Disposition 
An automatic tendency to only be concerned with 
one’s own interests, often with an unconscious 
disregard for the interests of others, e.g., when 
consuming corporate products that probably come 
from some exploitative source.  
Political Disposition Automatic tendency or inclination to want to 
connect or infuse otherwise neutral topics with 
political concerns or overtures. 
Uncritical 
Disposition 
Automatic tendency to not question prevailing 
norms and values. 
 
Additionally, if it is accepted, as the mainstream of cognitive and social 
psychology argues, that cognitive dispositions, while largely manifesting beyond 
our conscious awareness, nonetheless play a key role in the way we perceive and 
filter out social information, and how we act in accordance with those perceptions 
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and filters, than their role in social reproduction should not be underestimated. 
Thus far, I have only identified ten dispositions, as listed above, but even this 
small sample offers noteworthy theoretical insights. For instance, some of these 
dispositions are conducive to the aims of critical and progressive pedagogy, e.g., 
critical, political, and empathetic dispositions. Some of these are neutral but can be 
oriented towards a critical and progressive pedagogy, e.g., affective and aesthetic 
dispositions (via politically charged art centred classroom activities), and some of 
these are potential barriers that critical and progressive pedagogues need to take 
into account and directly address, e.g., fatalistic, apolitical, self-interested, 
apathetic, and uncritical dispositions.  
 To be certain, it is arguable that Critical/Political young people are 
automatically inclined to be political and critical, and therefore, it probably did not 
take much initial exposure to political influences to ignite their politicization. 
Indeed, the development of their initial political awareness and attitudes, 
according to their responses, began at relatively young ages (around 11-14). 
However, young people that are more in line with Artsy/Indie or Mainstream 
characteristics, and who likely lack this political and critical predisposition, will 
need more significant and substantive exposure to political knowledge in order for 
them to generate more developed political-economic understandings. The 
obviousness of this hopefully not too controversial generalization or assumption, 
however, may overshadow the important discovery of the Artsy/Indie and 
Mainstream young people’s unique dispositions that may render exposure to 
political knowledge and practices inefficacious. Hence, I argue that critical and 
progressive pedagogic strategies and practices must emphasize both 
conscientization and the cultivation of affective, attitudinal, and behavioural 
dispositions that are conducive to progressive social change and a democratic 
ethos. Moreover, these strategies must also target any pre-existing dispositions, 
which may hinder this cultivation; the overall goal being to cultivate within young 
people critical, democratic, co-operative, tolerant, and empathetic dispositions that 
are enacted both reflectively and automatically. In the next section, I discuss some 
of the content of such a curriculum, illustrating how this might be done, as 
inspired by an activity described to me by two of my Critical/Political participants.  
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8.3 Towards a Pedagogy of Dispositional Democracy 
 In this section I set out some indicative content of a curriculum aimed at 
enabling the pre-existing socio-cognitive dispositions of young people to surface 
so they are able to reflect on them, as well as providing them with important 
factual political knowledge.  
 Most people are not aware of their most deep-seated beliefs, emotions, and 
practices, and generally only become aware of some of them when they 
experience something that contradicts their pre-existing expectations or beliefs. 
Hence, because most beliefs and practices are tucked away in cognitive schematic 
compartments, people may not even realize that they are acting out according to a 
certain set of internalized belief and affective systems. However, by bringing these 
to the surface level, people can become more cognizant of them, and potentially be 
able to make more genuinely free and rational decisions. There were certain 
questions that seemed to prompt my participants to express dissonant and 
ambivalent thoughts, particularly when it came to questions about consumption. In 
response to this set of questions, participants from all three groups tended, to 
varying extents, to mention that they consume corporate goods, but a significant 
number of them expressed guilt over this when I probed them about the conditions 
under which the products that they like and consume are made. Given that 
consumption and media-culture are central to most Western young people’s lives, 
a good starting to point to help young people to develop socio-cognitive 
frameworks that more extensively connect their everyday experiences and 
practices with larger political-economic consequences and concerns is to develop 
classroom activities that, for example, go beyond superficial or brief lessons on 
sweatshops, to induce a feeling of cognitive dissonance amongst students. As 
discussed in section 2.5, cognitive dissonance can lead individuals to bring their 
deep-seated attitudes, emotions, and beliefs to the conscious surface, during 
instances when these run counter to their ad hoc experiences, which then leads to 
the reification or modification of those pre-existing schemata. In classroom 
settings, instances of cognitive dissonance can be potentially initiated so students 
may more consciously reflect on the consequences of their deep-seated attitudes, 
emotions, beliefs, and practices. An example of this is revealed in one of the 
following classroom practices described to me by my Critical/Political 
participants Lisa and Arlene.  
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Rudy: Let’s briefly go back to like some of the things you learned in class 
about sweatshop conditions. What are some of the things that you 
guys can think of? 
Lisa: It was working in cramp spaces where there is no air ventilation, and 
  you’re constantly breathing in all the dust particles in the air. 
Arlene: Like, for example, when we were on that topic our teachers made us 
do this sort of game where she was like our manager and we had to 
persuade her to boost our salary up, and some people were like 
coming up with ideas like oh well I’m pregnant, I need money for my 
family, or I’m sick, and she would just say, “I don’t care, that’s not 
my family”. 
Rudy:  So how were guys able to come up with a solution? 
Arlene:  I remember I was very mad because in that class you would get very 
very passionate, and I was like no way, we have to walk out, we have 
to walk out. And I was like I retired, and everyone retired and we 
walked out of class. 
Rudy:  You guys walked out of class? 
Arlene:  Yeah, and like she did that with all of her classes but no other class 
  walked out except for us. So we walked out and we were like striking 
  outside of class, and everyone came out seeing that [we were striking] 
  and we were striking, striking, striking. It was very funny. 
Lisa:  She gave us an A for the project.  
Rudy:  How did you guys come up with the decision to strike? 
Lisa:  Because I felt like it wasn’t worth it [to work] under such conditions. 
  (World-Vision participants) 
 
Now arguably, the teacher in this case, in effect, initiated a state of cognitive 
dissonance within her students by going against their work-place expectations and 
sense of fairness, which as Arlene notes, prompted a very powerful emotional 
response.
75
 The students in this activity probably assumed that a boss would be 
fair and humane, and boost their salary or be otherwise accommodating to their 
fictional plight. That is, in acting out actual labour practices, the teacher directly 
challenged her students’ pre-existing schemata for labour practices and 
consumption, initiating dissonant thoughts, which in Arlene and Lisa’s case, seem 
to have contributed to their lasting ethical consumption practices.
76
  
                                                 
75
 According to Dias et al., (2009, p. 784), “cognitive dissonance can be conceived both as a 
concept related to the tendency to avoid internal contradictions in certain situations, and as a higher 
order theory about information processing in the human mind”. Research findings support the 
theory that people tend to avoid internal dissonance even when there are no punishments or 
rewards involved, and that this tendency operates at a mostly unconscious level. 
76
 Without the benefit of having observed this activity at first hand, this will have to remain a 
tentative interpretation. However, Arlene and Lisa’s account inspires a promising avenue for future 
research on the use of cognitive dissonance in the development of more effective critical and 
progressive pedagogic strategies.   
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 Moreover, and quite remarkably, rather than give up or succumb to more 
fatalistic dispositions, the students in this class enacted direct democratic practices 
as a solution to the problem posed by their teacher. Hence, in initiating cognitive 
dissonance, this politically charged classroom activity helped Lisa and Arlene to 
not only make a clear connection between their everyday cultural practices, like 
consumption, and their wider political-economic consequences, like labour 
exploitation, but also helped to foster within them the sorts of transposable 
empathetic, critical, and political dispositions that they expressed throughout my 
time with them. Furthermore, this activity and others like them probably 
influenced, or at the very least reinforced Arlene’s competency in direct 
democratic decision-making, which she and her World-Vision colleagues 
displayed when I first came across them. 
 Additionally, these types of simulation classroom activities can be retrofitted 
to incorporate in depth discussions on environmental problems, alternatives to 
current market arrangements, and labour practices, and on the broad canon of 
democratic theory and action. These can include examples of contemporary forms 
of democratic work-place practices that are being followed in different parts of the 
world (and even by Western corporations, e.g., see WorldBlu). These lessons 
should also include in depth discussions that demystify taken for granted 
economic notions, and specifically, those discourses that presents the ‘economy’ 
as a sort of omnipotent deity, rather than a collection of human practices that are 
diffused through various human institutions, and that are, therefore, subject to 
human control. Moreover, these lessons should be accompanied by equally in 
depth lessons on neoliberal theory and practices, so that young people can discern 
the differences between different forms of political-economic arrangements, and 
be able to make a more conscious choice as to which they support. In depth 
lessons on human nature would also be valuable. While I was not able to uncover 
why so many of my participants held a standard neoliberal ontological view of 
human nature, which arguably stops discussion let alone actual implementation of 
alternative systems in its tracks, exposing them to differing conceptions of human 
nature may prove a useful pedagogic tactic that can get young people to think 
about the potential for humans to act in very different ways. There is a lengthy 
academic literature in place, spanning the social sciences and currently growing in 
the cognitive sciences that consistently demonstrates that while human beings do 
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indeed display self-interested dispositions, they also display altruistic, autonomous, 
empathetic, creative, and co-operative dispositions (Graeber, 2004; Olson, 2008; 
Patel, 2010; Sloane et al., 2012). Which set is more pronounced is largely 
determined by the political-economic and concomitant socio-cultural structures 
that humans choose to implement and reproduce. As F. B. M. de Waal  (in Olson, 
2008, p. 1) notes, “you need to indoctrinate empathy out of people in order to 
arrive at extreme capitalist positions”. Engaging young people and teachers alike 
with this empirical literature, can get them to think critically about this very 
important factor from which all possibilities for genuine alternative political-
economic models stem, and whether they agree with it or not, it may at the very 
least prompt them not to take human selfishness for granted. As Mallott, (2011, p. 
74) argues in advancing anarchist pedagogy that is supported by empirical 
findings: 
 
While many anarchist writers correctly understand that ones view of 
human nature is going to determine ones understanding of what kind of 
societies humans are capable of successfully creating thereby shaping 
future possibilities and interpretations of historical events, they tend to 
fail to transgress the idea that ones conception of human nature is 
purely subjective and a matter of personal preference or political 
commitments. 
 
 Furthermore, Giroux (2000) recommends that a critical examination of how 
contemporary corporate culture and cultural artifacts contribute to discourses that 
propagate and legitimate race, class, gender, and political inequalities, as well as 
to the commodification of youth and culture for corporate profits, must be 
included in the curriculum of any critical pedagogic project. It was especially 
evident from the London Mainstream participants that the dominant media-culture 
materialistic ideals and aspirations were being accepted without much decoding or 
critical examination. While it is not my intention to suggest that young people 
should accept alternative socio-cultural discourses, they should be presented with 
the tools to comprehensively analyze existing and competing socio-cultural and 
political-economic discourses so that they can make a more conscious choice 
about which to accept and reproduce. As it stands, their acceptance of market 
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norms and values seems to stem from their underexposure to competing discourses. 
An incorporation of cultural studies into pedagogy, where contemporary and 
popular media texts that most young people engage with are scrutinized and 
dissected for their ideological content, can contribute to the goal of getting young 
people to be more critically aware of the inner workings of neoliberal consumer 
capitalism and its implications. It may not be the case that once armed with the 
critical tools to dissect corporate media-texts and the dominant socio-cultural and 
political-economic discourses imbued in them that young people will then 
automatically reject or contest them. However, as argued throughout this thesis, 
critical and political cognitive frameworks that are informed by accurate and 
detailed information are a necessary precondition for more critical practices. As 
Giroux (2000, p. 7) notes:  
 
Struggles over culture are not a weak substitute for a ‘real’ politics, but 
are central to any struggle willing to forge relations among discursive 
and material relations of power, theory and practice, as well as 
pedagogy and social change.  
 
 Lastly, all of these lessons, as in the Frierian (1994) and Deweywian (1997) 
traditions, should themselves be taught in a more democratic fashion that moves 
away from the standard banking, behaviourist, and authoritarian model of 
contemporary education. Democratic pedagogic practices can serve to instill 
within young people a democratic ethos and sense of non-hierarchical 
organization. It is clear from the existing literature as discussed in section 3.4, as 
well as from some of the accounts of my participants, that the teaching of politics 
in particular, necessitates, and is in fact more enjoyable and conducive to learning 
when young people are actively involved in discussions and encouraged to share 
their opinions and beliefs. Many of my Zoo participants, for instance, pointed out 
that it was being allowed to openly talk about controversial political issues in the 
safety of the classroom that opened their eyes to, and made them appreciate, other 
people’s points of view.  
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8.4 Course Preface 
Rudy: Now do you think that they’re able to comprehend some of these 
complicated political and economic issues at an early age, you know 
things like war, environmental degradation, government?  
Warren:  That’s a good question. I think one of the things about them being 
taught in school is that they just become academic subjects that they 
get graded on, and that’s then becomes boring to them. Just like some 
of the classic novels for instance that I never read because I was 
supposed to read them. There is always that fear that if you teach 
something to a kid in school they’re going to associate it with 
something they don’t care about. So I don’t know if it’s making the 
impact at the same rate that it’s being taught to them. But you know if 
you talk to them for 100 hours about social justice, they’re at least 
going to hear an hour of it, rather than if you talk to them about it for 
an hour and they’ll only hear a minute of it. So that’s really the best I 
can say if it’s working. 
Rudy: Right, but you think the exposure is good? 
Warren:  Yes, I think the exposure is really good. I don’t think that there is any 
  harm in it. (Youth Worker Bresee Foundation)  
 
In the following section, I will describe a course and corresponding set of 
classroom activities that largely draws on the classroom practices of existing 
critical pedagogies and progressive schools. However, this proposed course takes 
into consideration all of the elements discussed in this chapter thus far, viz., the 
socio-cognitive limitations of existing critical pedagogies, the specific dispositions, 
political-economic knowledge, and influential political educational experiences of 
my youth participants, and key curriculum content that is often missing from 
conventional politics courses including empirically informed discussions on 
human nature, welfare, alternative political-economic systems, workplace 
organization, and cultural content analyses. This course is different from 
conventional politics courses in two key aspects. First, it is primarily designed for 
educators who may not have the institutional and/or community support typically 
afforded to educators working in progressive schools (Apple & Beane, 1999). 
Hence it is meant to be used by educators working in conventional schools, and be 
taught to young people who have never attended a progressive school or had much 
exposure to critical or political pedagogy of any kind. To be certain, the majority 
of the Critical/Indie, Artsy/Indie, and (in particular) Mainstream young people had 
received a very limited political education from their schools with only Arlene and 
Lisa attending a social justice oriented school. However, teachers and pupils from 
progressive and social-justice oriented schools may benefit from it as well, and 
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activities 5, 6, and 7 (described in the following section) were initially inspired by 
Arlene and Lisa’s classroom activity described above in section 8.3.  
 Second, in order to address the possibility of pre-existing socio-cognitive 
filters and limited political exposure which can compromise the effectiveness of 
critical pedagogies, as discussed above in section 8.1, the set of activities are 
informed by the major preliminary findings of the empirical psychological work 
on cognitive dissonance, empathy, and fairness, which suggest the following: 1) 
As discussed in section 2.5, research by Dias et al., (2009) and Ramaprasad (1993), 
has found that cognitive dissonance may be an intrinsic property of the human 
mind that predisposes individuals to hold internally consistent mental schemata to 
the extent that the holding of two dissonant schemata will push individuals to 
consciously or unconsciously ignore, repress, rationalize, or reconfigure one of 
them in order to achieve internal consistency. 2) Recent empirical studies from the 
fields of social neuroscience and developmental psychology suggest that empathy 
and fairness may be innate properties of human nature that predispose individuals 
to value fairness and to feel the pain of others when observing the suffering of 
others directly or indirectly via sounds and images (Jackson et al., 2006; Sloane et 
al., 2012). Although these findings are still very much preliminary, they suggest 
that human beings have the capacity to value fairness, empathy, and seek to hold 
internally consistent views and practices. Incidentally, these were tendencies that I 
repeatedly observed in my youth participants. For example, in the previous three 
chapters I described several instances where my youth participants from all three 
classifications expressed an empathic concern for others as exemplified in the 
following extract: 
 
Rudy: What are some of things in the world that you care the most about? 
Diana: I like caring a lot about others, as well, as how can you say poverty. 
  Like I care a lot about people that aren’t, don’t have benefits like I do. 
  [..] Cause like in other countries that are suffering, I care a lot about 
  them, and I kind of want equality and just want to help them out.   
Rudy: These ideas about equality, like how do you think you got these ideas, 
  like how are you prone to thinking this way? 
Diana: For me it was people it was seeing other people suffer in Peru. And 
  seeing the corruption [and] the way the police work. (Artsy/Indie and 
  Zoo participant)  
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Additionally, a propensity to value fairness and justice was a pronounced 
characteristic of the Critical/Political and some of the Artsy/Indie young people. 
And paradoxically, as discussed briefly in section 7.3, even in the cases where 
Mainstream youth participants’ expressed emphatically negative views and 
attitudes towards welfare programmes and recipients, these could be related to 
their potentially inherent sense of fairness and justice which is disturbed by 
accounts of people cheating the welfare system. This is a speculative 
interpretation; however, with the exception of one participant, all the Mainstream 
young people supported welfare provisions, and their call for more stringent 
regulatory schemes was entirely premised on their concern for fraud and insistence 
that everyone get their fair share of provisions. And lastly, I have also noted how 
several of my participants from all three classifications expressed what can 
arguably be considered instances of cognitive dissonance when discussing issues 
of labour exploitation and consumption. 
 Therefore building on all of these preliminary findings, activities 5, 6, and 7, 
for example, are designed to affectively trigger participants’ potentially existing 
empathic and fairness predispositions, as well as their deep seated beliefs and 
expectations. If there is a clash between these, than their predisposition towards 
cognitive consonance, in conjunction with the highly salient and affective stimuli 
of the activities (which would be difficult to ignore or filter out) should, in theory, 
force participants to be more cognizant of and deliberative in relation to their 
views and expectations. Furthermore, the consequent cognitive resolution could 
have lasting effects (e.g., see Briñol et al., 2009), as is seemingly the case in 
Arlene and Lisa’s accounts described above and in section 5.1. Thus, this course 
may help to circumvent the fatalist, uncritical, apolitical, apathetic, and self-
interested dispositions (see Table 8.1), which are likely to be common amongst 
large numbers of young people (especially amongst those with limited exposure to 
critical and political perspectives), and which can lead young people to filter out 
critical and political pedagogy and knowledge. Additionally, this proposed course 
also contains activities designed to synergistically play on young people’s 
aesthetic and affective dispositions in a way that orients these to critical and 
political deliberations (e.g., see activities 1 and 14). That is, young people whose 
characteristics are similar to those of the Artsy/Indie classification, and which 
include a notable apolitical disposition, may be more responsive to political 
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knowledge if it is presented with activities that emphasize aesthetic resources. 
However, no one of course can ever hope to address all of the unique cognitive 
and socio-cognitive dispositions of every single pupil, nor am I claiming that what 
is outlined in the following section will even work in circumventing the socio-
cognitive filters that I observed in my youth participants. What is offered, is 
simply a modest, largely provisional, and scattershot approach.  
 
8.5 Sample Course: A Socio-Cognitive Approach 
Area: Social Studies/Civics/Politics 
Suggested Ages: (13-18) 
Length of time needed: approximately 10-15 hours. 
Materials Required: Access to YouTube and Google Video, television or projector 
that is attached to an Internet connection, construction paper, markers.  
Concepts Taught: Neoliberal Globalization, Capitalism, Political-Economic 
Systems, Content Analysis, Welfare, Human Nature. 
 
Course Title: Shoes, Sweatshops, and Democracy 
Anticipatory Set: In order to effectively engage students with the following 
material, it is essential that the teacher: 
 Reviews contemporary introductory neuroscience articles on human 
empathy and co-operation. (Suggested readings include Gary Olson’s 
(2008). We Empathize, Therefore We Are: Toward A Moral Neuropolitics, 
and Engemman et al., (2012) Games People Play-toward an enactive view 
of co-operation in social neuroscience). 
 Reviews contemporary articles on democratic workplace organizations and 
practices. (Suggested readings and specific examples can be obtained from 
http://www.worldblu.com/). 
 Review contemporary articles on alternative economic frameworks, e.g., 
participatory economics. (Suggested readings and information can be 
obtained from http://www.zcommunications.org/zparecon/parecon.htm). 
 Reviews some specific aspects of the contemporary welfare/benefits/public 
policies of their respective national settings. (Suggested readings for UK 
teachers can be obtained from http://www.taxresearch.org.uk. US teachers 
 246 
can obtain information from http://www.ips-dc.org/, and from current 
articles on welfare by Frances Fox Piven). 
 
Objectives: By the end of this course, students should be able to: 
 Express a fundamental understanding on how to dissect media texts, 
e.g., by being able to conduct a basic content analysis. 
 Connect some of their socio-cultural practices like material and media 
consumption, to larger political-economic concerns and consequences. 
 Tell the difference between liberal and authoritarian neoliberalism, 
Keynesian social-democracy, and democratic and authoritarian 
socialism, and representative and direct democracy. 
 Express a fundamental understanding of the various conceptions of 
human nature, and how these feed into conceptions of political-
economic organization.  
 
Purpose: 
1. To help students develop a comprehensive understanding of existing 
political-economic modes and their implications and outcomes, and 
potential alternatives. Additionally, to help students form connections 
between their socio-cultural practices and the larger political-economic 
consequences of those practices.  
2. To attempt to bring out any fatalistic, apathetic, apolitical, uncritical, and 
self-interested dispositions, and to help foster critical, political, empathetic, 
and co-operative dispositions that can take their place. 
 
Input and Check for Understanding: 
The teacher will employ in depth Socratic questioning throughout this lesson and 
activity to ensure that students understand the various concepts and problems 
being discussed.  
 
Suggested activities: 
1. At the beginning of the first lesson, the teacher will take a poll asking 
students to vote on contemporary popular songs that they are currently 
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listening to. The only requisite is that the songs must include lyrics, 
specifically those valorising materialism and consumption (most of which 
can be accessed from the Billboard top 40 website). After a democratic 
process, the two or three most popular songs agreed upon by majority of 
the students, will have their corresponding official music video accessed 
on YouTube. 
2. Split the classroom into small groups of 3-4 students per group. Inform 
them that their task is to perform a content analysis of each song. This will 
entail playing each song, and having students analyze both the types of 
images being displayed and the types of messages that are being overtly 
expressed by the lyrics. Have the students write down their observations 
and then discuss them within their groups. Play the songs as many times as 
necessary. The teacher should take care to prompt students to think about 
the more implicit messages of each song. 
3. After a discussion on the materialistic and consumerist messages that have 
been extracted, have students discuss whether they believe that these songs 
influence what they buy. The teacher should take care to prompt students 
to think deeply about their consumption practices and their corresponding 
beliefs. 
4. The teacher will then show the short documentary The Story of Stuff, and 
ask students what they think about it. 
5. (Key Activity) After the discussion from step 4, the teacher will break up 
the classroom into different small groups. During this activity the teacher 
will tell the students to pretend that they are now employees making Nike 
shoes and that the teacher is now the boss. The teacher/boss using pairs of 
shoes as props (students can volunteer theirs), will point to different parts 
of the shoe, and tell each group that they are responsible for assembling 
each component part. Next, the teacher should ask students how much time 
they think that they should have to assemble each piece, and how much 
they think they are going to get paid, and supplant student responses with 
correct information. (Note, this information can be obtained from 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/).  
6. Each group is then given a different scenario e.g., pregnancy, sudden death 
of a family member, or an illness, and then expected to come up with ways 
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to convince the boss for time off or more money. (Note: at this crucial 
juncture it is imperative that the teacher rejects all the students’ pleas, and 
attempts as much as possible to get a strong affective reaction out of them.) 
7. Have students discuss how these existing labour practices made them feel, 
and why they think that such practices are so rampant and accepted. Next 
have an in depth lesson and discussion on some of the basic structural 
imperatives and characteristics of neoliberal globalization and capitalism. 
At this juncture, the teacher should prompt students to ask themselves, is 
this the only way, and why? 
8. Introduce students to competing political-economic systems and models, 
including Keynesian Social Democracy (with an emphasis on welfare and 
contemporary welfare policies), and democratic and authoritarian forms of 
socialism. The teacher should take care to show students comprehensive 
examples of each. (Note, when discussing Neoliberalism and Keynesian 
Social Democracy, in depth lessons on welfare policies must be discussed. 
The teacher should attempt to bring out student’s conceptions of welfare, 
and address as many misconceptions as possible by providing them with 
factual information). Moreover, the teacher must take care to get students 
to understand the differences between political systems, e.g., authoritarian, 
representative, democratic, and their overlap with economic systems, e.g., 
capitalism, socialism, mixed-economies.  
9. Introduce students to alternative labour practices. This can be facilitated by 
showing documentaries like the The Take, as well as short and accessible 
descriptions of Parecon as theorized by Michael Albert and Robin Handel. 
After this, ask students to think about which political-economic system 
most reflects these labour practices.  
10. Break students into different small groups and get them to think about 
what type of workplace they would like to work in. As the teacher, you 
should not push one way or the other, but rather have students debate and 
discuss amongst themselves, and write down a comprehensive work-lay 
out including types of management structures, pay, and division of labour, 
and their rationale for this set-up. Next have the group discuss the merits of 
each others’ work lay outs.  
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11. Break up students into different small groups, and have them discuss 
which political-economic system they would prefer to implement and live 
under and why. Have them debate the merits of their preferred systems 
with the other groups, and think about what the possible impediments to 
implementing them might be. The teacher should ensure a respectful and 
tolerant exchange of ideas and opinions, while at the same time ensuring 
that all students get an equal chance to voice their views. 
12. Have in depth discussions, supported by empirical studies, on the various 
conceptions and dimensions of human nature.  
13. Break up students into different small groups, and have them once again, 
in light of the discussion on human nature, discuss what form of political-
economic system they would like, and believe is feasible.  
14. Finally, break up students into different small groups. Next, play random 
songs from the Billboard top 40, and get students to dissect them for their 
ideological content. Get students to answer the following questions: 
a. What are the messages of these songs? 
b. Whose interests are these songs promoting? 
c. What political-economic ideology do these songs reflect? 
 
Please note that it is the teachers’ job as a facilitator of knowledge to present 
factual and empirically validated information in an objective a mode as possible, 
while helping students to question their deep-seated beliefs, emotions, attitudes, 
and practices. The teacher should at all points avoid displaying or otherwise 
expressing an open political preference, and allow for each student to make up 
their own mind on political positions. However, the teacher should also emphasize 
and point out to students the many local and international organizations that are 
working on issues of poverty, labour rights, human rights, environmentalism etc.  
  
8.6 End Thoughts: 
 This chapter has reviewed the central tenets and political objectives of critical 
and progressive pedagogy as well as their potential limitations, and discussed 
some of the ways that findings from my study can help to potentially address these 
limitations. In particular, it has laid the framework for a theoretical socio-cognitive 
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approach to critical and progressive pedagogy, which has included some 
suggestions for a series of lesson activities.  
 Before concluding, it is worth briefly pointing out some key challenges that 
would make such a curriculum difficult to implement. First, initiating a state of 
cognitive dissonance requires on the part of teachers at least a basic understanding 
of this concept and the methods used to activate it. Hence, in addition to all of the 
other concepts and material suggested for this lesson, it requires a significant 
amount of preparation time on the teacher’s part, which he or she may not be able 
to spare. Second, there is no guarantee that having students simulate a sweatshop 
environment will succeed in getting their predispositions to surface. And certainly, 
it will be hard for teachers to assess whether or not their students experience 
cognitive dissonance during this lesson in the first place, without having had 
training in social psychology, and/or having access to the help of a social 
psychologist. Third, given the realities of the standards-based practices that most 
UK and US teachers have to abide by, they may not have the time, or indeed even 
be allowed to implement such a curriculum. However, teachers concerned with 
fostering democracy and social justice generally find clever ways to bypass their 
schools’ constraints, and in this instance, this curriculum is rather flexible in its 
time requirements and application. Moreover, its content is comprehensive, and is 
meant to offer students a breadth of political-economic knowledge, and in that 
sense can perhaps be sold to head teachers, principals, and parents on those 
grounds. That is, it is not an exercise in political indoctrination. Rather, it is a 
comprehensive series of activities designed to teach students the basics of 
political-economy, and to specifically educate them about what democracy 
actually entails, in order for them to make informed decisions about the political-
economic arrangements and accompanying socio-cultural norms and values that 
they would wish to support. It is hard to imagine that anyone, regardless of their 
political position, could be against this basic objective. 
That said, it cannot be emphasized enough that the activities set out in the 
above section have not yet been trialed. I can therefore make no claims to their 
efficacy in achieving the goals of getting young people to develop lasting critical, 
political, empathetic, democratic, and co-operative dispositional and reflective 
attitudes, beliefs, tendencies, and practices. One of the aims of these activities is to 
bring to the surface some of the dispositions that young people may have that 
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might pre-dispose them to filter out political and social justice concerns. How far 
this curriculum can go in targeting such deep-seated dispositions is unknown. 
However, at the very least, it is unlikely to undermine this objective, and at best, 
can help to nurture young people’s political convictions and knowledge, their 
tolerance and respect for the views of others, and a passion for the public good 
that can transcend their narrow self-interests.  
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored some of the socio-cultural and political-economic 
dispositions, emotions, thoughts, and to a more limited extent, practices and 
experiences of young people living in the neoliberal urban societies of LA and 
London. It has examined, among other factors, their political awareness, media-
culture interests and interpretations, their leisure time activities, future aspirations, 
and the implications of all of these things for the contribution of these young 
people to the reproduction or contestation of neoliberal discourses and practices. 
The thesis has also sought to map out and unpack some of the content, central 
tendencies, and conceptual, lexical, and semantic associations that constitute these 
young people’s socio-cultural and political-economic schemata, and discussed 
some of the insights that these can contribute to a socio-cognitive approach to 
critical and progressive pedagogy aimed at helping young people develop a more 
cognizant awareness of neoliberal discourses and practices and their roles in 
reproducing or contesting them. This chapter begins with an overview of some the 
main themes discussed, and lessons found, in each chapter. It then proceeds to a 
discussion of some of the limitations of this study, and the lessons learned that can 
inform future research on this topic.  
  
9.1 Overview of Chapter Themes and Lessons 
 In Chapter 1, I discussed the genealogy and ontological claims of neoliberal 
theory, and traced some of the structural consequences that neoliberal policies 
have had for UK and US societies. In particular, I described some of the ways that 
neoliberal ideology has structurally and discursively shaped major political-
economic and socio-cultural UK and US institutions (e.g., corporations, think-
tanks, welfare institutions, schools, non-profit organizations, and culture 
industries), creating what Plehwe et al., (2007) refer to as a network of hegemonic 
constellations that, in effect, legitimate and promote neoliberalism domestically 
and globally. From the analysis offered in this chapter, I outlined some of the 
possible implications that neoliberalism may pose for the political-economic and 
socio-cultural cognitive frameworks and concordant practices of contemporary 
urban UK and US young people. 
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In Chapter 2, I discussed the leading theories on capitalist social reproduction 
and its corresponding media driven consumer culture. This included some of the 
works of the classic and contemporary Frankfurt schools, the classic Birmingham 
School of Cultural Studies, and some of the key concepts and arguments from the 
works of Louis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu, and Teun van Dijk. I paid particular 
attention to the empirical validity and criticisms of these approaches, and argued 
that a synthesis of their strengths, coupled with often neglected insights from 
cognitive and social psychology is needed to comprehensively theorize and 
research neoliberal hegemony and its multi-faceted and wide reaching material 
and discursive effects. I ended this chapter by setting out the broad conceptual 
framework that guided the methodology and data analysis for the empirical 
component of this thesis. 
In Chapter 3, I connected the discussions of Chapters 1 and 2 to the wide 
literature on young people and youth culture. Specifically, I used the guidelines 
laid out in Chapter 2 to analyze four of the most prevalent themes found in the 
contemporary literature on young people and youth culture. These themes 
consisted of young people’s accounts of identity construction, their agentic use of 
media-culture, the effects of media-culture on young people’s socio-cognitive 
development, and youth political and civic engagement. From this preliminary 
meta-analysis, both gaps and insights were identified that further informed the 
empirical component of this thesis.  
In Chapter 4, I described the methodology used for the empirical component 
of this thesis. By drawing on all the lessons and insights that came out of the 
literature reviewed in the first three chapters, I discussed the ontological 
orientations of my study, and laid out the research design and methodology. This 
methodology consisted of a broad array of qualitative inductive, critical-
ethnographic, interview, and triangulation methods that were employed to collect 
data from a cross-sectional sample of LA and London millenials. This chapter also 
described the research sites where I carried out this study, the processes by which I 
gained access to them and the participants, the interviews with participants, and 
the ethical considerations that needed to be addressed. I ended the chapter by 
explaining how I conducted the data analysis using a combination of thematic, 
critical discourse, and socio-cognitive inspired analytic strategies culminating in 
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the construction of a three-fold actual/real typology of LA and London young 
people, which I categorized as: Critical/Political, Artsy/Indie, and Mainstream. 
In Chapter 5, I described the first classification of my typology of LA and 
London young people: Critical/Political. From these participants’ accounts of 
their socio-cultural experiences and political-economic knowledge, and 
particularly from their interpretations of their preferred media texts, I tentatively 
suggested that their cognitive frameworks of the social world are imbued with 
transposable critical, political, and empathetic dispositions. These dispositions, 
manifested as automatically expressed attitudes, inclinations, and rapid shifts 
between domain specific subjects, tended to lead and correspond to politically 
informed and detailed responses that were consistently critical of existing and 
dominant socio-cultural and political-economic discourses and practices. My 
account of these dispositions drew upon a socio-cognitive inspired critical 
discourse and bundle association analysis of the lexical, semantic, and conceptual 
associations, as well as voice intonations, facial expressions, and response times 
from the interviews with these participants. Of particular note, I highlighted how 
these young people’s informed opinions on various domain specific subjects like 
education, media-culture, consumerism, welfare, and politics, and their abilities to 
rapidly, automatically, and seemingly unconsciously move across and make 
connections between them, suggests that their underlying socio-cultural and 
political-economic schemata, are intimately and intricately integrated.  
I also noted how even though most of the young people in this classification 
answered most of my questions in a similar manner. That is, they shared many of 
the same views and opinions on various subjects, only three of them held a 
conception of political-economic organization that was ontologically antithetical 
to the standard neoliberal model. The others expressed a preference for what can 
be considered a more Keynesian/Left Neoliberal social democratic system 
(excluding Sam who identified as a Trotskyist socialist), which is probably 
premised on their ontological presuppositions which hold that human beings are 
too selfish to be able to implement and maintain a more radical alternative, 
however more preferable that alternative may be. This automatic belief that 
humans are predominantly selfish, appeared to be a deeply ingrained disposition in 
most of these young people, despite their politically precocious and highly 
empathetic views - one that, in effect, lends itself to the passive acceptance, and 
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thus consequent reproduction of, neoliberalism. Nonetheless, uncovering these 
fatalistic dispositions provided a valuable insight that helped me in forming 
recommendations that can contribute to a more socio-cognitive approach to 
critical and progressive pedagogic discussed in Chapter 8.  
In Chapter 6, I described some of major socio-cultural experiences and leisure 
activities of the second classification of young people: Artsy/Indie. From the 
responses of these artistically inclined young people, I argued that a preoccupation 
with varying forms of cultural production provided these young people with a 
space to avoid the dominant neoliberal discourses of consumer capitalism. I also 
noted how this proactive engagement with artistic pursuits corresponds to their 
affective and aesthetic dispositions and tentative rejection of mainstream-culture. 
However, while expressing a degree of compassion for the suffering of others, 
which however ambivalent was most noticeable in their support for welfare 
programmes, these young people exhibited dispositions that were largely centred 
around individualistic aesthetic pursuits, which seem to correspond to their 
apolitical dispositional tendencies to avoid engagement with current political 
issues and struggles. From these insights, I argued that it is entirely possible that 
since these Artsy/Indie young people seem to have a dispositional aversion to 
political concerns, pedagogic strategies aimed at developing their critical and 
political dispositions (and by inference those of other young people who can be 
loosely situated within this classification) may fall on deaf ears. Moreover, by 
unpacking some of the central tendencies of their political-economic schemata, I 
also noted how their political-economic knowledge, while more substantial than 
that of the Mainstream young people, was still underdeveloped relative to that of 
the Critical/Political young people. Overall, the findings from this chapter suggest 
that at the very least, these young people may benefit from a more tailored and 
socio-cognitive approach to pedagogy that takes into account their aesthetic and 
apolitical dispositions.  
 In Chapter 7, I described the Mainstream young people. Out of all three 
classifications, the Mainstream young people were the ones who most readily 
echoed the dominant neoliberal discourses of individual responsibility and upward 
mobility. Contra the cultural populist thesis that positions young people as 
sovereign agents who are beyond the influence of corporate culture, I argued and 
highlighted how these young people expressed career aspirations, and self-
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interested, apathetic, and consumeristic dispositions that mirrored those promoted 
by their favourite media texts, which were generally highly corporatized.. 
Moreover, given that these young people expressed especially under-developed 
political-economic schemata, it is unlikely that they actively adopted such 
discourses after having compared and contrasted them with opposing ones.  
 However, in unpacking some of the central tendencies of their socio-cultural 
and political-economic schemata, I also highlighted potential spaces for neoliberal 
contestation. Moreover, unlike the Artsy/Indie young people who expressed a 
more pronounced apolitical disposition, these young people’s political apathy may 
be a result of their relative underexposure to political-economic knowledge and 
practices, with the majority of the London participants, in particular, commenting 
that they have not had any lessons in civics or politics during their time in 
secondary schools. Hence, it would be inaccurate to classify these young people as 
apolitical, since they are not actively avoiding political-economic information and 
ideas; it is simply that their surrounding interpellating environments (e.g., schools, 
youth centres, and media-culture) have only presented them with one particular set 
of mostly neoliberal consumerist discourses. This was nonetheless potentially a 
positive insight, as there is no telling what the effects of a more critical and 
progressive pedagogy of the sort described in Chapter 8 may have on their 
political consciousness. However, unless such efforts are implemented, and 
implemented thoroughly, it is very likely that this group of young people will 
continue to reproduce neoliberal discourses and practices at a mostly dispositional 
level.  
 Finally, in Chapter 8, I reviewed the central tenets and political objectives of 
critical and progressive pedagogy. Drawing on the empirical findings of my study, 
I argued that these types of pedagogies seem to overlook the dispositional barriers 
that some young people may have developed and which can significantly filter out 
political information and social justice concerns. Moreover, I indicated what a 
socio-cognitive approach to pedagogy, aimed at fostering democratic, empathetic, 
critical, tolerant, and political dispositions, and at helping to displace pre-existing 
fatalistic, uncritical, apathetic, and apolitical dispositions, might entail. Following 
this, I laid out a series of activities that may help to achieve these goals. I ended 
the chapter with concluding remarks emphasizing the limitations of these 
proposed activities.  
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9.2 Methodological Limitations and Lessons 
 The data collection and analysis methods used for the empirical component 
of this thesis relied on inductive and sociological approaches, and were designed 
to generate preliminary accounts of the intersection between neoliberal structures 
and discourses, and contemporary young people’s cognitive frameworks for 
making sense of the neoliberal world they inhabit. However, a number of 
important limitations revealed themselves that can inform future research. In this 
section, I briefly detail some of these limitations, and propose some of the ways 
that a revised methodology can help to address these limitations in future research 
in order to support the development of more comprehensive accounts of young 
people’s cognitive frameworks and corresponding practices.  
 Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 4, I was at times too rigid in the application 
of my interview schedule, and overlooked important cues from my participants 
where I should have probed them further in order to get richer data. Secondly, I 
was not able to ask all of my participants the same questions, which makes my 
typology all the more tentative, exploratory, and prototypical in nature. It is 
possible that had I had the opportunity to ask all my participants the same 
questions, the ensuing data analysis of their responses would have revealed more 
exact classifications than the three broad ones that I constructed. Thirdly, the 
discrepancy in sample sizes between the LA and London participants contributed 
to constructing the Artsy/Indie classification with only LA participants. 
Additionally a lack of more London participants may also be the reason for why I 
did not observe any significant differences between the participants that could be 
attributed to national settings. Fourthly, the response times, facial expressions, and 
valence strength variables that I used to support my claims concerning the 
description of my youth participants’ dispositions, were based on approximate 
measurement derived from my subjective observations. Correspondingly, the 
interview methods that I used, as Vaisey (2009) argues, while good for generating 
detailed narratives and filtered or censored accounts, are mostly ineffective in 
gathering participants’ unconscious cognitive processes. However, I maintain that 
the qualitative and inductive methods and linguistic analysis that I utilized, are 
empirically valid qualifiers that shed some light on my participants’ unconscious 
cognitive frameworks, but which can be complemented with more exact social-
psychological methods in future research. Taking all of these limitations and the 
 258 
lessons they offer into consideration, the following methodological revisions could 
be applied to future research:  
 
 Deeper Ethnography: More extensive participant observations in youth 
centres specifically, where young people tend to feel more at ease than 
they would in schools, is necessary to observe young people’s practices, in 
order to more comprehensively detail how these relate to their expressed 
views, beliefs, and practices. Cyber ethnography that explores young 
peoples’ blogs, social networking cites can also be employed to gather 
information on young people’s consumptive habits, media-cultural 
preferences, and political understandings and leanings.
77
  
 Larger and Purposive Sample Sizes: In addition to larger samples sizes 
future sampling methods must include protocols to draw in a more 
extensive range of young people, e.g. conservative and/or religious young 
people. 
 Quantitative Surveys: In conjunction with larger sample sizes, the 
construction of surveys that ask young people about their consumption 
habits, musical tastes, and political-economic beliefs and attitudes can be 
used in order to explore if significant statistical correlations exist between 
these variables, as well as the proportion of young people that approximate 
to each type.  
 Lexical-decision tasks: These include the use of computerized priming 
software (e.g., SuperLab or E-Prime) in order to create programmes that 
can better gauge participants’ implicit attitudes and knowledge. That is, 
these methods are specifically designed to explore people’s semantic 
memory, mental representations, and implicit attitudes and their 
corresponding valence by measuring their reactions times to a given 
stimulus (Zemack-Rugar et al., 2007). As the same stimuli are applied to 
all participants under controlled settings, and their reactions times are 
                                                 
77
 While traditional ethnography whereby researchers fully immerse themselves in the everyday 
activities and lives of their participants and their environments is often recommended for research 
on young people and their experiences, I find this approach to be unnecessary for this particular 
research. I do not have the space to go into detail on this topic, but I believe that the types of 
ethnography that I propose, in conjunction with the other methods outlined, should sufficiently 
generate data that accounts for the nuances and complexities of young people’s lives, experiences, 
views, and practices. 
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measured in milliseconds by specialized software, these methods address 
the limitations of the more subjective observations and measurements that 
I employed. In other words, they can help elicit data that will make the 
dispositional characteristics of my existing typology, and of other potential 
subsequent classifications, more precise and objective, particularly as the 
controlled settings will also help to ensure that all participants involved are 
examined for the same variables.  
 Problem-Solving tasks: These include think aloud protocols or timed 
written responses that induce participants to use abstract and conceptual 
reasoning in order to solve complicated problems based on hypothetical 
scenarios. These types of methods can be used to explore the development 
of young peoples’ political schemata, and the ways that they draw on their 
pre-existing knowledge frameworks and attitudes to solve political 
conflicts (Torney-Purta, 1992). For example, Adelson and O’Neil’s (1966) 
classic study on young people’s political cognitive development included 
the following question: Imagine that 1,000 people have left their society 
and moved to an abandoned island. How would you organize this new 
society and its government? They found that older adolescents had more 
nuanced understandings about laws, authority, and freedom as compared to 
younger adolescents who tended to express a more benevolent view of 
leaders and the status quo. In my proposed research, in addition to eliciting 
data that can lead to the assessment of the development of young people’s 
political schemata, these methods may also elicit data, which can help add 
more characteristics to the existing typology, such as types of political 
reasoning, and/or contribute to the construction of new classifications.  
 Potential Questions to add to the interview schedule: 
1) How would you characterize your style of dress, and what do you 
think influences it? 
2) How much do you think your government spends on 
welfare/benefits programmes? 
3) What do you think about labour unions? 
4) Do you think there is such a thing as human nature? Why/why not? 
And if they think there is, what are its main characteristics? 
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While these proposed methodological revisions may seem overly ambitious and 
would probably require extensive collaboration with social psychologists, they 
offer a comprehensive and multi-dimensional methodology that complement one 
another. Moreover, I believe them to be feasible and necessary in future research 
on the relationships between neoliberal discourses and young people’s socio-
cognitive frameworks, processes, and corresponding practices. 
Finally, the trans-disciplinary approach that I have taken throughout this 
thesis means that I have sacrificed depth in certain areas. However, as I have 
explained and argued throughout this thesis, I maintain that neoliberalism has 
political-economic structural imperatives and socio-cognitive dimensions that 
must be included to some extent in all sociological research concerned to properly 
understand the social reproduction or contestation of neoliberalism. With this in 
mind, I have read and carefully studied widely on the areas outside of my 
immediate disciplinary boundaries (in some cases consulting with respective and 
established experts), and have made it a priority throughout this thesis to both 
draw attention to the limitations of the study, and provide the reader with an 
extensive and comprehensive literature review, footnotes, and reference list. 
Through this approach, I have sought to contribute, albeit in a modest way, to 
more nuanced understandings of contemporary political socialization and 
processes of social-reproduction and/or social change, and to the emerging 
interdisciplinary fields of youth politics, global media studies, and socio-cognition.  
 
9.3 Conclusion: 
Human nature is neither a biologically fixed and innate sum total of 
drives nor is it a lifeless shadow of cultural patterns to which it adapts 
itself smoothly, it is the product of human evolution, but it also has 
certain inherent mechanism and laws. There are certain factors in 
man’s nature which are fixed and unchangeable, the necessity to satisfy 
the physiologically conditioned drives and the necessity to avoid 
isolation and moral aloneness. We have seen that the individual has to 
accept the mode of life rooted in the system of production and 
distribution peculiar for any given society. In the process of dynamic 
adaption to culture, a number of powerful drives develop which 
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motivate the actions and feeling of the individual. The individual may or 
may not be conscious of these drives, but in any case they are forceful 
and demand satisfaction once they have developed (Fromm 2001, p. 17).  
 
There is no direct causal mechanism linking thought to action. Individual 
human behaviour is far too complex, and thoughts alone, whether conscious or 
unconscious, are only one of many confounding variables that determine 
behaviour. Nonetheless, exploring the multifaceted ways in which neoliberalism 
and all of its various and concomitant discursive articulations actually permeate 
the thought processes of individuals (and their interaction with other processes, 
e.g., environmental, sociological, and emotional ones) is key to understanding its 
reproduction, and to uncovering spaces where neoliberal discourses are and may 
be contested. In this thesis, I have attempted to map out some of most important 
structural and ideological consequences of neoliberalism relevant to contemporary 
UK and US societies, the various ways in which neoliberal discourses are 
distributed via major socio-cultural institutional outlets, how they surround UK 
and US millenials, and the consequent relationships between those discourses and 
the socio-cognitive frameworks of my sample of LA and London millenials. The 
preliminary results from my research indicate that, far from being homo-
economicus, all of my participants expressed variations of sympathetic and 
empathetic tendencies. Despite being immersed in what my youth worker 
participant Jerald referred to, in the LA context, as a 360 media environment (LA 
is an important centre and home of neoliberal media-culture as is London), all of 
my youth participants held a variety of anti-neoliberal views. After agonizingly 
trying to pinpoint the institutional setting where exposure to critical perspectives 
can have the biggest impact, I found that I did not have sufficient data to draw any 
robust conclusions of this kind. And frankly, even if I had spent more time with 
these young people, conducted dozens more interviews, and had strapped them to 
a machine (if such a machine could be invented) to more comprehensively map 
out their inner cognitive processes, it is unlikely that I could ever discover why it 
is that some young people are more critical and political than others.  
Moreover, in terms of conceptions of human nature and political-economic 
organization, which are arguably the most important factors in the reproduction or 
contestation of hegemonic structural and discursive forms, only three of my forty-
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three youth participants were able to articulate conceptions that are antithetical to 
neoliberalism. The rest could not, which at least provisionally suggests that they 
are likely to enact more or less conscious dispositions and practices that in some 
way reproduce some mode of neoliberalism. However, what did seem to be a 
striking revelation is that even the most minimal exposure to critical perspectives, 
be it from media, family, school, or youth centres, can have the potential to open 
up a young person to more critical evaluations of their society. That is, no matter 
how much they are bombarded with specific discourses that reinforce their 
neoliberal worldview, and for how long, one teacher, one song, one movie, one 
friend, or one relative that is critical of such a worldview, has the potential to alter 
a young person’s views (as described in sections 5.5 and 6.5). If there is any 
lesson to be learned from this case study, it is that people who are interested in 
challenging neoliberalism, can make an impact, but they have to do a better job 
spreading those critical discourses, and they have to start presenting young people 
with viable and radically different alternatives to neoliberalism, which first starts 
with a fundamental and in depth examination of human nature, its possibilities, 
what democracy means, and to what extent society should be democratic. My 
participants, however hopeless they sometimes sounded, seemed more than 
willing to at least listen to accounts of those alternatives, and more than 
intellectually competent enough to meaningfully engage with them. As one of my 
youth worker participants (echoing Bourdieu, 1990) declared, albeit somewhat 
pessimistically:  
 If you grow up in a family or you grow up in a school where there is a theme 
 of political action or social change, it’s going to be much easier or more 
 natural for someone to grow into that. So if you take someone that is growing 
 up in a family where there is no consciousness at all that you can do 
 anything to improve your life or the life around you, that all you have to do 
 is work and buy these things, and you’re just a slave to that machine, then, by 
 the time you’re a 10th or 11th grader, one class is not going to turn you 
 around. It’s not going to make much of a difference. They’re [young people] 
 going to have to start connecting the dots, but there has to be dots for them to 
 connect. And that comes from mentors and other influences. 
-Jerald (Youth Worker Bresee Foundation)  
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Appendix A: 
Interview Schedule for Young People 
 
After School Activities, Leisure time: 
 
1.  Tell me a little bit about yourself, name, age, hobbies, what you normally      
      do after school or in your free time? 
 
2.   Are there any after-school programmes or youth centers that you go to? If so,  
      why, and what type of activities do participate in?  
 
3.   If you do attend a youth center, what types of subjects are taught there?  
      Are any particular programmes that they emphasize or expect you to    
      participate in? 
 
4.   If you had more free time, what would you do with it?  
 
Perceptions on education: 
 
1. What high school did you go to? 
 
2. How do you feel about your education thus far? 
 
3. What would you change about it if you could? 
 
4. What do you feel the role of education should be? That is, what do you think 
schools should be teaching students? 
 
Consumption: 
 
1. Do you ever go to the mall or shopping centers? If so, do you like going to     
those places? Why or why not? How often would you say you go to these 
places? 
 
2. Do you purchase brand name clothing and electronics, why or why not? 
 
3. If so, can you describe to me what you’re thinking when you purchase       
something you really want? For example, let’s say you’re buying a nice pair of 
shoes, what exactly is going through your mind, your thoughts, your feelings? 
 
4. Furthermore, do you know where these brand-name clothes and electronics are 
made, and under what conditions they are made? 
 
5. If so, where did you learn that, and what do you think about the situation of 
the workers that make the products you buy? 
 
6. If not, why do you not consider their situations when purchasing your items? 
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7. What about the impact on the environment that occurs because of the 
production of these items, do you know anything about that? If so, what are 
your thoughts? 
 
Opinions on socio-economic issues and politics: 
 
1. How do you think the current political system that you live under works? 
 
2. So for instance what do you think about the current Obama administration/ 
Cameron administration? 
 
3. Our economic system is described as a capitalist system of private property 
rights and competing privately owned businesses where individuals are 
rewarded based on how hard or how little they work, what do you think of this 
economic arrangement? 
 
4. Do you know about any other political and economic alternatives?  
 
5. Do you think it is the government’s job to do something about social problems 
like poverty and global warming, or do you think these problems should be 
mostly addressed by private charities and organizations that do not rely on 
taxation but on voluntary donations?  
 
6. Why do you think that some people are homeless, unemployed, or poor?  
 
7. What do you think about government welfare programmes? 
 
8. As an individual, do you think that you have, or can have (if you wanted to)a 
say in government, and how the government is run? That is, how do you think 
you can influence the government, what kinds of actions do you think are 
necessary to make governments responsive to the wants of their citizens?  
 
9. What do you think about voting, do you think it is effective as a way to get the 
government to do what citizens want, or to influence government policies? 
And do you vote, or would vote, and for whom? Why or Why not?  
 
10.  Do you think that the mainstream/major political parties represent the            
interests of their supporters?  
 
11.  What do you think can be done to help solve some of these large social    
problems that we face like homelessness, poverty, and global warming?  
 
12.  Are some of the political views you expressed different from those of          
your parents? 
 
Family life: 
 
1.   What do you think your parents expect of you, that is, what do you think they 
 want you to do in life? Are their aspirations for your future, different 
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 from your own? If so can you tell me how? For example, is there a  particular 
 career path that they would like you to take or that they give you advice on? 
 
2.   What do your parents do for a living? Would you like to have a job similar to 
theirs?  
 
3.  Do you think parents feel that your education is preparing you for your 
 future aspirations, that is, are there any subjects they wish that schools 
 would teach you? 
 
 
Media and Culture Intake and Interpretation: 
 
1. What type of music/television/film do you watch or listen to? Why do  
 watch or listen to them, and what type of messages do you interpret from 
 them? 
 
2.  Can you think of 1 song, 1 TV show, and 1 film that you really like and 
 why?  
 
3.   Do you ever surf the Internet? If so, what type of websites do you visit and 
 why? 
 
5. Do you blog on the Internet, if so, what about, or do you visit blogs, and if so, 
what about? 
 
6. What types of newspapers and magazines do you read if any? 
 
7. Where do you get your news from? And when you watch the news, do you     
think that the newscasters are telling you the truth about events?  
 
8. What are your favorite news sections that watch? 
 
9. Do you listen to any political music, or watch political TV shows, movies, or    
internet sites? Why or why not? 
 
 
Personal Aspirations and Biography: 
 
1. Finally, what do you want to do in your future? Is there a particular career that 
you want to do, and why? 
 
2. Who do you look up to the most and why? 
 
3. Are there any famous people you look up to and why? 
 
4. What are some of things in the world that care about the most? 
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Appendix B: 
Interview Schedule for Youth Workers 
 
Education: 
 
1. What type of subjects do you teach, and or what does your work with 
young people entail, and about how much time would you say you spend 
with your students? 
 
2. Some schools I have visited have a mandatory geography class where all 
9
th
 graders are taught about social issues like economic globalization, 
theories on poverty, and even sweatshop working conditions. Are such 
subjects taught to young people in your after-school non-profit 
organization)?  
 
3. If so, what do you think the impact of such a class has on your students’ 
social consciousness? 
 
4. If not, do you believe that such a class would be beneficial to your students, 
why or why not? And why do you think such a class is not offered by your 
after-school non-profit organization? 
 
Opinions on Student Aspirations: 
 
1. What would you say are your students’ major aspirations in life? 
 
2. What do you think are the biggest influences on your students’ values, 
attitudes, and life aspirations? And why do you think this? 
 
3. Who do you think are major role models for your students? 
 
Media and Culture: 
 
1. From your experiences, what are the most popular forms of media-culture 
that your students engage with? Can you think of specific examples? 
 
2. What type of lessons do you think your students learn from these media 
artifacts? That is, what do you think are some of the main messages they 
receive or interpret from media? And, why do you think this? 
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Appendix C 
Demographic Information of Each Youth Participant 
 
Los Angeles Participants 
(Each participant is listed here in the group where they were interviewed as discussed 
in Chapter 4.)
78
 
 
South-Central Los Angeles (Group): Participants 
 
Pseudonym Luz 
Age 18 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working Class: Her parents are garment workers. 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and spent most of her life in South-Central Los 
Angeles, and was born in Mexico. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Undecided, and is currently concerned with her 
immigration status which does not allow her to work. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to anarcho-punk, grind core, Talking Heads, 
Pink Floyd, reads novels by Dostoyevski, and watches 
political documentaries.  
 
 
Pseudonym Lupe 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
                                                 
78
 Their socio-economic status is inferred from their parents’ employment occupations, 
geographical residency and upbringing, and/or their unique accents. 
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Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in South-Central Los Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Undecided, but wants to study history or anthropology at 
a university. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to punk music and bands like Talking Heads. 
Reads novels by Kafka, and watches mostly indie films 
and political documentaries.  
 
 
Pseudonym Gloria 
Age 18 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Lower middle-class: Her mother is a school counselor. 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in South-Central Los Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become an independent filmmaker. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Pink Floyd, Muse. Watches the Daily Show, 
Stephen Colbert Show, and Family Guy, and her 
Favourite movie is Me You and Everyone You Know 
(an American/British indie romance-comedy).  
 
Pseudonym Tiffany 
Age 18 
Gender Female 
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Race/Ethnicity Latino/Salvadorian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-class: Her father is a private construction 
contractor, and her mother owns a water distribution 
store. 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in South-Central Los Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to pursue a career in anything related to animal 
care or husbandry.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Electronic Dance Music. Watches Nip/Tuck 
(an American drama series), and one of her favourite 
movies is Innocent Voices (A Mexican film about the 
Salvadorian Civil War).  
 
 
Zoo (Group): Participants 
  
Pseudonym Anthony 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Studio City district of Los 
Angeles. 
Career 
Aspirations 
N/A 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to R&B and soul music, and watches a lot of 
PBS shows, Rachel Maddow, and the Daily Show.  
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Pseudonym Joey 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up and lives in the Sherman Oaks district of Los 
Angeles. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a journalist. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to punk rock, reads Adbusters magazine, and 
watches political documentaries.  
 
 
Pseudonym Ben 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: His parents are academics. 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Silverlake district of Los 
Angeles. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Want to become an academic or research scientist.  
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Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to the Red Hot Chili Peppers (a US alternative 
rock band), and watches Animae films and science 
documentaries.  
 
 
Pseudonym Jesse 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class:  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the San Fernando district of Los 
Angeles. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a musician. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to anything that is not produced by the Disney 
Corporation. Watches Family Guy.  
 
 
Pseudonym Evyn 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity African-American 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in North Hollywood. 
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Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a video game developer. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Electric Dance Music, reads Mangas (Japanese 
comics), and watches Animae films and shows.  
 
 
Pseudonym Phillip 
Age 18 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in Studio City district of Los 
Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a musician. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Pink Floyd, and indie rock bands. Watches the 
Office (American version).  
 
 
Pseudonym Zack 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
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Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Tahunga district of Los Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a musician. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Damien Rice and Iron and Wine. Watches 
Family Guy, South Park, and Jackass. His favourtie 
movie is the Polar Bear Express.  
 
 
Pseudonym Diana 
Age 16 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Peruvian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: Her father works for the department of 
water and power.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Atwatter Village district of Los 
Angeles.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Undecided 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Korean pop, and reads Korean Romance 
novels. Her favourite book is Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov.  
 
 
Pseudonym Emir 
Age 18 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Turkish 
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Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
 
 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Born and grew up in Turkey and immigrated to the US 
when he was 16, and resides in North Hollywood. 
Career 
Aspirations 
N/A 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap, and watches the show the 
Office (American version), James Bond films, and Fails 
videos on YouTube.   
 
 
Pseudonym Ela 
Age 18 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Jewish 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives in Lake Balboa, and spent a small time living in 
Israel.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to be a model.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Brittney Spears and Dr. Dre. Reads celebrity 
news magazines including People and Vogue, and 
watches CSI and Gossip Girl.  
 
 
Pseudonym Dennis 
Age 18 
Gender Male 
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Race/Ethnicity White/Bulgarian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: His mother is an artist and his dad is an 
engineer.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
He was born in Bulgaria, but spent the majority of his life 
in the North Hollywood district of Los Angeles.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to be an entrepreneur/financial investor.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Bulgarian music, dub-step, Pink Floyd, and 
watches Skins (UK version) and Lost (US drama).  
 
  
Pseudonym John 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White/Greek 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: His parents are restaurateurs. 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Studio City district of Los 
Angeles.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Undecided.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to old-school rap.  
 
 
Pseudonym Becky 
Age 17 
 298 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Jewish 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: Her father is a rocket scientist.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Studio City district of Los 
Angeles. 
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to work with animals.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to country music, and her favourite movie is the 
Frisco Kid.  
 
 
Pseudonym Karina 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Salvadorian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class: Her father is a security guard, and her 
mother is a cashier for a pharmacy.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in South Gate, a small city bordering 
LA.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to work with animals. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Bruce Springsteen and Buddy Holly, and likes 
movies with the actor River Phoenix.  
 
 
Pseudonym Maurine 
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Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the North Hollywood district of Los 
Angeles.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to work with animals.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to the pop-punk band All American Rejects, 
reads music blogs and newspapers, and watches Fox 
News.   
 
 
Pseudonym Maria 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latina 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up in Downtown LA.  
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to work with animals.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Watches animals related shows on PBS and National 
Geographic.  
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World Vision (Group): Participants 
 
Pseudonym Arlene 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latina/Salvadorian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: Her parents own a small garment 
business. 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up in the Downtown/Pico Union neighbourhood of 
LA.  
 
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to be a teacher.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
N/A 
 
 
Pseudonym Lisa 
Age 16 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Asia/Filipino 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up in the Downtown/Pico Union neighbourhood of 
LA.  
 
Career 
Aspirations 
Wants to be an artist.  
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Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to comedian George Carlin, and watches political 
documentaries.  
 
 
Pseudonym Desmon 
Age 16 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Asian/Filipino 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up in the Downtown/Pico Union neighbourhood of 
LA.  
 
Career 
Aspirations 
N/A 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Watches Anime shows and movies.  
 
 
Pseudonym Senai 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Salvadorian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up in the Downtown/Pico Union neighbourhood of 
LA.  
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Career 
Aspiration 
N/A 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
N/A 
 
 
Pseudonym Elizabeth 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up in the Downtown/Pico Union neighbourhood of 
LA.  
 
 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a teacher.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
N/A 
 
 
Bresee Foundation (Group): Participants 
 
Pseudonym Fernanda 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
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Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class: Her father is a construction worker.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Pico Union district of Los 
Angeles. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a nurse and own a chain of nursing 
homes.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap and singers Rhianna and Nicky 
Minaj, and watches the shows Bad Girls Club and The 
Jersey Shore.  
 
 
Pseudonym Jose 
Age 18 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Salvadorian 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Grew up and lives in Rampart district of Los Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a filmmaker. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to metal and mainstream pop music, and watches 
independent films.  
 
 
Pseudonym Jazmin 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
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Race/Ethnicity Irish-Mexican 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the McArthur Park area of Los 
Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a tattoo artist or youth worker. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to punk rock and hardcore metal, and watches 
political documentaries.  
 
 
Pseudonym Veronica 
Age 18 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Latino/Mexican 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class: Her parents are garment workers.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Born in Mexico, and grew up in Pico Union Area of Los 
Angeles.  
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a documentary filmmaker. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap and pop, mainstream Mexican 
music, and watches The Jersey Shore and Bad Girls 
Club.  
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London Participants 
 
Islington (Group): Participants 
 
Pseudonym Aimee 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity White British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class. Her father works for a newspaper and her 
mother is a yoga teacher.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Islington area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to pursue a career in art or music. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to punk-rock and folk-punk bands, and reads 
music and political blogs on the Internet.  
 
 
Pseudonym James 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: His parents are both teachers.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Islington area of London. 
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Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to pursue a career in art or film production. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to punk rock and folk-punk music, watches 
movies directed by Alfred Hitcock, RT News, and RSA 
animated lectures.  
 
 
Pseudonym Sam 
Age 16 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: His mother is a special education needs 
teacher, and his father is a company researcher.   
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Islington area of London. 
Career  
Aspiration 
Undecided 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to Pink Floyd and Bob Dylan, and reads the 
Guardian and the New Statesman.  
 
 
Bermondnsey (Group): Participants 
 
Pseudonym Jack 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White British 
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Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Bermondsey area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a youth worker.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream British rap and watches East 
Enders and Holyoaks. 
  
 
Pseudonym Josh 
Age 16 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Bermondsey area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Expressed an interest in becoming a youth worker. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to rappers like M&M.  
 
 
Pseudonym Lindsey 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
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Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Bermondsey area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a hairdresser.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap music, and watches East 
Enders and Holyoaks. 
 
 
Pseudonym Alice 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity White 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class 
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Bermondsey area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a child psychologist. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap and pop and watches East 
Enders.  
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Pseudonym Anthony 
Age 18 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity White British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Bermondsey area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a physical therapist for a football team. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap, and watches Football 
prgramming.  
 
 
Pseudonym Dilanda 
Age 16 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity Black British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Middle-Class: Her parents are teachers.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Bermondsey area of London. 
 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to be a child psychologist. 
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Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap and pop, and watches East 
Enders and Holyoaks. 
 
 
Hackney (Group): Participants 
 
Pseudonym Tirian 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Black British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class: His mother is retired.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Hackney area of London. 
 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become a famous chef like Jamie Oliver. 
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap, the rapper Drake and watches 
shows with Jamie Oliver.  
 
 
Pseudonym Sean 
Age 17 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Black British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class. His mother is a homemaker, and his 
father is a clothing merchant. 
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Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Hackney area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to run a business of some sort.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap, the rappers Drake and P-
Diddy and watches East Enders.  
 
 
Pseudonym Iris 
Age 17 
Gender Female 
Race/Ethnicity British of Algerian and Portuguese descent.  
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class:  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Hackney area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Want to become a model.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to mainstream rap and pop, singer Alicia Keys, 
watches the show Top Model (both UK and US 
versions), and cites Save The Last Dance as her 
favourite movie. 
 
 
Pseudonym Tyrone 
Age 19 
Gender Male 
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Race/Ethnicity Black British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class: His father is a black cab driver.  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Hackney area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to own a black cab and/or fast food chicken 
restaurant.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to R&B, mainstream rap, rapper Drake, watches 
Made in Chelsea, and reads the Sun.  
 
 
Pseudonym Jenkins 
Age 18 
Gender Male 
Race/Ethnicity Black British 
Socio-
Economic 
Status 
Working-Class:  
Predominant 
Geographic 
Residence/s 
Lives and grew up in the Hackney area of London. 
Career 
Aspiration 
Wants to become an international business mogul like 
Alan Sugar.  
Major Media-
Culture 
Preferences 
Listens to R&B, mainstream rap, watches the Wire, The 
Apprentice (UK version), Dr. Who, and reads the 
Financial Times.  
 
 
 
 
